MIDDLE GAME

Secrets of Chess Tactics

Mark Dvoretsky



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Mark Dvoretsky

Translated by Malcolm Gesthuysen

An Owl Book
Henry Holt and Company
New York

Henry Holt and Company, Inc.
Publishers since 1866
115 West 18th Street
New York, New York 10011

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First published in the United States in 1993 by
Henry Holt and Company, Inc.

Reprinted 1994

Originally published in Great Britain in 1992 by
B. T. Batsford Ltd.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 92–56733

ISBN 0–8050–2630–4 (An Owl Book: pbk.)

First American Edition—1993

Printed in the United Kingdom
All first editions are printed on acid-free paper. ∞

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2

Adviser: R. D. Keene, GM, OBE
Technical Editor: Andrew Kinsman

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Preface

Friends of mine have on many occasions convinced me of the need to set down in a book at least some of the rather voluminous material that I have accumulated in the course of my training activities. I agreed with them in principle, but the most appropriate form that this idea could take was not too clear to me. I resolved that I certainly had no intention of compiling a logical exposition of all my ideas on training, of formulating something like a new version of the famous *My System* by Nimzowitsch. But neither did I wish to confine myself to the description of some tiny province in the vast and rich kingdom of chess. I finally hit upon a concept for the sort of chess book I wanted to write. But when I sat down at my desk I quickly realised that this concept could not be accommodated within the framework of a single book. In 1991 my first work, *Secrets of Chess Training* (the Russian title is *Iskusstvo Analiza*—'The Art of Analysis'), was published by Batsford. It was very successful and was even acclaimed as 'Book of the Year' by the British Chess Federation.

The present book continues in a similar vein to the previous one; though specific knowledge of *Secrets of Chess Training* is not required. But, before I discuss the contents of this new book, I should like to explain the overall concept, which, strictly speaking, contains not one but several ideas.

1. Fresh material. I have mainly made use of the games of my pupils—primarily of Artur Yusupov and Sergei Dolmatov, who both began their chess careers some years ago in junior tournaments—and my own games. Examples from the games of others have been quoted only in cases when we (that is, I or one of my pupils) have managed to see something new, to formulate their analysis more clearly or to add to it. I invite the reader into our creative and analytical laboratory by offering here material which is original and unfamiliar, not available from other books.

2. The art of analysis. It is clear that, given such an approach to the selection of material, rather a lot of attention must be devoted to the process of chess analysis, to the technique of carrying it out, to typical errors in analysis etc. I do not wish to enlarge here on the importance to any chessplayer of analytical skill; I shall merely quote the opinion of World Champion Gary Kasparov: "I consider that the analytical approach, the analytical method of studying chess, must give any chessplayer a colossal advantage over those who only have experience of practical play, all other things being equal, and that self-improvement in chess is impossible without analysis".

3. Exercises for training purposes. It is simply not enough just to play chess—you need to train constantly, to develop qualities and skills which will help you to make decisions over the board. With this aim in mind, it is useful to work through exercises—easy and difficult, positional and tactical. Training may take many forms: solving exercises in your head, analysing, moving pieces on the board, playing out specially selected positions, etc. All these forms of training are

discussed in this book, and various examples to be worked out on your own are also given. These have been divided into 'Exercises' (designated by the letter 'E'), the solutions to which are given at the end of the book, and 'Questions' (letter 'Q'), the answers to which follow in the text.

4. Ways to approach the taking of decisions in the most diverse situations: i.e. the 'pure' chess approach, but also the approach based on the psychological aspects of chess. This, of course, is what my basic concept is really all about. My ideas, the viability of which has been confirmed by the achievements of my pupils, at times do not coincide entirely with the traditional point of view. I wish to acquaint the reader with these ideas. When investigating one or other of the concrete positions examined in the text, you will discover the hidden springs governing the contest, ways of searching for the right move, the reasons for errors and also procedures for avoiding them in future.

It was a pleasure to read the following words in a review of my book *Secrets of Chess Training* by Grandmaster Murray Chandler: ". . . Reading the text, and just attempting the analysis, will start you thinking in a new way". This is precisely what I was aiming for.

In order to solve the task at hand sufficiently fully, it is necessary to consider the broadest possible range of situations. But in my above-mentioned first book only positions with a limited amount of material were considered—practical endings and studies. This new book continues the theme, but taking as examples middlegame positions involving combinations and sacrifices in both attack and defence.

The first half of the book is devoted to combinational 'technique'—if this word may be considered appropriate—that is, the skill to be able to find a tactical idea and calculate it accurately. I have examined various types of combination, methods which facilitate the calculation of variations, and ways to develop the calculating abilities every chessplayer needs.

The examples analysed in the second half of the book are mainly of a problematic, irrational nature. They involve sacrifices which defy accurate calculation, with a constructive risk in both attack and defence. In order to realise my conception fully, I still have one or two more books to write: to investigate the problems of positional play and of opening preparation, and also to analyse some most interesting and valuable games containing many of the ideas already studied. But all this lies in the future; let us now move on to the study of tactics.

1 Combinations and the Calculation of Variations

A trainer I once knew liked to say, half joking but half serious: "Chess is just a simple boardgame played by moving the pieces around". With this 'aphorism' he wished to stress the role of tactics in chess, to express the idea that no science, no profound positional considerations or strategic subtleties, can help a player if he is unable to find strong moves or to see and accurately calculate concrete possibilities for himself and his opponent.

Some people are of the opinion that tactical abilities are innate—either you have them or you don't, and if you don't there is nothing you can do about it. My experience as a trainer has convinced me that this is not the case. With targeted training methods it is possible to develop one's abilities considerably in the sphere of tactical play (as, incidentally, in any other sphere). I remember a lecture which Grandmaster (Senior Master) Ostap Bender, hero of the immortal novel *The Twelve Chairs* by Ilf and Petrov, gave to chess-lovers in the town of Vasyuka. "We see that the fair-haired man plays well, but the dark-haired man plays badly. And no lectures will ever change this state of affairs, unless each individual constantly trains at playing draug. . .—that is, I meant to say—chess. . ." Bender, admittedly, did not explain how exactly one should train. I have tried to rectify his omission in the third chapter of *Secrets of Chess Training*, which was devoted to studies, and in this book we shall continue our discussion of this theme.

A chessplayer's tactical skill comprises two components—combinational vision and the technique of calculating variations. These in turn may also be broken down into constituent elements—various ways of searching for and deliberating over moves, typical schemes and situations. Even if a player is, on the whole, an excellent tactician, it is always possible to reveal aspects of his

tactical play which could be improved still further.

Combinational Vision

A game conducted logically and finished off with a beautiful combination—that is my chess ideal.
Vladimir Simagin

The term 'combinational vision' should be taken to mean the ability to rapidly discover 'disguised' tactical ideas—the sort of moves which do not immediately strike the eye and which usually involve sacrifices.

In order to develop your chess imagination — combinational vision—you should solve exercises (studies and examples from practical play), the main difficulty of which consists in finding the right tactical idea. Note that I do mean actually finding it and not just, say, calculating or evaluating it. For this purpose you may make use of any of the numerous books of problems which are published, it seems, in every country of the world. On the whole, such problems contain relatively simple combinations, which a well-drilled player notices very quickly, even when playing blitz. Here are a couple of examples from my own five-minute games which serve to illustrate precisely this point.

Dvoretsky–Zilberstein
Moscow 1966



Q. 1.1 What should White play?

White has an overwhelming lead in development and all his pieces are placed as actively as possible. There must be a combination here.

20	**♖xd7!**	**♔xd7**
21	**♕a7!!**	

Another winning move was 21 ♗d2!.

Black resigned.

Dvoretsky–Bogomolov
Moscow 1967

1	**e4**	**c5**
2	**d4**	**cxd4**
3	**c3**	**dxc3**
4	**♘xc3**	**e6**
5	**♗c4**	**d6**
6	**♘f3**	**a6**
7	**0-0**	**b5?!**
8	**♗b3**	**♘e7**
9	**♘g5!**	**♘g6**
10	**f4**	**♗e7**
11	**f5**	**♗xg5**

12	**fxg6**	**hxg6**
13	**♗xg5**	**♕xg5**
14	**♕xd6**	**♕e7**



Q. 1.2 What should White play?

Although he is a pawn down, it is possible for White to agree to exchange queens, but only because of a specific combinational idea.

15	**♕xe7+**	**♔xe7**
16	**♘d5+!**	**♔d6**

16 . . . exd5 17 ♗xd5 ♖a7 18 ♖xf7+ and 19 ♖xa7.

17	**e5+!**	

It would be a mistake to play 17 ♖xf7? because of 17 . . . exd5 18 ♗xd5 ♗e6!; also unconvincing is 17 ♘b6?! ♖a7.

17	**. . .**	**♔xe5**
18	**♘c7**	**♖a7**
19	**♖xf7**	

White has obtained a clear advantage, and he soon won.

Even if such examples do not cause you the least trouble, it still makes sense to become well-versed in their solution from time to time. Such problems are rather like the scales played by musicians at rehearsal—they are extremely useful for improving your form just before a competition. By rapidly finding the answers to a series of combinational exercises, you not only sharpen your perception of positions, you also sense a growing confidence in your own powers.

I have already had occasion to mention five-minute games, taking the opportunity to show off two of my own beautiful victories (and over strong opponents at that). Both of those games were played during a training session for the Moscow team prior to a USSR People's Spartakiad. I came to this session immediately after taking part in another training session, in which I assisted Valery Chekhov in his preparation for the World Junior Championship. Our work together was extremely productive. Chekhov became World Junior Champion, and in the Spartakiad I performed rather well.

Petrosian–Dvoretsky

Liepaja 1975

1	**c4**	**♘f6**
2	**♘c3**	**g6**
3	**g3**	**♗g7**
4	**♗g2**	**0-0**
5	**♘f3**	**d6**
6	**0-0**	**e5**
7	**d3**	**♘c6**

8	**♖b1**	**a5**
9	**a3**	**♗f5**
10	**♘d2?!**	

Stronger is 10 b4. True to his prophylactic style, Petrosian wards off the threat of 10 . . . e4, but this was not really a threat, since after 10 b4 axb4 11 axb4 e4?! 12 ♘h4! exd3 13 ♘xf5 dxe2 14 ♘xe2 gxf5 15 b5 White gets an advantage.

10	**. . .**	**♕d7**
11	**♖e1**	**♗h3**
12	**♗h1**	**♘g4!**

If the white knight were on f3, Black would have had to waste a tempo in playing . . . h7–h6. But now Black immediately begins a typical and very dangerous attack. The knight on g4 is very menacing, as will become clear after the thematic advance . . . f7–f5–f4. Much weaker is 12 . . . ♘h5? 13 b4 f5 14 b5 ♘d8 15 c5! with advantage to White, as in the game Chernin–Levitt, Rome 1989.

13	**b4**	**axb4**
14	**axb4**	**f5**
15	**b5**	**♘d8**
16	**♘d5**	**♖f7**
17	**♗b2**	**♘e6**
18	**♖a1**	**♖af8**
19	**♖a7**	**♘c5**
20	**♘b3**	**f4**
21	**♘xc5**	**fxg3**
22	**hxg3**	**dxc5**
23	**f3**	

Both players have carried out their attacks in consistent fashion,



each on his own side of the board, but it seems to me that Black has made more progress. The position of the white king gives some cause for concern, and combinations are simply hanging in the air—Black has only to choose the best one. I found a beautiful idea, but was of course unable to examine it fully, given the limitations of blitz play.

23	**. . .**	**e4**
24	**♗xg7**	**♕d6**
25	**f4**	**♖xf4**
26	**gxf4**	**♖xf4**



The former World Champion resigned, finding no defence

against the threat 27 . . . ♖f1+ 28 ♖xf1 ♕h2 mate.

E. 1.1 Was Petrosian's decision justified?

Dvoretsky–Gulko
Liepaja 1975

1	**e4**	**c5**
2	**♘f3**	**e6**
3	**c3**	**d5**
4	**exd5**	**exd5**
5	**d4**	**♘c6**
6	**♗e3**	**♕b6?!**

Better is 6 . . . cxd4.

7 ♘a3!

A very strong response. Much worse is 7 dxc5 ♕xb2, or 7 ♕b3 c4. Now on 7 . . . ♕xb2 White plays 8 ♘b5, and on 7 . . . a6—8 ♕b3!, forcing the transition to a better ending. If, however, 7 . . . c4, then 8 ♘xc4! dxc4 9 d5 ♕xb2 10 dxc6 with advantage to White. Therefore Gulko's reply is practically forced.

7	**. . .**	**cxd4**
8	**♘xd4**	**♗xa3**
9	**♘xc6!?**	

Also possible, of course, was the simple 9 bxa3. But White wants more. On 9 . . . ♕xc6 he plans to play 10 ♕b3! (with the threat 11 ♗b5) 10 . . . ♕d6 11 ♗b5+ ♗d7 12 ♗xd7+ ♕xd7 13 ♕xa3.

9	**. . .**	**♕xb2!**
10	**♗d4!**	**bxc6**

Probably Black should have preferred 10 . . . ♘f6 11 ♖b1 ♕xa2 12 ♗b5 0-0 13 ♖a1 ♕b2 14 c4 ♗g4!. This at any rate had seemed to Chekhov and myself to be the main line when we analysed this variation during our training session.

11 ♖b1!

Not immediately 11 ♗xg7? in view of 11 . . . f6.

11	**. . .**	**♕xa2**
12	**♗xg7**	**♗g4**

This is where our preliminary analysis came to an end—we had only considered 12 . . . ♗c5 13 ♕e2+.

13	**f3**	**♔d7**

The threat is 14 . . . ♖e8+.

14	**♖b7+**	**♔d6**

On 14 . . . ♔c8 there follows 15 ♗a6. Here I noticed a spectacular combination and could not resist the temptation.



15	**♗e5+?!**	**♔xe5**
16	**♕d4+**	**♔d6?**

This is what White had been counting on.

17	**♕f4+**	**♔c5**

Or 17 . . . ♔e6 18 ♕xf7+ with a very dangerous attack.

18 ♖b5+! cxb5
19 ♕c7 mate

A so-called 'epaulette mate'.

Instead of 16 . . . ♔d6? it was essential to reply 16 . . . ♔e6!, not fearing the capture of the bishop with check: 17 ♕xg4+ f5. After 17 fxg4!?, intending 18 ♗d3, White would have retained quite good attacking chances, but there was, of course, very little point in going in for such complications. In fact, the crude 15 fxg4 ♖e8+ 16 ♗e2 would have won without any difficulty.

Of course, considering the regulations for blitz games, it is ridiculous to reproach oneself for such a decision. But playing for a brilliancy like this in a serious tournament game would be totally unacceptable—the simplest route should always be preferred.

As a child I once showed a similar combination to Grandmaster Simagin, who gave lessons to young chessplayers in the Moscow Palace of Pioneers. Knowing Vladimir Pavlovich to be a player with a sharp, distinctive style, I hoped he would look upon my own 'creative endeavours' with approval, but I had miscalculated. "Combinations for their own sake", he concluded, "are not justifiable from either a sporting or a creative point of view." Later I came to realise that such games look attractive only until one has considered the position carefully and begun to find fault with the underlying variations.

Combinations look much better, even if they are comparatively straightforward, if they are correct and represent the shortest (or even the only) way to achieve one's aim. This is especially true when they are the logical conclusion of the preceding strategy. I shall now give two very nice examples.

Mukhin–Dolmatov
Pushkinskiye Gory 1977

1	**e4**	**e5**
2	**♘f3**	**♘f6**
3	**♘xe5**	**d6**
4	**♘f3**	**♘xe4**
5	**d4**	**d5**
6	**♗d3**	**♗e7**
7	**0-0**	**♘c6**
8	**♖e1**	

Some time later 8 c4 became the main line for White.

8	**. . .**	**♗g4**
9	**c3**	**f5**
10	**♘bd2**	

At the Wijk aan Zee tournament in 1975 Enklaar tried 10 h3 against me. I sacrificed a pawn: 10 . . . ♗xf3 (quieter is 10 . . . ♗h5) 11 gxf3!? ♘f6 (11 . . . ♘d6? 12 ♕b3) 12 ♗xf5 0-0 13 ♕d3 ♗d6 14 ♗g5 ♘e7. Clearly mistaken now is 15 ♗xf6? ♖xf6 16 ♗xh7+ ♔f7, as the bishop is trapped (or 16 . . . ♔h8 with a strong attack).

After 15 ♘d2! ♘xf5 16 ♕xf5 ♕d7 17 ♕xd7 ♘xd7 the ending would be roughly equal. By giving the careless check 15 ♗e6+? Enklaar conceded the square g6 to my knight and he consequently lost control over the most important square f4. The reprisal was swift: 15 . . . ♔h8 16 ♘d2 ♘g6 17 ♗f5 (17 ♗xd5 ♗f4!; 17 ♕f5 c6) 17 . . . ♗f4 18 ♗xf6 ♕xf6 19 ♗xg6 ♗xd2 20 ♖e2? ♗f4 21 ♗xh7 ♕g5+ 22 ♔h1 ♕h5 White resigned.

The rather old continuation 10 c4!? has also been encountered, but the strongest move, according to theory, is 10 ♕b3.

10 . . . ♕d6!?

Dolmatov wishes to castle long. If White had played 10 ♕b3 he would now have had the riposte 11 ♘fd2!, which is known to be strong.

11 ♕b3

Or 11 c4 ♘xd4 12 ♕a4+ ♘c6 with unclear play.

11 . . . 0-0-0
12 ♗b5 ♗f6

12 . . . ♘xd2!?.

13 ♕a4 ♘xd2
14 ♗xd2

The game Mestel–Wolff, London 1985, continued: 14 ♘xd2 ♖he8 15 ♖f1 ♗e2 16 ♗xe2 ♖xe2 17 b4 ♘xd4! with complications not unfavourable to Black.

14 . . . ♗xf3
15 gxf3 (*see diagram*)
15 . . . a6



Sounder was 15 . . . ♔b8, not giving White anything to latch onto for a queenside pawn offensive. But Dolmatov wishes to improve his situation in the endgame—after a double exchange on c6 he will be able to move his king immediately to d7—and so he takes a risk in the middlegame.

16 ♗d3?!

If White is not going to play 16 ♗xc6 then it would be better to retreat the bishop to f1.

16 . . . ♔b8
17 ♗xf5?

Consistent, but bad. From the game Enklaar–Dvoretsky we know that the pawn on f5 in such positions is of no particular significance. It was urgently necessary to begin play on the queenside: 17 b4.

17 . . . ♗h4!
18 ♗h3 ♕f6
19 ♗g2 ♘e7

The same knight manoeuvre as in my game against Enklaar.

20 ♖e2 ♘g6
21 f4

21 ♖ae1!?.

21	**. . .**	**♘xf4**
22	**♗xf4**	**♕xf4**
23	**♔h1**	**♖hf8**
24	**♖f1**	**♖f6**
25	**♖e8**	**♖h6**
26	**♕d7**	



Q. 1.3 What should Black play?

White was counting on 26 . . . ♖xe8 27 ♕xe8+ ♔a7 28 ♕e5(e3) with approximate equality, or 26 . . . ♔a7 27 ♖xd8 ♗xd8 28 h3, attacking with the queen both the bishop and the pawn on d5.

26	**. . .**	**♔a7!**
27	**♖xd8**	**♗e7!!**
28	**h3**	**♗d6**
29	**♕xd6**	

Forced.

29	**. . .**	**♖xd6**

Dolmatov has converted his positional advantage into extra material, and he proceeded confidently to turn this into a win.

30	**♖xd6**	**♕xd6**
31	**♖e1**	

More stubborn was 31 f4.

31	**. . .**	**c6**
32	**♖e2**	**♕f4**
33	**♗f1**	**♕c1**
34	**♔g2**	**g5**
35	**♔g1**	**♕b1!**
36	**a3**	**♕c1**
37	**f3**	**♕f4**
38	**♔f2**	**h5**
39	**♔g2**	**h4**
40	**♔f2**	**♕g3+**
41	**♔e3**	**♕f4+**
42	**♔f2**	**♕c1**
43	**♗g2**	**♔b6**

Now the point behind Black's 35th move is clear—his king now has access to the queenside.

44	**♗f1**	**♔a5**
45	**♔g1**	**♔a4**
46	**♖f2**	**♔b3**

Black's plan is clear: having first brought up his queenside pawns, he will shortly sacrifice his queen at b2. White resigned.

A. Sokolov–Yusupov

3rd game, Candidates match, Riga 1986

1	**e4**	**e6**
2	**d4**	**d5**
3	**♘c3**	**♗b4**
4	**e5**	**c5**
5	**a3**	**♗xc3+**
6	**bxc3**	**♘e7**
7	**♘f3**	**b6**

Black wishes to exchange his 'bad' bishop. This system, which is not too highly regarded by theory (and perhaps rightly), had

been specially prepared by Yusupov for this duel with Sokolov, and he employed it with success. In the first game of the match his opponent chose 8 ♗b5+ ♗d7 9 ♗d3, but for the thirteenth he prepared a completely new idea: 8 ♘g5!?.

8 a4 ♗a6
9 ♗xa6

Another possibility was 9 ♗b5+ ♗xb5 10 axb5.

9 ... ♘xa6
10 0-0 ♘b8
11 dxc5 bxc5
12 c4 0-0
13 cxd5 ♘xd5

In the fifth game of the Candidates match Geller–Spassky (Sukhumi 1968), Black captured on d5 with the queen. Yusupov takes advantage of the first convenient opportunity to diverge from theory, in order to compel his opponent to think for himself.

14 ♕d3 h6
15 c4?!

Stronger was 15 ♖d1 or 15 ♕e4.

15 ... ♘e7

It was tempting to play 15 ... ♘b4, but there is nothing for the knight to do on this square. The square e7 is far superior—from here the knight controls the c6-square, and it may come to f5 or g6.

16 ♕e4 ♘d7!

Where is the queen's knight best placed, on c6 or d7? Yusupov again finds the correct solution. It is important that the pawn on c5 be securely defended.

17 ♖b1?

White should not have weakened the pawn on a4. After 17 ♖d1 ♕c7 the position would be roughly equal.

17 ... ♕a5!
18 ♖d1?!

It would have been better for White to acknowledge his mistake: 18 ♖a1 followed by ♗d2.

18 ... ♖ad8!

Weaker was 18 ... ♕xa4?!, in view of 19 ♗xh6! (but not 19 ♗g5 ♕c6!) 19 ... gxh6 20 ♖a1 ♕c6 21 ♕xc6 ♘xc6 22 ♖xd7 with an equal ending.

19 ♕c2



Q. 1.4 What would you play now?

Black could have played the simple 19 ... ♘b6!?, but Yusupov found a different solution, stronger and more beautiful.

19 ... ♘xe5!!

20	**♘xe5**	**♕c3!**
21	**♕e2**	**♕xe5**

Exemplary exploitation of the weakness of the back rank. Black has won a pawn—and with it the game.

22	**♗e3**	**♘f5**
23	**♕f3**	**♖xd1+**
24	**♖xd1**	**♘d4**
25	**♗xd4?!**	

More stubborn was 25 ♕b7.

25	**. . .**	**cxd4**
26	**♕d3**	**♖d8**
27	**g3**	**♕c5**
28	**f4**	**♕b4!**
29	**♖a1**	

29 ♕c2 d3! 30 ♖xd3 ♕e1+.

29	**. . .**	**a5**
30	**h4**	**h5**
31	**♖b1**	**♕xa4**
32	**♖b5**	**g6**
33	**♔f2**	**♕a2+**
34	**♔f3**	**a4**
35	**♖b6**	**♔g7**
36	**♖b1**	**♔g8**
37	**♖b6**	**♕a1**
38	**♔e2**	

White should have set a final trap: 38 ♖xe6, and if 38 . . . ♕c3? then 39 ♖e3!. But Yusupov had intended to reply 38 . . . ♖b8! 39 ♖xg6+ ♔f8, winning.

38	**. . .**	**a3**
39	**♖a6**	**♕b2+**
40	**♕d2**	**d3+**

White resigned.

In conclusion, I offer a few simple exercises for the reader to solve:

E. 1.2



White to move

E. 1.3



White to move

E. 1.4

White to move

E. 1.5

Black to move

E. 1.6



Black to move

E. 1.7

White to move

Sunspots

Only a strong chessplayer knows how weak he really is.
Saviely Tartakower

"The sun also has spots" is an old Russian proverb. Even at the highest level of competition—matches for the World Championship — players sometimes totally overlook favourable combinational possibilities. This is hardly surprising, since finding a concealed combination under nerve-racking match conditions, with the clock ticking away, is not easy even for a World Champion or a pretender to this title.

Chiburdanidze–Levitina
4th game, World Ch. match, Volgograd 1984



Q. 1.5 Evaluate 26 ♗b4.

White has a healthy extra pawn. The Women's World Champion played simply: 26 ♖xe2 ♗xe2 (26 . . . ♖xe2 27 ♗d3) 27 g3 ♗e5 28 ♖c1 g5?? 29 ♖c8+ ♔g7 30

♗f8+ Black resigned. Also after a more normal turn of events, 28 ... ♗g4 29 ♖c2, White would have had every reason to reckon on victory, but the process of turning the extra pawn into a win might have been somewhat protracted.

A forced win could have been achieved with the following beautiful combination.

26 ♗b4! ♖xa2

Nothing is changed by 26 ... ♖xe1+ 27 ♖xe1 ♖xa2.

27 ♖xa2 ♖xa2

28 ♗f5!

The theme of the combination is the weakness of the back rank. No good were either 28 ♗f3? ♗e6 or 28 ♗b1? ♖e2.

28 ... ♗e2!

29 ♗b1!!

An essential intermediate move. Mistaken would be 29 ♗g4? ♗b5, while on the immediate 29 ♗d3? Black replies 29 ... a5! with the spectacular idea 30 ♗c3 ♗e5!!. On 30 g3 there also follows 30 ... ♗e5!, and if 30 ♗c5 then 30 ... ♗d2!. That only leaves 30 ♗xa5 ♖xa5 31 ♗xe2, but of course it is not worth playing a combination just for the sake of an extra pawn in an ending with bishops of opposite colours.

29 ... ♖b2

29 ... ♖a1 30 ♗xh7+ or 30 ♗c3.

30 ♗d3

Now it is no use playing 30 ... a5 31 ♗xa5; and 30 ... ♖xb3 31 ♖xe2 g5 32 ♖e8+ ♔g7 33 ♗f8+ also loses.

Thus we have convinced ourselves that the move 26 ♗b4! was objectively the strongest. Nevertheless, from a practical point of view the continuation chosen by Chiburdanidze does not merit criticism. Indeed, when calculating combinations it is usually not long before you make a mistake, whereas the quiet route preserves the advantage without any worries.

Kasparov–Karpov

1st game, World Ch. match, Moscow 1985



Q. 1.6 What should Black play?

Watching this game from the tournament hall, I of course first thought about 18 ... bxc5. But this hardly seems possible—White has two refutations: 19 ♘xc8+ ♖dxc8 20 ♗b7; and 19 ♖xb8 ♘xb8 20 dxc5 (intending 21 ♖b1)

20 . . . ♘a6 21 ♘xc8+ ♖xc8 22 ♗b7.

"If it is not possible, then I should very much like . . . to make it possible!" (an aphorism from the back page of *Literaturnaya Gazeta*). It is clear that if events develop quietly it will be difficult for Black to save the game—he is far too cramped. If he cannot succeed in solving the problems of his position by normal means, then it is necessary to think about more forceful methods, and so I continued examining the move 18 . . . bxc5. I at once noticed that after 19 ♘xc8+ ♖dxc8 20 ♗b7 ♖xb7 21 ♖xb7 cxd4 22 ♖xa7 ♘c5 23 ♖b1 e5 Black gets excellent compensation for the sacrifice of the exchange. If White advances his a-pawn immediately then his rook will never excape from a7.

In the second variation Black has to give up a piece: 18 . . . bxc5!! 19 ♖xb8 ♘xb8 20 dxc5 ♘a6! 21 ♘xc8+ ♖xc8 22 ♗b7 ♖xc5 (hopeless is 22 . . . ♖c6? 23 ♗xc6 dxc6 24 ♖b1) 23 ♗xa6 ♖a5 24 ♗c8! (more accurate than 24 ♗b7) 24 . . . ♖xa2+ 25 ♔e3 ♔d8 (25 . . . ♖c2? 26 ♖d1) 26 ♗b7 ♖c2 27 ♖a1 (27 ♗a6 ♖a2 28 ♗b5? a6) 27 . . . ♖xc4 28 ♖xa7. After 24 ♗b7?! the black king would be on e7 and the pawn on a7 would be invulnerable in view of the pin . . . ♖c7. But now the ending is rather drawish.

A good example of a combination coming to the rescue. I don't doubt that in his best years Karpov would have discovered it without any difficulty—he is of course deservedly renowned for his ability to defend difficult positions. But nearly every chessplayer's reserves of energy diminish with age, and there is a tendency to abstain from the calculation of complicated variations as one's combinational vision becomes blurred. Apparently these sad changes have already begun to affect even Karpov, in so far as he played the passive move **18 . . . ♘c7?**, with the idea of exchanging the dangerous knight on d6. I recall that this seemed to me to be a bad omen for the World Champion, and indeed at the end of the match the supreme title passed to Kasparov.

19 ♖b4! ♘e8

20 ♘xe8?

As Kasparov has pointed out, White could have obtained a decisive advantage with 20 ♘xc8+! ♖bxc8 (20 . . . ♖dxc8 21 ♖hb1 and 22 ♔d3) 21 cxb6 axb6 22 ♔d3 ♘d6 23 ♖c1 ♖b8 24 ♖cb1. But after the move in the game Karpov could again have obtained quite good chances of saving the game by playing 20 . . . ♖xe8! 21 ♖hb1 ♗b7 22 d5 exd5 23 cxd5 ♔f8+ (this check is the point of the combination) 24 ♔d2 ♖a8!.

20	**. . .**	**♔xe8?**	**33**	**a5**	**g5**
21	**♖hb1**	**♗a6**	**34**	**hxg5**	**♖xg5**
22	**♔e3**	**d5**	**35**	**g4**	**h5**
23	**cxd6**	**♖bc8**	**36**	**b6**	**axb6**
			37	**axb6**	**♖b7**
			38	**♖c5**	**f5**
			39	**gxh5**	**♖xh5**
			40	**♔c4**	**♖h8**
			41	**♔b5**	**♖a8**
			42	**♖bc4**	

23 . . . ♖xd6 24 c5 ♖dd8 25 c6 ♖bc8 26 ♖a4.

Black resigned.



17 W

Turning the next morning to the papers in order to read the reports of the first game of the match, I found no word of the combinational possibilities overlooked by both players. So I attempted to establish my prior claim by publishing in the next edition of *64—Shakhmatnoye Obozrenie* ('64—Chess Review') a short paragraph on this topic. Alas, nothing really came of it—authors of books devoted to this match have quoted both combinations without any reference to their originator.

Q. 1.7 Evaluate 24 ♖a1.

For the second time while still sitting in the spectator hall I succeeded in finding a combination which was not noticed by the players on the stage. Clearly, the attempt to force events with 24 ♖a4 ♗xc4 25 ♗b7 will be met by 25 . . . b5!. But the counter-punch 26 d7+!! then leads to an immediate win.

Kasparov played less energetically, and the struggle was somewhat drawn out.

24	**♔d3?!**	**♖xd6**
25	**♖a4**	**b5**
26	**cxb5**	**♖b8**
27	**♖ab4**	**♗b7**
28	**♗xb7**	**♖xb7**
29	**a4**	**♔e7**
30	**h4**	**h6**
31	**f3**	**♖d5**
32	**♖c1**	**♖bd7**

E. 1.8



18 W

White to move

Twin Combinations

Men play better than women because they know far more chess combinations of the type that may be repeated ad infinitum in almost any game, whereas naive women always want to play independently, relying only on their own beauty, imagination and temperament—that is, not trusting in the real life of the chess pieces.
David Bronstein

Quite some time has passed since Bronstein wrote these lines, and much has changed in the chess world. The impressive successes achieved by the young Polgar sisters have been to a considerable extent a consequence of their entirely professional attitude to working at their chess. But the main idea expressed in Bronstein's words is of course not in the least outdated. *Ideas, techniques and combinations repeat themselves. They can and should be studied. Your future success depends on the work you do, on the knowledge you carry around in your head.*

A chessplayer relies on his own discoveries to no less an extent than on those made by others. His own are nearer to him, stick in his memory better, since they were at a certain time profoundly thought through and keenly felt. One's own games should be carefully preserved and occasionally reviewed. Having returned home after a tournament round, it was my custom to record the game I had just played in a special notebook, noting the variations which I had calculated over the board and the thoughts which had occupied me in the course of the game. I would leave space for future additions and corrections. I later made repeated use of the information kept in this way both in preparing for new games and as material for use in teaching young players. And I have recommended the same system to all my pupils. The games which we play, together with the ideas which we put into them, are the main creative results of our chess careers, so they deserve to be treated with care.

I shall now bring to your attention two complete games of Dolmatov's in which he carried out very similar combinations. The second combination certainly came to him without any particular difficulty, as he was helped by the experience he had already gained.

Dolmatov–Botto

European Junior Ch., Groningen 1977/78

1	**e4**	**e6**
2	**d4**	**d5**
3	**♘d2**	**c5**
4	**exd5**	**exd5**

5	**♘gf3**	**♘c6**
6	**♗b5**	**♗d6**
7	**dxc5**	**♗xc5**
8	**0-0**	**♘ge7**
9	**♘b3**	**♗d6**
10	**♗g5**	**0-0**
11	**♖e1**	

In the second half of the 1970s this was a standard opening position, encountered in a great number of games. Black has tried various defensive systems, but I could not find the move which Botto played in the *Encyclopaedia of Chess Openings*.

11	**...**	**♖e8**
12	**c3**	**a6**
13	**♗e2**	**f6!?**

Black wishes to defend by occupying the strongpoint on e5 with his knight. This is an interesting idea, probably prompted by the game Gipslis–Korchnoi, Amsterdam 1976. In that encounter Black began to carry out this plan three moves earlier, from the *tabiya* position: 11 . . . f6 12 ♗h4 ♕b6! 13 ♗e2 ♗e6 14 ♗g3 ♘e5! with an acceptable game.

14	**♗h4**	**♕c7**
15	**♗g3**	**♘e5!**

Of course, the young Welsh player avoids an unfavourable exchange of dark-squared bishops.

16 ♘fd4

It is useful to prevent the transfer of the bishop to f7, where it would strengthen the weak pawn on d5.

16 ... ♗d7

17 ♗f3!

A good plan: White places his bishop on f3 and transfers his knight to e3. By 'leaning on' the pawn at d5, Dolmatov hopes to provoke favourable exchanges. It should be noted that the strength of the transfer of the knight to e3 in such positions was already familiar to Sergei. Our opening preparation, needless to say, had not amounted to mere memorising of concrete variations—we had analysed some characteristic games and striven to gain a deeper understanding of the ideas behind this opening and to pick out some typical tactical methods. That is to say, we did just the sort of work which Bronstein recommends.

17	**...**	**♖ad8**
18	**♘c2**	**♗c6?**

A positional error, as this is a rather unfortunate square for the bishop. It was better to play 18 . . . ♗e6; for example: 19 ♘bd4 ♗f7 20 ♘e3 g6.

19 ♘bd4 ♕c8

If 19 . . . ♘g6 then 20 ♗h5, intending ♘f5 or f2–f4–f5.

20 ♘e3 ♗c5

20 . . . ♘xf3+ 21 ♕xf3 ♗c5 22 ♖ad1 with advantage to White.

21 ♗h5! g6
22 ♘g4! ♘xg4

Forced.

23 ♗xg4 ♗d7

Or 23 . . . f5 24 ♗f3 with a clearly superior position. Dolmatov has successfully solved his main task—exchanging the knight on e5.

Q. 1.8 How should White continue?

There followed a new 'little combination' (as Capablanca liked to say).

24 ♘e6! f5
25 ♘xd8 fxg4
26 ♖xe7! ♖xe7

26 . . . ♗xe7 27 ♕xd5+ with a quick mate.

27 ♕xd5+ ♗e6

27 . . . ♔f8 28 ♗h4 or 28 ♗f4.

28 ♘xe6 ♕xe6
29 ♕xe6+ ♖xe6
30 ♔f1

The combination has yielded an extra pawn for White, which with accurate play he quickly converts into victory.

30 . . . ♔f7
31 ♖d1 h6
32 ♖d5 ♗b6
33 c4 ♔f6
34 b3 ♖e4
35 a4 ♖e6
36 a5 ♗a7
37 b4 ♖e4
38 b5

Black resigned.

The following game was played six months later.

Dolmatov–Mokry

World Junior Ch., Graz 1978

1 e4 c5
2 ♘f3 d6
3 d4 cxd4
4 ♘xd4 ♘f6
5 ♘c3 a6
6 f4 e6
7 ♗e2 ♗e7
8 0-0 0-0
9 a4 ♘c6
10 ♗e3 ♕c7
11 ♔h1 ♗d7
12 ♘b3

Prior to this championship, Dolmatov studied the main variations of the Sicilian Defence at a training session with the assistance of a great connoisseur of this opening—Grandmaster Tukmakov.

The present game was the first test of Dolmatov's strength in what was for him a new opening system. Despite his lack of practical experience, Dolmatov confidently grasped the subtleties of the position. Here, for example, he retreated the knight to b3 only after the black bishop had come out to d7—otherwise Black could have developed his bishop much more actively by playing ... b6 and ... ♗b7.

Instead of 11 ... ♗d7, nowadays players of Black more often play 11 ... ♖e8.

12 ... ♘b4

If 12 ... ♘a5 then 13 e5! is unpleasant.

13	**a5**	**♗c6**
14	**♗f3**	**d5**
15	**e5**	**♘d7**
16	**♕e2**	**b5?!**

White has the advantage on the kingside and in the centre; his opponent should have sought counterplay on the queenside by playing 16 ... b6.

17	**♘d1**	**♗b7**
18	**c3**	**♘c6**

Black is playing too passively. Rather better was 18 ... ♕c4, to which Dolmatov had intended to reply 19 ♘d4!.

19	**♘f2**	**♗c8**
20	**♘d3**	**♖b8**
21	**♖fc1**	**f6**
22	**exf6**	**♖xf6**
23	**♗f2**	**♘f8**
24	**♗b6**	**♕d7**
25	**♘d4**	**♗d6**
26	**g3**	**♗b7**
27	**♖e1**	**♖c8**
28	**♗g4**	**♖e8**
29	**♘xc6**	**♗xc6**
30	**♗d4**	**♖f7**



21 W

Q. 1.9 What should White play?

Up to this point Dolmatov has been consistently strengthening his position, and now the moment has come to turn his positional gains into a material advantage. Remembering the previous game, it is quite easy to find the solution.

31	**♗h5!**	**g6**
32	**♘e5!**	**♕c7**
33	**♘g4!**	

Of course, also sufficient was 33 ♘xf7, but the move in the game is more accurate.

33	**...**	**♘d7**
34	**♘h6+**	**♔f8**
35	**♘xf7**	**♔xf7**
36	**♗g4**	

Turning the advantage of the exchange here into a win is not too difficult. Dolmatov first consolidates his position as far as

possible and then . . . adjourns. In our home analysis we chose the most appropriate way to break through the enemy's defence.

36	**. . .**	**♘f8**
37	**b4**	**♕e7**
38	**♖a2**	**♘d7**
39	**♕g2**	**♘f8**
40	**♖ae2**	**♗d7**
41	**♕h3**	**♔g8**
42	**♕h6**	**♕f7**
43	**♕g5**	**♕e7**
44	**♕h6**	

The sealed move.

44	**. . .**	**♕f7**
45	**f5!**	**exf5**
46	**♖xe8**	**♗xe8**
47	**♗xf5!**	**♗d7**
48	**♗xd7**	**♘xd7**
49	**♕e3**	

Black resigned.

In one of the first rounds the Master 'recommended' a continuation which at first sight looked extremely peculiar. The Candidate was unable to puzzle out the point behind it, and he played something else. But he was wrong to do so, as the suggested move was in fact very strong. After this incident it was decided at a 'council of war' that all instructions were to be carried out without question. In the next round the Master suggested giving up a pawn. The Candidate did not understand why, but sacrificed the pawn and failed to obtain any compensation for it. Having lost the game, he indignantly asked the Master what the point had been. "Even I can make a mistake," he replied, shrugging his shoulders.

I have always considered such unsporting ruses as a pathetic attempt to compensate for inadequacy, and they are in any case a reliable indication of a weak mind. The very high degree of moral authority which Artur Yusupov, Sergei Dolmatov and Nana Alexandria have attained in chess circles is a rightful consequence of the fact that they, like their trainer, have always tried to obey the rules of honest sporting competition.

However, I can recall an incident when someone once tried to suggest a move to me. But, as in the story just related, this par-

Prompting

We alone are responsible for our own happiness or misfortune.
Michel de Montaigne

A certain Candidate Master decided in a recent tournament to reach the Master norm without fail and at any cost. He persuaded a friend of his, a strong Master, to help him not only in preparing for his games but also during play. Together they worked out a system of conventional signs with the aid of which the Master would be able to prompt strong moves at decisive moments.

ticular episode also did not have a happy ending.

I was playing a game at the end of a junior team tournament. Having exchanged all the pieces, I went into a favourable pawn ending. I was sitting at the board, calculating some rather complicated variations and trying to find a winning line, when the team's trainer, Alexander Roshal, came up to me (he was also my trainer) and whispered: "It's a draw!". I was astonished—but, having considered that such a result was in the team's interest, I waited for a couple of minutes and then offered a draw. My opponent, needless to say, agreed.

Having stood up from the board I was immediately asked by Roshal, "Why didn't you play on? You were better, weren't you?".

"But you told me yourself—draw," I replied in amazement.

"Nothing of the sort, I was whispering: 'We've got four'."

A year and a half passed. For the first time in my life I played in a tournament which was offering a Master norm, and straightaway I exceeded the necessary score by one and a half points. The following game, in which I had to endure quite a few unpleasant experiences, was perhaps decisive. But towards the end I was helped by a prompt, albeit an indirect one, which helped to determine the result of the game.

Bobolovich–Dvoretsky
Semi-Final, Moscow Ch. 1966

1	**♘f3**	**♘f6**
2	**c4**	**g6**
3	**g3**	**♗g7**
4	**♗g2**	**0-0**
5	**0-0**	**c5**
6	**d4**	**d6**
7	**♘c3**	**♘c6**
8	**dxc5**	**dxc5**
9	**♗e3**	**♗e6**
10	**♕a4**	**♕a5?**

A mistake, which at once gives Black a difficult position. Correct, according to theory, is 10 ... ♘d4.

11	**♘d2!**	

The threat is 12 ♗xc6.

11	**...**	**♕xa4**
12	**♘xa4**	**♘d7**
13	**♗xc5**	**♖ac8**
14	**♗e3**	**♗xc4**

Having lost a pawn, I was now attempting desperately to alter the course of a game that was turning out badly.

15	**♘xc4**	**b5**
16	**♖ad1?**	

Much stronger was 16 ♖fd1 ♘cb8 17 ♖ac1 bxc4 18 ♗xa7.

16	**...**	**♘cb8**
17	**♘c3**	**♗xc3**
18	**bxc3**	**♖xc4**
19	**♗xa7**	**♖xc3**

Now White no longer has an extra pawn, but 'merely' the advantage of the two bishops, although this should be crushing in an open position.

20 ♖d2 ♖fc8
21 ♖b2?

Not bad was the simple 21 ♖fd1, but serious consideration should also have been given to 21 ♗xb8!? (there is a well-known truism: "the main advantage of the two bishops is that one of them can always be exchanged") 21 ... ♘xb8 22 ♗b7! ♖c2 23 ♖fd1 ♖xd2 24 ♖xd2 ♖c1+ 25 ♔g2 ♘c6 26 ♖d7.

21 ... ♖c2
22 ♖fb1 ♖xb2
23 ♖xb2 ♖c1+
24 ♗f1 ♘c6
25 ♗e3 ♖a1
26 f4? ♘f6
27 ♔g2 b4
28 ♗d2 ♘e4
29 e3


22 B

Q. 1.10 What should Black play?

At this moment my schoolfriend and fellow Pioneer, Candidate Master Sasha Karasev, came into the tournament hall. We greeted each other and I continued thinking about my next move.

It was clear that the worst for Black had passed and that I should not lose. I was looking to see how I could be most sure of guaranteeing the draw. If, say, 29 ... ♘c3, then 30 ♗c4, and then not 30 ... ♘a5? because of 31 ♖xb4. It was possible simply to exchange on d2, but wouldn't the pawn on b4 then become weak when the white king crosses over to the queenside, especially in the event of an exchange of rooks?

At this point I sensed some commotion around me, raised my head from the board and noticed that my friend was in a state of severe agitation. His expression had changed, and he had begun circling around my table. I understood immediately: Sasha had seen something. This forced me to take a fresh look at my position, to cease looking for a draw and to muse on what it was he could possibly have discovered. And, finally, the solution came to me in a flash.

29 ... **b3!!**
30 **axb3** ♖d1

The bishop is trapped. If 31 ♗b5 then 31 ... ♘a7.

31 ♗c3 ♘xc3
32 ♖c2 ♘d5

And now the awkward position of the other bishop is the telling factor.

33 ♖xc6 ♘xe3+
34 ♔f2 ♘xf1
35 ♔e2 ♖b1

36 b4 ♘xh2

White resigned.

Why have I told this story? Simply because I realised afterwards just how important it can sometimes be to take a fresh look at a position. This is the sort of 'prompt' which we can always give ourselves.

Petrosian once reflected that, as a rule, a chessplayer will notice an unexpected combinational idea either at once or not at all. This is explained by the fact that, having been diverted by the examination and precise formulation of variations, he is influenced into forming a definite view of the position, and consequently, unable to get out of the rut, he forgets about searching for new ideas. This psychological effect can and should be combated.

Having in the course of a game come up against a problem which is not easily solved, interrupt your calculations for a time and switch over to searching, asking yourself: "What may still be concealed in this position? What might I not have noticed?". It doesn't always work, but quite often such a 'diversion' will yield good results.

Candidate Moves

All candidate moves should be identified at once and listed in one's head. This job cannot be done piecemeal, by first examining one move and then seeking another.

Alexander Kotov

It is not enough to be able to find a combination: once it has been found, its consequences have to be accurately calculated. In order to train the ability to calculate variations, you should solve exercises, the main difficulty of which consists not in the search for hidden, beautiful ideas, but in the need to consider a large number of different lines, sometimes requiring analysis many moves ahead.

Many years ago, Alexander Kotov, then merely a first-category player, succeeded, as a result of targeted training, in developing his calculating abilities very considerably. The result was a sudden leap in his standard of play, and he became a grandmaster. In his books Kotov has shared the experience of his labours, identifying methods which improve the quality of calculated variations, and giving a lot of useful advice. One such piece of advice has served as the epigraph for this section.

In the first chapter of *Secrets of Chess Training* the value of this advice was extensively discussed when applied to the analysis of adjourned positions. But, of course, it is also important for over-the-board play. I shall now

quote what is for me a memorable example of this theme.

Dvoretsky–Schüssler
Tbilisi 1980

1	**e4**	**e5**
2	**♘f3**	**♘f6**
3	**♘xe5**	**d6**
4	**♘f3**	**♘xe4**
5	**d4**	**d5**
6	**♗d3**	**♗e7**
7	**0-0**	**♘d6?!**

Black defends against c2–c4, but in order to do this he moves this knight for the third time. It is not good to waste tempi in the opening, so it is hardly surprising that White can obtain a better position in several ways. Not bad, for example, is 8 ♘c3 c6 9 ♘e2 ♗f5 10 ♘g3.

8 ♗f4

Now Black cannot play 8 ... ♗f5 in view of 9 ♗xd6.

8 ... ♗g4
9 ♘bd2

An interesting plan was worked out by Makarychev: 9 ♖e1 0-0 10 h3 ♗h5 11 ♘c3! c6 12 ♕e2.


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Q. 1.11 What would follow in reply to 12 ... ♖e8?

It is bad to play 12 ... ♖e8, because of 13 ♗xh7+! ♔xh7 14 ♘g5+ ♗xg5 15 ♕xh5+ ♗h6 16 ♖xe8 ♘xe8 17 ♗xh6 gxh6 18 ♕xf7+ ♘g7 19 ♖e1 or 19 ♕xb7.

Q. 1.12 How can 12 ... ♘c8 be refuted?

It is also no use playing 12 ... ♘c8 13 ♗xb8 ♗xf3 (13 ... ♖xb8 14 ♕e5!) 14 ♕e5!! ♗f6 15 ♕f4 ♗g5 (15 ... ♗h5 16 ♗c7 ♕d7 17 ♗f5) 16 ♕f5! g6 17 ♕e5 ♗f6 18 ♕c7!, when the bishop on f3 can only retreat to e4.

Finally, on 12 ... ♗f6 Makarychev points out the following variation: 13 ♕e3! ♖e8 (13 ... ♗xf3 14 ♕xf3 ♗xd4 15 ♘xd5!!) 14 ♗e5 ♘d7 15 g4 ♗g6 16 ♕f4 with advantage to White.

9 ... 0-0
10 ♖e1 ♘d7

This position had already occurred in one of my games seven years earlier, against Khachaturov (Moscow 1973). Then I played rather superficially with 11 c3, and Black succeeded in equalising by means of 11 ... ♖e8 12 ♕b3 ♘b6 13 ♕c2 g6 14 ♘e5 ♗f5 15 ♖e2 ♗g5! 16 ♗xg5 ♕xg5 17 ♖ae1 f6.

This time I chose a more logical plan. At present it would not be helpful to play 11 h3 ♗h5, as Black gets the opportunity to exchange light-squared bishops with

the move . . . ♗g6. But if White first transfers his knight to g3 and only then plays h2–h3, Black will have to exchange on f3, after which the white pieces will exert unpleasant pressure against Black's kingside.

11 ♘f1 ♘f6

Everything is clear: on 12 ♘g3 Black intends to reply 12 . . . ♘h5. But there is a serious defect in my opponent's plan.

Q. 1.13 What is wrong with Black's plan?

12 ♘g3 ♘h5
13 ♘xh5 ♗xh5
14 ♖e5!

An extremely unpleasant double attack. If Black exchanges on f3 and then plays 15 . . . c6 (there appears to be no other way to avoid losing a pawn), White can sacrifice his bishop on h7. After the game, my opponent showed me the move which he had been studying 'out of desperation'—14 . . . g5?!—but, of course, such a move could not really be taken seriously.

Schüssler sank into deep thought. His reply came a mere one and a half hours later (!). At this time I had some sympathy with his plight: "What can you do, if all moves are bad. You can think as long as you like, but your position is beyond repair."

14 . . . ♗xf3
15 ♕xf3 c6



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Q. 1.14 What should White play?

I didn't doubt that the sacrifice of the bishop was correct. Therefore I first intended to take on h7 without thinking, in order to see which defence my opponent would choose after 16 ♗xh7+ ♔xh7 17 ♖h5+ ♔g8 18 ♕h3— 18 . . . f6 or 18 . . . f5—and only then to calculate the variations. But, fortunately, I did not actually commit such a stupid error but began to examine the sacrifice and saw that matters were not so simple as they had at first seemed.

The variation 18 . . . f6 19 ♖e1 ♘f7 20 ♕f5 suited me fine, in connection with the possibility after 20 . . . ♘g5 (20 . . . ♘h8 21 ♕e6+; 20 . . . ♘d6 21 ♕e6+ ♖f7 22 ♕h3) 21 ♗xg5 fxg5 22 ♕e6+ ♖f7 23 ♕h3 ♖f8 of playing 24 ♖h7!, with the terrible threat of 25 ♕h5. (Alas, I totally overlooked the better and, apparently, entirely adequate defence 20 . . . ♖e8!.)

But I did not succeed in finding anything in reply to 18 . . . f5 19 ♖e1 (19 ♖h7 ♘f7; 19 ♖h8+ ♔f7 20 ♕h5+ ♔e6) 19 . . . ♘e4! 20 ♖h8+ ♔f7 21 ♕xf5+ ♗f6 or 21 . . . ♘f6 (but not 21 . . . ♔e8? 22 ♖xf8+ ♗xf8 23 f3).

Two or three times I was distracted from sacrificing the bishop and weighed up other natural moves; for example, 16 ♖ae1. But I did not find any advantage after these possibilities and again returned to the examination of the consequences of the move 16 ♗xh7+, thereby contravening another principle pointed out by Kotov: "When calculating complicated variations, each of the numerous branches of the tree should be gone through one at a time".

Having thought for about an hour, getting more and more tired and almost despairing at ever being able to find a way to get an advantage, I suddenly noticed a possibility which I had not previously considered. I hurriedly examined it and finally made my move.

16 ♕g3!

The threat is 17 ♖xe7. In the event of 16 . . . ♗f6 17 ♗xh7+ ♔xh7 18 ♖h5+ ♔g8 19 ♗xd6 ♖e8 20 ♗e5 Black has no compensation for the loss of a pawn.

It is significant, however, that I did not see the best defence: 16 . . . ♘e8!. If my opponent had played this I am not sure that I would have had enough strength left to find the correct way to continue the attack: 17 ♖ae1 ♗f6 18 ♖h5 g6 19 ♕h3! ♗xd4 20 ♖xh7. Objectively this position favours White; for example: 20 . . . ♕f6 21 g3 ♗xb2 22 ♕h6 (threatening 23 ♗g5) 22 . . . ♗d4 23 ♖e2 or even 23 c3.

I was lucky: Schüssler was no less tired than I and he made White's task easier.

16	**. . .**	**♗h4?**
17	**♗xh7+**	**♔xh7**
18	**♖h5+**	**♔g8**
19	**♕h3!**	

Of course, not 19 ♖xh4? ♘f5, and not 19 ♕xh4? ♕xh4 20 ♖xh4 ♘f5.

19	**. . .**	**g5**
20	**g3**	

Also strong was 20 ♗e5, but the move in the game is simpler.

20	**. . .**	**♕c8**
21	**♕xc8**	**♘xc8**
22	**♗d2**	**♘e7**
23	**gxh4**	**gxh4**
24	**♔h1!**	

And Black resigned, as 24 . . . ♘g6 25 f4 is decisive.

I do not blame myself that I had been immediately diverted by calculation of the bishop sacrifice—it seemed too tempting. *But as soon as it became clear that the sacrifice did not lead to a forced win, it was essential to pause and compile a full list of candidate moves.* If I had concentrated on

this task, I would most certainly have seen 16 ♕g3 quickly and after a brief examination I would have realised that this was the move I had to play. As a result it would have been possible to save quite a lot of time and effort.

Grandmaster Yusupov attaches exceptional importance to the identification of all candidate moves. This routine has helped him on numerous occasions to find and exploit the hidden resources of his position. A good illustration is the following game.

Yusupov–Nogueiras
Candidates Tournament, Montpellier 1985

1	**d4**	**d5**
2	**c4**	**e6**
3	**♘c3**	**c6**
4	**♘f3**	**♘f6**
5	**♗g5**	**♘bd7**
6	**cxd5**	**exd5**
7	**e3**	**♗d6**
8	**♗d3**	**♘f8**

Black wishes to accomplish the same manoeuvre which I employed to my advantage in the previous game: . . . ♘g6 followed by . . . h7–h6. For the sake of this, he makes, as did Schüssler, several moves in the opening with the same piece. This dubious plan had been adopted previously by Nogueiras, so Artur and I had had an opportunity to prepare, and we foresaw the subsequent course of events.

9 ♘e5!? ♕b6

In the event of 9 . . . ♘g6 White reinforces his knight in the centre with the move 10 f4. The game Chernin–Cvetkovic, Belgrade 1988, continued: 10 . . . 0-0 11 ♕c2 ♕e8 12 0-0 ♗b4 13 ♔h1 ♗xc3 14 bxc3 h6 15 f5 ♗xf5 16 ♗xf6 ♗xd3 17 ♕xd3 gxf6 18 ♘g4 with a decisive attack for White.

10 0-0 ♗xe5

Highly dangerous for Black would be 10 . . . ♕xb2 11 ♖c1.

11 dxe5 ♘g4?

Better was 11 . . . ♘6d7, after which Yusupov had the following variation in mind: 12 ♗f4 ♕xb2 13 ♖c1 ♘g6 14 ♗xg6! hxg6 15 e4, which would have secured him an advantage. Instead of capturing the pawn it is better for Black to play 12 . . . ♘c5, as in the game Gulko–Smagin, Moscow Ch. Ch. 1984.

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

Q. 1.15 How should White continue?

We had given this position a cursory glance in our preparation for this game, and we decided that it favoured White, in view of the variation 12 ♗f4 ♘g6 13 ♗xg6 hxg6 14 h3 ♘h6 15 e4!. But Yusupov usually verifies any preliminary analysis over the board, especially if it was done in a hurry. He began to wonder whether there were any other possibilities besides 12 ♗f4, and he saw an extremely tempting idea. Coming to the conclusion that in the variation planned at home Black can still defend by means of 15 ... ♕xb2 16 ♖c1 0-0!, Artur preferred the continuation he found during the game.

12 ♕a4! ♕xb2?!

Now White's lead in development becomes overwhelming, but it is hard to advise anything better for Black. In the event of the obvious 12 ... ♗d7 White could have chosen between 13 ♕a3!? f6 14 exf6 gxf6 15 ♗h4, and 13 e6!? ♗xe6 14 ♘xd5 ♗xd5 15 ♕xg4— in both cases with a clear advantage to White.

13 ♖ac1 ♗d7

On 13 ... ♘xe5, White wins with either 14 ♖c2 ♕b6 15 ♘xd5, or 14 ♘xd5 ♘xd3 15 ♖xc6!.

(*see following diagram*)

Q. 1.16 How can White most quickly profit from his advantage?

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

White's first thought was to bring all his pieces into play with 14 ♖c2 ♕b6 15 ♖b1. But after 15 ... ♕c7 16 ♘xd5 ♕xe5, or 16 ♗f4 ♘e6 Black somehow holds on.

Again Yusupov asked himself which were his candidate moves. As a result he found a deadly solution.

14 ♕d4!!

White has created five (!) threats: 15 ♘xd5, 15 ♘b5, 15 ♘e4, 15 ♖b1 and 15 e6 ♗xe6 16 ♕xg7. It is, of course, impossible to defend against all of them. If, for example, 14 ... ♕b6 then 15 e6!, winning a piece.

14 ... f6
15 exf6 gxf6
16 ♗xf6 ♖g8

16 ... ♘xf6 17 ♕xf6 ♖g8 18 ♘xd5!.

17 ♘b5! ♕xb5
18 ♗xb5 ♘e6
19 ♕b2 cxb5
20 ♗h4

Black resigned.

Nunn–Miles
Baden 1980

1	**e4**	**c5**
2	**♘f3**	**d6**
3	**d4**	**cxd4**
4	**♘xd4**	**♘f6**
5	**♘c3**	**g6**
6	**g3**	**♘c6**
7	**♘de2**	**♗g7**
8	**♗g2**	**♖b8!?**
9	**a4**	**a6**
10	**0-0**	**b5**
11	**axb5**	**axb5**
12	**♘d5**	**0-0**

An exchange on d5 is unfavourable for Black in view of the weakness of the c6-square (12 . . . ♘xd5 13 exd5 ♘e5 14 ♘d4). In the event of 12 . . . e6 13 ♘xf6+ ♗xf6 White obtains nothing from either 14 c3 0-0, or 14 ♗f4 ♘e5, but he can sacrifice a pawn in order to deprive the enemy king of the right to castle: 14 ♗h6! ♗xb2.



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Q. 1.17 How should White continue his offensive?

In the book by Nunn and Griffiths, *Secrets of Grandmaster Play*, the following variation is suggested: 15 e5! (the exclamation mark is the authors') 15 . . . ♘xe5 16 ♖a2 ♘g4 (16 . . . ♘c4? 17 ♖xb2 ♘xb2 18 ♕d4) 17 ♘d4 ♘xh6 (17 . . . ♗xd4 18 ♕xd4 e5 19 ♗c6+) 18 ♘c6 ♕c7 19 ♘xb8 ♗g7 20 ♘c6, and the position arising is assessed as favouring White.

Dolmatov did not agree with this evaluation and suggested continuing the variation: 20 . . . d5! (weak is 20 . . . ♘f5 21 ♖a7 ♕b6 22 g4! ♘d4 23 ♖a8 ♘xc6 24 ♕xd6, or 22 . . . d5 23 ♗xd5! exd5 24 ♖e1+ ♔f8 25 ♕xd5) 21 ♗xd5 exd5 22 ♖e1+ ♔f8 23 ♕xd5 ♗f6, when it is not clear how White can strengthen his attack.

Apparently Sergei is right, but Yusupov found a more convincing objection to the move recommended by Nunn (here and later on I give the name of only one of the co-authors, since in the preface to the book Nunn states that: "In general, the moves are mine and the words Peter's"). Artur's habit of identifying all the candidate moves helped him to notice after 15 e5? (this time the punctuation is mine) the excellent reply 15 . . . d5!, which makes further complicated calculations unnecessary.

In Yusupov's opinion it is necessary to play simply 15 ♖b1!

♗f6 16 ♖b3! (worse is 16 f4 ♘e7!? with the threat 17 . . . ♘g8) 16 . . . e5 (16 . . . ♕e7 17 f4; 16 . . . ♘e5 17 h3 or 17 ♘d4) 17 ♖d3 ♕e7 18 ♘c3! ♗e6 19 ♘d5 ♗xd5 20 ♖xd5, when White maintains unpleasant pressure against his opponent's position.

13	**♗g5**	**♘d7**
14	**♕c1**	**♘c5**
15	**b4?!**	

The simple 15 ♖d1 would have guaranteed White the better chances. Instead of this, Nunn decided on an exchange sacrifice, the consequences of which are far from easy to assess. Miles did not risk taking the rook, preferring to win a pawn with 15 . . . ♘e6 16 ♗h6 ♘ed4 17 ♘xd4 ♘xd4 18 ♔h1 ♗xh6 19 ♕xh6 ♘xc2. But after 20 ♖ac1 ♘d4 21 ♖c7 White obtained more than adequate positional compensation. The game ended in a win for White.

Let's try to sort out what could have happened if Miles had chosen the most testing continuation.

15	**. . .**	**♗xa1!**
16	**♕xa1**	**♘e6**
17	**♗h6**	

Not 17 ♗xe7? ♘xe7 18 ♘f6+ ♔h8 19 ♘d7+ f6 20 ♘xb8 ♕b6.

17	**. . .**	**♖e8**
18	**f4**	**f6**
19	**f5**	

(*see following diagram*)



Q. 1.18 Where is it best to retreat the knight, to c7 or g7?

Try first to guess the answer, and only then immerse yourself in the variations. It is very hard to make the right choice, since there are plausible arguments in favour of each of the possibilities.

In the event of 19 . . . ♘g7, White may continue a pawn storm on the kingside by means of 20 g4 followed by g4–g5, but after 19 . . . ♘c7 there is simply no time to do this, as Black can immediately exchange off the strong knight on d5.

After 19 . . . ♘g7 20 ♕a2 Black can repel his opponent's threats with the move 20 . . . ♔h8, not fearing 21 fxg6 hxg6 22 ♘df4 in view of 22 . . . ♘e5! 23 ♘xg6+ ♔h7! (23 . . . ♘xg6? 24 ♕f7 ♖g8 25 ♕xg6 ♗d7 26 ♗e3) 24 ♘xe5 ♗e6! when the attack is beaten off, leaving Black the exchange ahead.

In the event of 19 . . . ♘c7 20 ♕a2 the move 20 . . . ♔h8 does actually lose: 21 ♘xc7 ♕xc7 22 fxg6 hxg6 23 ♕f7 ♖g8 24 ♖f4! g5 25 ♗xg5! fxg5 26 ♕h5+.



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W

So is this sufficient reason for Black to prefer to retreat the knight to g7? No, it is not: instead of 20 . . . ♔h8? Black has available the—at first sight—risky move 20 . . . e6!, pointed out by Nunn. After 21 ♘xc7 ♕xc7 22 fxg6 hxg6 23 ♖xf6 ♔h7, followed by . . . ♘e5, the strong position of the knight in the centre of the board insures Black against attack. Neither 21 fxe6 ♗xe6 22 ♘ef4 ♗f7, nor 21 ♘df4 ♔h8! (worse is 21 . . . ♘e5 22 ♘d4) 22 fxg6 hxg6 23 ♘xg6+ ♔h7, present any danger.

Finally, on 21 e5 Nunn gives the following interesting variation: 21 . . . ♘xd5 (bad is 21 . . . exd5? 22 ♗xd5+ ♘xd5 23 ♕xd5+ ♔h8 24 ♕f7 ♖g8 25 exf6, but, apparently, 21 . . . ♘xe5 is entirely possible) 22 ♗xd5 ♘xb4 23 fxe6 (23 exf6 ♕xf6!, but not 23 . . . ♘xa2? 24 f7+ ♔h8 25 f6!, or 24 . . . ♔xf7 25 fxe6+ ♔g8 26 e7+) 23 . . . ♘xd5! (23 . . . ♕b6+? 24 ♖f2 ♘xa2 25 e7+ ♔h8 26 exf6) 24 exf6 ♗xe6 25 f7+ ♗xf7 26 ♖xf7 ♔xf7 27 ♕xd5+ ♖e6 28 ♘f4 ♕f6, and the attacking resources dry up.

The only other try to be investigated is the sacrifice of the rook at f6. Nunn considers this idea to be incorrect and gives the variation 19 . . . ♘c7 (he doesn't consider the move 19 . . . ♘g7 at all) 20 fxg6 hxg6 21 ♖xf6 exf6 22 ♘xf6+ ♔f7 23 ♘xe8 ♘xe8 "wins for Black".

This position might arise after either retreat of the knight on move 19, but Black is by no means winning here. After 24 ♕h8! he has, despite being a rook up, no secure way to parry the threats 25 ♕f8+ and 25 ♕h7+. Totally bad is 24 . . . ♕f6? 25 ♕f8+. On 24 . . . ♗g4 there follows 25 ♕h7+ ♔e6 (25 . . . ♔f6 26 ♗g5+!) 26 ♘f4+ ♔e5 27 ♕f7!?. And after 24 . . . ♘f6 25 ♕g7+ ♔e8 White plays not 26 ♗g5? ♖b7!, but 26 ♕xg6+! ♔d7 27 ♗g5, remaining with two or three pawns for the exchange and maintaining his attack.

Let us now try to find where Black can deviate from this unfavourable variation. After 19 . . . ♘g7 20 fxg6 hxg6 (20 . . . ♘e5!? 21 gxh7+ ♔xh7 22 ♕c1, and White has good positional compensation for the sacrificed exchange) 21 ♖xf6! exf6 22 ♘xf6+ ♔f7 23 ♘xe8 (23 ♗xg7? ♖e5!) he should examine 23 . . . ♘h5!? (worse is 23 . . . ♘e6 because of

the same move—24 ♕h8!). But then 24 ♘g7 ♘e5 (24 . . . ♕f6 25 e5!?) 25 ♕a2+ gives White a good game. If this is not enough he may try 24 ♕h8!? ♕xe8 25 ♕h7+ ♔f6 26 ♘f4! (worse is 26 h4 ♗g4, or 26 ♘c3 ♘xb4) with the threats 27 ♘d5+ and 27 ♘xh5+. After 26 . . . ♖b7 (26 . . . ♘xf4 27 ♕g7+ ♔e6 28 gxf4) 27 ♘d5+ ♔e6! (27 . . . ♔e5 28 ♗f4+ ♔d4 29 ♗d2!) 28 ♘c7+ (28 ♗h3+ ♔e5 29 ♗f4+ ♔xe4) 28 . . . ♖xc7 29 ♕xc7 ♘e7 30 ♗g5 White maintains a dangerous initiative, which entirely compensates for the loss of a piece.

So, after 19 . . . ♘c7 20 fxg6 hxg6 21 ♖xf6 exf6 22 ♘xf6+ ♔f7 23 ♘xe8 Black repels the attack with 23 . . . ♔xe8!—for example: 24 ♕h8+ ♔d7 25 ♗h3+ ♔e6.

Therefore we are entitled, finally, to state our conclusion: the move 19 . . . ♘c7! is considerably stronger than 19 . . . ♘g7, which tells above all in the event of White's sacrificing the rook at f6. It would have been practically impossible to be able to foresee this on the basis of 'general considerations' alone. It was essential to calculate accurate variations several moves deep, each time—without exception—identifying all the candidate moves both for oneself and one's opponent. Remember how easy it was to come to a mistaken conclusion when examining, at least, the variation with 20 ♕a2—one had only to overlook Black's hidden defence.

Perhaps the only purely positional reason which could have helped in coming down in favour of the move 19 . . . ♘c7! was the threat thereby created of exchanging knights, which compels White to force events and so excludes quiet moves like 20 g4. But this is just a little prompt—in other, similar cases it is just not possible to do without careful and concrete examination of variations.

Ivanchuk–Dolmatov
Manila IZ 1990

1	**e4**	**e6**
2	**d4**	**d5**
3	**♘d2**	**c5**
4	**exd5**	**exd5**
5	**♗b5+**	**♘c6**
6	**♘gf3**	**cxd4**
7	**♕e2+**	**♕e7**

This variation was played three times by Korchnoi in a Candidates match against Hübner (Merano 1980/81). On all three occasions after 8 ♘xd4 ♕xe2+ an endgame arose which slightly favoured White. Ivanchuk had prepared a sharper continuation.

8	**♘e5!?**	**♗d7**
9	**♗xc6**	**bxc6**
10	**0-0**	

E. 1.9 How should Black defend?

30
B



Paying Attention to the Opponent's Possibilities

One's opponent also has a right to exist.
Saviely Tartakower

Yusupov–Fries-Nielsen
World Junior Ch., Skien 1979

1	**d4**	**e6**
2	**♘f3**	**♘f6**
3	**♗g5**	**c5**
4	**e3**	**b6?**

An opening inaccuracy, known from the game Petrosian–Kozma, Munich Ol. 1958. In that game White obtained a clear advantage with 5 d5! exd5 6 ♘c3 ♗b7 7 ♘xd5 ♗xd5 8 ♗xf6 ♕xf6 9 ♕xd5 ♘c6 (9 . . . ♕xb2 10 ♖d1 ♕b4+ 11 c3! ♕xc3+ 12 ♖d2 ♕c1+ 13 ♔e2, winning) 10 ♗c4.

The very same mistake, however surprising it may seem, was committed by Karpov against Yusupov in the fifth game of their Candidates Semi-Final (London 1989). Instead of 6 . . . ♗b7 Karpov played 6 . . . ♗e7, but after 7 ♘xd5 ♗b7 8 ♗xf6 ♗xf6 9 c3 0-0 10 ♗c4 was also left with an inferior position. Yusupov achieved a spectacular victory, and the game was voted the best from the Candidates Semi-Finals and also one of the best in the 48th volume of *Informator*.

5	**d5!**	**d6**
6	**dxe6**	**♗xe6**

6 . . . fxe6 7 e4!.

7	**♗b5+**	**♘bd7**
8	**♘c3**	**a6**

31
W



Artur thought for a long time and then forced a series of exchanges: 9 ♗xd7+ ♗xd7 10 ♘d5 ♗e7 11 ♗xf6 ♗xf6 12 ♘xf6+ ♕xf6 13 ♕d5 ♔e7 (forced: after 13 . . . 0-0 14 0-0-0 the pawn on d6 is lost) 14 0-0-0. Having left the enemy king stranded in the centre, White has obtained some advantage, although it is not too great. Soon afterwards his opponent played inaccurately and Yusupov won.

"Why did you think for so long over your ninth move?", I asked Artur after the game.

"I was looking to see whether I could obtain more than I did with 9 ♗xd7+, and was examining the move 9 ♗c6", he explained, and he showed me the following beautiful variation.

9 ♗c6 ♖a7

9 . . . ♖c8? 10 ♗b7.

10 ♘e4



32
B

Q. 1.19 What should Black play?

The pawn on d6 is *en prise*. The passive 10 . . . ♕e7 11 0-0 leads to a position in which Black has no prospects at all. He has to give up a pawn.

10 . . . ♕c7!
11 ♘xf6+ gxf6
12 ♗xf6 ♖g8

Sacrificing the exchange is unsound: 12 . . . ♕xc6 13 ♗xh8 f6 14 ♕d3, or 13 . . . ♗c4 14 b3.

13 ♗xd7+ ♕xd7
14 0-0

Mistaken is 14 ♗h4 ♖xg2 15 ♗g3 ♕c6, as White cannot get at the enemy rook. Worthy of consideration is 14 ♘h4, but it is clear that with a white knight on the edge of the board Black has definite compensation for the sacrificed pawn.

But after castling White intends to consolidate his position by transferring his bishop to g3. Black cannot play 14 . . . ♗h3 15 ♘e1 ♗xg2? 16 ♘xg2 ♕h3 because of 17 ♕d5!.

14 . . . ♖xg2+!!
15 ♔xg2 ♗h3+
16 ♔h1 ♗xf1
17 ♕xf1 ♕f5

Black regains the pawn and a roughly equal position arises.

Quite magnificent calculation! In order to find such subtle moves over the board it is important not merely to retreat into your own ideas and to examine them carefully; just as much attention should be devoted to seeking your opponent's concealed resources as to seeking your own. Candidate moves should be identified not only for yourself but also for your opponent.

The following example, in which the evaluation of the position changed more than once, convincingly demonstrates the fatal consequences of not paying attention to one's opponent's counter-chances.

Sax-Kovacevic
Sarajevo 1982



Q. 1.20 Where should the rook retreat?

White's pawns are weak. Black should have played simply 32 . . . ♖b1!, intending 33 . . . ♘xc5 with a big advantage.

Kovacevic chose the tempting **32 . . . ♖b4?!**, setting a little trap: if 33 ♗xc6? then 33 . . . ♖h4+! 34 ♔g3 ♖g4+ 35 ♔h3 bxc6. But he overlooked the counter-punch:

33 g4!

With the idea 33 . . . fxg4 34 ♗xc6, which leads to a much sharper struggle.

33 . . . ♔c7!
34 gxf5 ♘xc5

Sounder, as Kovacevic pointed out, was 34 . . . ♖xa4 35 ♘b3 ♖b4 36 fxe6 ♘xe6 37 ♖e3 ♘dxc5 38 ♘xc5 ♘xc5 39 ♔g3 h6 with advantage to Black.

35 ♖c2!



Q. 1.21 How should Black continue?

In Kovacevic's opinion he should now have contented himself with the equal position arising after 35 . . . b6 36 ♘xc6 ♖xa4. In fact, the move in the game, 35 . . . ♘xa4?, allowed Sax to seize the initiative with tactical play. Also mistaken would have been 35 . . . ♘fd7? 36 ♗xc6!? (also possible is 36 fxe6 ♘xe6 37 ♘xc6, but not 37 ♗xc6? ♘d4) 36 . . . bxc6 37 fxe6 ♖xa4? 38 e7!.

But Kovacevic had not considered all his candidate moves. There was one other possibility: 35 . . . ♘e4!. By blocking the line of action of his opponent's dangerous bishop, Black defends against tactical tricks on the squares b7 and c6. Apparently it is best for White to play 36 h6! gxh6 37 f6 ♖xa4 38 ♘c4, but then there follows 38 . . . ♘c5! (weaker is 38 . . . ♘g5 39 ♗g2 and 40 f4) 39 ♔g3 ♘g6 with the threat 40 . . . b5, or 39 ♗g2 ♘d3 40 ♗f1

♖xc4! 41 ♖xc4 ♘xe5 when Black retains an advantage.

35 ... ♘xa4?

36 ♘xb7?!

Kovacevic wrongly gave this move two exclamation marks in the 33rd volume of *Informator*. After 36 ... ♖xb7! 37 ♗xc6 (37 fxe6 ♔d8 38 ♗xc6 ♖b4) it is not good to play 37 ... ♘b6? 38 fxe6! ♘xe6 39 ♗d5+, but the simple reply 37 ... exf5! would secure equality for Black.

A different combination would have maintained some winning chances for White: 36 ♗xc6! bxc6 37 fxe6 ♘xe6 (37 ... c5 38 e7 ♖b8 39 ♖c4!) 38 ♖xc6+ ♔d7 39 ♖d6+ ♔c8 40 ♖xe6 ♖h4+ 41 ♔g3 ♖xh5 42 ♖e7.

36 ... ♔xb7?

37 ♖xc6 ♖f4

38 fxe6! ♘xe6

39 ♗g2 ♖xf2

39 ... ♖h4+ 40 ♔g3 ♖xh5 41 ♖xe6+ ♔c7 42 f4 and Black has a lost position.

40 ♖xe6+ ♔c8

41 ♔g3 ♖c2

Bad is 41 ... ♖f7? 42 ♖a6.

42 ♖d6 ♘c5

43 e6 ♔c7

44 e7 ♖e2

45 ♖c6+ ♔d7

46 ♖xc5 ♔xe7

Thus White has won a piece and now has a right to reckon on victory. But the adventures in this game are by no means over.

47 ♗f3 ♖e1

48 ♔f4 ♖f1

49 ♖c8 ♔f7

50 ♖h8 ♖f2

51 ♔g3 ♖b2

52 ♔f4

52 ♗d5+ ♔f6 53 ♖xh7? ♖b8! with a draw.

52 ... ♖f2

53 ♔g4 ♖d2

54 ♗e4 ♖d4

55 ♔f4 ♖d1



Q. 1.22 Is it not time to take the pawn on h7?

White has a winning position. The simplest is 56 ♔g3 followed by ♗xh7; also strong is 56 ♔e5 ♖e1 57 ♖c8 ♖e2 58 ♖c7+ ♔f8 59 ♔d5.

Of course, 56 ♖xh7? ♔g8 would be a mistake, but why not take the pawn with the bishop? This is precisely what Sax played, having evidently overlooked his opponent's ingenious defence.

56 ♗xh7? g5+!!

57 hxg6+

57 ♔xg5 ♔g7.

57 ... ♔g7
58 ♖g8+ ♔h6

The game soon ended in a draw. Because of the extremely unfortunate position of his bishop, White is unable to profit from his modest lead in material. In the event of an exchange of rooks, an elementary theoretical fortress would arise (such a position was mentioned in the second chapter of *Secrets of Chess Training*, in the section 'The Fortress').

E. 1.10



Black to move

E. 1.11



Black to move

E. 1.12



White to move

E. 1.13



Evaluate 26 ... ♕d6.

The Method of Exclusion

In the third chapter of *Secrets of Chess Training*, in the section devoted to the playing-out of studies, I stressed the exceptional importance of the method of exclusion for saving time and effort when taking decisions. *Now and then, it is quite difficult for us to calculate the consequences of the strongest move—it is simpler to convince ourselves that all other*

moves are bad or in any case noticeably weaker. As a result of such an examination, we come to a definite conclusion about the move that needs to be played.

It is clear that, in order to employ the method of exclusion without making a mistake, it is essential to cultivate the skills discussed in the previous sections of this book. First we identify all the candidate moves which make sense, and then we look carefully for our opponent's strongest replies, which force us to discard most of the candidate moves; and if, as a result, only one unrefuted possibility remains, then that is the one we should choose. Therefore exercises for training taking the 'method of exclusion' as their theme simultaneously facilitate the development of the two skills indicated above.

Arkhipkin–Dvoretsky
USSR Cup, Ordzhonikidze 1978



Wary of an attack on my king, I did not wish to allow the exchange of my dark-squared bishop, which is protecting my kingside. Therefore I began to calculate variations associated with the move **21 ... ♗d4!**, and this is what I eventually played. After 22 ♘g3 ♖ed8! 23 ♗xa6?! bxa6 24 ♘e2 ♕h6 25 ♕e4?! (it was necessary to transpose into a roughly equal four-rook ending) 25 ... ♗f6 26 ♖c7 ♔g8! 27 b4 ♕d2 Black seized the initiative and eventually won the game.

When choosing my 21st move I was obliged to consider my opponent's most active replies, involving an attack on the bishop at d4. It is easy to see that neither 22 ♖c4 ♖ad8! nor 22 ♖fd1 ♖ed8 is at all dangerous. But after **22 ♖cd1!?** things are rather more complicated.



Q. 1.23 What should Black play?

White has two threats: 23 ♗xa6 and 23 ♗b5 ♖ed8 24 ♖xd4. I realised first that attempts to defend the bishop with one of my

rooks could be easily refuted: 22 ... ♖ad8? 23 ♗b5 winning the exchange; 22 ... ♖ed8? 23 ♗xa6 bxa6 24 ♖xd4! ♖xd4 25 ♕h8+ ♔e7 26 ♕xa8 ♕xe4 27 ♕xa7+ and 28 ♕xa6 with two extra pawns for White.

Then I subjected knight moves to examination. After 22 ... ♘b4? 23 ♗b5 ♗ed8 24 ♖xd4! ♖xd4 25 ♕h8+ ♔e7 26 ♕xa8 ♕xe4 27 ♕xa7 White comes out a pawn up. Still worse is 22 ... ♘c5? 23 ♗b5 ♖ed8 24 ♖xd4!.

But I could not succeed in refuting the move **22 ... ♘c7!**, and this seemed to me to be sufficient reason for deciding to play 21 ... ♗d4!.

The list of candidate moves that I considered was not exhaustive. At this stage of preliminary calculation I did not need to study all the available possibilities—it was sufficient to find one sound defence. Afterwards I examined the other continuations and convinced myself that they were all considerably weaker than 22 ... ♘c7!.

Bad is 22 ... ♗f6? 23 ♗xa6 bxa6 24 ♖d7, when the only defence against mate, 24 ... ♕h6, leads to the loss of a piece. On 22 ... ♗e5? a strong continuation is 23 ♗xa6 bxa6 24 ♘c5. In the event of 22 ... e5? the simplest is 23 ♘d6.

It is dangerous to take the pawn on b2: 22 ... ♗xb2?! 23 ♖b1 ♕e5 (23 ... ♘b4 24 ♗b5) 24 ♘d2! with the threat 25 ♘c4.

What do we still have to consider? There is the move 22 ... ♕e5?!, but then 23 ♕h8+ ♔e7 24 ♕h4+ is unpleasant, and if 24 ... ♔f8 then 25 ♗xa6 bxa6 26 ♘g5. The last try is 22 ... ♗b6?!, in response to which a line worth considering is 23 ♘d6!? ♕xd6 24 ♗xa6 ♗xf2+ 25 ♔h1 (but not 25 ♔xf2?! ♕c5+!) 25 ... ♕xa6 26 ♖xf2, or 24 ... ♕c7 25 ♖c1 ♕f4 26 ♗xb7 ♖ab8 27 ♗c6 with advantage to White.

This results in a curious picture: Black has eleven (!) possibilities to choose from, but only one of them is playable. It was still necessary to find the best continuation in each of the other lines, so that this example is perhaps not so much on the theme of the 'method of exclusion', as on the theme 'candidate moves'.

A somewhat different situation—and, incidentally, highly typical and instructive—could have arisen in the following game.

Yusupov–Timman
3rd game, Candidates Quarter-Final, Tilburg 1986

1	**d4**	**♘f6**
2	**c4**	**e6**
3	**♘f3**	**b6**
4	**a3**	**c5**
5	**d5**	**♗a6**
6	**♕c2**	**exd5**

7	**cxd5**	**g6**
8	**♘c3**	**♗g7**
9	**g3**	**0-0**
10	**♗g2**	**d6**
11	**0-0**	**♖e8**
12	**♗f4**	

In the fifth game of the match Yusupov improved on White's play: 12 ♖e1 ♘bd7 13 h3! (but not 13 e4? in view of 13 . . . ♘g4!) 13 . . . ♘e5 14 ♘xe5 ♖xe5 15 e4 ♖e8 16 ♗e3 ♘d7 17 f4 c4, and now the standard positional pawn sacrifice 18 e5! dxe5 19 d6 ♖c8 20 f5 gave him a lasting initiative.

12	**. . .**	**♕e7**
13	**♖fe1**	**♘bd7**

A mistake now would be 14 e4? ♘g4!, since, after it reaches e5, the knight will have the weak d3-square firmly in its sights. The game continued instead: 14 ♖ad1 ♘e4! 15 ♕a4 ♗xc3 (better, apparently, than 15 . . . ♘xc3 16 bxc3 ♗b7 17 ♖d3) 16 bxc3 ♗b7 17 ♖d3 f5 18 ♘d2 ♘xd2! 19 ♗xd2 ♘e5 with roughly equal chances.

Yusupov could have played:

14	**♕a4!?**	**♗b7**
15	**♘b5**	

In this case Timman would have had to solve an extremely difficult problem by adopting the method of exclusion.

(*see following diagram*)

Q. 1.24 How should Black continue?

The pawn on d6 is *en prise*, and



White also threatens 16 ♘c7. It is simplest to parry both threats with 15 . . . ♘e5, but it is not desirable to play this—after an exchange on e5 the position will look unpleasant for Black. What are the other possibilities? Capturing the pawn on d5 with the knight, or sacrificing the exchange with 15 . . . ♘e4.

Let us first examine 15 . . . ♘xd5. The variation 16 ♘xd6 ♘xf4 17 ♕xf4 ♗xf3 seems quite alright for Black (18 exf3 ♕xe1+; 18 ♘xe8 ♗xg2 19 ♘xg7 ♗b7 20 ♕c7 ♕e4 21 f3 ♕c6). But by looking carefully at the opponent's resources it is possible to find a refutation: 18 ♗xf3!! ♗e5 19 ♕d2 ♗xd6 20 ♗xa8 ♖xa8 21 ♖ad1, and White wins the exchange. He also has a second solution: 16 ♗xd6 ♕f6 17 e4, and if 17 . . . a6 then 18 ♘c7! ♘xc7 19 ♕xd7 ♖ac8 20 ♗xc7 ♖e7 21 e5!.

It looks tempting to play the positional exchange sacrifice 15 . . . ♘e4, based on the variation 16 ♘c7 ♗xb2 17 ♘xe8 ♕xe8!

(weaker is 17 . . . ♗xa1 18 ♘xd6! ♘xd6 19 ♖xa1 with advantage to White) 18 ♖ab1 ♗g7 with an unclear position. The refutation of this idea is not immediately apparent, but nonetheless it is there: 16 ♘d2!! ♘xd2 (16 . . . ♘df6 17 ♘xe4 ♘xe4 18 ♗xe4 ♕xe4 19 ♕xe4 ♖xe4 20 ♘xd6) 17 ♘xd6!.

So that only leaves the modest move **15 . . . ♘e5!**, which is the one we didn't really want to play. But at least it doesn't lose by force. Here the method of exclusion is seen in its purest form. Incidentally, on examination it turns out that our first impression of the positional defects of this move was considerably exaggerated. There is no obvious way for White to get a clear advantage. Here is a possible variation: 16 ♘xe5 dxe5 17 d6 ♕d7 18 ♗xb7 ♕xb7 19 ♗g5 ♕c6! 20 ♕c4 (20 ♖ad1 a6 21 ♘c3 ♕xa4 22 ♘xa4 ♘d7) 20 . . . ♖ed8! 21 ♖ad1 a6 22 ♘c7 ♖a7 and White's attack looks like it has reached a dead-end.

Yusupov declined to play 14 ♕a4 precisely because of 15 . . . ♘e5!. While one may admire the depth and accuracy of his evaluation of the position, from a practical point of view I think he was, all the same, wrong. Black would have had a very difficult choice to make and Timman could easily have deviated from the right course. After 14 ♖ad1 the path to equality was more obvious.

The following example shows how adopting the method of exclusion in practice can sometimes be far from easy.

Furman–Dvoretsky
USSR Ch., 1st League, Tbilisi 1973

43
B



Q. 1.25 How should Black defend?

Playing on in this position—a pawn down and with a bad bishop on g7—would be completely hopeless. The only chances of saving the game were offered by the move played, **28 . . . ♗f6!**, with the idea of exchanging bishops after 29 . . . ♗g5.

Q. 1.26 How should White reply?

At this point Furman thought for a long time. In the event of 29 ♗xh6 ♕xe2 30 ♖xe2 ♖xb4 Black's pieces come alive, and

White has to reckon with the transfer of the bishop ... ♗f6–d8–b6 and the breakthrough ... f7–f5. It is understandable that White wished to find something more convincing.

Furman's attention was attracted by the tactical idea 29 ♘e3 ♕xe4 30 ♕a6 (useless is 30 ♘g4 ♕xe2 31 ♘xf6+ ♔g7). The knight and the pawn on d6 are both attacked; bad is 30 ... ♘b6? 31 ♕a7. But the intermediate move 30 ... ♕d4! saves Black, since White cannot play 31 ♕xd6?? because of 31 ... ♖b6!.

If White defends the pawn on e4 with 29 f3, Black replies 29 ... ♗g5 30 ♘e3 (30 ♗xg5 ♕xe2 31 ♖xe2 hxg5 and 32 ... ♖xb4) 30 ... ♕xb2, maintaining entirely adequate counterplay.

Eventually Furman played 29 g3 (evidently having in mind to answer 29 ... ♗g5 with 30 f4). Undoubtedly he had not thought this move through seriously, but had chosen it by the 'method of exclusion', having first rejected the other possibilities: 29 ♗xh6, 29 ♘e3 and 29 f3. But in fact the move he played was not better at all. After 29 ... ♗g5 Furman realised that opening the game up with 30 f4? exf4 31 gxf4 ♗h4 would be too dangerous. There followed: 30 ♗xg5 ♕xe2 31 ♖xe2 hxg5 32 f3 ♖xb4 and a draw was agreed.

Having convinced himself that all the other continuations promised him nothing, White should have settled for an ending with an extra pawn after:

29	**♗xh6!**	**♕xe2**
30	**♖xe2**	**♖xb4**
31	**♗d2**	

It would not have been easy for Black to get a draw. For example: 31 ... ♖b1 32 ♖e1 ♗d8 (32 ... ♘c5 33 ♘c3) 33 ♘e3 ♖b2 34 ♗c1 etc.

E. 1.14



White to play

E. 1.15

White to play

E. 1.16



Black to play

E. 1.17



Black to play

The Double Attack

If you chase after two hares, you will not even catch one.
Clearly not a chess proverb

The double attack or, as it is often called, the 'fork', is one of the most powerful tactical devices. This is quite understandable: it is easier for your opponent to repel one threat than two at once, and such threats often arise in different areas of the front line.

Dvoretsky–Zaitsev
USSR Ch. Semi-Final, Odessa 1972



Q. 1.27 Evaluate 47 ♖xc7.
Excessive greed would turn out to be a grave mistake. On 47 ♖xc7? Black would reply 47 . . . ♖a1+ 48 ♔f1 ♕d8! with two threats: 49 . . . ♕xc7 and 49 . . . ♖xf1+ 50 ♔xf1 ♕d1+. After the forced 51 ♕b3 ♕xc7 52 ♕xb4 ♖c1 Black would have quite good winning chances.

In the game there followed:

47 ♕d3!

Threatening the double attack 48 ♕d5+.

47 . . . c6

48 c5!

Again threatening a double attack with 49 ♕b3(c4)+.

Black resigned.

Kirpichnikov–Dvoretsky
USSR Team Ch., Moscow 1966

1	**e4**	**e6**
2	**d4**	**d5**
3	**♘c3**	**♗b4**
4	**♗d3**	**dxe4**
5	**♗xe4**	**♘f6**
6	**♗d3**	**c5**
7	**dxc5**	**♘bd7**
8	**♗d2**	

The game Shekhtman–Dvoretsky (quickplay tournament, Moscow 1984) continued in curious fashion: 8 c6 ♘c5!? 9 cxb7 ♗xb7 10 ♗b5+ ♔e7 11 ♕xd8+ ♖hxd8 12 ♘f3 ♘ce4 13 0-0 ♘xc3 14 bxc3 ♗c5 15 ♘e5 ♖ac8 16 ♖b1 ♘e4 17 ♗d3 ♗a8 18 c4 f6 with an excellent game for Black.

8	**...**	**♘xc5**
9	**♗c4**	

Equality results after 9 ♗b5+ ♘cd7 10 ♘f3 a6 11 ♗d3 0-0 12 0-0 b6 13 ♘e4 ♗e7 14 ♕e2 ♗b7 (Averbakh–Botvinnik, USSR Ch., Moscow 1955).

9	**...**	**0-0**
10	**♘f3**	

49
B

Q. 1.28 How can Black simplify the game?

I feared that after the natural 10 ... ♕c7 11 ♕e2, followed by castling on either side and then a2–a3, the two bishops would guarantee White the better chances. Having noticed a little combination on the theme of the double attack, which would allow several pieces to be exchanged, I played it without hesitation.

10	**...**	**♘ce4!**
11	**♘xe4**	**♘xe4**
12	**♗xb4**	**♕b6**
13	**0-0**	

Attempts to refute the combination would fail: 13 ♕d4 ♕xb4+ 14 c3 ♕xb2, or 13 ♕e2 ♕xb4+ 14 c3 ♘xc3!.

13	**...**	**♕xb4**
14	**♕d4**	**♘d6!**

The game transposes into a roughly equal ending.

15	**♗b3**	**♕xd4**
16	**♘xd4**	**♖d8**
17	**♖fd1**	**♔f8**
18	**f4**	**♗d7**
19	**♘f3**	**♗e8**
20	**♘e5**	$\frac{1}{2}-\frac{1}{2}$

Though quite a short game, this example perfectly illustrates how useful a double attack can be, even in a situation which might still be regarded as an opening.

The following game demonstrates once again that double attacks are considerably more dangerous than the simple variety, though this time the setting is a complex middlegame.

Yusupov–Agzamov
USSR Young Masters Ch., Baku 1979



Q. 1.29 What should White play?

By choosing 23 ♕xe5?! ♗xe5 24 ♗g4, White created the threat of 25 ♖xc8. This is not so simple to repel: Black loses after 24 . . . ♔h8? 25 ♗xe6, or 24 . . . ♔f7? 25 ♖e1 ♔f6 26 ♗xe6! ♔xe6 27 f4. The only saving move is the counter 24 . . . h5! 25 ♗h3 (25 ♖xc8 hxg4) 25 . . . ♔h7. Now 26 ♗xe6 ♗xe6 27 ♖xf8 ♗xb2 leads to a non-standard position in which the two black bishops and passed pawns are barely weaker than the white rooks.

With the move 26 ♖d2 Yusupov renewed the threat of 27 ♗xe6. This should have been parried with the awkward 26 . . . ♖g8! (or 26 . . . ♖h8!), after which White would apparently have had no advantage. But Agzamov could not stand the pressure and played 26 . . . c5?, and after 27 ♗xe6 ♗xe6 28 ♖xf8 c3 29 bxc3 ♗xc3 30 ♖c2 ♗d4 (30 . . . b4 31 ♖xc3) 31 ♖b8 ♗c4 (31 . . . b4 32 ♖b5 and 33 ♖xc5) 32 ♔g2 White converted his material advantage into a win.

Let us return to the position before the exchange of queens and try the move **23 ♕c6!**, pointed out by Yusupov immediately after the game. Two 'long' threats have been created at once: a) 24 ♗g4 followed by ♖xc8; b) 24 ♖b8, and then ♖xb5 or ♕a8. The main variation is:

23 . . . ♗e7
24 ♗g4

But not 24 ♖b8 ♕f5 25 ♕a8 e5 when play is unclear.

24 . . . ♗d6

On 24 . . . ♔h8 strong is 25 ♖b8 ♕f6 26 ♖f1, but not 26 ♖d2? because of the double attack 26 . . . ♕g5!.

25 ♖b8

25 ♖xd6? ♕e1+.

25 . . . ♕f6
26 ♖f1

And White has a winning position.

Besides purely tactical double attacks, also highly effective are moves with two purposes, each of which may be of a strategic nature and not associated with a direct attack on enemy pieces. This next example illustrates how powerful a double attack based purely on positional factors can be.

Dvoretsky–Shamkovich
USSR Ch. Semi-Final, Voronezh 1973

51
W



Q. 1.30 What should White play?

Black wishes to occupy the centre with the moves ... e7–e5, ... ♘a5–c6 etc. In order not to fall into a positional bind, it was essential that I find some plan of my own. I should really like to play d3–d4, but how is this to be achieved? On 17 ♘ed2 there follows 17 ... e5 18 ♘c4 ♘c6, and in the event of 17 ♕f4 my opponent has the excellent reply 17 ... f6!.

17 ♕b1!

With this modest move White creates two positional threats at once: 18 d4 (the knight on e4 is now defended) and 18 b4.

17 ... e5

If 17 ... ♘c6 then 18 d4, but worth considering was 17 ... ♗xe4!?.

18 b4 cxb4
19 ♕xb4 ♘b7
20 ♘d6! a5
21 ♕a3 ♘dc5

21 ... ♘bc5 22 d4!. By now continuing 22 d4! exd4 23 ♘xb7 ♗xb7 24 ♖xd4, White could have obtained a positional advantage in connection with the possibilities of an attack on the kingside (24 ... ♕f6 25 ♖f4; 24 ... ♕e7 25 ♖e3). Regrettably I played less forcefully and the game ended in a draw.

For a long time a game stuck in my memory in which, having achieved a truly overwhelming position, I played carelessly and allowed my opponent to create two serious threats literally out of nothing.

Dvoretsky–Anikaev
USSR Young Masters Ch., Batumi 1969

52
W



27 ♗xg6! ♗xd4

In the event of 27 ... ♗xh3 White would have a pleasant choice between 28 ♖xc8 ♖xc8 29

♕xd5, and 28 gxh3 fxg6 29 ♕xd5+.

28	**♘xd4**	**♕xd4**
29	**♗b1**	**b6?!**
30	**♕c2**	**♖fd8**

Only here did Anikaev notice that 30 ... ♕g7 loses immediately, in view of 31 ♖xc8 ♖xc8 32 ♖xe6!.

31	**♕h7+**	**♔f8**
32	**♖xc8**	**♖xc8**
33	**♕xh6+**	**♕g7**
34	**♕f4?**	

Of course, White must play for an attack. In the event of an exchange of queens the passed d-pawn and the open file for the rook would ensure definite counter-chances for my opponent despite the fact that he is a pawn down. But I should have preferred the simple 34 ♕h4!, intending ♔h2 and ♖e3. I supposed that the exchange of my pawn on h3 for the pawn on d5 would deprive my opponent of any hopes of counterplay, but I underestimated how much my king's pawn cover would be weakened.

34	**...**	**♗xh3**
35	**♕d6+**	**♔g8**
36	**♕xd5**	**♗e6**
37	**♕d6?!**	

53
B



Two dangerous threats have been created at once: 38 ... ♖c1 and 38 ... ♗d5, and it is not at all easy to parry them. It was probably best to reply passively: 38 ♕d1 ♗d5 39 f3, but, then too, the weakening of the dark squares around my king would have given my opponent quite good counter-chances.

38	**♗e4?**	**♖c1**
39	**♖d1**	

54
B



Q. 1.31 What should Black play?

Black's position looks utterly hopeless, but Anikaev had not lost his composure and he found a brilliant reply.

37 ... ♕g5!!

Q. 1.32 What did Anikaev play now?

There followed a spectacular move on the theme of interference:

39 ... ♗d5!!

I was lucky to be able to find a drawing line:

40	**♕b8+!**	**♔g7**
41	**♖xc1**	**♕xc1+**
42	**♔h2**	**♕h6+**

42 . . . ♗xe4? 43 ♕e5+.

43	**♔g1**	**♕c1+**
44	**♔h2**	**♕h6+**
45	**♔g1**	**♕c1+**

And here we signed a peace treaty.

Gutman–Razuvaev
USSR Cup, Tbilisi 1976

1	**d4**	**d5**
2	**c4**	**e6**
3	**♘c3**	**♘f6**
4	**cxd5**	**exd5**
5	**♗g5**	**♗e7**
6	**e3**	**0-0**
7	**♗d3**	**♘bd7**
8	**♘ge2**	**♖e8**

Black has not played . . . c7–c6, as he is waiting to see where the white king is going to castle. If White castles long, Black's usual plan is . . . ♘f8, . . . ♗e6 and . . . c5 (perhaps after first playing . . . a6 and . . . ♖c8). In this case the move . . . c7–c6 turns out to be a loss of a tempo.

9	**0-0**	**♘f8**

White has castled short, so it was now time to play 9 . . . c6.

10	**b4!?**	

E. 1.18 Does it make sense to take the pawn on b4?

The Trapped Piece

Recent games played with one's 'own' openings constitute an important source of opening information. In publications such as *Informator* or *New in Chess* games are provided with annotations, usually brief but at times highly detailed. Such notes can make work on an opening substantially easier, elucidating some important details. But, on the other hand, they can also lead one astray—indeed these games are as a rule annotated in some haste and almost inevitably contain mistakes. One should act according to the ancient Russian principle: "Trust, but verify!", by testing the soundness of the 'book' recommendations for oneself.

Grandmaster Yusupov once investigated via *Informator* the following game.

55
B



Taimanov–Borkovsky
Wroclaw 1979

1	**♘f3**	**d5**
2	**b3**	**♗g4**
3	**e3**	**e5**
4	**h3**	**♗xf3**
5	**♕xf3**	**♘f6**
6	**♗b2**	**♘bd7**
7	**c4**	

56
B



Black chose 7 . . . e4, and after 8 ♕d1 ♘c5?! (stronger was 8 . . . dxc4) 9 b4! ♘d3+ 10 ♗xd3 exd3 11 cxd5 ♘xd5 12 a3 found himself in a somewhat inferior position.

Was it not possible, by playing 7 . . . c6, for Black to strengthen his centre? In his notes to the game Taimanov answers this question in the negative and quotes the following variation:

7	**. . .**	**c6?**
8	**cxd5**	**cxd5**
9	**♗b5!**	**♗d6**
10	**♘c3**	**e4**
11	**♕f5**	

Taimanov, whose exclamation and question marks are given above, assessed this position as clearly better for White.

Q. 1.33 Find the mistake in the Grandmaster's analysis.

Yusupov saw that the final position in this variation—in which in Taimanov's opinion White has the advantage—does, on the contrary, actually favour Black.

11	**. . .**	**g6!!**
12	**♗xd7+**	

Playing 12 ♘xd5 gxf5 13 ♘xf6+ ♔e7, or 13 ♗xf6 ♕a5, would also not help.

12	**. . .**	**♔f8!**
13	**♕g5**	**h6**
14	**♕h4**	**g5**

A superb combination on the theme of trapping the enemy queen.

It is very important not to fall under the spell of one's own discoveries. Having considered the position soberly, Artur concluded that after 7 . . . c6 8 cxd5 cxd5 White is still entitled to claim some advantage, by choosing instead of 9 ♗b5?! the more restrained 9 ♘c3.

Of course, a critical approach is necessary not only towards analysis done by others, but also to one's own. Here is an experience from my own games in which I allowed my imagination to run away from me, with predictable results.

Alterman–Dvoretsky
USSR Ch. Semi-Final,
Voronezh 1973



Tempting is the positional pawn sacrifice 25 . . . ♗f4, as a result of which Black would get the excellent square e5 for his knight. Anyway, there was nothing better for me, so it was possible to play this without any calculation. Nevertheless, I looked a little more deeply and saw a tactical possibility to transpose into a winning—as it appeared to me—minor-piece ending.

25	**. . .**	**♗f4!?**
26	**♗xf4**	**exf4**
27	**♘xf4**	**♘xf4**
28	**♖xf4**	**♘e5**
29	**♕g3**	**♖xf4**
30	**♖xf4**	

Q. 1.34 What should Black play?

Now was the right time to pause and quietly examine my preliminary calculations. It is clear that after 30 . . . ♖f8!? Black does not stand worse. However, neither is



he better: he has full compensation for the sacrificed pawn, but no more than that. Realising this, I was unable to contain my excitement and almost without pausing continued my intended forced variation.

I am not the first and, I fear, not the last player who has made such a mistake. This is what Botvinnik wrote about one episode in his game against Smyslov from the tournament in Groningen in 1946:

"Here, in calculating the variation that followed, I came to the conclusion that it led to a winning ending with an extra pawn, and so, not bothering to examine the variation any further (after each move by Black)—quite unforgivable carelessness—I quickly played the moves I had planned."

30	**. . .**	**♖xh4?**
31	**♖xh4**	**♕xh4**
32	**♕xh4**	**♘f3+**
33	**♔f2**	**♘xh4**
34	**♔g3**	**g5**
35	**e5**	**dxe5**
36	**d6**	**♔f6**

I had expected only 37 ♔g4 ♘g2. The next move, incidentally, with a knight on the edge of the board, is entirely standard, but for some reason it fell outside my field of vision.

37 ♗e4!

It is all over! The knight cannot now free itself from the trap.

37 ... ♔e6
38 ♔g4 ♔xd6
39 ♔xg5

And Black soon resigned.

Tukmakov–Dolmatov

USSR Ch. Premier League, Odessa 1989

59
B



Q. 1.35 How should Black continue?

The threat of h4–h5–h6 looks very dangerous. In order to parry it, Dolmatov retreated the knight from g6 in advance, but in so doing he gave the enemy knight the important square e5. After 27 ... ♘f8? 28 ♘e5 ♕c7 29 ♕d2 ♘g6 30 ♕b4 ♕d8 (30 ... a5 31 ♕d6) 31 ♕a4 a5 32 b4 f4! 33 g4! axb4 34 ♕xb4 ♘xh4 35 ♗h3! g5 36 ♕e7, Tukmakov obtained a big advantage (although he was subsequently unable to convert it into victory).

White's threat could have been very effectively repelled with the spectacular move **27 ... h6!!**. Not playable then is 28 ♕xg6? ♗c6 followed by 29 ... ♗e8, when White loses his queen for just two minor pieces. On 28 ♕e3 there would follow 28 ... ♔f7 (or 28 ... ♗c8!? and 29 ... ♗d7), intending 29 ... ♕c7, and possibly ... ♘h5. Apparently, Black could have maintained the equilibrium in this way.

Having found the idea ... h7–h6!! it is natural to consider in what situation it is best to play it—it was indeed possible to wait until White played h4–h5. But I think there would have been no point in postponing it, as can be seen from the following possible variations: 27 ... ♗c6? 28 h5 h6 29 ♕e3 winning (but not 29 ♕c1? ♘xh5 30 ♕xc6 ♕xg3+ 31 ♔f1 ♘f4); 27 ... ♕c8?! (reckoning on 28 h5? h6!) 28 ♘e5! with a clear advantage; 27 ... ♗c8?! 28 ♕e3 (28 h5? h6) 28 ... ♕c7? (now it is essential to play 28 ... h6!) 29 ♘e5 ♘xe5 30 dxe5 ♘d7 31 ♗d6 ♕c2 32 ♕g5.

Regrettably, this is not the only time Dolmatov has not noticed that he could have trapped an enemy piece. You will find two more examples in the Exercises.

E. 1.19

60
B



Black to move

E. 1.20

61
W



White to move

E. 1.21

62
B



Black to move

The Strength of the Passed Pawn

When a game reaches an ending with a limited number of pieces, there is virtually no chance of mating one's opponent. *The main theme of the endgame is the process of promoting pawns into queens. Pawns in the endgame gain in strength considerably, especially if they are passed.*

Dvoretsky–Rusakov
Moscow 1964

63
W



Q. 1.36 What should White play?

Is the pawn on c7 strong or weak? This depends on whether the black king can manage to approach it. For example, in the variation 31 g3? ♔e7 32 ♗h3 ♗d7 the pawn will definitely be lost. It is essential to support it with tactics.

31 a4! ♗a6

If 31 . . . ♗xa4 then 32 d4 (with

the threat of 33 ♗a6) 32 . . . b5 33 g3, intending ♗h3 or ♗g2–b7. On 31 . . . ♗d7 then a decisive line is 32 d4 ♖a8 (32 . . . ♖e8 33 ♗b5) 33 ♗a6 ♗c8 34 ♗b5 a6 35 ♗c6 ♖a7 36 ♖e1!.

32 g3 ♖e8

In the event of 32 . . . f5 33 ♗h3 g6 34 g4 ♖e8 35 gxf5 ♗c8 36 ♖f1! there is no square for the black king to retreat to (36 . . . ♔g8 37 f6!).

33 d4! ♗c8

34 ♗b5

Now it is clear that White has a firm grip on the initiative.

34 . . . ♖e4

35 ♔d3 f5

36 ♗c6 ♖e7



37 d5!!

"But why did you give up such a pawn?", exclaimed Grandmaster Simagin in amazement when I showed him this ending. Of course, only a moment later he understood everything. The pawn which now perishes is replaced by a new passed pawn on d6, which together with the bishop takes away all the surrounding squares from the enemy pieces. Perhaps giving two exclamation marks to the move White played is a little excessive, particularly since there are certainly other ways to win. But in fact the author was then merely a first-category player, and for someone with such a lowly rating it is not easy to decide to sacrifice—on the basis of purely positional considerations—the 'pride and joy' of one's position—the pawn on c7.

37 . . . ♖xc7

38 d6 ♖f7

39 ♔d4

Also strong was 39 ♗d5.

39 . . . ♗d7

40 ♔d5 ♔e8

41 ♗xd7+ ♖xd7

42 ♖c8+ ♖d8

43 ♖c7

The position which has now arisen is an excellent illustration of Nimzowitsch's thesis (although at that time I had not been able to read his books, as one rarely came across them in libraries): "*The absolute possession of the seventh rank, combined with distant passed pawns, leads as a rule to a win*".

43 . . . a6

43 . . . ♖d7 44 ♔e6.

44 ♔e6 ♖b8

45 ♖xg7 ♔f8

46 ♖xh7

Black resigned.

Combinations based on the strength of passed pawns are not encountered only in the endgame.

Panczyk–Yusupov
Warsaw 1985

65
B



Q. 1.37 What should Black play?

White has launched a desperate attack on the king. On 17 ... ♘xh5? he had planned 18 ♗xf7+! ♔xf7 (or 18 ... ♔h8 19 ♗xh5 ♖e5 20 cxd4 ♘xd4 21 ♗b2) 19 ♕xh5+ ♔g8 (19 ... ♔h8 20 ♗xh6!) 20 ♖xg7+! ♔xg7 21 ♗xh6+ ♔f6 22 ♗g5+ winning. No use either is 17 ... ♘g4? because of the simple 18 h3!.

Yusupov refutes his opponent's onslaught by sacrificing a piece for two pawns, one of which will be a most dangerous passed pawn.

17 ... ♗g4!
18 ♘xf6+ ♕xf6
18 ... ♖xg4 ♘xg4 wins.
19 ♖xg4 dxc3
20 ♗e3
20 ♖f4 c2.
20 ... c2

66
W

21 ♕f1

Q. 1.38 What should Black play in reply to the move in the game, and to 21 ♕e1?

In the event of 21 ♕e1 the tempting 21 ... ♘e5?! is unconvincing. White has two possible rejoinders: 22 ♖f4 ♕xf4 23 ♗xf4 ♘d3 24 ♕xe8+ ♖xe8 25 g3!, and 22 ♖d4 ♘f3+ (22 ... ♘d3 23 ♖xd3 ♕xa1 24 ♕xa1 c1(♕)+ 25 ♖d1) 23 gxf3 ♕xd4 24 ♗xd4 ♖xe1+ 25 ♖xe1 c1(♕) 26 ♖xc1 ♖xc1+ 27 ♔g2—the consequences of all these variations are totally unclear.

The winning line is 21 ... ♖cd8! (threatening 22 ... ♕xa1!! 23 ♕xa1 ♖d1+) 22 ♗b3 (22

♖c1 ♕b2 wins) 22 . . . ♕b2 23 ♗a4 b5 24 ♗xc2 ♕xc2 25 ♖c1 ♕b3 or 25 . . . ♕f5.

But Artur had already foreseen the spectacular refutation of the move in the game when he began his combination.

21	**. . .**	**♖xe3!!**
22	**fxe3**	**♕xf1+**
23	**♖xf1**	**♘e5**

The threats are 24 . . . c1(♕) and 24 . . . ♘xg4. Despite his extra rook White is defenceless. If, for example, 24 ♗xf7+ then 24 . . . ♔h8! 25 ♖gf4 c1(♕) 26 ♖xc1 ♖xc1+ 27 ♔f2 ♘d3+.

24	**♖gf4**	**c1(♕)**
25	**♖xc1**	**♖xc1+**
26	**♖f1**	**♖xf1+**
27	**♔xf1**	**♘g4!**

White resigned, as he loses a second pawn.

The following classical combination has graced many chess books.

Teichmann–Anonymous
Zürich 1921



67
W

Q. 1.39 What should White play?

No use is 1 ♕f5? (with the threat of 2 ♕xf7+) because of 1 . . . ♗a6(b7)!. Being two pieces down, Teichmann is obliged to barge ahead.

1	**♖xh6!**	**♘xh6**

Also no use was 1 . . . ♖xh6? 2 ♗xf7+, or 1 . . . bxc4? 2 ♖h8+!.

2	**♕g5**	**♘f7**
3	**♕d8+!!**	**♘xd8**
4	**h6**	

In view of the threat 5 h7+, it looks like Black has to resign (and according to some sources, this is what he did).

Q. 1.40 Is Black's position really lost?

In fact it is a bit too early to resign. True, it is unsatisfactory to play 4 . . . ♕f8 because of 5 h7+ ♔f7 (5 . . . ♔xh7 6 gxf8(♕)) 6 gxf8(♕)+ ♔xf8 7 h8(♕)+ ♔e7 8 ♗xe6 ♘dxe6 9 ♕xe5. On the other hand, entirely possible is:

4	**. . .**	**♕d4!!**

Vacating the d6-square for the king.

5	**h7+**	**♔f7**
6	**g8(♕)+**	**♔e7**
7	**h8(♕)**	**♔d6!**

How should one assess this position? In the event of 8 ♗xe6 ♖dxe6, or 8 ♕f8+ ♔c7 9 ♕xd8+ ♔b7, the advantage evidently passes to Black. After I had published my analysis in one of my articles, the chess trainer


68
W

and Candidate Master Yuri Nikonov from Barnaul sent me his analysis showing that this sharpest of skirmishes should objectively end peacefully after

8 ♖g7! ♕xd2!

8 ... ♘b7? 9 ♗xe6 ♘xe6 10 ♕xe6+!!; 8 ... ♗b7? 9 ♕xd8! ♖xd8 10 ♕xd8; 8 ... bxc4? 9 ♕xd8.

9 ♕f8+ ♔c7

10 ♕xd8+ ♔b7

White can do nothing but give perpetual check.

Don't Let your King get in the way of a Combination!

Grandmaster Yusupov once noted at a lesson he gave at our chess school for gifted young players that, when studying Kasparov's games, his attention was attracted by a particular motif which is quite often adopted by the World Champion. Just as an attack is coming to its climax he suddenly makes a very quiet move with his king, and it later turns out that this move was decisive in strengthening the attack. On its previous square the king had been a hindrance, since in certain variations it could have been checked.

An excellent illustration is given at least by the sixteenth game of his third match against Karpov (Leningrad 1986). But Artur could easily choose examples of this theme from his own games.

E. 1.22


69
W

White to move

Yusupov–Magerramov

World Junior Ch. qualifying tournament, Leningrad 1977


70
W

White's passed pawns in the centre are solidly blockaded, but Black's queenside pawns are free to advance. Objectively, White should probably have taken advantage of a convenient opportunity to force a draw with 30 ♘e3!? ♖xe3 (doubtful is 30 . . . ♘b4 at least because of 31 ♕h5) 31 ♘f7+ ♔g8 32 ♘h6+. But Yusupov was out for a win and decided to seek his fortune in a kingside attack.

30 h4!? b4
31 ♔h2!?

Q. 1.41 Why did White play these moves?

Tempting was the piece sacrifice 30 ♘xf6 gxf6 31 ♕g4. But how could the attack have been continued after 31 . . . ♘d7? The aggressive 32 ♖e1 would pose Black insoluble problems if the rook could not be taken with check. Incidentally, with the king on h2 Black also has to reckon with the immediate ♖e1 (without the sacrifice on f6), as the rook cannot be captured in view of the mate in two.

31 . . . a5?

Amazing carelessness! Magerramov does not even attempt to puzzle out White's conception, but quietly advances his pawns. On the basis of this episode one may suppose with a considerable degree of probability that Black was suffering from an extremely serious complaint—continual underestimation of his opponent's resources. It was necessary to parry the threats by means of 31 . . . h6 (freeing the h7-square for the knight) or 31 . . . ♘d7.

32 ♘xf6! gxf6
33 ♕g4 ♘g6

Black loses at once after 33 . . . ♘d7 34 ♖e1!.

34 fxg6 ♕d7
35 ♕f3 ♕e6
36 ♘f7+?

A typical mistake in such situations (correct was 36 ♘f5! with very dangerous threats). *When an attack on the king becomes menacing, the defending side usually attempts to buy himself out of trouble by giving up material. It is important here not to get a bad bargain. Winning material is frequently a natural result of your attack, but it can happen that by being too greedy you grant your opponent the initiative. The attack comes to an end, and your pieces, which had taken up excellent attacking positions, prove to be excluded from the ensuing positional struggle.*

36 . . . ♖xf7
37 gxf7 ♕xf7
38 h5

White has to continue his storm, otherwise he will not be able to cope with the menacing passed pawns on the queenside. But now that the formidable knight has been removed from the

board the success of the attack is problematic.

38 ... b3

38 ... a4!?.

39 h6 a4?

Further confirmation of the 'diagnosis' which I described in the note to Black's 31st move—Magerramov is again not paying the least attention to his opponent's threats. He should have chosen between 39 ... ♕e6 40 ♖g7 f5 and the immediate 39 ... f5.

40 ♖g7 ♕e6

41 ♕g3

The threat is 42 ♖xh7+; on 41 ... ♖g8 decisive is 42 ♖e1 ♕c8 43 ♖xg8+ ♕xg8 44 ♖e8.

Black resigned.

71
W



This position could have arisen in the game Khalifman–Oll, Kiev 1984. White has a clear positional advantage, but it could evaporate after the quiet 1 f4?! ♗d1. On 2 ♕c5 it is a mistake to play 2 ... ♗f3+? because of 3 ♖xf3! exf3+ 4 ♔h3 ♔h6 (4 ... ♕d2 5 ♔g4! ♕d7+ 6 ♗e6! ♕xe6+ 7 f5+) 5 g4 g6 6 g5+ fxg5 7 fxg5+ ♔h5 8 ♕d4. But possible is 2 ... b5 3 ♕xb5 ♕xe3, or 2 ... ♔h6 followed by 3 ... g6.

Q. 1.42 What would happen in the event of 1 ♕c3?

The answer to this question requires deep and careful calculation of variations.

1 ♕c3!? exf3+

2 ♔h3

Unconvincing is 2 ♖xf3 ♕d1.

2 ... ♗f5+

3 g4 ♕g1!

Hopeless are both 3 ... ♗xg4+ 4 ♔xg4 ♕g1+ 5 ♔xf3, and 3 ... ♕xc3 4 gxf5+ ♔xf5 5 bxc3 ♔e4 6 ♗b3 or 6 ♗e6 followed by 7 ♔g3 (less accurate is 6 ♔g3?! ♖c8).

4 gxf5+ ♔h5!?

A double attack — Black threatens both 5 ... ♕xf2 and 5 ... ♕g4 mate. Quite bad would have been 4 ... ♔h6 5 ♖xf3, and on 4 ... ♔g5 a decisive line would be 5 ♕d4! ♕xf2 6 ♕f4+ ♔h5 7 ♗f7+ g6 8 ♗xg6+! hxg6 9 ♕g4+ ♔h6 10 ♕xg6 mate.

5 ♗f7+!

Not 5 ♕d4? ♕xf2 6 ♗f7+ (6 ♕g4+ ♔h6 7 ♕f4+ g5!) 6 ... ♔h6! 7 ♕f4+ g5 8 fxg5+ ♔g7.

5 ... g6

6 ♕d4 ♕xf2

7 ♗xg6+! ♔h6

8 ♕f4+ ♔g7

9 ♕c7+!

And mate is inevitable.

Therefore the move 1 ♕c3 leads to a forced win. So why is it

not adorned with two exclamation marks but with the much more modest exclamation mark followed by a question mark, expressing doubt? The point is that there is a much simpler solution. By removing his king from any checks in advance with 1 ♔h3!, White would have immediately placed his opponent in a hopeless position. Bad is 1 . . . exf3 because of 2 ♖xc2!; on 1 . . . ♔h6 decisive is 2 ♕c3, and on 1 . . . ♗d1—2 ♕c5!.

E. 1.23

72
W

White to move

E. 1.24

73
W



White to move

You Learn by your Mistakes!

Why with the time do I not glance aside
To new-found methods and to compounds strange?
William Shakespeare (Sonnet 76)

Alterman–Dvoretsky
USSR Ch. Semi-Final, Voronezh 1973

74
B



When this position arose I sunk into deep thought for some time. Black clearly stands well, but it is not clear that he has any easy way to seize the initiative.

Q. 1.43 What should White play in reply to 21 . . . ♗f4?

At first, sacrificing a pawn seemed tempting, in connection with the variation 22 ♘xf4 exf4 23 ♗xf4 ♖xf4! 24 ♖xf4 ♕g5+ 25 ♖g4 ♘xg4 26 ♕xg4 ♕e3+ and 27 . . . ♘e5. But I rejected it because of a

counter sacrifice of the exchange: 22 ♖xf4! exf4 23 ♘xf4.

From a positional point of view it would be useful to transfer the knight from d7 to h5, in order to reinforce the threat of invading on f4. But in the event of 21 . . . ♘f6 I would have to reckon with 22 h4. Is it not possible to solve this problem by means of a combination?

21 . . . ♘f6
22 h4 ♘h5
23 hxg5

I also weighed up 23 ♖xf8 ♘xg3 24 ♕e1 ♖xf8 25 ♕xg3 ♗f4 26 ♕h3—Black does not stand badly, although for the time being he cannot apparently achieve anything in particular. But there is some point in going deeper into this line if it turns out that an advantage for Black can be found in the main variation with 23 hxg5.

23 . . . ♘xg3

Now White would lose after 24 gxh6+? ♖xh6, but very strong is 24 ♕e3!. Both knights are *en prise* at once; 24 . . . ♘xf1 25 gxh6+ ♖xh6 26 ♖xf1 gives Black only a rook and a pawn for two minor pieces.

I very much wanted to play 21 . . . ♘f6, so I studied the position arising after 24 ♕e3 for a long time, but still found nothing. I was obliged to play the passive move 21 . . . ♘f7 (vacating the square h6 for the bishop), which led only to an equal game. After 22 h4 ♗h6 23 ♖f2 (23 h5!?) 23 . . . ♘f6 24 ♖af1 ♘h5 25 ♔g4! we arrived at a position analysed earlier in the section 'The Trapped Piece'.

One of the most inventive analysts, Igor Zaitsev, who was playing in the same tournament, became interested in this position. He found an amazing possibility to prepare the transfer of the knight to h5: 21 . . . c4!! 22 ♗xc4 ♘f6 23 h4 ♘h5 24 hxg5 ♘xg3 25 ♕e3 ♘hf5! 26 exf5 ♖h1+ 27 ♔f2 ♘xf5 28 ♕d2. With the bishop on d3 White would have had the simple reply 28 ♗xf5. 28 . . . ♘e3+! 29 ♔xe3 ♕xg5+ 30 ♔d3 e4+ 31 ♔c3 ♖h3+ 32 ♗d3 ♖c8+, and White loses his queen.

Zaitsev's discovery made a strong impression on me. The connection between a combination on the kingside and a *Zwischenzug* on the queenside was completely unexpected. The motivation behind the pawn sacrifice was very subtle—deflection of the bishop from the square f5, a square which was in any case controlled by a white pawn.

Further analysis of this position allowed me to draw another useful conclusion: the effects of good moves can be felt not only in those variations for the sake of which they were made: 21 . . . c4!! 22 ♗xc4 ♘f6 23 h4 ♘h5 24 ♖xf8

♘xg3 25 ♕e1 ♖xf8 26 ♕xg3 ♗f4 27 ♕h3. We have already seen a similar position (but with a pawn on c5) and were doubtful about how to evaluate it. It turns out that the pawn sacrifice helps here, too: after 27 . . . ♕c7! the queen bursts into the opponent's position on the dark squares.

It is best for White to decline to play 23 h4, but also after 23 ♗h2! ♘h5 24 ♖xf8 ♖xf8 25 ♖f1 ♗f4! Black has excellent compensation for the sacrificed pawn.

The main conclusion to be drawn from this game is: many tempting but imperfect ideas can be realised in practice if a way can be found to prepare them. It is constantly necessary to seek intermediate moves which would make the planned idea stronger.

I very much wanted to rehabilitate myself after my failure in the game with Alterman, having in a manner of speaking missed my chance. For a long time no convenient opportunity presented itself, but in the end fortune did smile on me, and, what's more, twice within a short space of time.

Dorfman–Dvoretsky

Vilnius 1978

(*see following diagram*)

16	**. . .**	**♘b4**
17	**a3**	**exd4**
18	**axb4**	



18 ♕xd4 is bad because of 18 . . . ♘c2.

18	**. . .**	**dxc3**
19	**♕xc3**	**axb4**
20	**♕xb4**	**♖e7!**

Black prepares two regroupings of his forces at once: 21 . . . ♘e8 followed by . . . ♖a8, or 21 . . . ♗c8 and . . . ♖de8.

21	**e5**	**dxe5**
22	**♖xd8+**	**♕xd8**
23	**♖xe5**	**♕c7**
24	**f4**	**♖e8**
25	**♘f3**	**h6**
26	**♘d4**	**♗c8**
27	**♕c5**	**♖d8!**
28	**♘b5**	**♕b8!**

28 . . . ♕d7?! 29 ♘a7!; 28 . . . ♕a5?! 29 b4 ♕a2 30 ♘d6.

29	**♘c3**	

29 ♕b6? ♗e6 30 ♘d4 ♘d7.

29	**. . .**	**♗e6**
30	**♕c3**	**½–½**

Outwardly, everything that occurred in this game seems straightforward and uninteresting. But beauty in chess is actually determined not so much by the

moves themselves as by the ideas behind them. Moves which at first sight seem quiet may conceal subtle and profound ideas. Let us try to understand why Dorfman, annotating this game in *Informator*, gave the move 16 . . . ♘b4 two exclamation marks.

The position in the diagram is quite promising for White. His main positional threat is 17 f4!. In search of an antidote I turned my attention to the curious move 16 . . . ♘h5?!, with the idea of countering 17 f4 with a central thrust: 17 . . . exf4 18 gxf4 d5. Black does not fear 17 ♗f3 ♘f6, since the bishop would not be well placed on f3, and after other continuations it will be possible for Black to consolidate his position, for example with . . . g7–g6 and . . . f7–f6.

Reasoning in this way, I came to the conclusion that I needed to examine the most testing variation once more: 16 . . . ♘h5 17 f4 exf4 18 gxf4 d5 19 e5!. White threatens to play 20 ♗f3 and on 19 . . . ♕e7 there follows 20 ♕f2, intending f4–f5–f6. White here has a clear advantage.

It was a pity to give up this tempting idea, and eventually I found a way of strengthening it by means of an intermediate thrust on the other side of the board (as in the previous example).

After 16 . . . ♘b4!! the threat is 17 . . . exd4 18 ♕xd4 ♘c2. It is clear that Dorfman does not wish to close the centre with 17 d5. The move in the game, 17 a3, led to simplification, which in theory favours Black, who has a cramped position. I was reckoning mainly with the replies 17 ♖f1 and 17 ♖e2. In the event of 17 ♖f1 Black could have got an excellent game by breaking through in the centre: 17 . . . exd4 18 ♕xd4 d5!. But after 17 ♖e2 this would not be possible, as after a series of exchanges on d5 the rook on e8 would be hanging.

On 17 ♖e2 Black had intended to accomplish his main idea with 17 . . . ♘h5!. Now in the event of 18 f4 exf4 19 gxf4 d5 20 e5 ♕e7!, the rook covers the second rank and White no longer has the very important move 21 ♕f2.

Glyanets–Dvoretsky
Tbilisi 1979

1	**d4**	**d5**
2	**c4**	**c6**
3	**♘c3**	**♘f6**
4	**cxd5**	**cxd5**
5	**♘f3**	**♘c6**
6	**♗f4**	**♗f5**
7	**e3**	**e6**
8	**♗b5**	**♘d7**
9	**♕a4**	**♕b6**

9 . . . ♖c8 is an interesting alternative.

10 ♘h4

After the 'normal' retreat of the bishop White seizes the initiative

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B



by breaking through in the centre: 10 . . . ♗g6 11 ♘xg6 hxg6 12 e4 (and if 12 . . . dxe4 then 13 d5 ♘c5 14 dxc6 bxc6 15 ♗xc6+ ♔e7 16 0-0-0! ♘xa4 17 ♖d7+ ♔e8 18 ♗xa4 with a decisive attack, as in the game Andrianov–Imanaliev, Sochi 1980; or 10 . . . ♗g4 11 h3 ♗h5 12 e4.

Black cannot play the tactical trick 10 . . . ♗d3? in view of 11 ♘xd5! (11 ♗xd3? ♕xb2) 11 . . . exd5 (11 . . . ♗xb5 12 ♘xb6 ♗xa4 13 ♘xa8, and Black has no compensation for the loss of the exchange) 12 ♗xd3 with a clear advantage to White.

10 . . . ♗e4!
11 f3?

On 11 0-0 or 11 ♖c1 Black replies 11 . . . ♗e7. The strongest continuation, according to theory, is 11 0-0-0 ♖c8 (11 . . . ♗e7 12 f3) 12 f3 ♗g6 13 ♘xg6 hxg6 14 ♔b1, which was first encountered in the game Yusupov–Belyavsky, USSR Ch., Premier League, Minsk 1979.

11 . . . ♗d3!
12 ♘xd5 ♗xb5
13 ♘xb6 ♗xa4
14 ♘xa8

In comparison with the variation with an immediate 10 . . . ♗d3?, the situation has changed radically. With the intermediate move 10 . . . ♗e4! I provoked my opponent to put his pawn on f3. As a result of this, the knight on h4 now has nowhere to retreat to.

14 . . . ♘b4!
15 g4

After 15 ♔d2 ♗e7 16 ♘c7+ ♔d8 17 ♖hc1 g5! (Magerramov–Kosikov, Daugavpils 1978), Black obtained a decisive advantage.

15 . . . ♘d3+!
16 ♔e2 ♘xf4+
17 exf4

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B



Q. 1.44 Explain the point of the move played in the game.

Of course, I began my calculation

of variations with the obvious 17 ... ♗d6, which robs the enemy knight of the square c7. White replies 18 ♖c1. We shall examine the various attempts to trap the piece.

Not good is 18 ... ♔e7? 19 ♘c7 ♖c8 20 ♘d5+, or 19 ... ♗c6 20 d5 exd5 21 ♘f5+.

On 18 ... 0-0, there follows 19 ♘c7 ♗c6 (19 ... ♖c8 20 b3 ♗c6 21 d5 exd5 22 ♘xd5) 20 ♖xc6! bxc6 21 ♘a6 ♗xf4 22 ♘g2, when Black has nothing special.

In the event of 18 ... ♗c6 19 d5! exd5 20 ♘f5 the game gets sharper.

We are now able to assess the merits of the intermediate move played in the game. White has two replies: 18 ♘g2 and 18 g5 (bad is 18 ♖ac1 0-0). On 18 g5 I had planned 18 ... ♗d6 19 ♖ac1 0-0! 20 ♘c7 ♗c6 21 ♖xc6 (21 ♘a6 ♗b5+; 21 d5 exd5) 21 ... bxc6 22 ♘a6 ♗xf4 and the pawn, which Black tempted onto g5 with his 17th move, is lost (23 ♖g1 ♗xh2).

18	**♘g2**	**♗d6**
19	**♖ac1**	**♗c6!**
20	**♘e3**	

Now d4–d5 comes too late, since the white knight has been chased away from the square f5. After 20 ... 0-0 remained with a lead in material, which he later successfully converted into victory.

E. 1.25

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B



Black to move

E. 1.26

79
B



White to move

E. 1.27

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B

Black to move

E. 1.28



White to move

Look Out—It's a Trap!

Traps should be forbidden by the position.
Saviely Tartakower

According to Botvinnik's definition, a combination is a forced variation with a sacrifice. As a result of a combination we are sure to obtain (if, of course, we have not made a mistake in calculation) the position which we were aiming for from the very beginning.

Things are somewhat different when we set a trap for our opponent. He is by no means obliged to fall into our net. In order that he might indeed fall in, some sort of bait is necessary. The opponent has to be tempted with what seems to be an easy opportunity to achieve material or positional gains, in response to which we have prepared a hidden refutation.

How does one think up a trap? While considering some move or other for ourselves, we might find an unpleasant reply from our opponent. But we continue to think the variation through, not taking fright at his reply, and suddenly notice that it can be refuted. Quite outstanding imagination is sometimes required in order to devise such a refutation. It is precisely in cases like this that a trap has real chances of success—indeed, if the refutation is rather straightforward then our opponent will most probably see it as well.

In the first chapter of *Secrets of Chess Training*, I acquainted the reader with several traps which I would call 'traps of last resort'. We shall now consider another example of a game which was miraculously saved thanks to a trap.

A. Ivanov–Dolmatov
Novosibirsk 1976



Black should lose of course, since he is inevitably going to lose the pawn on e4. Dolmatov tries his last chance.

38 ... h5!
39 ♖d4 e3!
40 ♖xb4??

The 'bait' has worked. The simple 40 fxe3 would have led to a win, but Ivanov was in severe time-trouble and was simply unable to realise what was going on.

40 ... e2

The time-trouble is over and the players now agreed to a draw, since after 41 ♖e4 ♗xf5 42 gxf5 h4! Black manages to build a fortress: the white rook is tied down to the e-file, and the king cannot get out of the corner.

In a desperate situation there is nothing terribly wrong in risking any trap, even one which objectively loses more quickly, as long as it promises at least some practical chance of success. But in normal positions, playing to set a trap at the cost of making your position inferior is quite unjustified. The best type of trap is one associated with a move which enters into the plan already being carried out.

Yusupov–Lputyan
USSR Young Masters Ch., Baku 1979

Q. 1.45 What should White play?



Artur chose 14 ♗d2. His opponent could have replied 14 ... ♘b4!?, when after 15 ♗xb4 ♗xb4 White's advantage is insignificant. But there followed 14 ... b5?! 15 axb5 axb5 16 ♖fd1 ♕c5 17 e4 ♘b4 18 ♗xb4 ♕xb4 19 e5! (now White has a serious advantage) 19 ... f6 20 ♖a8 ♕c5 (20 ... fxe5 21 ♗e4) 21 exf6 ♗xf6 22 ♕e4 ♕e5, leading to the position which we considered in the section on double attacks.

But why did Yusupov not play 14 ♖d1—was it really not good to chase the enemy queen away from the centre? Most probably he feared the counter-thrust 14 ... ♘b4. But he needn't have—this would have been an excellent trap to set: 14 ♖d1! ♘b4? 15 ♕xh7+!! ♔xh7 16 ♖xd4 and White wins a pawn (not 16 ... ♘c2? in view of 17 ♗e4+).

It sometimes happens that a trap arises by itself, simply as a consequence of the careful calculation of variations. Having weighed up all the possibilities, we

choose the continuation that offers the best chance for our opponent to make a mistake.

Dvoretsky–Khachaturov
Moscow 1973



Q. 1.46 How should White proceed?

Having realised that this position is drawn, I started to look for an opportunity to set my opponent some problems.

36 ♘d7+ ♔e7

36 . . . ♔e6? 37 ♘f8+.

37 ♘b6! ♔e6

38 ♘a8!

Black's task is simpler after 38 h4 h6 39 ♘a8 (otherwise 39 . . . ♘f7 and 40 . . . g5+) 39 . . . ♘e8!.

38 . . . ♔d7?

The white knight, having gone right into the corner of the board, has successfully played the role of bait—Khachaturov was unable to resist the temptation to trap it. This is what I had been counting on. Essential was 38 . . . ♘f7!. I still cherished the hope that after 39 ♘c7+! (39 h4? ♔d6, and the knight is indeed trapped) 39 . . . ♔d6 40 ♘b5+ ♔e6 41 h4 my opponent might hurry to chase the white king away from the centre and play 41 . . . h6?, as then it would have been possible to break through with 42 ♘c7+ ♔d6 43 h5! g5+ (43 . . . gxh5 44 ♘e8+ and 45 ♘g7) 44 ♔xf5 ♔xc7 45 ♔g6 ♘d6 46 ♔xh6 ♘f5+ 47 ♔g6 ♘xd4 48 h6 ♘e6 49 ♔f7. But the waiting move 41 . . . ♔d7(e7) or 41 . . . ♘d8 would have led to a draw.

But what of it? In that case I would have been able to tell myself with a clear conscience: "I did everything I could!".

39 ♔e5 ♔c6

40 ♘b6!

Now Black is in a bad way. If 40 . . . ♘f7+ then 41 ♔e6.

40 . . . f4

41 h4

But not 41 ♘xd5? ♘f7+ 42 ♔f6 ♔xd5, or 41 ♔e6? ♘f5.

41 . . . h5

More stubborn was 41 . . . ♘f5 42 ♘xd5 ♘xh4.

42 ♘xd5 ♘f5

43 ♘xf4 ♘xh4

44 ♔e6 g5

45 d5+ ♔c7

46 ♘xh5

And Black soon resigned.

In the next game I succeeded in setting perhaps my best-ever trap.

Lukin–Dvoretsky
World Junior Ch. qualifying tournament, Moscow 1967


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B

Q. 1.47 Evaluate 14 . . . ♘e4.

White has the freer position, and so it would be useful for me to exchange knights, at the same time opening the diagonal for my dark-squared bishop. But by playing the knight to e4 Black would allow the enemy knight to come to d5. This is, at first glance, quite sufficient reason to discard immediately the idea of playing 14 . . . ♘e4. I can take pride in the fact that I did not give in to the obvious, but looked at the position a little more deeply.

14	**. . .**	**♘e4!!**
15	**♘d5?!**	**♗xd5**
16	**cxd5**	**exd4**
17	**♘xd4?!**	

Probably better was 17 ♖xc7 dxe3 18 ♕xe3, with complicated play, but my opponent still cannot see the point.

17	**. . .**	**♕h4!**

The idea of setting a trap finally becomes intelligible: it is difficult for White to defend the f2-square.

18	**♖f1**	**♗xd4**
19	**exd4**	**♘d2**
20	**♖fe1**	

Now the simple 20 . . . ♕xd4 would have guaranteed Black the advantage. Bad in reply are both 21 ♖cd1 ♖xe2! 22 ♖xe2 ♘f3+, and 21 ♖xc7 ♘c5 with the irresistible threat 22 . . . ♘d3. Even now it annoys me that I 'blotted my copybook' by playing 20 . . . ♘f6? almost instantaneously. After 21 ♖xc7 the position again became unclear.


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B

Black to move

Logic or Intuition?

Young players take pride in being able to calculate deep variations accurately and quickly. Tal was famous for this ability in his youth, but I did not wish to step aside. . .

Lev Polugayevsky

Chessplayers with a universal style of play, able to handle positions of any type equally well, are very rarely encountered. Fischer was such a player, and also—in his better years—Spassky.

As a rule, all players, including top grandmasters, have particular deficiencies in their playing style, so that in certain situations they do not feel too confident. I have always striven to help the players I have trained to develop their 'backward' sides, to get rid of their own weaknesses (without, of course, discarding their own characteristic creative style).

Traditionally, chessplayers can be divided into the combinational and the positional. At one time it was comparatively easy to distinguish players by this criterion, but now the situation is quite different—there are hardly any pure positional or pure combinational players any more. Besides, such a classification relates only to the manner of play and not to any particular way of thinking. It is not very informative from the point of view of choosing which direction to take and what to concentrate upon as regards the training the player requires. If, for example, you need to make progress in the field of tactics, the skills whch need to be developed are too numerous and diverse (you will, I hope, have already gathered this). The situation is rather similar if you wish to improve your positional skills.

It seems to me more productive to consider differences in the way chessplayers think, to see which approach dominates when they take decisions—the intuitive or the logical. Grandmasters of the intuitive type—Capablanca, Tal, Petrosian, Karpov—can sense the subtlest nuances of a position and have very sharp combinational vision. They are weaker in organising the game, in strategy, they do not particularly like to calculate variations, and they commit errors in calculation. At the opposite extreme we would find, for example, Rubinstein, Botvinnik and Kasparov. They find profound plans in the opening and also at subsequent stages of the game, they think in a disciplined way, and they can calculate variations clearly. But at times they overlook unexpected tactical ideas, they are sometimes excessively direct in their approach, and they do not sense the crisis-points of the battle keenly enough.

Of course, all this is only a very rough scheme. Usually the 'diagnosis' which I offer the player I am dealing with (whether it be a young Candidate Master or a Grandmaster) includes considerably more parameters of different kinds. Nevertheless, the classification I have indicated seems to me extremely important and useful

from the point of view of methodology.

It is clear, for example, that for the chessplayer of the intuitive type of thinking it is worthwhile to work through exercises involving complex calculation of variations, requiring perseverance and concentration (training of this sort helped Chernin to make considerable and rapid progress: from ordinary Master to Grandmaster and participant in the World Championship Candidates Tournament). But for logical chessplayers—such as, for example, Yusupov—one may recommend the solving of examples which require the tactical or positional features of a position to be quickly grasped.

I am not sure that you, dear reader, will be immediately prepared to agree with all the considerations and assessments expressed above. And in any case you must have been amazed that I numbered Mikhail Tal among the grandmasters who have problems in calculating variations. Recall at least the epithet which frequently accompanied the Rigan Grandmaster in his youth: "Tal the electronic calculator". Here I must explain myself.

Tal is a player of genius who, I believe, surpasses all others in his utterly unbridled imagination and inventiveness, and also in his colossal courage, his total inhibition and his inner freedom in the decisions he takes. Of course, he was capable of noticing instantly not only hidden possibilities but also the variations underlying them. However, when rapidly calculating these variations many moves ahead, he was not always accurate. Trusting in his intuitive impression, Tal usually did not bother to examine carefully the combinational complications that he was initiating. Knowing this, players such as, say, Korchnoi or Polugayevsky did not trust Tal's calculations—they looked for the vulnerable points and frequently found a successful refutation.

The following game is quite a good illustration of what I have just described.

Polugayevsky–Tal

USSR Ch. Semi-Final, Tbilisi 1956

1	**d4**	**d5**
2	**c4**	**e6**
3	**♘c3**	**c5**
4	**e3**	**♘f6**
5	**♘f3**	**♘c6**
6	**a3**	**cxd4**

6 . . . a6 is an interesting alternative.

7	**exd4**	**♗e7**
8	**♗d3**	

Stronger, according to theory, is 8 c5 ♘e4 9 ♗b5.

8	**. . .**	**dxc4**
9	**♗xc4**	**0-0**

10 0-0 b6?!

10 . . . a6! and 11 . . . b5.

11 ♕d3 ♗b7
12 ♖d1 ♖c8
13 ♗a2 ♕c7
14 ♗g5 ♖fd8
15 ♕e2

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

Ten years later Tal again reached this position, but this time playing White against Brinck-Claussen at the XVII Olympiad (Havana 1966). His opponent replied passively: 15 . . . ♘d5?!, and after 16 ♘xd5 exd5 17 ♕d3! ♕d6 18 ♗xe7 ♘xe7 19 ♖e1 ♘g6 20 g3 ♖e8 21 h4! White obtained a perceptible positional advantage.

15 . . . ♘g4!

True to his style, Tal takes advantage of the very first opportunity to rush into combinational complications. He creates the concrete threat of 16 . . . ♘xd4 17 ♖xd4 ♗xf3, which would be played in reply to 16 ♗xe6? or 16 h3?. In the event of 16 ♗xe7? Black has a pleasant choice between 16 . . . ♘xd4 and 16 . . . ♘xe7.

Q. 1.48 What promising continuations does White have?

From the notes given by Tal and Polugayevsky it would appear that the move played in the game, 16 ♘b5!, was the only real possibility. In fact there was one other interesting idea: 16 d5!? ♗xg5 17 h3!. In reply Black cannot play either 17 . . . ♘ce5? 18 ♘xg5, or 17 . . . ♘xf2? 18 ♔xf2. The only correct move is the calm and composed 17 . . . exd5! 18 ♘xd5 ♕b8! (18 . . . ♘d4? 19 ♖xd4 ♗xd5 20 ♗xd5 ♘f6 21 ♗xf7+) 19 hxg4 ♖e8. White will not succeed in deriving any concrete benefit from the active placement of his pieces and the game becomes level (for example, 20 ♕d3 ♘e5!).

16 ♘b5!

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

Bad now for Black would be 16 . . . ♕b8? 17 ♗xe6. Black has two

tactical possibilities: 16 . . . ♗a6 and 16 . . . ♘xd4.

Q. 1.49 Try to calculate or analyse both these continuations.

First, let's see how the game continued.

16	**. . .**		**♗a6?!**
17	**♕xe6!**		**♗xb5**

Forced.

18	**♕xg4**		**♗e2**
19	**♗xe7**		**♕xe7**
20	**♖e1**		

Weaker was 20 ♖d2?! ♗xf3 21 gxf3 (21 ♕xf3? ♘xd4 22 ♕d1 ♘f3+!) 21 . . . h5.

20	**. . .**		**♗xf3**

20 . . . ♘xd4 21 ♕xd4!.

21	**♕xf3**		**♕d7**
22	**d5!**		**♘d4**
23	**♕d3**		**♘c2**
24	**♗b1!**		**♘xe1**
25	**♕xh7+**		**♔f8**
26	**♗f5**		**♕xd5**

Up until now events have been forced. Tal writes that when he went in for this whole variation he thought he could refute his opponent's attack by means of 26 . . . ♕e8 27 ♕h8+ ♔e7 28 ♖xe1+ ♔d6, when White loses because of the weakness of the back rank. An extremely ingenious conception, which, however, is easily refuted by the prosaic 27 ♗xc8!. In studying Tal's games, I have noticed that a similar picture very often occurs. He calculates a long variation, finds in it a brilliant 'point', is inspired by it and without hesitating makes the move. Alas, the insufficiently-examined variation usually contains a 'hole', and sometimes a rather primitive one.

27	**♖xe1**		**f6**
28	**♗xc8**		**♖xc8**
29	**h4**		

As a result of these lovely complications White has emerged with an extra pawn and has excellent winning chances. But in his delight Polugayevsky makes a mistake on his very next move and lets slip a well-deserved victory.

29	**. . .**		**♖d8**
30	**h5?**		

30 ♖e3!.

30	**. . .**		**♕d3**

Black forces the exchange of queens. Tarrasch once made a poignant observation: "All rook endings are drawn". The game finished: 31 ♕xd3 ♖xd3 32 ♖c1 ♖b3 33 ♖c2 ♔g8 34 g4 ♔h7 35 ♔g2 ♔h6 36 f3 a5 37 ♔g3 a4 38 ♖c4 ♖xb2 39 ♖xa4 ♖xb3 40 ♖a8 ♔h7 41 ♔f4 b5 42 ♔e4 ♖c3 43 ♖a5 b4 44 axb4 ♖c4+ 45 ♔f5 ♖xb4 46 ♖a7 ♖b3 47 f4 ♖b5+ 48 ♔e6 ♖b4 ½–½.

But now let us see what could have happened if Tal had played differently on his 16th move. Let us first acquaint ourselves with his own notes:

"Here there was the interesting variation 16 . . . ♘xd4 17 ♖xd4! ♗xf3 18 ♖xd8+ ♗xd8 19 ♘xc7

♗xe2 20 ♘xe6 ♗xg5 21 ♘xg5 ♘e5 22 f4 h6 23 fxe5 hxg5 24 e6 ♗c4 25 e7 ♗xa2 26 ♖d1 (in our youth we didn't calculate badly, and we both saw this variation)."

Undoubtedly a long and beautiful variation. But I suggest we examine it move by move to see how correct it is.

Only to begin with is play forced.

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B



16 ... ♘xd4!

17 ♖xd4!

17 ♘bxd4? ♖xd4 or 17 ... ♗xg5 18 ♗xe6 ♖e8.

17 ... ♗xf3

18 ♖xd8+

A mistake would be 18 ♕xf3? ♕xh2+ 19 ♔f1 ♖c2. Playing 18 ♘xc7 ♗xe2 19 ♖xd8+ (19 ♘xe6? ♗xg5! 20 ♘xd8 ♖xd8! 21 ♖xd8+ ♗xd8 22 ♖e1 ♗b5) 19 ... ♗xd8 amounts to transposition.

But now comes the first opportunity to deviate from the variation pointed out by Tal: 18 ... ♖xd8!? 19 ♘xc7 ♗xe2 20 ♗xe7 (20 ♘xe6 ♖d7) 20 ... ♖d7 and Black wins the piece back.

18 ... ♗xd8

19 ♘xc7 ♗xe2

20 ♘xe6! (*see diagram*)

From this point on let us examine all the candidate moves a little more closely. Of course, it is bad to play 20 ... fxe6? 21 ♗xe6+ ♔f8 22 ♗xc8 ♗xg5 23 ♖e1. But besides 20 ... ♗xg5, Black may still play 20 ... ♗f6!. Not dangerous is 21 ♗xf6 ♘xf6 22 ♘g5 ♗h5, or 21 ♖e1 ♗c4. At first sight 21 h3 is a strong move, having in mind 21 ... ♘e5? 22 ♗xf6 gxf6 23 ♘d4 with advantage to White. But Black is saved by the intermediate 21 ... h6!, after which White has nothing.

The defence found is entirely sufficient to allow us to draw a conclusion about whether Black's position is defensible after 16 ... ♘xd4!. But, even so, for the sake of interest let us continue our analysis and see whether Black's game is actually bad after 20 ... ♗xg5.

20 ... ♗xg5

21 ♘xg5

Now Tal suggests 21 ... ♘e5, but Black has several alternatives. In the event of the passive 21 ... ♖h6? 22 ♘e1 White's advantage is clear. But worth considering is 21 ... ♗c4!? 22 ♖c1 b5 23 b3! ♗e6 24 ♖xc8+ ♗xc8 25 b4 ♘e5 (but not 25 ... ♘h6? 26 f3 and 27 ♔f2) 26 f4 ♘c4 (26 ... h6?

27 ♘e4, intending ♘d6) 27 ♗xc4 (weaker is 27 a4 ♘d6!) 27 . . . bxc4. White's position is to be preferred, but I consider that Black can rightly hope to save the game.

But was it necessary to defend the pawn on f7? It looks extremely tempting to play 21 . . . ♖c2!?.

22 f4 h6

22 . . . ♘c4? 23 ♖e1.

23 fxe5 hxg5

24 e6

Even here the situation is still not quite clear. But Black should not fall into a combination pointed out by Tal: 24 . . . ♗c4? 25 e7 ♗xa2 26 ♖d1. Also mistaken is 24 . . . f6? 25 e7+ ♔h7 26 ♗e6! ♖e8 27 ♖e1, or 26 . . . ♖b8 27 ♗f7 ♗b5 28 ♖d1 and 29 ♖d8. Correct is 24 . . . ♔f8! 25 exf7 (25 e7+ ♔e8) 25 . . . ♖c2, intending 26 . . . ♖xb2 or 26 . . . ♗c4. Also possible is 25 . . . ♗h5 26 ♖f1 ♖c7.

Now recall the question of how Tal calculates variations. Can we say it is bad? No, of course we could never say that. Do you know many chessplayers who are capable of seeing so many moves ahead? But neither can you say that it is good—the fact is that his long and beautiful variations turn out to be just too unreliable.

But we shall not hasten to draw conclusions. In order to judge objectively the play of a great chessplayer, which Mikhail Tal undoubtedly is, a single example is clearly not enough. I hope to be able to return to the examination of examples of his games in a later work, which will be devoted to attacks, risk and problematic sacrifices of material.

The Examination of Exercises

If you show a chessplayer a move which looks heroic but actually turns out to be a bluff, and if, succumbing to his first impression, he seriously believes this move, then after the bluff is discovered he will feel deeply offended, and it will take a long time before this feeling subsides.
Emanuel Lasker

I have for many years been collecting a 'card index' of exercises intended for the development of thinking skills and for mastering the techniques of combat which are essential to the practical chessplayer. The examples included in this card index have to conform to certain rather demanding aesthetic and methodological requirements.

When looking through chess literature: newspapers, books, *Informators* (primarily well-annotated games and fragments), I linger over interesting and instructive episodes which occurred in the games or which are given in the notes. I consider for what pur-

pose a particular episode could be useful to me and in which section of my card index it should be included. Then I begin a careful examination, which in at least half of the cases forces me for some reason or other to reject what I have found.

If, however, everything is in order, the example enters the card index and within a short time is used in my lessons. There it undergoes a new examination, and a much stricter one. There have been numerous occasions when my pupils, in solving an exercise, have discovered in it facets which I had not even suspected. As a result I have had to either remove the example from my card index or substantially rework it.

Bartrina–Ghitescu
Olot 1974



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W

Q. 1.50 How should the game end?

Mistaken would be 1 ♖d8? ♗f2+! 2 ♔xf2 ♖xb2+ with mate. White played a combination which has found its way into many books on tactics.

1 ♗g7! ♗f2+
2 ♔f1!

White cannot play either 2 ♔xf2? ♖xb2+, or 2 ♔h1? ♗xg2+! 3 ♔xg2 ♕g3+ 4 ♔f1 ♕g1+ 5 ♔e2 ♖xb2+.

2 ... ♗b5+

2 ... ♗xg2+ 3 ♔xf2! ♖xb2+ 4 ♔g1.

3 ♔xf2 ♕e2+
4 ♔g3 ♕xd1
5 ♗h8! ♕d6+
6 ♔f2

Black resigned

But Black could have avoided defeat if he had found the cool-headed defence 1 ... f6!. Now 2 ♗h8 leads to perpetual check after 2 ... ♗f2+ 3 ♔f1 ♗b5+ 4 ♔xf2 ♕e2+ 5 ♔g3 ♕e5+, as White has nothing better. Also possible, by the way, is a different move-order: 1 ... ♗f2+ 2 ♔f1 f6!.

A refutation does not necessarily have to be of a concrete, tactical nature—at times it is sufficient simply to look at the position sensibly and formulate an accurate assessment.

Stein–Bronstein
Moscow 1971

Q. 1.51 How should White continue?

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W



Leonid Stein played a combination based on the weakness of the back rank.

22 ♘xc5

Grandmaster Raymond Keene, in his book devoted to Stein, gives this move two exclamation marks. I would rather replace the first one with a question mark.

22 ... dxc5

22 ... ♕xc5 23 ♕xe8.

23 ♕xe8 ♗g4!

After 23 ... ♖xe8? 24 ♖xe8+ ♗f8 25 ♗h6 Black would be mated. Black's game is hopeless after 23 ... g5? 24 ♗xg5 (24 ♕e4? f5) 24 ... ♖xe8 25 ♖xe8+ ♗f8 26 ♖xc8 ♔g7 27 ♖e1.

The intermediate move 23 ... ♗g4, which removes the bishop from attack, changes the situation. After the rook retreats there will follow 24 ... g5 25 ♗xg5 ♖xe8. If 24 f3 then 24 ... ♗d4+ 25 ♔h1 ♖xe8 26 ♖xe8+ ♔g7 27 fxg4 h6 or 27 ... a4. Therefore Stein was forced to transpose into a complicated ending.

24 ♕b5! ♕xb5

25 cxb5 ♗xd1
26 ♖xd1

The threat is 27 b6.

26 ... ♖b7!

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W



Although White has only one pawn for the exchange, he has the initiative, thanks in no small measure to his two strong bishops. The enemy rooks are tied down by the need to keep an eye on White's passed pawns.

Stein won the ensuing struggle. Our assessments of a game are frequently strongly influenced by the end result, and therefore it is not surprising that on giving the endgame a cursory glance it seemed to be won for White. But this was a great exaggeration. Grandmaster Dolmatov has given a fairer assessment of the position: the combination did not in fact give Stein any advantage—Black lost only because of his subsequent errors.

27 ♖e1 ♖d8
28 ♗c4 ♗f8

29	**♔f1**	**♔g7**
30	**a3**	**bxa3**

A disputable although entirely plausible decision. Simpler was 30 . . . ♙d6.

31	**♖a1**	**♙d6**
32	**♙d2**	**♙c7**

Worth considering was 32 . . . ♖db8 33 ♖xa3 ♖xb5.

33	**♖xa3**	**♖a7**
34	**♙e3**	**♙b6?!**

Stronger was 34 . . . ♙d6, not fearing, needless to say, 35 b4? in view of 35 . . . cxb4.

35	**♔e2**	**♔f6**
36	**♔d3**	**♔e5?**

In such positions it is essential to play . . . h7–h5, in order not to allow White to clamp down on the kingside.

37	**♖a1**	**♔f6**
38	**g4!**	**♔g7**
39	**g5!**	**♖ad7**
40	**h4**	**♔f8**
41	**h5!**	

Now that White has active possibilities on both wings, defending has become extraordinarily difficult. The game finished: 41 . . . ♖d6 42 ♖h1 ♖6d7 43 ♖h4! ♖a8 44 hxg6 fxg6 45 ♖f4+ ♖f7 46 ♖xf7+ ♔xf7 47 d6+ ♔e8 48 ♙d5 ♖c8 49 ♙c6+ ♔f7 50 ♔c4 ♔e6 51 ♙xc5 ♙xc5 52 ♔xc5 ♖f8 53 ♙d5+ ♔d7 54 f3 ♖h8 55 ♙c6+ ♔e6 56 b6 ♖d8 57 b7 ♖b8 58 f4 Black resigned.

Now let us return once more to the position from which we started. It is quite obvious that White has a considerable positional advantage. He could have continued 22 ♕g3! (the attack on the pawn at d6 prevents the move 22 . . . ♙f5 and forces the enemy rook to take up an awkward position on d7) 22 . . . ♖d7 23 h4.

Having initiated complications, Stein threw away a substantial part of his advantage. He carried out a typical "combination for its own sake" (Simagin's expression, already mentioned in the first section of this chapter). Incidentally, it may be that the Grandmaster from Lvov simply underestimated the strength of Bronstein's reply 23 . . . ♙g4!.

Please do not think that, when confronted with someone else's analysis, I am at once seized by the thrill of the hunt, the wish to refute it come what may. It is simply that for an exercise to be 'pure' and leave a strong impression on its solver it must first be tested for its durability. And I am only too pleased if the example stands up to the test.

Keres–Benko
Candidates Tournament, Yugoslavia 1959

Q. 1.52 What should White play in diagram 93?

Keres found a quiet move of awesome power: **20 ♙c2!!**. How can Black defend against the threat 21 ♙f5? In all variations Black loses

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W

at least a pawn. For example: 20 . . . h5 21 ♗f5 (also good is 21 ♘xf6+ ♘xf6 22 ♗f5) 21 . . . hxg4 22 ♗xd7 ♖d8 23 ♗xg4, or 20 . . . ♗d5 21 ♗f5 ♗e6 22 ♖xe6!. In the game there followed: 20 . . . g6 21 ♖d1 and Black resigned.

A very convincing finish, wasn't it? However, it is necessary to examine whether White had a different, equally effective way to achieve a decisive advantage. The existence of a second solution would of course considerably reduce the aesthetic impression made by the exercise.

After 20 ♘xf6+? ♘xf6 21 ♖e7 ♘d5 the game is level, since the combination 22 ♖d7 ♘xf4 23 ♖xf7 leads only to a draw: 23 . . . ♘e2+ 24 ♔f1 ♘c1 25 ♗e6 ♖e8 26 ♖e7+ ♔f8.

It looks stronger to play 20 ♖d1. On 20 . . . ♗c6, possible is at least 21 ♗c2 h5 22 ♘xf6+ ♗xf6 23 ♗f5. Black must reply 20 . . . ♘c5 21 ♗c2 ♗e4 22 ♘xf6+ gxf6 23 ♗xe4 ♘xe4. Of course, the position favours White, but it is not easy for him to derive any tangible advantage. For example: 24 ♖d7 ♘c5 25 ♖xc7 ♖xc7 26 ♗xc7 ♘a4, or 24 ♗h6 ♘d6 25 g4 (preventing the move 25 . . . ♘f5) 25 . . . f5 followed by . . . f7–f6, . . . ♔f7 etc.

The analysis quoted shows that the move played by Keres was indeed the strongest, and this means that the exercise is entirely correct.

Browne–Ljubojevic
Tilburg 1978



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W

Q. 1.53 Find and calculate the strongest continuation for White.

Tempting is 14 d5, but Ljubojevic had prepared the strong reply 14 . . . ♕c5!. After 15 dxe6 (15 ♘a4 ♕a5 16 dxe6 ♗xe1 17 exd7 ♘xd7 White's pieces are 'hanging') 15 . . . ♕xc4 16 exd7 ♘xd7 Black's position is to be preferred.

In the event of another standard move, 14 ♘e5, the continuation 14 . . . ♘xe5 15 dxe5 ♕c5 looks dubious, but entirely pos-

sible is the simple 14 . . . ♗xc3 and 15 . . . ♕d6.

Browne found an excellent solution.

14 ♗d5!! ♗a6

Rather bad would be 14 . . . ♗xd5 15 ♘xd5, but we shall be coming back to the move 14 . . . ♗xc3!?.

15 ♕a4 ♗xc3

Roughly the same position would be reached after 15 . . . ♗a5 16 a3 ♗xc3 17 bxc3 ♘b8 18 ♗a2 ♕d7 19 ♕c2.

16 bxc3 ♘b8

17 ♗b3

White has obtained a clear advantage. His pieces are considerably more active, and the bishop on a6 cannot easily be brought back into play in view of the weakness of the pawn on a7.

17 . . . b5

17 . . . ♕d7 18 ♕a3.

18 ♕a5 ♕b7?

Better was 18 . . . ♕c7.

19 ♗xf6 gxf6

20 d5!

The time has now come for the thematic breakthrough in the centre.

20 . . . exd5

21 ♕b4 ♕d7

22 ♕h4 ♔g7

23 ♘d4

The threat is 24 ♗c2.

Black resigned.

Judging from the notes in *Informator*, Ljubojevic rejected 14 . . . ♗xc3 (in reply to 14 ♗d5!!) because of 15 ♗xb7 ♗xe1 16 ♗xc8 ♗a5 17 ♗xd7 ♕xd7 18 ♗xf6, when White has the advantage. But he had an interesting tactical possibility available: 16 . . . ♗xf2+!? 17 ♔f1! (17 ♔xf2? ♘e4+) 17 . . . ♗xd4! 18 ♘xd4 ♘c5. Black wins back the piece but loses it again: 19 ♕f3 ♖xc8 20 b4 ♕d7 21 ♗xf6 gxf6 22 ♕g4+ ♔h8 (or 22 . . . ♔f8) 23 bxc5.

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B

This position, it would appear, has arisen by force. After 23 . . . ♖xc5 White has a choice between 24 ♖xc5 bxc5 25 ♘b3, and 24 ♖d1 ♖d5 25 ♖d3. Although theoretically the material on each side is equivalent (three pawns for a knight), it seems to me that White has the better chances. This means that we have not succeeded in refuting Browne's conception. Considering that in the initial position 'normal' paths did not promise White any advantage, the operation he carried out can be acknowledged to have been totally justified.

An extremely unusual and beautiful exchange of blows occurred in the following game.

Novikov–Nikolaev
Kharkov 1968

1	**d4**	**d5**
2	**c4**	**dxc4**
3	**♘f3**	**♘f6**
4	**e3**	**♗g4**
5	**♗xc4**	**e6**
6	**♘c3**	**a6**
7	**a4?**	**♘c6**
8	**h3**	**♗h5**
9	**g4?!**	**♗g6**
10	**♘h4**	**♗b4**
11	**♘xg6**	**hxg6**
12	**♕f3**	



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B

Q. 1.54 Evaluate 12 . . . e5.

White has played the opening inaccurately, and his position is rather ragged. It was possible for Black to underline this by playing simply 12 . . . ♘a5 13 ♗a2 c5. But Black's attention was drawn towards the more energetic, albeit double-edged, plan 12 . . . e5!?. By immediately attacking the enemy centre, Black at the same time increases the scope of the bishop on c4 and weakens the f7-square. Accurate calculation is required.

The cautious 13 d5? leads after 13 . . . e4! 14 ♕e2 ♘e5 to a clear advantage for Black. In the event of 13 dxe5?! ♘xe5 14 ♕xb7 ♖b8 (of course, not 14 . . . ♗xc3+ 15 bxc3 ♘xc4? 16 ♕c6+ and 17 ♕xc4), White cannot play 15 ♕xa6? ♖b6 16 ♗b5+ c6, but after 15 ♕g2 his compensation for the sacrificed pawn is more than adequate. For example: 15 . . . ♖b6 (also strong is 15 . . . 0-0) 16 ♗e2 ♘d3+ 17 ♔f1 (17 ♗xd3 ♕xd3 18 ♕a8+ ♔e7 19 ♕xh8 ♖d6) 17 . . . ♖e6 18 g5 ♗xc3 19 bxc3 ♘e4 with advantage to Black.

13	**g5!**	**exd4!**
14	**gxf6**	

On 14 exd4, good are both 14 . . . ♘xd4 and 14 . . . ♕xd4.

14	**. . .**	**dxc3**
15	**fxg7**	**cxb2+**



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W

The situation has become irrational: Black is threatened with mate in one, and both sides have pawns on the threshold of promotion.

16 ♔e2

It seems that things are bad for Black: how can he repel the threats 17 ♕xf7 mate and 17 gh(♕)+? It does not help to play 16 . . . ♘d4+ 17 exd4 ♕e7+, in view of 18 ♗e3.

16 . . . ♕d3+!!

Black had to see this wonderful resource well in advance—when he played his 12th move.

When examining Black's idea, I turned my attention to the fact that in the event of 16 ♔f1 (instead of 16 ♔e2) the counter-thrust 16 . . . ♕d3+ would not be so strong: 17 ♔g2! bxa1(♕) 18 ♕xf7+ ♔d8 19 g8(♕)+ ♖xg8 20 ♕xg8+ ♔d7 21 ♕e6+ ♔d8 22 ♗xd3 with advantage to White. But Black would have had a different deflection sacrifice of the queen: 16 . . . ♕d1+!! 17 ♕xd1 bxa1(♕) 18 gxh8(♕)+ ♕xh8 and Black emerges a pawn up. A unique case: two queen sacrifices on two different squares almost straight out of the opening.

17 ♗xd3

Worse is 17 ♔xd3 0-0-0+ and 18 . . . bxa1(♕).

17 . . . bxa1(♕)

18 gxh8(♕)+ ♕xh8

Black has emerged from the complications with a pawn more, but his opponent has retained some positional compensation for it.

19 ♗e4 ♕c3

20 ♗xc6+ ♕xc6

21 ♕xc6+ bxc6

Now, by continuing 22 h4! in order to exchange his isolated h-pawn, White could have obtained real drawing chances.

Black's brilliant combination was entirely correct, but I am not sure that it was the strongest continuation objectively. Therefore, in offering this position by way of an exercise for training the imagination and the ability to calculate variations, it is expedient to make use of a question which defines the matter more precisely, namely the one which was set before the start of the combination.

E. 1.30



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White to move. What would you have played?

E. 1.31



Black to move. Having calculated the variations, give an assessment of the position.

E. 1.32



In the game there followed: 31 . . . ♖f8? 32 dxc6+ ♔a8 33 cxd7 ♖f2+ 34 ♔b3 ♕xb2+ 35 ♔a4 Black resigned.

Much stronger was **31 . . . ♘c5!**, after which 32 dxc6+? ♔c8 would be bad for White. Calculate 32 ♕xc6+ and 32 ♕xd8.

Does the Problem Have a Solution?

The following ending of an ancient game is quoted in many chess manuals.



Dark clouds have gathered over the black king's position. The move Black played, **1 . . . ♕xb2!**, looks like a gesture of desperation—what significance can the pawn on b2 possibly have in this situation?

But matters are not quite as simple as they seem. From the square b2 the queen interacts quite well with the other black pieces and assists in repelling the immediate threats on the back rank and the weakened dark squares on the kingside. For example, the direct 2 ♖xe5? ♖xe5 3 ♕f6 does not achieve anything, in view of 3 . . . ♕b1+ 4 ♔g2 ♕e4+ with perpetual check (after the forced 5 ♔g1). In the event of 2 c4? the bishop on e5 is defended by the queen, and so Black has the reply 2 . . . ♖d8 (threatening 3 . . . ♗g7) 3 ♕e4(e3) f6 when Black's position is quite in order.

Q. 1.55 Does 2 ♕f6 win?

102
B



This was the tempting continuation which White chose in the game, and after 2 ♕f6?! ♕xc3? 3 ♕g7+! ♗xg7 4 ♖e8+ he announced mate. But later a brilliant defence was found: 2 ... ♕c1!! 3 ♕xe5! ♕xh6! 4 ♕b8+ ♔g7 5 ♕xb7 ♕d2 with roughly equal chances, as it is not good for White to play 6 ♖e7? ♖f5 7 ♕xa7 c5!.

Having become acquainted with this ending, I started to consider what exercises could possibly be created from it. One of them—associated with the development of the imagination and paying attention to the opponent's counter-chances—you have just solved. The introductory question in this exercise, the aim of which is the search for Black's defensive resources, alleviates the solver's task.

So, if we were to succeed after 1 ... ♕xb2 in finding for White a clear (and the only!) way to win, it would be possible to do without the leading question and simply suggest that the reader take a decision for White. In this case an extremely difficult problem would arise on the theme of taking the opponent's resources into account. To discover an effective refutation of the move 2 ♕f6?! without any special hint that it exists, to refute this move and choose another, stronger move, is a task which not every grandmaster would be capable of solving.

Q. 1.56 Find the strongest continuation for White.

This exercise is not for solving in your head for but serious analysis—therefore I recommend that you move the pieces on the board. Concentrate your attention on identifying candidate moves for both sides.

Recalling the section 'Don't let your king get in the way of a combination!', we shall begin our examination with the move 2 ♔g2, which renews the threats of ♕f6 and ♖xe5. Bad is 2 ... f6? 3 ♖xe5. The only defence is 2 ... f5!. The following variations are then possible:

A. 3 c4 ♖a5! (weaker is 3 ... ♖d7 or 3 ... ♖d8 because of 4 ♕e3) 4 ♖d1 (4 ♕d3 ♕d4; 4 ♗f4 ♕d4, but not 4 ... ♔f7? 5 ♕e3 ♔f6 6 c5 winning) 4 ... ♕c2! with the threat of ... ♕e4. If Black were to be greedy with 4 ... ♖xa2

he would lose: 5 ♖d2 ♕b1 6 ♖xa2 ♕xa2 7 ♕d3.

B. 3 ♗f4 ♗xf4! (3 . . . ♕xc3? 4 ♖xe5; on 3 . . . ♗xc3 or 3 . . . ♗f6 decisive is 4 ♖e8+ ♔f7 5 ♕e3) 4 ♕xf4 ♕d2! 5 ♖e8+ (5 ♖e3 ♖d8 followed by . . . ♕d7) 5 . . . ♔f7 6 ♕b8 ♖d7! and if 7 ♖h8 then 7 . . . ♔f6 or 7 . . . ♕d5+ 8 ♔h3 ♔f6.

To be honest, the conclusion that the move 2 ♔g2?! is insufficient to win only pleased me, since I had seen one more, so it seemed, very strong possibility: 2 ♕e3.

103
B

White creates three threats at once: 3 f4, 3 c4 and 3 ♕xa7. After 2 . . . f6 it is a mistake to play 3 f4? ♖d2! 4 fxe5 ♖xh2 5 ♕f3 ♖xh6. But the simple 3 ♕xa7! maintains an advantage for White.

For at least a year I thought that a solution had been found, and I made repeated use of this exercise in my training lessons. But, one day, one of the students specialising in chess at the Institute of Physical Culture (where I then taught), who had solved the exercise, turned his attention to the subtle defence 2 . . . ♕a3!!, which parries all of White's immediate threats: 3 f4 ♗g7 4 ♕e8+ ♕f8, or 3 c4 ♕xe3 4 ♖xe3 ♖a5 5 f4? ♗d4. More dangerous is the preparatory move 3 ♔g2!, having in mind the variations 3 . . . b5? 4 c4! ♕xe3 5 ♖xe3 bxc4 6 f4 winning, or 3 . . . ♗g7? 4 ♕xa7! ♕f8 5 ♗xg7 ♔xg7 6 ♕xb7 with an extra pawn for White. But after 3 . . . f6! Black can defend successfully by sacrificing a pawn: 4 f4 ♔f7 (also worth considering is the immediate 4 . . . ♕xa2+) 5 fxe5 ♖xe5 6 ♕d2 ♖xe1 7 ♕xe1 ♕xa2+. The situation began to remind me of some old mathematical textbooks, when, having agonised for ages over the solution and finally looked up the answer, the pupil sometimes reads with astonishment and indignation: "This problem cannot be solved".

Nevertheless, before giving up, let us think whether we have not missed any candidate moves. For example, 2 h4 with the threat 3 ♖xe5. But after 2 . . . f5! roughly the same variations arise as after 2 ♔g2.

There is only one other possibility, which, in my opinion, happens to be the strongest: the attempt to prevent . . . f7–f5 by playing 2 g4!!. The threat is 3

♖xe5 ♖xe5 4 ♕f6 ♕b1+ 5 ♔g2 ♕e4+ 6 ♔g3 ♕d3+ 7 f3. If 2 . . . ♕c2 then the reply 3 ♕e3! is extremely unpleasant. The best defence is, all the same, 2 . . . f5!, when the straightforward 3 gxf5 gives White nothing, in view of 3 . . . ♕xc3 4 ♖e3 ♕c2!. But the intermediate move 3 c4! places Black in a difficult position.

Thus a solution to the problem exists. But it would be practically impossible to make a move such as 2 g4!! in an actual game—a move like this can only appear as a result of lengthy analysis of the position (as in fact happened). But tasks which are to be offered judiciously for training the practical chessplayer should be analogous to those which he will actually come up against over the board (but maybe just a little more difficult and, if possible, more beautiful). So here, perhaps, we have not found a good exercise.

Incidentally, the position with which we started is entirely appropriate as an exercise. Black should not be afraid of ghosts, and, finding strong replies to his opponent's main attacking moves (including 2 ♕f6), should bravely capture the pawn on b2.

Now we move on to examine some tactical situations which are perhaps more appropriate for the practical player.

How Many Roads Lead to Rome?

Dvoretsky–Mochalov
Minsk 1962

104
W



White obtained a decisive advantage with a very nice combination.

20 dxe5! ♖xe5

20 . . . ♗xe5 21 ♘xe4; or 20 . . . ♕xc5 21 exf6 wins.

21 ♘xe4 ♖xe4
22 ♖xe4 ♕xc5
23 ♕g4!

Only this move leads to a win. Now Black cannot play either 23 . . . dxe4 24 ♕e6+, or 23 . . . ♗xb2 24 ♕e6+ ♔h8 25 ♕e8+!. If 23 . . . ♗g7 then 24 ♕e6+ ♔h8 25 ♕e8+ ♕f8 26 ♗xg7+ ♔xg7 27 ♖e7+ ♔g8 28 ♕xc6.

In the game there followed: 23 . . . ♕d6 24 ♖c6 ♕d8 25 ♖xc6 ♗xb2 26 ♕e6+ ♔h8 27 ♖xa6 ♖xa6 28 ♕xa6 ♗g7 (28 . . . d4 29 ♕b5!) 29 ♗g5! ♕e8 30 ♕a5! d4 31 ♕d8 ♕xd8 32 ♗xd8 d3 33 ♔f1 ♔g8 34 a4 ♔f8 35 a5 ♔e8 36

a6 ♗d4 37 ♗g5 d2 38 ♗xd2 Black resigned.

Remembering this example one day, I considered whether or not to use it as an exercise. The combination is completely correct, but could White not have achieved success by some other, more simple method?

During the game I saw that I could not play 20 ♖xe4? because of 20 . . . ♗xg5, and the variation 20 ♘xe4 dxe4 21 ♕c2 exd4 22 ♖xc6 ♕e7! did not seem convincing. But on examination it turned out that after 20 ♘xe4 dxe4 21 ♕b3+! ♔h8 22 dxe5 ♗xe5 (22 . . . ♕xc5 23 exf6; 22 . . . ♖xe5 23 ♕b7) 23 ♕c2 with the threats 24 ♖xc6 and 24 ♖c4, Black can hardly succeed in holding this position. Also quite unpleasant for him is the move 20 ♕c1!?.

Of course, I did not include this position in my 'card index of exercises'. Why calculate a combination if there is a simpler way to achieve your goal? Emanuel Lasker wrote: "One should not demand serious efforts where they are not required . . . It should be possible to achieve the result with a single move—it is not allowed to have competitors".

Polugayevsky–Torre
Toluca IZ 1982
(*see following diagram*)

Q. 1.57 What should Black play?

105
B



Torre has an extra pawn, but his knight is *en prise*, and if the knight retreats then 38 ♘a4 is extremely unpleasant. For example: 37 . . . ♘f3? 38 ♘a4 ♕e3 39 ♖d8+ and White wins. Does Black have anything better than playing on the exchange down after 37 . . . ♘f7 38 ♘a4 ♕c6?

37 . . . ♘c4!!
38 ♘a4 ♕c6!

Mistaken is 38 . . . ♕e3? 39 ♖d8+ ♖f8 40 ♖xf8+ ♔xf8 41 ♕b8+ ♔f7 42 ♕c7+ and 43 ♕xc4.

39 ♕xf2 ♕xe4+
40 ♕g2

40 ♔g1 ♕g4+ and 41 . . . ♕xd1+.

40 . . . ♕xg2+
41 ♔xg2 ♘e3+
42 ♔f3 ♘xd1

If now 43 ♔e2 then 43 . . . b5. The combination has led to a winning knight ending. Subsequently Torre successfully converted his material advantage into victory.

This whole variation will probably have astonished some readers—those who found a dif-

ferent, simpler solution to the exercise: 37 . . . ♕c5! 38 b4 (38 ♘a4 ♕c2 39 ♖d8+ ♔f7) 38 . . . ♕f8! with a winning position for Black. I suspect that Torre did not play this only because he had not noticed the possibility of playing 38 . . . ♕f8!. It is well known that long retreats with pieces quite often fall outside a chessplayer's field of vision.

Although I tend to avoid exercises which have more than one solution, some such examples have nevertheless retained their place in my 'card index of exercises'. In each of them the subsidiary solution is just as exact and interesting as the main one. By observing which route the solver chooses, one can sometimes judge his attitudes to chess and also particular features of the way he thinks.

Tal–Anonymous

Simultaneous display with clocks, Riga 1958

106
W



Q. 1.58 Calculate 18 ♘xf7.

Of course, the sacrifice on f7 looks very tempting, but how is the attack to be continued after 18 ♘xf7! ♔xf7 19 ♕xe6+ ♔f8? Not 20 ♖f3+? ♗f6 21 ♖xf6+ (21 ♗xf6 gxf6) 21 . . . ♕xf6!.

A few sections ago I observed that Mikhail Tal's amazing imagination helps him when calculating variations to detect instantaneously completely unexpected resources for his attack. This is the case here: even the fact that Tal was playing several games simultaneously did not prevent him from seeing in advance the brilliant quiet move 20 ♗c1!!, which creates the irresistible threat of 21 ♖f3+ ♗f6 22 ♗a3+. There followed: 20 . . . ♗f6 21 ♗a3+ ♖e7 22 ♖e4 ♔e8 23 ♗xe7 ♘xe7 24 d5 ♗b5 25 d6 ♗xd3 26 d7+ with mate next move.

When Artur Yusupov solved this exercise he first considered the forced continuations with checks (an entirely reasonable approach in such positions). One of them, as it turned out, leads to a quick mate: 20 ♗xe7+! ♖xe7 21 ♖f3+ ♔e8 22 ♕f7+! ♔d7 23 ♖xe7+ ♘xe7 (23 . . . ♕xe7 24 ♗xd5) 24 ♕e6+ (also strong is 24 d5) 24 . . . ♔e8 (24 . . . ♔c7 25 ♖f7) 25 ♖f8+! ♔xf8 26 ♕f7 mate. Yusupov's approach, though different to Tal's, leads to the same result!

Taimanov–Gufeld
Chelyabinsk 1959

107
W



Q. 1.59 How should White continue?

It is clear that the active placement of White's pieces is more than enough to compensate for his being a pawn down, but he needs to act energetically. Taimanov hesitated slightly: 28 h4?, and after 28 . . . ♕b7! Black had the threat of 29 . . . c5. The game finished unexpectedly quickly in a draw: 29 ♗a6 ♕b4 30 ♗c4 ♕b7 31 ♗a6.

I considered the move recommended in the notes to this game to be the solution of this position: 28 g5! hxg5 (28 . . . ♗d8 29 ♕d6!; 28 . . . ♗f8 29 ♘xh6+) 29 ♗xg5 with the threat 30 ♗xf6. The following variations show convincingly that White has a big advantage: 29 . . . ♕b7 30 ♗xf6 c5 31 ♗d5 ♕xd5 32 ♘xe7+ ♖xe7 33 ♕xd5 ♗xd5 34 ♗xe7; 29 . . . ♔f8 30 ♘xg7!; 29 . . . ♗d8 30 ♗xf7+! ♔xf7 31 ♘d6+ ♔f8 32 ♘xe8 ♕g4+ 33 ♔f1; 29 . . . ♗f8 30 ♘h6+ ♔h7 (30 . . . gxh6 31 ♕xf6 ♖e1+ 32 ♔g2 c5+ 33 ♔h3) 31 ♕f5+ g6 32 ♕xf6 ♖e1+ 33 ♔g2 c5+ 34 ♔h3.

Yusupov found a different, combinative way of carrying out an attack.

28 ♘xg7! ♔xg7
29 ♗xh6+! ♔h7

Quite bad is 29 . . . ♔xh6 30 g5+ and 31 gxf6.

30 g5!

Weaker is 30 ♗g5 ♗d8, or 30 ♖c3 ♕d6.

30 . . . ♕d2

30 . . . ♕d6 31 ♕f5+ ♔h8 32 ♗xf7.

31 ♖e1 ♕c2

If 31 . . . ♗d8 then 32 ♕f5+ ♔h8 33 ♖xe8+ ♘xe8 34 ♕e5+ ♘f6 35 gxf6 ♕d1+ 36 ♗f1 ♕g4+ 37 ♕g3 ♕xg3+ 38 hxg3 ♗xf6 39 ♗c1 followed by 40 ♗c4 and White remains a pawn ahead in a four-bishop ending. He should most probably win.

32 gxf6 ♗c5
33 ♗d3+! ♕xd3
34 ♕xe8 ♕g6+
35 ♔h1! ♗xf2
36 ♗g7!

And the combinational complications end in White's favour.

The second route is considerably more interesting than the first. On the other hand, the first is simpler and, apparently, objectively stronger, and therefore from a practical point of view it deserves preference.

In all the exercises given below there are two solutions of roughly equal merit. Try to find them!

E. 1.33



White to move

E. 1.34

White to move

E. 1.35



White to move

E. 1.36



Black to move

"Difficult to Teach—Easy to Do!"

In the third chapter of *Secrets of Chess Training*, devoted to studies, I discussed a highly effective training-method—the playing-out of studies and positions taken from practical games. I remind the reader that for this purpose examples are used in which one player—or both players in exercises for two-handed playing-out—has to make a sequence of best moves over-the-board within a limited time. In contrast to the more customary type of exercise, which requires a single decision to be made, albeit a very difficult one, exercises for playing-out require the solution of a whole series of logically consistent tasks. When making one's first few

moves, it is most often impossible—and in any case unnecessary—to foresee how the game will end or what problems will have to be solved on the way.

Exercises which make use of examples from practical games, although sometimes not as spectacular as studies, are on the other hand usually more substantial and varied. In studies, everything is constructed solely on the basis of the search for combinational possibilities and the calculation of variations. When playing out a study, a player must accurately calculate right through to the end either the continuation chosen by him or, if a decision is being made by the method of exclusion, all the other possibilities that he rejects. The situation is quite different when playing out practical positions. Here, many decisions may be made on the basis of a positional assessment (but, all the same, usually supported by calculation).

The playing-out of practical positions is a form of training which most closely imitates the conditions of tournament play. When helping my pupils to prepare for a competition I have frequently made use of the playing-out of positions instead of the more traditional type of training-game. In fact, in the course of a single lesson I sometimes manage to play out two or three positions at once, but training-games take up considerably more time and their nature is unpredictable, so that they may not actually give rise to interesting play at all, whereas with the playing-out of positions one always needs to solve complicated problems. Besides, the trainer can choose exercises on a theme which is particularly beneficial to the pupil at the given time. In so far as positions are being played out which have been carefully analysed beforehand, it is easier for the trainer to identify mistakes committed by the pupil.

I am by no means calling for the abolition of training-games—they have their merits. It is simply that one should choose on each occasion the most appropriate specific form of training, bearing in mind those tasks that the player concerned still needs to complete as part of his preparation.

In this and subsequent sections I shall give several examples which have been played out at training sessions by my pupils, and I shall describe the interesting discoveries made in the process.

I myself first 'played-out' the following position—in a tournament game.

Balashov–Dvoretsky
USSR Ch., Premier League, Yerevan 1975


112
B

25 ... ♖d8

The threat was 26 ♘e3 or 26 ♘b6, winning a pawn.

26 a4 ♖bb8

26 ... ♖c5? 27 ♘xf6 gxf6 28 ♕xc5.

27 ♘b6

White's next move will be 28 ♘c4, after which the pawn on d6 cannot be defended. How can Black create counterplay?

27 ... ♕c7
28 ♘c4 d5!

In the event of 28 ... ♘d4? strong for White are both 29 ♘xe5 dxe5 30 cxd4, and 29 cxd4 ♕xc4 30 dxe5.

29 ♖xd5 ♖xd5
30 ♖xd5 ♘e7
31 ♖c5 ♕d7

Now the point of Black's idea is clear. White's pawns on a4 and f5 are both attacked; if 32 ♖xa5 then 32 ... ♘xf5 (intending 33 ... ♕d3) with sufficient counter-chances. To be frank, I did not examine the ensuing variations during the game, since I knew very well that *a queen and a knight become very menacing in tandem if they are close to the enemy king*. It was best here for White to force a draw by means of 33 ♕f3 ♘xh4 34 ♕e4 ♕d1+ 35 ♔h2 ♕h5 36 g4 ♘f3+ 37 ♔g3 ♕h2+ 38 ♔xf3 ♕h1+ 39 ♔e3 ♕e1+ with perpetual check.

Balashov quite reasonably decided to give back his extra pawn.

32 ♘e3!? ♕xa4
33 ♖c7

But now Black has a problem concerning the exchange of pieces. The tempting 33 ... ♘d5?! leads after 34 ♘xd5 ♕d1+ 35 ♔h2 ♕xd5 36 ♕g3 to a clearly better position for White. One of the black pieces will have to defend the square g7, and at the same time the passed c-pawn will march forward.

It is tempting to play the following combination: 33 ... ♕a1+?! 34 ♔h2 ♖xb2 35 ♕f3 ♖b1! (35 ... ♘g8? 36 ♕g3) 36 ♖xe7 ♖h1+ 37 ♔g3 ♕e1+ 38 ♕f2 ♕xc3 with quite good compensation for the sacrifice of a piece. But White is not obliged to go along with these complications—he plays simply 34 ♕f1! ♕xf1+ (34 ... ♕xb2 35 ♖xe7 ♕xc3 36 ♕f2 followed by 37 ♕g3) 35 ♔xf1, obtaining an advantage in the endgame.

The most active white piece is the rook, which has penetrated onto the seventh rank. It is necessary to drive it away or exchange it.

33 ... ♕e8!
34 ♕d2

Preventing the move 34 ... ♕d8; if 34 ♘c4 then 34 ... ♕d8 35 ♕a7 ♘xf5.

34 ... ♖d8
35 ♕e2 ♖d7!

The exchange of knights with 35 ... ♘d5 is dubious here as well: 36 ♘xd5 ♖xd5 37 ♕g4 ♖d7 38 ♕a4.

36 ♕c4 ♕d8!
37 ♖xd7 ♕xd7

Black has achieved his aim and has fully equalised. Now the game could have been drawn after 38 ♕e6 ♕d3 39 ♔f2 e4 40 ♕xe7 ♕d2+ 41 ♔f1 ♕xe3. Balashov played less forcefully: 38 ♕e4?!, and after 38 ... ♕d2! it was he who now had to face certain difficulties.

Events in this game developed rather by force. Black had to solve a number of tasks—both tactical and, mainly, positional. Therefore the quoted fragment seemed to me entirely suitable to be played out in training.

While I was helping Artur Yusupov to prepare for the World Junior Championship in 1977 we played through this position (Artur of course had the black pieces). To my surprise we only played two moves from the game Balashov–Dvoretsky: 25 ... ♖d8 26 a4 ♖bb8 27 ♘b6

113
B



27 ... ♕b7!?

It had seemed to me that Black was only able to maintain the equilibrium by playing, as in the game: 27 ... ♕c7 28 ♘c4 d5!. But Yusupov found a different solution, and rather a good one. And several years later Alyosha Dreev chose 27 ... ♕f7!? 28 ♖xd6 ♖xd6 29 ♖xd6 ♕c7 30 ♘c4 ♘e7.

In a study, any deviation from the main variation is usually punished immediately. For the trainer it is sufficient in such situations simply to indicate on the board the refutation which was foreseen by the author of the study. But with the playing-out of practical positions the matter is far more complicated. Here it is entirely probable that there will be deviations, either unforeseen or not fully worked out, from the solution which the trainer had in mind. In such cases he needs to

get really involved in the game and exert every effort to demonstrate to his pupil the deficiencies of the unexpected solution he has chosen (if, of course, they exist), or to set his opponent new problems, or in any case simply in order not to lose face with weak play. Therefore it should be understood that for a trainer who is not himself a player of sufficiently high standard it is best not to meddle in the playing-out of practical positions.

28	**♘c4**	**d5!**
29	**♖xd5**	**♖xd5**
30	**♖xd5**	**♕b3**
31	**♖c5**	**♕xa4**
32	**♕f3**	

After 32 . . . ♘e7 33 ♖c7 Black's position is bad. But, as it turned out, Artur had foreseen an excellent counter-punch.

32	**. . .**	**e4!**
33	**♕xe4**	**♘e5**
34	**♖xa5!**	**♕d1+!**

In the event of 34 . . . ♕xc4 35 ♖xe5 ♕xe4 36 ♖xe4 ♖xb2 White would have maintained excellent winning chances in the rook ending. Yusupov decided to stay two pawns down but to create threats against the white king.

35	**♔h2**	**♘g4+**
36	**♔g3**	**h5**
37	**♖a8**	**♖xa8**
38	**♕xa8+**	**♔h7**
39	**♕e4**	**♕g1**
40	**♕e2**	

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

Here, unfortunately, Artur made a mistake. He played 40 . . . ♕c5?, having underestimated the strong reply 41 ♔f4!, which allowed White gradually to convert his advantage in material into a win. Analysis showed that by continuing 40 . . . ♕h2+! 41 ♔f3 ♕xh4 Black would have maintained sufficient counterplay.

Now look at the ending of a game played by Artur just one month later.

Popovic–Yusupov
World Junior Ch., Innsbruck 1977

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

Chances here are roughly equal, but both players were in a

very aggressive mood; the Yugoslav player—influenced by memories that only a few moves earlier he had stood better, and Yusupov—since he was beginning to like the position that had arisen.

30 ... ♕a3!

It is useful to penetrate behind enemy lines with the queen.

31 ♕f2 ♕c1
32 ♕d2 ♕b1
33 ♖d7 ♘f5
34 ♕f2

Bad is 34 ♗xf5 ♕xf5 35 ♖xb7? because of 35 ... ♕g4! 36 ♕f2 ♖d8 with decisive threats.

34 ... b5!

Black not only removes his pawn from the threat of capture and attacks on the queenside, but also tempts his opponent to attack the pawn on c6 with his bishop.

35 ♗g2?! ♘h6!
36 ♔g3?

The bait has worked (it was essential to return the bishop to h3). Now Black launches a decisive counter-attack in exactly the same way that he had done a month earlier, at our training session.

36 ... ♘g4
37 ♕d2 ♕g1
38 ♖d8 ♖xd8
39 ♕xd8+ ♔h7
40 ♕d4 (*see diagram*)
40 ... ♕h2+!

This time Artur rectifies the

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

mistake he committed in training, and takes the pawn on h4. Weaker was 40 ... ♘e3? in view of 41 ♔f3!.

41 ♔f3 ♕xh4
42 ♔e2 ♕h2
43 ♔f1 c5!
44 ♕e4 ♕g3
45 ♔e2 ♕f2+
46 ♔d3 ♕xa2
47 ♕b7 ♕xb3

White resigned.

This victory over a dangerous competitor inspired Yusupov. He went on to win several other games and secured himself the title of World Champion with a round to spare. An important ingredient of his success was the serious training done before this tournament, including the playing-out of positions. Of course, such an ideal opportunity to make use of an idea from a training-game in an actual tournament encounter might very well not present itself, but this is not really the point. Targeted training procedures helped Artur to improve

his technique of calculating variations and to come to the biggest tournament of his life in excellent form.

Combinations which are Impossible to Find

It is always easier to find treasure where someone has already found a handful of coins.
Igor Zaitsev

In 1988 Sergei Dolmatov and I decided to devote several training sessions to the playing-out of very complicated, almost irrational positions, in order to improve his technique of calculating variations and his ability to guess the most promising continuations by intuition. For this purpose I had to select a number of deeply analysed games (or fragments) having great combinational complications. This was by no means easy, considering the particular requirements which examples offered for playing-out must satisfy, and also the fact that all the best exercises contained in my card index had already been solved or played out by Dolmatov.

Fortunately, a short time previously a book by Nunn and Griffiths had been published, entitled *Secrets of Grandmaster Play* (Batsford). Nunn's most interesting games, excellently analysed by him, gave me just the material that we required.

Nunn rightly noted in his preface: "...with such a large quantity of analysis some mistakes are inevitable". (I fear that I have also not succeeded in avoiding them in my own book.) So when Dolmatov—a top-class Grandmaster—played (and then analysed) to the best of his ability a game which had previously been played by someone else, it was clear that he would have to solve certain problems somewhat differently, to find nuances not foreseen by the English Grandmaster either over the board or in analysis. Of course, the same thing would happen if Nunn were to play out one of Dolmatov's games.

Borkowski–Nunn
European Junior Ch., Groningen 1974/75

1	**e4**	**g6**
2	**d4**	**♗g7**
3	**♘c3**	**d6**
4	**f4**	**♘f6**
5	**♘f3**	**0-0**
6	**♗d3**	**♘a6**
7	**e5**	**♘d7**
8	**h4?!** (*see diagram*)	

This is the point where we began our game. Dolmatov played Black, and up to the 15th move he played the same moves as Nunn.

8 ... c5

Without doubt the most natural move, although also entirely

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

possible is 8 . . . dxe5 9 fxe5 c5, as was played in the game Borkowski–Balcerowski, Poland 1979. Dolmatov practically did not consider the move 8 . . . dxe5, explaining afterwards that in principle he doesn't like the type of position which arises after 9 dxe5, since the bishop on g7 is then shut out of the game. This assessment is not indisputable (after 9 . . . ♘dc5 Black seems to stand well) but quite interesting. In any case it is highly informative for a trainer—on the basis of such episodes he can judge particular features of his pupil's thought-processes and style of play.

9 h5 cxd4

10 hxg6 hxg6

Worse is 10 . . . fxg6? 11 ♗c4+ ♔h8 12 ♘g5 h6 13 ♕d3!, or 10 . . . dxc3? 11 ♘g5! hxg6 12 ♗xg6!.

11 ♘g5! dxe5

We already know that it is not good to play 11 . . . dxc3? 12 ♗xg6!.

Q. 1.60 How would White continue his attack in the event of 11 . . . ♘dc5?

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

Not particularly promising is 12 ♘ce4 ♘xe4 13 ♗xe4 ♘c5, or 12 f5 ♘xd3+ 13 ♕xd3 ♗xf5 (but not 13 . . . dxc3? 14 ♕h3 ♖e8 15 ♕h7+ ♔f8 16 ♘e6+ fxe6 17 ♗h6) 14 ♕xd4 ♕a5! 15 ♕h4 ♕xe5+ 16 ♘ce4 ♖fc8 and White's attack is beaten off.

It is necessary to play 12 ♔f2! (creating the terrible threat of 13 ♖h8+! ♗xh8 14 ♕h1) 12 . . . ♘xd3+ 13 cxd3. After the forced reply 13 . . . ♖e8 White has no need to play his combination: 14 ♖h8+ ♗xh8 15 ♕h1 ♗g7 16 ♕h7+ ♔f8 17 f5, which apparently leads to a draw (17 . . . ♗xf5 18 ♘e6+ fxe6 19 ♗h6). More dangerous for Black is the simple 14 ♘ce4.

Thus the move 11 . . . ♘dc5 is not too good. But besides the move chosen by Nunn (and Dolmatov), 11 . . . dxe5, Black had one other strong possibility: 11 . . .

♘xe5!? 12 fxe5 dxc3, as tried in the game De Firmian–van den Berg, Wijk aan Zee 1986.

12 f5! ♘f6!

Here we have the first departure from Nunn's variations and evaluations. He gives the move played by him not an exclamation mark but a question mark. In his opinion, in this game Black should objectively have found himself in a difficult position, whereas 12 . . . gxf5 would have led to an advantage for Black (other possibilities are bad: in the event of 12 . . . dxc3? or 12 . . . ♘dc5? White gets a decisive attack after 13 fxg6). Dolmatov showed that, on the contrary, the move in the game is correct, and that capturing on f5 (which we shall consider later) would have led to defeat.

13 fxg6 ♗g4!

Nunn sacrifices the exchange, counting on the strength of his central pawns. He would have lost after 13 . . . fxg6? 14 ♗c4+, or 13 . . . dxc3 14 gxf7+ ♖xf7 15 ♗h7+.

14 gxf7+ ♖xf7
15 ♘e2

15 ♘xf7 ♔xf7 16 ♗e2 ♗f5.

Q. 1.61 How should Black continue?

After 15 . . . ♖f8 16 ♗c4+ ♘d5 Black, regrettably, cannot play the spectacular 17 ♘c3 ♗xd1 18 ♗xd5+ ♕xd5 19 ♘xd5 ♖fe8 20



♔xd1 ♖ad8, when Black has the better chances. But White retains a strong attack by playing 17 ♕d3 ♗f5 18 ♕f3 ♘ab4 (18 . . . e6 19 ♘g3 ♗xc2 20 ♕g4) 19 ♘g3.

Nunn decided to prevent the move ♗c4 and played

15 . . . ♕d5

A critical position arose after

16 ♗g6 ♖ff8
17 ♕d3 e4

Bad for White now is 18 ♘xe4? ♘b4, or 18 ♗xe4 ♘xe4 19 ♕xe4 ♕xe4 20 ♘xe4 ♘b4, but the beautiful 18 ♘c3!! would have guaranteed White the advantage. The main variation runs: 18 . . . ♕e5 (18 . . . dxc3? 19 ♗h7+; 18 . . . exd3 19 ♘xd5 ♖fd8 20 ♗f7+! ♔f8 21 ♘f4 ♗f5 22 ♗e6; 18 . . . ♕a5 19 ♕xd4 ♖ad8 20 ♕c4+ e6 21 ♗e3) 19 ♘cxe4 ♘c5 20 ♕g3! ♕xg3+ 21 ♘xg3 ♘e6 22 ♘f5 ♗xf5 23 ♗xf5 ♘xg5 24 ♗xg5, and White's two bishops are very active.

18 ♕xd4?! ♕xd4
19 ♘xd4 ♖ad8

20 ♗e3 ♘b4
21 ♖c1?

The equilibrium could still have been maintained with the move 21 ♘ge6!.

21 ... ♘bd5
22 ♗f2 ♘f4
23 ♗f5 ♖xd4
24 ♗xd4 ♗xf5
25 g3 ♘e6
26 ♘xe6 ♗xe6
27 ♗xa7 ♘g4
28 ♗c5 ♗xb2

White resigned.

In our training-game Dolmatov played much more forcefully than Nunn:

15 ... ♘c5!

By bringing the knight in towards the centre and not allowing White the chance to include his queen in the attack, he gets more than adequate compensation for the exchange.

16 ♗c4 e6
17 ♘xf7 ♔xf7
18 0-0

18 ♗g5 b5 or 18 ... ♘ce4.

18 ... ♕h8

It turns out that it is difficult for White to defend against an attack along the h-file. Also not bad was 18 ... b5 (19 ♗xb5 ♕b6).

19 ♕e1

19 ♗g5 ♕h5 20 ♗xf6 ♗xf6 followed by ... ♖h8.

19 ... ♕h7
20 ♗g5

Better is 20 ♕g3, but this move would also not save White.

20 ... ♖h8
21 ♘g3 ♕h2+
22 ♔f2 e4!

And I had to capitulate, in view of the variation 23 ♖h1 e3+ 24 ♗xe3 ♘e4+.

As you see, Dolmatov played this game with great power and confidence (having used, incidentally, only 63 minutes). The only thing that I could reproach him for was that he did not consider at all some of the promising possibilities which he had at his disposal, such as 11 ... ♘xe5 or 12 ... gxf5.

Having agreed that the move 11 ... ♘xe5 actually deserved serious consideration, Dolmatov immediately, however, expressed serious doubts about 12 ... gxf5. This compelled him to turn to Nunn's analysis, in which Sergei very quickly discovered a weak link.

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

Q. 1.62 Identify the candidate moves for White.

Two possibilities are obvious: 13

♗xf5 and 13 ♕h5. There is also a third, much more camouflaged: 13 ♘ce4.

It is easiest to discard the primitive capture of the pawn. After 13 ♗xf5? ♘f6 14 ♗h7+ (14 ♗xc8 ♕xc8 15 ♘ce4 ♘xe4 16 ♘xe4 ♕f5) 14 . . . ♘xh7 15 ♖xh7 ♗f5 16 ♕h5 ♕d6 (followed by . . . ♕g6) Black wins.

It is much more complicated to analyse (not to mention calculate, without moving the pieces) the most natural move 13 ♕h5. Nunn considers it to be the strongest, but convincingly proves that after 13 . . . ♘f6 the defence nevertheless turns out to be superior to the attack.

A. 14 ♕h2? dxc3 15 ♘e4 (15 ♘h7 ♘g4) 15 . . . fxe4 16 ♗xe4 ♖e8 17 ♗h7+ ♔f8 18 ♗h6 ♘g4;

B. 14 ♕h3 dxc3 15 ♘h7 ♘g4 16 ♘g5 (16 ♘f6+ ♘xf6 17 ♗h6 f4 18 ♕h4 cxb2 19 ♗xg7 bxa1(♕)+ and 20 . . . ♕xh1, or 19 ♖d1 ♕a5+ 20 ♔f1 e4! 21 ♗xg7 ♕h5 22 ♕xh5 ♘xh5 with extra material for Black) 16 . . . ♘h6 17 ♘e6 cxb2! (dangerous is 17 . . . ♗xe6 18 ♗xh6) 18 ♘xg7 bxa1(♕) 19 ♕xh6 ♕xc1+ 20 ♕xc1 f4 21 ♕d1 ♕a5+ 22 ♔f1 e4 23 ♗xe4 ♔xg7 and Black wins;

C. 14 ♕h4 dxc3, and now: 15 ♘h7 ♘g4 16 ♘g5 (16 ♘f6+ ♘xf6 17 ♗h6 ♕d4!) 16 . . . ♘h6 17 ♘h7 (17 ♘e4 ♕b6; 17 ♘e6 fxe6 18 ♗xh6 ♕d4; 17 ♘xf7 ♖xf7 18 ♗c4 ♕d6) 17 . . . ♕d4 18 ♕xd4 exd4 19 ♘xf8 ♔xf8 20 ♗xh6 ♗xh6 21 ♖xh6 ♔g7 and Black has an overwhelming advantage; 15 ♘e4 fxe4 16 ♗h6 (16 ♗xe4 ♖e8! 17 ♗h6? ♕d4, or 17 ♗h7+ ♔f8 18 ♗h6 ♕d2+! 19 ♗xd2 cxd2+ 20 ♔xd2 ♖d8+) 16 . . . cxb2 17 ♖d1 (17 ♗xg7 bxa1(♕)+ and 18 . . . ♕xh1; 17 ♕g5 bxa1(♕)+ 18 ♔d2 ♕a5+) 17 . . . ♗f5 18 ♕g5 (18 ♗xg7 ♘h7 19 ♗xe5 ♕a5+, or 19 ♕g3 ♕b6 20 ♗f6+ ♗g6) 18 . . . ♗g6 19 ♗xg7 ♘h7 20 ♖xh7 exd3 (mistaken is 20 . . . ♕a5+? 21 ♔f1 ♗xh7 22 ♗c4! e6 23 ♗f6+ ♗g6 24 ♕h6, but entirely possible is 20 . . . ♗xh7 21 ♗f6+ ♗g6 22 ♗c4 ♕xd1+ 23 ♔xd1 b1(♕)+, and the king has no retreat square) 21 ♗xa5 (21 ♖h8+ ♔xg7 22 ♕h6+ ♔f6) 21 . . . ♕a5+ 22 ♔f1 ♕xe5 23 ♕xe5 ♗xh7 with a win for Black. If on his 17th move White had put the rook on b1, then 20 . . . exd3 would have been decisive (the alternative 20 . . . ♗xh7 21 ♗c4 e6 22 ♗f6+ ♗g6 23 ♗xe6 ♕xf6 is less sound).

Let us now consider the move which Nunn found and underestimated—the brilliant **13 ♘ce4!!**. After 13 . . . fxe4 14 ♘xe4 (with the threat 15 ♕h5) it is difficult for Black to defend. For example: 14 . . . ♘f6 15 ♘xf6+ exf6 16 ♗h7+ ♔h8 17 ♕h5 and White has a mating attack; 14 . . . ♕b6 15 ♕h5 ♕g6 (15 . . . ♖d8 16

♕h7+ ♔f8 17 ♗h6) 16 ♕xg6 fxg6 17 ♗c4+ ♖f7 18 ♘g5 with advantage to White; 14 . . . e6 (if 14 . . . f6 or 14 . . . f5 then 15 ♗c4+) 15 ♕h5 f5 (15 . . . ♖e8 16 ♗h6!) 16 ♕h7+ ♔f7 17 ♗g5! (stronger than 17 ♘g5+ ♔e7 18 ♕xg7+ ♔d6) 17 . . . ♕b6 (17 . . . ♕a5+ 18 ♔e2; 17 . . . fxe4 18 ♗xd8 ♖xd8 19 0-0+ ♘f6 20 ♖xf6+ ♔xf6 21 ♖f1+ ♔e7 22 ♕xg7+ ♔d6 23 ♗xe4, or 18 . . . exd3 19 0-0+ ♔e8 20 ♖xf8+ ♗xf8 21 ♗g5 ♘dc5 22 ♖f1 winning) 18 ♕h5+ ♔g8 19 ♕g6 (threatening primarily 20 ♖h7 ♖f7 21 ♗h6) 19 . . . ♕xb2 (19 . . . fxe4 20 ♕h7+ ♔f7 21 ♖f1+ ♔e8 22 ♕g6+; 19 . . . ♖f7 20 ♖h8+ ♔xh8 21 ♕xf7 ♘f8 22 ♘f6) 20 ♕xe6+ ♖f7 21 ♗c4 ♕b4+ (21 . . . ♕xa1+ 22 ♔f2 ♕xh1 23 ♕xf7+ ♔h7 24 ♕g8+ ♔g6 25 ♗f7 mate) 22 ♔e2 ♕f8 (22 . . . ♕xc4+ 23 ♕xc4 fxe4 24 ♖af1) 23 ♕g6 ♕e8 24 ♘d6 and Black has to resign.

Besides these variations found by Nunn, it is necessary to consider one other defence, 14 . . . ♖e8!?, pointed out by Yusupov.

It seemed to me at first that White can win spectacularly with 15 ♖h8+ ♔xh8 (15 . . . ♗xh8 16 ♕g4+ ♗g7 17 ♗h6) 16 ♕h5+ ♔g8 17 ♘g5. Alas, after 17 . . . ♘f6 the attack is repelled: 18 ♗h7+ (18 ♕xf7+ ♔h8 19 ♕g6 ♖f8) 18 . . . ♘xh7 19 ♕xf7+ (19 ♕xh7+ ♔f8 20 ♘e6+ fxe6! 21 ♗h6 ♕a5+ followed by 22 . . . ♖d8, and the black king runs away to d7) 19 . . . ♔h8 20 ♕h5 ♗f5 21 ♘f7+ ♔g8 22 ♘xd8 ♖axd8, and Black has a rook and two minor pieces for his queen.

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White gets a menacing position after 15 ♕h5 ♘f6 16 ♘xf6+ exf6 17 ♗h6! ♔f8 (forced) 18 ♗xg7+ ♔e7. But possibly still stronger is 15 ♗h6! ♕b6 (15 . . . ♘f6 16 ♗xg7 ♕a5+ 17 ♔f1 ♔xg7 18 ♕c1; 15 . . . ♗xh6 16 ♖xh6 ♘f6 17 ♕d2 ♘xe4 18 ♗xe4 e6 19 ♖h8+!) 16 ♗xg7 ♔xg7 17 ♖h7+! ♔g8 (17 . . . ♔xh7 18 ♘f6+ ♔g7 19 ♕g4+) 18 ♕h5 ♕g6 19 ♖h8+ ♔g7 20 ♕xg6+ and 21 ♖xe8.

We have convinced ourselves that Black should not accept the piece sacrifice. Nunn considers that the attack can be beaten off with the move **13 . . . ♕b6**.

Q. 1.63 How should White continue?

On 14 ♕h5 there follows 14 . . . ♕h6! (but not 14 . . . ♕g6? 15

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W

♕xg6 fxg6 16 ♗c4+) 15 ♕xh6 ♗xh6 16 ♖xh6 fxe4 17 ♗xe4 ♘f6, and the black king is safe.

14 ♗c4!!

This move, found by Dolmatov, is decisive in strengthening the attack: 14 . . . ♕b4+ 15 ♗d2 ♕xc4 16 ♖h8+! (Not 16 ♕h5? ♖d8) 16 . . . ♗xh8 17 ♕h5 and mate is inevitable; 14 . . . fxe4 15 ♕h5 with an irresistible double attack on the squares h7 and f7; 14 . . . ♕g6 15 ♘xf7 ♖xf7 16 ♘g5 with advantage to White.

The conclusion which can be drawn on the basis of all the variations we have considered can be formulated briefly: the move 12 . . . gxf5?! does not solve the defensive problems, in view of 13 ♘ce4!! ♕b6!? 14 ♗c4!!. Stronger is 12 . . . ♘f6.

Comparing this combination with a multitude of others familiar to me, I have to acknowledge it as one of the most difficult. Its complexity consists both in the unusual nature of White's combinative play and in the enormous number of accompanying variations (accurate calculation of which would be completely impossible), which entice us onto any one of a number of 'false trails'. Of course, Dolmatov and I could barely have succeeded in getting at the truth if a large part of the work had not already been done by John Nunn, whom we sincerely thank.

A Game Played Several Times Over

Polugayevsky–Nunn
European Team Ch., Skara 1980

1	**d4**	**♘f6**
2	**♘f3**	**c5**
3	**d5**	**e6**
4	**c4**	**exd5**
5	**cxd5**	**d6**
6	**♘c3**	**g6**
7	**e4**	**♗g7**
8	**♗e2**	**0-0**
9	**0-0**	**♖e8**
10	**♘d2**	**♘bd7**
11	**♕c2**	**♘e5**
12	**b3**	**♘h5?**

This move leads to a difficult position for Black. Much more promising, according to theory, is any of three other possibilities: 12 . . . g5, 12 . . . a6 or 12 . . . ♘fg4.

13	**♗xh5**	**gxh5**
14	**♗b2**	**♗d7**

If 14 . . . ♕h4 then 15 ♘b5 ♖d8 16 f4 ♘g4 17 ♘f3.

15 ♖ae1

15 f4 is premature, in view of 15 ... ♘g4 16 ♘d1 ♗d4+! 17 ♗xd4 (17 ♔h1 ♘xh2!) 17 ... cxd4 when Black succeeds in complicating the game. But now the threat really is 16 f4 ♘g4 17 ♘f3. There is no reliable way to forestall the white pawn offensive in the centre—it is only possible to hold it up for a short time by tactical means.

15 ... ♕h4

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

Unsuccessful now for White would be 16 ♖e3?! ♘g4 17 ♘h3 ♕g5 (threatening 18 ... ♘xf2) 18 f4 ♗d4+ 19 ♔h1 ♕g7 with a dangerous initiative for Black. But extremely strong was the prophylactic move 16 ♔h1!, which renews the threat of 17 f4 ♘g4 18 ♘f3. Neither 16 ... ♕f4 17 ♘e2, nor 16 ... ♘g4 17 ♘f3 ♕e7 18 h3, would promise Black any sort of counterplay.

Another excellent possibility for White was 16 ♘d1!. Nunn had intended to prevent the move 17 f4 with 16 ... ♕f4, having in mind 17 g3? ♕xd2, or 17 ♔h1?! h4 18 g3 ♕h6. However, as Zaitsev has said, *the queen is a bad blockader!*, and White could have obtained an advantage with the simple 17 ♘c4 or 17 ♗c1 ♗h6 18 ♘b2.

16 f4?

A mistake which, from a grandmaster of Polugayevsky's class, is difficult to explain. Most probably he had reckoned on being able to trap the black queen after 16 ... ♘g4 17 ♘f3 ♗d4+ 18 ♔h1 ♘f2+ 19 ♖xf2 ♕xf2 20 ♕c1, but had not noticed the rather simple reply 20 ... ♗h3!, after which it is Black who has the advantage.

Now the game enters a period of most interesting tactical complications, and it is therefore entirely appropriate as an exercise to be played out, both as a 'normal' exercise (for Black) and also as a 'two-hander'. Several training-games have helped substantially in making a fairly precise assessment of many of the variations analysed by Nunn.

Incidentally, why have these games been played starting from precisely this position? It is clear that it was not possible to begin earlier—indeed, up to now events have by no means been forced. But why should we suggest to the player of Black that he make a number of obvious moves (from the 16th to the 19th)?

First, in order to disguise the

decisive moment in the game when he will have to apply all his powers to the calculation and evaluation of extremely complicated variations. It is better if this does not happen on the first move—otherwise what we have essentially is an exercise not for playing-out but for solution.

Secondly, in order to provoke (and then to discuss seriously) a typical error which many players commit in such circumstances. They attempt straightaway to find their way in the position 'right through to the end', spend a great deal of time and effort on calculation, make the necessary moves, and then again begin to examine variations which they have already calculated. This results in tiredness, mistakes in calculation and inevitable time-trouble.

It is much more sensible to make obligatory moves quickly (having first convinced yourself that they are indeed obligatory). And only when it is necessary to take a crucial decision, when a position requiring detailed calculation arises on the board—only at this point should you immerse yourself in complicated variations.

This, incidentally, was precisely how Dolmatov acted when he played out this position—the first four moves took him just two minutes.

16 ... **♘g4**
17 **♘f3** **♗d4+**
18 **♔h1** **♘f2+**
19 **♖xf2**

Bad, of course, is 19 ♔g1? ♘d3+. Zaitsev gives the following variation: 20 ♘xd4 ♘xe1 21 ♕d2 cxd4 22 ♖xe1 dxc3 23 ♕xc3 f6! (but not 23 ... ♔f8? 24 g3 ♕g4 25 ♕h8+ ♕g8 26 ♗g7+) 24 g3 ♕g4 25 ♕xf6 ♕g6 and White's attack is beaten off.

19 ... **♕xf2**
20 **♕c1?!**

This move, played by Polugayevsky, was the one I chose in training-games against Dolmatov and Yusupov, although I knew that 20 ♕b1! was objectively stronger.

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B



From the square b1 the queen defends the pawn on e4—this is a telling consideration in the variation 20 ... ♗h3 21 ♖g1 ♔f8? 22 ♘xd4 cxd4 23 ♘b5. And after 21 ... ♗g4 (instead of 21 ... ♔f8) 22 ♖f1 ♕e3 White complicates the game with 23 e5! f5! (23 ... ♗xc3 24 ♘g5; 23 ... dxe5 24 ♘e4) 24 ♘b5 or even 24 ♘xd4 cxd4 25

♘b5 (pointed out by Dolmatov).

During the game Nunn intended to play the ingenious move 20 . . . ♗f5 (with the threat 21 . . . ♗xe4 22 ♖xe4 ♖xe4).

Q. 1.64 What would you have replied to this?

The Grandmaster considered the following variations: 21 exf5 ♖xe1+ 22 ♕xe1 ♕xb2; 21 ♘d1 ♗xe4! 22 ♘xf2 (22 ♕xe4 ♖xe4 23 ♘xf2 ♖xe1+ 24 ♘xe1 ♗xf2) 22 . . . ♗xb1; 21 ♘f1 ♗xe4! 22 ♖xf2 ♗xb1; 21 ♖e2 ♗xe4! 22 ♕c1! (22 ♖xf2 ♗xb1; 22 ♘xd4 ♗xb1; 22 ♖xe4 ♖xe4) 22 . . . ♗xf3! (weaker is 22 . . . ♕xf3 23 gxf3 ♗xf3+ 24 ♖g2+ ♔h8) 23 ♖xf2 ♗xf2 and Black wins.

However, he later found during analysis the successful defence 21 ♗a1!?, which parries Black's threat, who is now forced to exchange on c3, which he really wished to avoid.

Another, perhaps even stronger, reply was suggested by Zaitsev: 21 ♖f1! ♗xe4 22 ♘xe4 ♕xb2 23 ♕d3! (but not 23 ♘xd4? ♕xb1 24 ♘f6+ ♔g7 25 ♘xe8+ ♖xe8 26 ♖xb1 cxd4 with a difficult rook ending for White). In connection with the threats 24 ♘eg5 and 24 ♘xd6 White retains quite good compensation for the sacrifice of the exchange. For example: 23 . . . ♖ad8 24 ♘eg5 (24 ♖b1? ♕a2 25 ♘d4 ♖xe4 26 ♘f5 ♕xb1+ 27 ♕xb1 ♖de8 wins for Black) 24 . . . ♖e7 25 ♕xh7+ ♔f8 26 ♘e5!, or 23 . . . ♗g7 24 ♘xd6 ♖e2 (24 . . . ♕e2 25 ♕b1) 25 ♘g5 ♕c2 26 ♕f3.

In reply to 20 ♕b1, Black should most probably cunningly choose 20 . . . ♗xc3 21 ♗xc3 ♗h3 22 ♖g1 ♗g4, without wasting too much effort. But also in this case the position is very unclear: White's strong dark-squared bishop and the vulnerable position of his opponent's king, as well as the fact that Black's pawns are disconnected, would to a considerable extent have compensated Polugayevsky for the loss of the exchange.

But now let us return to the game. Since it is evidently not good for Black to play 20 . . . ♗xc3? 21 ♕xc3, he has only one way to save his queen.

20 . . . ♗h3!
21 ♖g1



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B

Q. 1.65 What do you think is the strongest move here?

Nunn played the tempting move

21 . . . ♔f8, preventing 22 gxh3+ and creating the threat 22 . . . ♗xg2+ 23 ♖xg2 ♕xf3. Dolmatov played precisely the same move. He also seriously considered 21 . . . ♔h8 with the idea on 22 ♘xd4 of replying 22 . . . ♖g8 23 ♕c2 (23 gxh3 cxd4) 23 . . . ♗xg2+ 24 ♖xg2 ♖xg2 25 ♕xf2 ♖xf2 winning, but rightly rejected this idea because of 22 ♘g5! ♕xg1+ 23 ♕xg1 ♗xg1 24 ♔xg1.

The quiet continuation 21 . . . ♗g4 does not in Nunn's opinion promise Black an advantage. I too presumed this—until I played this position against Yusupov. But more about this later.

21 . . . ♔f8?!
22 ♘xd4 cxd4

Q. 1.66 What should White do?

Totally hopeless is 23 gxh3? ♕f3+ 24 ♖g2 dxc3 25 ♗xc3 ♖xe4. No better is 23 ♘d1? ♗xg2+! 24 ♖xg2 ♕e1+ 25 ♖g1 ♕xe4+ 26 ♖g2 ♕e1+ 27 ♖g1 ♕e2! with the decisive threat 28 . . . ♕f3+. On 23 ♘b5? the simplest is 23 . . . ♖xe4, threatening 24 . . . ♗xg2+.

Polugayevsky's desperate attempt to create counter-threats with 23 f5? turned out to be unsuccessful. There followed: 23 . . . dxc3 24 ♕xc3 (24 ♕h6+ ♔e7 25 ♗xc3 ♖g8) 24 . . . ♖xe4 25 gxh3 (25 ♕xh3 ♖e1; 25 ♕h8+ ♔e7 26 ♕f6+ ♔e8 27 ♕h8+ ♔d7 28 ♕xa8 ♗xg2+) 25 . . . ♔e8! (of course, Black parries his opponent's transparent threat 26 ♖g8+!) 26 ♕d3 ♖e1 27 ♖xe1 (27 ♕b5+ ♔f8 28 ♗g7+ ♔g8) 27 . . . ♕xe1+ 28 ♔g2 ♖c8 29 f6 ♔d7 30 ♕xh7 ♕d2+ 31 ♔g3 ♕xd5 32 ♔h4 ♖e8 and White resigned.

All the same, White's position was by no means hopeless. He was obliged to try

23 ♗a3!!



No use, of course, is 23 . . . dxc3? 24 ♗xd6+ ♖e7 25 ♕xc3. A beautiful variation was found by Jonathan Mestel: 23 . . . ♖ad8? 24 ♘b5 ♖xe4 25 ♘xd6!! ♗xg2+ 26 ♖xg2 ♖e1+ 27 ♕xe1 ♕xe1+ 28 ♖g1 ♕e2 29 ♘e4+ ♖d6 (29 . . . ♔e8 30 ♘f6 mate) 30 ♗xd6+ ♔e8 31 ♘f6+ ♔d8 32 ♖g8 mate.

Nunn considers that Black can win with 23 . . . ♖ec8, substantiating his opinion with the variation 24 ♗xd6+ ♔e8 25 ♕a3 ♖xc3 26 ♕a4+ ♔d8. But Dol-

matov, deliberating over the position after I had played 23 ♗a3!!, declined to play 23 ... ♖ec8 in view of 24 f5 or 24 ♗xd6+ ♔e8 25 f5.

Yusupov calculated the variations more precisely: he established that it is a mistake to play 24 ♗xd6+? ♔e8 25 f5 because of 25 ... ♖xc3 26 ♕g5 ♗xg2+ 27 ♖xg2 ♕e1+ 28 ♖g1 ♕xe4+. On the other hand, 24 f5! guarantees White a draw after 24 ... ♖xc3 25 ♕h6+ ♔e8 26 ♕xd6! ♗xg2+ 27 ♖xg2 ♕e1+ 28 ♖g1 ♕xe4+ 29 ♖g2, since it is bad to play 29 ... ♖d8? 30 ♕f8+ ♔d7 31 ♕xf7+ ♔c8 32 ♕e6+! ♕xe6 33 dxe6 ♖f3 34 ♖c2+ ♔b8 35 e7 ♖e8 36 ♗d6+ ♔a8 37 ♖c7 followed by ♖d7, and White wins.

Zaitsev suggested 23 ... f6, with the variation 24 ♘b5 ♖xe4 25 ♘xd6 ♗xg2+ 26 ♖xg2 ♖e1+ 27 ♕xe1 ♕xe1+ 28 ♖g1 ♕e2 29 ♘f5+ ♔e8. But here too the move 24 f5! (instead of 24 ♘b5?) allows White to create serious threats against the enemy king.

Black can prevent the opening of the dangerous diagonal c1–h6 by playing 23 ... f5. White must then act according to Yusupov's recommendation: 24 e5! dxc3 25 ♕xc3! ♗g4 26 e6, or 24 ... ♖ec8 25 ♗xd6+ ♔e8 26 ♕d1! ♗g4 27 ♕d3 with the threat 28 ♕b5+.

In our game Dolmatov played

23 ... ♔e7?

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W

Q. 1.67 What would you advise for White?

In principle, Black's idea of bringing the rook over to support the attack from g8 looks sensible, but it can be forcefully refuted by 24 ♘b5! ♖ac8 25 ♕f1!, when White retains his extra material.

I had not noticed the move 25 ♕f1!, since I was immediately attracted by a combination, but I had unfortunately made a mistake in my calculations. When I was an active tournament player I coped with such tasks without difficulty, but in the last few years, having given up practical play, I have regrettably ceased to be a strong enough partner for this sort of training. In this connection I wish to repeat my advice to those involved in training: it is essential to combine your training activities with active tournament play.

24 ♗xd6+? ♔d7
25 ♘a4 ♖ac8
26 ♘c5+ ♖xc5!

I was counting merely on 26 . . . ♔xd6? 27 e5+ ♔e7 28 d6+ ♔d8 (28 . . . ♔f8 29 gxh3) 29 d7!.

27	**♕xc5**	**♗xg2+!**
28	**♖xg2**	**♕e1+**
29	**♖g1**	**♕e4+**
30	**♖g2**	**♖c8**

White resigned.

We may draw the conclusion that after 23 ♗a3!! Black has no advantage, and this means that we are right to doubt the move 21 . . . ♔f8 (as will soon become clear, stronger was 21 . . . ♗g4!). Of course, it would scarcely be possible to calculate these variations accurately over the board—here you have to guess, to trust your intuition.

Let us now turn to the move **21 . . . ♗g4!**, played against me by Yusupov, and see how our 'game' went. Now the threat is 22 . . . ♗xf3 23 gxf3+ ♕xg1+, and on 22 ♖f1 there follows 22 . . . ♕e3 with tempo. Therefore **22 ♘xd4 cxd4** (22 . . . ♕xd4 23 ♘b5) is forced.

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W



When helping Dreev to prepare for the World 'Cadet' Championship in 1984 (where, incidentally, he became World Champion for the second time in succession), I organised a two-handed playing-out between him and Ivanchuk, who was about to take part in the same tournament. They soon arrived at the position in the last diagram (Dreev was playing Black). The subsequent course of the game, which was a true 'comedy of errors' once again illustrates how difficult it is to orientate oneself in such complicated situations without special training, even for such brilliantly talented players as Ivanchuk and Dreev. True, they were both then just 15 years old. The game went: 23 f5? dxc3? (essential was 23 . . . f6! with a winning position for Black) 24 ♕g5+ ♔f8 25 ♗xc3 ♖e5 26 ♕f6? (26 h3! would have led to a win for White) 26 . . . ♗h3! 27 ♕xd6+ ♖e7 28 f6 ♗xg2+ $\frac{1}{2}$–$\frac{1}{2}$.

23	**♖f1!**	**♕h4!**

Much weaker is 23 . . . ♕e3? 24 ♕xe3 dxe3 25 h3 ♗d7 26 ♖e1, since in the ending White still has excellent compensation for the exchange.

24	**♘b5**	**♖xe4**

On 24 . . . ♗e2 there follows 25 ♘xd6 ♗xf1 26 ♕xf1! ♖ed8 27 ♘f5 ♕f6 28 ♗xd4 ♕a6 29 ♕e1, and the black king is in danger. Instead of 26 . . . ♖ed8 it is better

to play 26 . . . ♕f6 27 ♘xe8 ♖xe8 28 e5 (28 ♕f3? ♕f5!; 28 ♕d3? ♕xf4) 28 . . . ♕f5 with chances for both sides.

25 ♘xd6 ♖e2
26 ♗xd4



Q. 1.68 What should Black play?

Bad is 26 . . . ♖d8? 27 ♕c7, or 26 . . . ♖xa2? 27 ♕c7 ♖f8 28 ♘e4 f6 29 ♕e7. Nunn considers that Black has to force a draw by playing 26 . . . ♗f3 27 ♘f5! ♕h3! (but not 27 . . . ♗xg2+? 28 ♔g1 ♕h3 29 ♘h6+ ♔f8 30 ♕c5+ ♔e8 31 ♕b5+ and 32 ♕xe2) 28 ♘h6+ ♔f8 29 ♕c5+ ♔e8 30 ♕b5+ ♔f8 31 ♕c5+ (31 ♕xe2? ♗xe2 32 gxh3 ♗xf1) with perpetual check. But Yusupov found a much stronger continuation:

26 . . . ♕e7!!
27 ♗c5

The knight cannot afford to move, as that would permit the black queen to come to e4. If 27 f5 then possible would be both 27 . . . f6 and 27 . . . ♕xd6.

27 . . . ♖d8!?
28 f5 f6!

Of course, not 28 . . . ♖xd6? 29 f6.

29 ♕f4

I also examined 29 h3, but rejected this move in view of 29 . . . ♕e5! 30 hxg4 ♕g3 31 ♗f2 ♖xf2 32 ♖xf2 ♕xf2 33 ♘e4 (33 ♕c7? ♕e1+ 34 ♔h2 ♕e5+) 33 . . . ♕d4 34 ♕c4 (34 ♕c7 ♖e8) 34 . . . ♕a1+ (the endgame arising after 34 . . . ♕xc4 also favours Black) 35 ♔h2 ♕e5+ and there is no doubt about Black's advantage.

29 . . . ♕e5!?

The variation 29 . . . b6 30 ♗a3 ♖xa2 31 ♘c4 ♕e2 (31 . . . ♖xa3 32 d6) 32 ♖g1 did not seem sufficiently convincing to Yusupov.

30 ♕xe5

30 h3 ♕xd5.

30 . . . ♖xe5
31 h3 ♗e2
32 ♖e1

32 ♖f2 ♗d3.

32 . . . ♖xd5
33 ♘xb7 ♖d1!

Stronger than 33 . . . ♖8d7 34 ♖xe2 ♖xb7 35 b4, which, however, is also sufficient to win.

34 ♘xd8 ♖xe1+
35 ♔h2 ♗d3

Also good is 35 . . . a6. In this position the game was cut short. Black has a decisive advantage —he intends to attack the g2-square by means of . . . ♖e2 and . . . ♗e4.

Practice in Playing-Out

I wish to bring to your attention three more positions which can be used as exercises to be played out. They are a bit simpler than the examples from Nunn's games, but nevertheless quite intricate. In the first and third you play White, in the second—Black.

Mestel–D. Gurevich
Hastings 1982/83



White has two extra pawns, but the pin of his rook on e5 is extremely unpleasant. It is clear that Black will not be able to survive without tactics.

43 ♖e1 ♖e8

Hopeless would be 43 ... ♖xe5? 44 ♕xe5 ♕xe5+ 45 ♖xe5 ♖f2 46 b3, as White retains both his extra pawns.

In the game there followed: 44 ♕c4+? ♖f7! (bad is 44 ... ♔f8? 45 ♕xb4! ♕xb4 46 ♖xf5+ ♔g8 47 ♖xe8+, but, as will become clear from what follows, Black would also not lose after 44 ... ♔h7!? 45 ♕c5 ♕xc5!) 45 ♕b5 ♖fe7 and the players agreed to a draw, in view of 46 ♕c4+ ♔h7 47 ♕h4+ ♔g8 48 ♕c4+.

44 ♕d1!!

Pointed out by Vaganyan. Bad now is 44 ... ♖fxe5? 45 ♕xd6 ♖xe1 46 ♕xb4, or 44 ... ♕xd1? 45 ♖xe8+ and 46 ♖xd1. If 44 ... ♕b8 then 45 ♕d5+ ♔h7 is decisive (nothing is changed by playing 45 ... ♔f8): 46 ♕b5! ♕xb5 (46 ... ♕d6 47 ♕xe8; 46 ... ♖fxe5 47 ♕xb8) 47 ♖xb5 ♖xe1 (47 ... ♖xb5 48 ♖xe8) 48 ♖xf5 ♖e2 49 b3 ♖e3 50 ♖f3.

The best defence is

44 ... ♕c7!

Q. 1.69 How should White continue?

Annotating this game in the 36th volume of *Informator*, D. Gurevich recommended the reply 45 ♕d5+. In fact this tempting check lets the win slip away. Black plays 45 ... ♔h7! (if 45 ... ♔f8? then not 46 ♕c5? ♕xc5 47 ♖xc5 ♖xc5, as the rook on e8 is defended; but on the other hand White wins with 46 ♕b7!! ♕xb7 47 ♖xf5+, or 46 ... ♕d6 47 ♕xb4!) 46 ♕a5!? ♕d6! (46 ... ♕b8? 47 ♕b5!; 46 ... ♕xa5? 47 ♖xa5 ♖xa5 48 ♖xe8 ♖xa4 49 ♖e4(b8) and 50 b3 winning) 47 ♕c5 ♕xc5! (but not 47 ... ♕b8? 48 ♕b5!) 48 ♖xc5 ♖xc5! 49 ♖xe8 ♖c2 50 b3 ♖c3. White loses one of his extra pawns, and

after an inevitable exchange of queenside pawns the outcome is a drawn rook ending.

The only way to win is 45 ♕c1!! ♕d6 (45 . . . ♕b8 46 ♕c4+ and 47 ♕b5) 46 ♕c5! ♕xc5 (46 . . . ♕b8 47 ♕b5!) 47 ♖xc5 ♖xe1 (in contrast to the previous variation, Black cannot play 47 . . . ♖xc5, since the rook on e8 would be captured with check) 48 ♖xf5 ♖e2 49 b3 ♖e3 50 ♖f3.

Mikh. Tseitlin–N. Popov
USSR 1982

1	**d4**	**♘f6**
2	**♘f3**	**b6**
3	**♗g5**	**♘e4**
4	**♗h4**	**d5**
5	**♘bd2**	**♗b7**
6	**e3**	**♘bd7**

6 . . . g6!?.

7	**c4**	**♘df6**
8	**♖c1**	**e6**
9	**cxd5**	

Black has played the opening unsuccessfully and it is now not easy to advise anything good. Bad is 9 . . . ♗xd5 10 ♗b5+, or 9 . . . exd5 10 ♕a4+ c6 11 ♖xc6! ♕d7 12 ♗b5 a6 13 ♖xe6+; on 9 . . . ♘xd2 very strong is the intermediate check 10 ♕a4+!.

The pawn sacrifice which occurred in the game, 9 . . . ♕xd5, seemed to me to be the only playable continuation, and so I originally intended to offer the position after White's ninth move as one to be played out. But then I established that even capturing with the queen still does not solve Black's defensive problems, in view of 10 ♗xf6! gxf6 11 ♖xc7 ♘xd2 12 ♘xd2 with a considerable advantage to White. The start of the exercise has to be postponed by one move.

9	**. . .**	**♕xd5**
10	**♖xc7?!**	

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B



Let us begin from this point. I remind you that you are playing Black. You will have to refute the opinion of the annotator Mikhail Tseitlin, who considered that Black's position was difficult.

10	**. . .**	**♘xd2**

Not at once 10 . . . ♗d6? because of 11 ♗c4.

11	**♘xd2**	

11 ♕xd2? ♘e4.

11	**. . .**	**♗d6**
12	**♕a4+**	**♔f8**

If now 13 ♖c3 then after 13 . . . ♘e4 or 13 . . . g5 14 ♗g3 ♔g7 Black gets good compensation for the pawn, thanks to his lead in

development. In order not to concede the initiative, Tseitlin initiates a combination which actually sets his opponent serious problems.

13 e4!? ♘xe4

No use was 13 . . . ♕h5? 14 ♖xb7 ♕xh4 (14 . . . ♖c8 15 ♘f3) 15 e5 ♗xe5 16 ♕a3+.

14 ♗c4

We have imperceptibly reached a crisis point in the game.

Q. 1.70 What should Black play?

Popov replied with the unfortunate 14 . . . ♕xd4?. There followed: 15 ♖xf7+! (worse is 15 ♘f3? ♕xb2) 15 . . . ♔g8 (15 . . . ♔xf7 16 ♗xe6+ and 17 ♕xd4) 16 ♘f3! (if 16 0-0 then 16 . . . ♘c5!, but not 16 . . . ♘xd2? 17 ♗xe6) 16 . . . ♕xb2 17 0-0! (17 ♖xb7? ♗b4+ 18 ♔f1 ♕c1+) 17 . . . ♘c5 (17 . . . ♔xf7 18 ♕d7+ with a quick mate) 18 ♗xe6! ♘xe6 19 ♖xb7, and White soon converted his overwhelming positional advantage into victory.

Similarly pitiful consequences for Black would also have resulted after 14 . . . ♕h5? 15 ♖xb7 ♕xh4 (15 . . . ♘xd2 16 ♗xe6! fxe6 17 ♕d7, or 16 . . . ♖e8 17 ♕xe8+ ♔xe8 18 ♗xf7+) 16 g3! ♗xg3 (16 . . . ♕g4 17 ♕d7, or 16 . . . ♘xg3 17 fxg3 ♗xg3+ 18 ♔d1) 17 fxg3! (the simplest, although also sufficient is 17 ♕d7 ♗xf2+ 18 ♔d1) 17 . . . ♘xg3 18 ♕a3+ and 19 ♕xg3.

14 . . . ♕f5!!

The only, but sufficient, defence.

15 ♖xb7 ♘xd2

16 ♔xd2

On 16 ♗e2 strong is 16 . . . ♖c8!.

16 . . . ♕f4+

17 ♔d3 ♕xh4

18 ♖xa7

No use is 18 ♕d7 ♗e7.

18 . . . ♖d8

19 ♖d7

Or 19 ♖a8 g6.

19 . . . g6

Black's king hides on g7, after which he will have excellent compensation for the pawn.

The following example can be used both for normal playing-out (as White), and as a two-hander.

Plachetka–Popovic
Zemun 1980

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W



Q. 1.71 What should White play?

White's pieces are active. The pawn structure around the black

king is ragged and so cannot provide a secure defensive shield. In such cases it is very important for the active side to find a concrete way to make use of his positional advantages—otherwise his opponent will consolidate and the advantage will evaporate.

In the game there followed: 24 h3?! ♖ac8 25 ♗b3 ♕b4! (in the event of an exchange of rooks on c1 the white queen would invade along the c-file) 26 ♘g4 ♖xc1+ 27 ♖xc1 ♖xc1+ 28 ♕xc1 h5 29 ♘e5 ♕d6 30 ♕c8 ♔g7 31 ♘c4 ♕d7 32 ♕a6 ♕c7 33 ♕a3 ♗c6 34 ♘e5, and the players agreed to a draw. Instead of 26 ♘g4, worth considering was 26 ♖xc7 ♖xc7 27 d5! exd5 (not 27 . . . ♕c3? 28 ♕a3+ ♕c5 29 d6! ♕xa3 30 dxc7) 28 ♘g4, but here too White has not obtained anything in particular.

It looks tempting to play 24 d5, but after 24 . . . exd5 the combination 25 ♘xg6+? turns out to be incorrect (better is 25 ♗f1): 25 . . . fxg6 26 ♕h8+ ♔e7 27 ♕e5+ ♘e6 28 ♗xd5 ♖xc1+ 29 ♖xc1 ♗d7.

In his notes to this game, Grandmaster Plachetka pointed out a very strong way to continue the attack, and he analysed it superbly, but unfortunately he did not take his analysis quite far enough, as a result of which he gave the idea which he had found an inaccurate evaluation.

24 ♘g4!

The threat is 25 d5. Bad is 24 . . . h5? because of 25 d5! hxg4 26 d6.

24 . . . ♖ac8!

25 d5! exd5!

Black loses after 25 . . . ♖xc4 26 ♖xc4 ♖xc4 27 ♕h8+ ♔e7 28 ♕f6+ ♔f8 29 ♘e5! (29 d6? ♕c3) 29 . . . ♕c3 30 ♕h8+ ♔e7 31 d6+ ♔xd6 32 ♘xc4+ ♕xc4 33 ♕xe8 (Plachetka).

Capturing the bishop was refuted even more simply in a training-game Yusupov–Dolmatov which took place in 1981: 26 ♕h8+ ♔e7 27 d6+ ♔xd6 28 ♕f8+ ♔d5 29 ♖xc4 ♖xc4 30 ♕xe8 ♖xg4 31 ♕xd8+ ♔e5 32 f4+ ♔f5 33 ♕d3+ ♔f6 34 h3 and Black resigned.

26 ♕h8+ ♔e7

Now White can prepare to capture the pawn on h6 with check.

27 ♕f6+ ♔f8

28 ♕d6+! ♔g7

Not 28 . . . ♔g8? 29 ♘f6+, or 28 . . . ♖e7 29 ♗xd5 or 29 ♗f1 with a decisive advantage to White.

29 ♕f4!

Threatening 30 ♕xh6+ ♔g8 31 ♘f6 mate.

29 . . . ♔f8

A training-game Chernin–M. Gurevich (1984) developed along interesting lines: 29 . . . ♖c6? 30 ♗f1! ♗d7 31 ♕xh6+ ♔g8 32 ♖xc6 ♖xc6 33 ♘e5 ♖d6 34 ♖c1 ♗b5 35 ♕f4! ♕a4 (35 . . . ♗xf1

36 ♘xf7! ♘xf7 37 ♖c7) 36 ♗xb5 ♕xb5 37 h4 ♕e8 38 ♖c8 and Black resigned.

30 ♕xh6+ ♔e7
31 ♕h4+ ♔f8
32 ♕h8+ ♔e7

The same position has arisen as after Black's 26th move, but without the pawn on h6.

33 ♕f6+

33 ♕e5+? ♖e6.

33 ... ♔f8
34 ♕d6+

Not 34 ♘e5 (with the threat 35 ♘xg6+), because of 34 ... ♔g8! 35 ♖d1 dxc4 36 ♖d4 (36 ♖xd8 ♖xd8 37 ♕xd8 ♕xe5) 36 ... ♘e6! 37 ♖h4 ♘g7.

34 ... ♔g7


133 W

We have already seen this position too (but with a black pawn on h6). Plachetka considers that there is no win for White here, in view of the variation 35 ♘f6 ♗b5!! (35 ... ♗a4? 36 ♘xd5 ♖xc4 37 ♖xc4 ♖xc4 38 ♕xd8) 36 ♘xd5 (36 ♖xb5 ♖xc4!) 36 ... ♖xc4 37 ♕e5+ ♔h7! (37 ... ♔g8? 38 ♘e7+ ♔h7 39 ♘xc8) 38 ♘f6+ ♔h6 39 ♘g8+ with perpetual check. But the attack may be conducted with greater accuracy.

35 ♕e5+! ♔f8
36 ♘f6!

The threat is 37 ♕xe8+, and if 36 ... ♗b5 then 37 ♘xd5 is decisive.

36 ... ♘c6!
37 ♕xd5

Weaker is 37 ♕d6+ ♘e7 38 ♘xd5 ♖d7.

37 ... ♘e7!
38 ♕xa5

There seems to be nothing better.

38 ... bxa5
39 ♘xe8 ♖xc4
40 ♖xc4 ♖xc4
41 ♘d6 ♖c2
42 g4! ♖xa2
43 ♖b8+ ♔h7
44 g5

The attack on the king still continues, even after many exchanges. Black will have to fight hard for a draw.

When White began to go after the pawn on h6 it was hardly possible to foresee that this would be a decisive factor in the distant endgame. *All other things being equal, you simply have to make use of any chance at all to improve your own position even a little, or to make your opponent's position worse, without asking yourself in which particular variations this will later come in useful.*

Exercises for Analysis

E. 1.37



Black to move

E. 1.38



Evaluate 29 . . . h4.

E. 1.39



Calculate 20 ♘xd7.

E. 1.40



Black to move

E. 1.41



Black to move

E. 1.42



Black to move

E. 1.43

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W



White to move

E. 1.44

141
B



Black to move

E. 1.45

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B



Black to move

2 Attack and Defence

In the previous chapter we saw quite a number of examples of spectacular combinations for breaking through the opponent's fortifications, and also of stubborn, inventive defensive play. When considering these examples we were most interested in how to FIND the strongest continuation (the development of combinational vision) and accurately CALCULATE the variations arising (training the technique of calculation). That is, we were mainly concerned with forced (and sometimes extraordinarily complicated) combinations.

Having found a strong move and accurately examined the variations associated with it, we shall of course play it. But what are we to do if it is not possible to exhaust all the possibilities of the position by accurate calculation? By choosing a crucial continuation and thereby abruptly disturbing the equilibrium, we may achieve success, but it is also possible that we shall find ourselves no better off. But so what? He who dares wins! The outcome of a game or even an entire tournament frequently depends on the ability to DECIDE to change the course of events at a critical moment, to set one's opponent—and, of course, oneself—new and complex problems. The element of risk is intrinsic to the game of chess, and without it a considerable part of the charm of the 'royal game' would be lost.

It is necessary to take risks both in attack and defence. The greatest expert on the problem of risk, Mikhail Tal, has written: "A player has given up a piece for an attack, although he might quite easily not have done so. Is he taking a risk? Undoubtedly. Indeed, the attack might be repelled, and the negative force (from the risk-taker's point of view) of the opponent's extra piece will be fully revealed."

"Fine, let's take this a little further. A player accepts the sacrifice of a piece (although he might quite easily have ignored it), reckoning on being able to repel the attack. Is he taking a risk? Undoubtedly! Indeed, the

attack might turn out to be irresistible."

"So whose risk is 'riskier'? There are no scales which could possibly provide an answer to this question."

So, the subject of our discussions will be the choice between the one and the other, the quiet or the risky plan of action in both defence and attack, as well as the manifestation of a chessplayer's individuality in making such a choice, problematic sacrifices of material, etc.

Sacrifice or Oversight?

A chessplayer would sooner stick his head in a lion's mouth than put his queen *en prise*.
Aron Nimzowitsch

The word 'sacrifice' is used in chess literature with two different meanings. First of all, this is a move which gives up material. A sacrifice in this sense of the word is, in Botvinnik's opinion, an indispensable element of any combination. ("A combination is a forced variation with a sacrifice"). The second meaning of the word 'sacrifice' relates to the giving-up of material in the absence of a combination—i.e. to a move which is not connected with a chain of precisely calculated variations that lead by force to success for the player making the sacrifice. Spielmann called such sacrifices "real" (as distinct from "apparent", as in the first case). When making a "real" sacrifice, a chessplayer relies on the influence of certain positional factors to compensate for the material given up. But his calculations may in fact not be justified, and therefore real sacrifices are always associated with risk.

The first serious book devoted to real sacrifices was written by Rudolf Spielmann and entitled *Richtig opfern!* (in English translation it is called *The Art of Sacrifice in Chess*, and in Russian, *Teoriya Zhertvy*). This theme was later continued by Leonid Shamkovich in his book *Zhertva v Shakhmatakh* (*Chess Sacrifices*). Both these works warrant very careful study.

Almost all the examples analysed in this chapter of the book involve real sacrifices. Let us begin with a game in which one of the players gives up his strongest piece—the queen!

Kapengut-Dvoretsky
USSR Cup, Ordzhonikidze 1978

1	**e4**	**c5**
2	**♘f3**	**e6**
3	**d4**	**cxd4**
4	**♘xd4**	**♘f6**
5	**♘c3**	**♘c6**
6	**♘xc6**	**bxc6**
7	**e5**	**♘d5**

8	**♘e4**	**♕c7**
9	**f4**	**♕b6**
10	**♗d3**	

At the time when this game was played, Black most often chose 8 ... f5, since the variation 8 ... ♕c7 9 f4 ♕b6 had not yet come into fashion. The main continuation for White later became 10 c4!? ♗b4+ 11 ♔e2!.

10	**...**	**♗a6**
11	**a3**	

In the event of 11 c4 White loses a pawn: 11 ... ♕b4+! 12 ♗d2 ♕xb2.

11	**...**	**f5?**

A mistake, which leads to a difficult position for Black. It was necessary to play !11 ... ♗e7, preparing to counter 12 c4 with 12 ... f5!.

12	**exf6**	**♘xf6**
13	**♘xf6+**	**gxf6**
14	**♕h5+**	**♔d8**

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W

Q. 2.1 How should White continue?

Black has to reckon with the move ♕f7, but this thrust by White would be premature before he has completed his development. On 15 ♕f7? there would follow 15 ... ♗xd3! (worse is 15 ... f5 16 ♕f6+ ♔c7 17 ♕xh8 ♗b4+ 18 axb4 ♖xh8 19 ♖xa6, or 17 ... ♗xd3 18 ♕c3) 16 ♕xf6+ (16 cxd3 f5 or 16 ... ♕d4) 16 ... ♔c7 17 cxd3 ♗c5 or 17 ... ♖g8, and Black has excellent compensation for the loss of a pawn.

An advantage could have been secured with a simple exchange: 15 ♗xa6! ♕xa6 16 ♗d2. The d7-square is very weak, and White intends to play the moves 0-0-0, ♗c3 (or ♗a5+) and ♕f7, in one order or another. I don't even know what I would then have done. On 16 ... ♕b5 there follows not 17 ♗a5+? ♔e7 18 ♗b4+ ♔d8 with equality, but 17 ♕f7 ♗e7 (17 ... ♕xb2 18 ♖d1 or 18 ♗a5+) 18 0-0-0.

Fortunately, my opponent was tempted by another alluring possibility and played **15 ♗d2?**, hoping to win a tempo thanks to the threat of 16 ♗a5.

15	**...**	**♗xd3!!**

It should be said that I began this tournament without having done any training at all, and this showed primarily in my openings. In the first round I had an absolutely hopeless position as early as move ten, although I subsequently outplayed my opponent and managed to win. In the

second round, with White, I emerged from the opening with a clearly inferior position, but eventually almost won the endgame. This was now the third round . . .

Having quickly made my move and stood up from the table I heard my Burevestnik team-mate Yuri Razuvaev say to our trainer in some distress: "Well, Mark isn't exactly in form—he's just blundered his queen away". I had to go up to them and calm them down: "Maybe I'm not in form, but I didn't blunder the queen—I sacrificed it!"

Besides its obvious disadvantages, a lengthy period away from tournament play does have some positive aspects. One's appetite for the game returns, and there is a freshness in one's perception of positions, a willingness to take risks and to sacrifice. Despite the opening difficulties which I experienced in almost every round, I finally succeeded, having won four games and drawn three, in achieving the best score on the men's boards in this tournament.

16 ♗a5

After 16 cxd3 the dangerous d-file is closed and White has nothing.

16 . . . ♗xc2

The position has become unclear. For his queen Black has only two bishops and a pawn, but his pieces will soon interact well and take control of many important squares. White has nowhere to put his major pieces.

17 ♖f1

Tempting was 17 ♗xb6+ axb6 18 ♕h4, attacking f6 and threatening the double attack 19 ♕f2. But Black would solve all his problems with a single bishop: 18 . . . ♗e7 19 ♕f2 ♗b4+! 20 ♔e2 ♗c5.

17 . . . f5

17 . . . ♔c7!?.

18 ♗xb6+ axb6

19 ♖f3

Stronger, apparently, was 19 ♔d2 followed by ♖ael.

19 . . . ♔c7

20 ♖g3 ♖a4

Sounder was 20 . . . ♗d6, not fearing 21 ♖g7 ♗xf4 22 ♕f7 ♖ad8.

21 ♕f3?!

21 ♕f7 or 21 ♖c1 would have been better.

21 . . . ♖c4!

The best defence against the threat of 22 ♕c3. It would be much weaker to play 21 . . . ♗b4+, in view of 22 axb4! ♖xa1+ 23 ♔d2.

22 ♖c1?

After this, the initiative passes conclusively to Black. Stronger was 22 ♔e2 ♖e4 23 ♖e3 with unclear play; this was also playable after inserting the moves 22 b3 ♖c5 23 b4 ♖c4.

22 . . . ♗d6

23 ♕e2 ♖e4

It also looked quite good to

play 23 . . . ♗d3, since after 24 ♖xc4 ♗xe2 25 ♔xe2 b5 the pawn on f4 would be lost.

24 ♖xc2

Kapengut decides to give the queen back. Still less attractive was 24 ♖e3 ♗xf4 25 ♖xe4 ♗xe4 26 ♖c3 ♗xh2 27 g3 ♗g1.

24 . . . ♗xf4
25 ♖g7 ♗xh2

Weaker was 25 . . . ♖xe2+ 26 ♖xe2, attacking e6.

26 ♕xe4 fxe4
27 ♖d2 ♗d6
28 ♖d4 c5!
29 ♖xe4 ♔c6



Black has two pawns for the exchange. It is clear that my opponent will have to fight for a draw.

30 b3 h5
31 ♖h4 b5
32 ♔e2 ♗e5

Also worth considering was 32 . . . ♖a8!? 33 a4 ♗e5! (worse is 33 . . . bxa4 34 ♖xa4) 34 axb5+ ♔d6 35 ♖h7 ♖a2+.

33 ♖g5 ♗d4
34 ♖hxh5

White should have preferred 34 b4 ♖a8 35 ♖g3.

34 . . . ♖a8
35 ♖h3 ♖xa3
36 ♖g8 e5
37 g4 ♖a2+

37 . . . e4!?.

38 ♔f3 ♖f2+
39 ♔g3 ♖b2
40 g5

More stubborn was 40 ♔h4.

40 . . . ♖xb3+
41 ♔g4 ♖xh3
42 ♔xh3 ♔d5
43 g6 e4
44 ♖b8 b4
45 ♔g4 ♔c4

White resigned.

After this game some of the players began to tease my opponent, saying that anyone could give him odds of a queen and get away with it. "I have told them that the position was unclear, but they don't believe me," Kapengut complained to me over dinner. I could only sympathise. For the casual onlooker it is certainly not easy to fathom what went on in this encounter, to see and assess the problems that both players had to solve.

When, later that evening, I entered the room where our teammates had gathered, the Grandmasters and Masters present greeted me with applause. Clearly the sacrifice of the strongest chess

piece warms the heart of both amateur and seasoned professional alike.

Nevertheless, the real difficulty of the operation carried out by Black consisted merely in taking such a possibility into account at all. The psychological prejudice noted by Nimzowitsch, which has served as the epigraph for this section, is a great hindrance. As soon as the sacrifice of the queen falls within one's field of vision it immediately becomes clear that this is the move that has to be played. Here the question of risk doesn't even arise. Indeed, given a more 'normal' continuation of this game Black's position would have become difficult, but after the sacrifice the situation could no longer be controlled by either side, and any outcome became possible.

"Not all that Glisters is Gold"

A combination should only be necessary when errors have been committed earlier in the course of the attack.
Siegbert Tarrasch

If one takes this idea of the great German player literally, i.e. that sacrifices are unnecessary given correct play, one may immediately dismiss him as a dogmatist (as has been done many times) and accuse him of a lack of understanding of the role and importance of combinations in chess. Fortunately, there seem to be fewer people nowadays, whether writers or readers, who like to attach thoughtless labels to people. In fact, Tarrasch himself was not averse to sacrificing material, and he by no means forbade others to do so.

If you have excellent attacking prospects and every reason to reckon on an advantage, but you then find you have to sacrifice material, so that the game enters a period of unclear complications, then you may assume that something was not quite right—that some time earlier you made a mistake. You should examine the preceding moves closely, and it is possible that you will find the moment when you could have played more forcibly. This, in my opinion, is what Tarrasch meant. He cautions against becoming blindly enraptured with one's own 'brilliant' play and demands a critical assessment of the whole game.

Dvoretsky-Tretyakov
Moscow 1968

1	**e4**	**c5**
2	**♘f3**	**♘c6**
3	**♗b5**	**g6**
4	**0-0**	**♗g7**
5	**♖e1**	**♘f6**
6	**e5**	**♘d5**

7 ♘c3 ♘c7
8 ♗xc6 bxc6?!

More sound is 8 . . . dxc6.

9 d3

Having later become familiar with a system in the English Opening (1 c4 e5 2 ♘c3 ♘f6 3 g3 ♗b4) where, with colours reversed, a similar position may arise, I realised that White should play 9 d4! cxd4 10 ♕xd4.

9 . . . ♖b8?!

Black wrongly delays completing his development. It was necessary to castle before it was too late.

10 ♘e4 ♘e6

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W

Q. 2.2 What would you advise for White?

One is tempted to play the developing move 11 ♗e3. On 11 . . . ♖xb2 White has a pleasant choice between 12 ♘xc5 ♘xc5 13 ♗xc5 ♕a5 14 d4, and 12 ♕c1 ♖b7(b8) 13 ♘xc5, intending 14 ♕a3.

After 11 . . . d6 12 exd6 exd6 White cannot play 13 ♗f4? ♘xf4, but it looks tempting to play 13 ♗g5!?. For example: 13 . . . ♘xg5 14 ♘f6+ (unconvincing is 14 ♘xd6+ ♔d7 15 ♘xg5 ♕xg7 16 ♘xf7 ♕f6(f5) 17 ♘xh8 ♗xh8) 14 . . . ♔f8 15 ♖e8+ ♕xe8 16 ♘xe8 ♘xf3+ 17 ♕xf3 ♔xe8 18 ♕xc6+ ♗d7 19 ♖e1+ ♔d8 20 ♕xd6 ♖xb2 21 ♕e7+ ♔c7 22 ♕xc5+ with advantage to White. However, I was confused by the reply 13 . . . f6.

It is difficult to assess the consequences of the variation 14 ♗h4 0-0 15 ♗g3 f5! 16 ♘xd6 f4 17 ♘xc8 fxg3 (also possible is 17 . . . ♕xc8) 18 ♖xe6 ♕xc8.

But, in Tarrasch's opinion, if you have a strategically very favourable position it is quite unnecessary to get involved in irrational complications. Having been diverted by complex calculations, I regrettably totally overlooked the thematic move 13 d4!, which would have secured a clear advantage for White.

Not finding the simple and clear path (11 ♗e3! d6 12 exd6 exd6 13 d4!), White chose a continuation which creates an extremely muddled situation, in both a strategic and a tactical sense.

11 ♘fg5?! ♗xe5

Of course, 11 . . . ♘xg5 12 ♗xg5 ♗xe5 was bad, as White would reply with a combination: 13 ♘f6+! exf6 14 ♖xe5+!. In the event of 11 . . . ♕c7, strong for

White would be 12 ♘xe6 fxe6 13 f4 d6 (the pawn sacrifice 13 . . . 0-0 14 ♘xc5 can scarcely be considered correct) 14 exd6 exd6 15 f5!.

12 ♘xc5!

White would obtain nothing from either 12 ♘xe6 fxe6, or 12 ♕f3 0-0 13 ♕h3 h5. After the move in the game Black has a wide choice of continuations.

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B

12 . . . ♗xh2+?

An unfortunate decision. My opponent could not resist the temptation to take the pawn, but his king now comes under a mating attack. Let us examine the other possibilities.

Mistaken is 12 . . . ♗xb2?, since after 13 ♗xb2 ♖xb2 14 ♘gxe6 fxe6 15 ♘b3 the black rook is trapped. It is clearly bad to help to develop the white bishop with 12 . . . ♘xg5 13 ♗xg5, and on 12 . . . ♗f6?! strong is 13 ♘gxe6 and 14 ♗h6, preventing Black from castling.

In the event of 12 . . . ♗g7 13 ♘cxe6 dxe6, only equality results from 14 ♕f3 0-0 15 ♕xc6 ♗xb2 16 ♗xb2 ♖xb2 17 ♖eb1 (17 ♕c3 ♖b5) 17 . . . ♖xb1 18 ♖xb1 ♕d5 19 ♕xd5 exd5. But it seems that after 14 c3 0-0 15 ♕c2 White's chances are to be preferred, by virtue of the deformation of his opponent's pawn structure.

We have taken a look at some quiet variations. But now let us venture into the world of combinations which are concealed in this position.

After 12 . . . ♗g7 13 ♘cxe6 the capture 13 . . . fxe6? leads to a forced loss: 14 ♕f3 ♗f6 15 ♕g3 (a very important tempo) 15 . . . ♖b5 16 ♘xh7! ♖xh7 17 ♕xg6+ ♖f7 18 ♗h6!, and Black is defenceless. In this, as in a number of the following variations, Black has to pay heavily for his unfortunate 9th move—the rook on b8 comes under constant threat.

White has an elegant solution in the variation 12 . . . ♘xc5 13 ♖xe5 d6 14 ♖e1 0-0?! 15 d4 ♘e6? 16 ♘xe6 ♗xe6 (also after 16 . . . fxe6 Black stands clearly worse).

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Q. 2.3 What should White play?

There follows a little combination on the theme of the double attack: 17 ♗h6 ♖e8 18 d5! ♗xd5 19 c4!.

A very sharp situation arises after 12 . . . ♕c7 13 ♕f3! 0-0 (13 . . . ♘xc5? 14 ♕xf7+ ♔d8 15 ♗f4! d6 16 ♗xe5 dxe5 17 ♕g7 ♖e8 18 ♘f7+ ♔d7 19 ♘xe5+ ♔d8 20 ♘f7+ ♔d7 21 ♕d4+) 14 ♘cxe6 dxe6 15 ♕h3 h5. White apparently has to sacrifice a piece: 16 g4 f6 17 gxh5 fxg5 18 hxg6 ♖f5 19 ♕h7+ ♔f8 20 h4!

The variations quoted vividly illustrate the dangers lying in wait for Black. It is clear that White's plan is not merely a bluff but actually sets his opponent serious problems. At the same time it is hard to believe that by giving up the centre White could nevertheless have maintained his advantage. Indeed, the results of the last variation we examined were unclear. But Black also has a quiet way to obtain equal chances. After 12 . . . ♘xc5 13 ♖xe5 d6 14 ♖e1 he can play 14 . . . f6! 15 d4 ♘a6, and if 16 ♘e6 then 16 . . . ♗xe6 17 ♖xe6 ♘c7.

But let us return to the game.

13 ♔xh2 ♘xc5

Little would be changed by first giving a check: 13 . . . ♕c7+ 14 ♔g1 ♘xc5 15 ♕f3 f5 (15 . . . 0-0 16 ♖xe7) 16 ♗f4 d6 17 ♕g3 (or 17 d4) with dangerous threats. It is not hard for an experienced player to evaluate the final position of this variation—he knows very well that *the presence of opposite-coloured bishops makes the attack much stronger and sharper.*

14 ♕f3 0-0

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Q. 2.4 How should White continue the attack?

The next move had to be seen in advance—otherwise White's pawn sacrifice on his 12th move would have been incorrect.

15 ♘xh7!! ♖e8

Now White has a strong attack in a position of material equality. But his opponent did not see a satisfactory defence after 15 . . . ♔xh7 16 ♕h3+ ♔g8 17 ♖h1! (with the threat of 18 ♔g1).

There is a forced mate after 17 . . . d6 (or 17 . . . d5) 18 ♕h6 ♗g4 19 ♔g3! ♗h5 20 ♖xh5 gxh5 21 ♕g5+ ♔h7 22 ♕xh5+ ♔g8 23 ♕g5+ ♔h7 24 ♗f4. Bad is 17 . . . ♔g7 18 ♕h6+ ♔f6 19 ♕f4+ (or 19 ♗g5+). On 17 . . . f6 the decisive move is 18 ♕g3! (again the black rook on b8 is the object of a double attack).

There is still the far from obvious defence 17 . . . ♕a5, but then White wins beautifully with 18 b4! (weaker is 18 ♔g3 ♘e4+ 19 dxe4 ♕h5) 18 . . . ♕xb4 (18 . . . ♖xb4 19 ♔g1) 18 ♖b1! ♕xb1 (otherwise White will take the ill-fated rook on b8) 19 ♔g3.

16	**♕e3**	**♘e6**
17	**♕h6**	**♖b5**

An interesting variation is 17 . . . ♕c7+ 18 ♔g1 ♖b5 19 ♘g5 ♘xg5 20 ♗xg5 (threatening both 21 ♗f6 and 21 ♖e4) 20 . . . ♖e5 21 ♗f4 ♖xe1+ 22 ♖xe1 d6 23 ♗g5, renewing the same threats. How straightforward and pleasant it is to carry out an attack when the bishops are of opposite colours!

18	**g4**	**♕c7+**
19	**♔g2**	**♗b7**
20	**♖h1**	**♕e5**
21	**♘f6+!**	**♕xf6**
22	**♕h7+**	**♔f8**
23	**♗h6+**	

Black resigned.

Quite a good illustration of Tarrasch's concept, isn't it? White's idea, begun with his 11th move, was bold and original, and for a long time I was proud of this game. Later, however, having considered it more objectively, I realised that if I had assessed the position more profoundly I could have managed quite without such extraordinary and violent operations.

Ten Years On

Sacrifices are clear evidence that a game has been played incorrectly.
Saviely Tartakower

In the next duel, events developed along very similar lines. The only difference was that this time I did not have to look for the correct way to develop White's initiative during subsequent analysis; I saw it over the board, but played something else, which gave me cause for regret after just a few moves. I was forced to correct the mistake I had made; as a result, although this game lost something overall, on the other hand it gained as a spectacle.

Dvoretsky-Simic
USSR vs Yugoslavia, Tallinn 1977

1	**e4**	**c5**
2	**♘f3**	**♘c6**
3	**♗b5**	**♘f6**
4	**♕e2**	

I had worked out the plan begun with this move during my preparation for this game. Despite the fact that White won the opening battle here, a different continuation later came into fashion: 4 ♘c3 ♘d4 5 e5 ♘xb5 6 ♘xb5 ♘d5 7 ♘g5!? (Zaitsev).

4	**. . .**	**g6**
5	**♘c3**	**♗g7**

The variation 5 . . . ♘d4 6

♘xd4 cxd4 7 e5 dxc3 8 exf6 favours White.

6 e5 ♘g4

The knight was not able to go to d5, but if it could manage to reach f5 via h6 then Black's game would be quite in order.

7 ♗xc6 dxc6
8 h3 ♘h6
9 g4!

It can't!

9 ... 0-0
10 d3 f5

10 . . . f6 11 ♗f4 ♘f7 12 0-0-0 with advantage to White.

11 g5 ♘f7
12 ♗f4

This was the position that White had been aiming for. His advantage in space, Black's bishop on g7 shut out of the game, the possibility of an attack on the kingside by playing h3-h4-h5—all these factors guarantee White the better chances in the forthcoming struggle.

12 ... ♕a5
13 ♕e3!

A good positional move. By defending the bishop in advance, I parried the threat of 13 . . . ♕b4, at the same time vacating the square e2 for a knight, and, by attacking the pawn on c5, I prevented 13 . . . b5.

13 ... ♘d8?!

In cramped positions you should try to exchange pieces. Therefore it was correct to play 13 . . . ♗e6 14 h4! ♗d5 15 ♖h3 ♗xf3, and only then . . . ♘d8–e6.

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

Q. 2.5 What would you recommend for White?

In good positions many moves seem strong, but this sometimes dulls one's sense of awareness.

14 h4?!

A shallow decision. I should have preferred 14 ♔f1! ♘e6 15 ♘e2, followed by ♔g2 and h4 etc. "But why bother with these subtleties?"—I thought to myself. "Why not begin an attack at once on the kingside, after castling long? The counter-attack on the queenside will surely come too late".

Having quickly weighed up the variation 14 h4 ♘e6 15 0-0-0 b5 16 h5 b4 17 ♘e2 ♕xa2 18 hxg6 hxg6 19 ♘h4 ♔f7 20 ♘xg6! ♔xg6 21 ♕f3, I decided that this combination would worthily crown White's opening strategy. Unfortunately it didn't turn out to be quite so simple.

14	**...**	**♘e6**
15	**0-0-0**	**b5**
16	**h5**	

On 16 ♔b1 unpleasant is 16 ... ♘xf4 17 ♕xf4 ♗e6. The threat of 18 ... b4 can be repelled by 18 ♘d2 (18 ... b4 19 ♘c4!), but then White will have to forget about an attack and worry about the safety of his pawn on e5 (18 ... ♕b4!?).

In order to defend the queenside securely in such positions, the knight should stand not on c3 but on c1, but White cannot manage to transfer it. He has to leave the pawn on a2 to the mercy of fate.

16	**...**	**♖d8!**

Why drive the knight to e2 if that is where it wants to go anyway? Instead of losing a tempo with 16 ... b4?, Black vacates the square f8 for his king and prepares the thrust ... ♘d4.

17	**hxg6**	**hxg6**
18	**♘h4**	**♔f7**

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

Q. 2.6 How should White continue?

White cannot succeed in breaking through Black's defence immediately. On 19 ♘xg6 ♔xg6 20 ♕f3 there would follow 20 ... ♘xf4, and in the event of 19 ♘xf5 gxf5 20 g6+ ♔e8 the black king slips out of the danger zone via the d7-square. After long reflection I realised that in order to continue the attack it was essential to have the knight on e2.

19	**♘e2!!**	

I very much wanted to avoid retreating the knight without being invited to do so, but this was necessary. Now Black has to take seriously the possibility of a knight sacrifice at g6. If he parries this threat with the passive 19 ... ♘f8, then White, by transferring his knight to c1 (20 ♔b1 ♗e6 21 ♘c1), will neutralise his opponent's counter-attack and retain a positional advantage.

I didn't even try to calculate the sacrifice accurately, limiting myself to just three short variations: 19 ... ♕xa2 20 ♘xg6 ♔xg6 21 ♕f3 ♔f7 22 ♖h7!; 19 ... ♖h8 20 ♘xg6 ♖xh1 21 ♖xh1 ♔xg6 22 ♕h3; 19 ... ♘d4 20 ♘xg6 ♔xg6 21 ♘xd4 and 22 ♕f3.

Clearly, in all these cases White maintains a dangerous attack, although, of course, it is not impossible that somewhere Black will be able to defend successfully. In this connection Rudolf Spielmann noted: *"As a rule, it is very difficult to calculate a sacrifice accurately with regard to all secondary*

variations, even just a few moves ahead; more often than not, such pointless waste of effort leads to a fraying of the nerves, time-trouble and undeserved defeat . . . Aspiring to calculate accurately the consequences of every sacrifice is fundamentally incorrect. One should have a belief in the position and in one's own powers. The game of chess is not a mathematical puzzle but a battle, and in any battle the attacking side always has the advantage." In principle, Spielmann is absolutely right, although many players nowadays would hardly agree with his final thought. "Break—do not build!"—it is usually easier to destroy than to create.

19 . . . ♕xa2
20 ♘xg6! ♔xg6

Otherwise 21 ♕f3 or 21 ♕h3, with the threat of 22 ♕h5.

21 ♕f3 ♔f7
22 ♖h7! ♕a1+

22 . . . ♔e8 23 ♕xc6+ ♗d7 24 ♕h1!.

23 ♔d2 ♕a5+?!

While my opponent was trying to find a playable defence, I was considering the testing continuation 23 . . . ♕xb2. After 24 ♕h5+ ♔g8 (24 . . . ♔f8 25 ♖h8+ ♗xh8 26 ♕xh8+ ♔f7 27 g6+) 25 g6 (25 ♖h1 is probably simpler), the threat is 26 ♖xg7+ or 26 ♖h8+. Black has the ingenious resource 25 . . . ♖xd3+!, with the idea 26 ♔xd3 ♕d4+!! 27 ♘xd4 ♘xf4+ 28 ♔e3 ♘xh5 29 ♘xc6 f4+, when the battle flares up anew. White can, however, decline the rook sacrifice: 26 ♔e1! ♖xd1+ 27 ♔xd1 ♕a1+ 28 ♔d2! (but not 28 ♗c1? ♘f8, and not 28 ♘c1? ♘f8! 29 ♖xg7+ ♔xg7 30 ♗h6+ ♔g8 31 ♗xf8 ♕d4+! 32 ♔e1 ♕xe5+, or 32 ♘d3 ♕g4+) 28 . . . ♘f8 29 ♖xg7+ ♔xg7 30 ♗h6+ ♔g8 31 ♗xf8.

The move in the game gives Black no chances whatsoever: 24 c3 ♔e8 25 ♕xc6+ ♗d7 26 ♕h1 ♖dc8 27 ♖xg7 ♘xg7 28 ♕h8+ ♔f7 29 g6+ ♔e6 30 ♕xg7 ♗e8 31 ♕g8+ ♔d7 32 g7 ♔c7 33 ♕d5 ♗c6 34 ♕xc5 ♔b7 35 e6 ♕a2 36 ♕xe7+ ♔a6 37 ♘d4! ♕xb2 38 ♘c2 ♗d5 39 ♖a1+ ♗a2 40 ♕b4 Black resigned.

Twenty Years On

Another decade passed. A game played by Artur Yusupov which I annotated for the magazine *Shakhmaty v SSSR* reminded me vividly of those two games of mine quoted above. Again I had to recall Tarrasch: "If you always make the strongest moves, the need to sacrifice seldom arises".

Yusupov-Ljubojevic
Tilburg 1987

1 d4 ♘f6
2 c4 e6
3 ♘f3 d5

4	**♘c3**	**♗e7**
5	**♗f4**	**0-0**
6	**e3**	**b6**

The usual continuation is 6 . . . c5, but Ljubojevic apparently wanted to get away from 'official' theory as quickly as possible.

7 ♖c1

In the event of 7 cxd5 Black can reply 7 . . . ♘xd5 8 ♘xd5 ♕xd5!?. Yusupov is waiting for the move 7 . . . ♗b7, since then after 8 cxd5 capturing on d5 with the knight would be bad for Black.

7 . . . c5

8 dxc5!

A theoretical novelty! Yusupov plans the siege of his opponent's hanging pawns, which turn out to be surprisingly vulnerable. Previously in this position White had exchanged pawns on d5, but had not achieved anything special.

Such novelties in the opening are usually the fruit of painstaking analytical work by the player concerned, or even of a whole brigade of trainers. But in this instance there was no initial preparation—the improvement in White's play arose during the course of the game. Yusupov's great strategic skill helped him to choose the most effective plan of action over the board.

8	**. . .**	**bxc5**
9	**♗e2**	**♗b7**
10	**0-0**	**♘bd7**
11	**cxd5**	**exd5**

Knowing the subsequent course of events, one might recommend capturing on d5 with the knight as the lesser evil for Black. But in the opening isn't it easy to produce, as Alekhine put it, "evidence of other people's shortcomings"!?

12 ♘e5

On the next move the bishop will come to f3, and how will Black then be able to hold onto the pawn at d5? It would be desirable for Black to alleviate his defence by exchanging pieces, but after 12 . . . ♘xe5 13 ♗xe5 ♘d7 14 ♗g3, followed by 15 ♗f3, Black's position would not be very pleasant.

12 . . . ♘b6

13 a4!

A fine positional idea and, with the knight on b6, rather opportune. The pawn wishes to attack the knight and then the bishop. Even if in reply to 13 . . . ♖c8 or 13 . . . a6 the move 14 a5 is still not very dangerous (14 . . . ♘bd7, and the pawn on a5 is under attack), it does become dangerous after the preliminary 14 ♗f3. And if the a-pawn is halted by being blocked, the important b5-square will be weakened.

13	**. . .**	**a5**
14	**♗f3**	**♖e8**

Black intends to oust the tiresome knight from e5 by playing 15 . . . ♗d6 (if 14 . . . ♗d6 immediately then 15 ♘b5 is strong),

but White has a very strong reply. More cautious was 14 ... ♖c8, after which Yusupov planned to play 15 ♖c2 and 16 ♖d2, increasing the pressure.

15 ♘b5!

Black's threat is parried, and White now creates his own instead: 16 ♘xf7! ♔xf7 17 ♗c7 and 18 ♗xb6. In the event of 15 ... ♖c8 then 16 ♘a7! is very strong. Ljubojevic's artificial reply (though it is possibly the only move) is clear evidence that his position is bad.

15 ... ♖a6

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

Q. 2.7 How should White continue?

Moves that strengthen the position seem to suggest themselves here: 16 b3! ♘a8 17 ♖c2! with an overwhelming advantage. Of course, Yusupov saw these moves. So why did he not play them?

The point is that the Grandmaster noticed the possibility of playing a complicated combination, which, as it seemed to him, would definitely give him a forced win. In principle it is just not practicable to play combinations in this type of situation—one may easily miscalculate (as did in fact happen: Artur either did not notice, or underestimated, his opponent's 21st move) and let one's present advantage slip away, or even hand the initiative to one's opponent. On the other hand, if the calculations are correct, the game can be won more forcibly, quickly and beautifully. Yusupov is a maximalist—he most often chooses the testing lines, even when they are risky. Frequently the choice of a particular plan of action is a matter of style and depends on the player's character, but here, with a simple and secure solution available, there was simply no point in engaging in extremely complicated calculations.

16 ♘d3?! c4
17 ♗c7

In the event of 17 ♘c7 cxd3 18 ♘xa6 ♗xa6 19 ♗c7 ♕d7 20 ♗xb6 ♗b4! Black has sufficient compensation for the exchange, which, incidentally, will soon be regained.

17 ... ♕d7!

By threatening 18 ... ♘xa4! 19 ♕xa4 ♗c6 (which would follow in reply to, say, 18 ♘f4), Black lures the knight onto e5, in order

to cut off the white bishop's retreat.

18 ♘e5 ♕c8
19 b3

This undermining move (and the piece sacrifice associated with it) is a logical continuation of White's plan, begun with his 16th move. The cautious 19 ♗xb6 ♖xb6 20 ♘g4 would only have been sufficient for equality.

19 ... ♘a8!
20 bxc4 ♘xc7

The attempt not to allow the opening of the c-file by playing 20 ... d4 would have been refuted by 21 ♗d5!, and if 21 ... ♖f8 then 22 ♕f3!.

21 cxd5 ♗d6!



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Q. 2.8 How should White continue the onslaught?

Now the price of every move is excessively high—any inaccuracy may at once determine the outcome of the game one way or the other. Black gets the advantage after either 22 ♘xd6 ♖xd6 23 ♘c4 ♖dd8, or 22 ♘c6 ♕d7! (with the threat 23 ... ♘cxd5) 23 e4 ♘xe4 24 ♗xe4 ♖xe4 25 ♘b8 ♕e7 26 ♘xa6 ♘xa6.

22 ♘c4!

The only possibility worth considering. Now extreme accuracy is required from Black.

22 ... ♗c5?

It turns out that Ljubojevic is not quite on top of this complicated situation, and he overlooks his opponent's beautiful 25th move. Black is also clearly worse after 22 ... ♗xh2+?! 23 ♔xh2 ♘cxd5 24 ♕d4 or 24 ♔g1 ♕b8 25 ♕d5. Essential was 22 ... ♗b4, after which White would have had to choose between 23 d6 and 23 e4 (23 ... ♘xe4 24 d6). In both cases White's two pawns and the active positions of his pieces would have completely compensated for the sacrificed piece, but probably no more than that. A double-edged struggle would have lain ahead, the outcome of which would have been unclear.

23 ♘xa5! ♖xa5
24 ♖xc5 ♕d8

No better is 24 ... ♕b8 25 ♕d2 ♘a6 26 ♖c4 ♕d8 27 ♘c7!.

25 ♘d6!! ♕xd6

Bad is 25 ... ♖xc5 26 ♘xb7 ♕e7 27 d6.

26 ♖xa5 ♗xd5
27 ♕d4! ♕e6

27 ... ♘e6 28 ♖xd5.

28 ♗xd5 ♘cxd5
29 ♖d1 ♖c8

30	**♖c5!**	**♖xc5**
31	**♕xc5**	

In theory, two knights are considered almost equal in strength to a rook and two pawns. But not in the ending, especially with a strong passed a-pawn, which the slow-moving knights are simply not able to combat. Yusupov has exchanged Black's rook and bishop, which could still have restricted the pawn's advance, just in time. Black's position is now completely hopeless.

31	**...**	**h5**
32	**a5**	**♕e4**
33	**h3**	**g6**
34	**♕c6**	**♕b4**
35	**a6**	**♕a5**
36	**♕b7**	**♕a4**
37	**♖b1**	

Black resigned.

We have considered some rather convincing examples illustrating Tarrasch's view of sacrifices that arise as a consequence of mistakes committed earlier in the attack, and we have explained the positive aspect of his assertion. As a counterpoint to this, I wish now to remark that, first, the fact that a game may not have been entirely impeccable prior to a sacrifice does not in any way devalue that sacrifice or diminish one's interest in it. Mistakes in chess are, unfortunately, unavoidable. It is very important to preserve one's presence of mind after making a mistake, to be able to neutralise its consequences, not hesitating to make sacrifices if necessary. Secondly, even in a game which has been played immaculately, the sacrifice of material is sometimes either objectively the best way to develop an initiative or, at the very least, one of several possibilities of roughly equal merit. We shall see quite a few examples of this later in this book.

Giving Up a Pawn to Prevent Castling

If I have a lead in development over my opponent, my attacking possibilities will reveal themselves.

Rudolf Spielmann

It nearly always makes sense to incur a small loss of material in the opening in order to leave the enemy king stranded in the centre and to seize the initiative. Many opening variations, both classical and modern, are based on this strategic idea.

Dvoretsky–Schmidt
Wijk aan Zee 1975

1	**e4**	**c5**
2	**♘f3**	**e6**
3	**c3**	**♘f6**
4	**e5**	**♘d5**
5	**d4**	**cxd4**
6	**cxd4**	**d6**
7	**a3**	

If White wishes to develop his bishop on d3, he needs first either to cover the b4-square or to exchange the knight on d5 by playing 7 ♘c3.

	7	**...**	**♘c6**
	8	**♗d3**	**dxe5**
	9	**dxe5**	**♕c7**

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

A rare situation: play has only just begun, but White already cannot avoid the loss of a pawn. But he gives up this pawn very willingly, since in return his opponent will be deprived of the opportunity to castle.

This game was played in the penultimate round. I was in the lead, after eight wins and five draws, but Wlodimierz Schmidt was only half a point behind. In principle I would have been entirely happy with a draw, but I was trying to forget this before the game. Attempting to head straight for a draw in such situations is a grave mistake. Siegbert Tarrasch wrote: "If I see the best move, one which gives chances of winning, then I shall simply act according to my natural instincts, in spite of the fact that I should have been happy to choose a move which leads only to a draw." Such 'secondary' moves, chosen only because they are quieter, more cautious, most often lead not in fact to a draw but to conceding the initiative to one's opponent, and—in the end—to thoroughly well-deserved defeat.

During my preparation I had reckoned with the possibility that in the opening variation I had chosen I might have to give up a pawn, but this did not worry me in the least. I think that Schmidt was also content with the outcome of the opening. After all, trying to win with Black is very difficult; yet here he immediately gets an advantage in material, and the situation becomes sharper. Nevertheless, I consider the risk which Black is taking to be too great. When playing for a win, you should not attempt to 'take the bull by the horns' immediately. It is better to aim for a protracted struggle, to maintain constant tension—and then your opponent may falter at some point.

	10	**0-0**	**♘xe5**
	11	**♘xe5**	**♕xe5**
	12	**♗b5+**	**♗d7**

Preferable was 12 ... ♔e7, but then after 13 ♖e1 ♕d6 14 ♕f3 f6 15 ♘c3 (it is important to exchange the strong knight on d5)

15 . . . ♘xc3 16 bxc3, White also has excellent compensation for the sacrificed pawn.

13 ♗xd7+ ♔xd7
14 ♖e1

Not 14 ♘c3? at once, in view of 14 . . . ♗d6.

14 . . . ♕d6
15 ♕f3

White's plan is clear: it is necessary to exchange knights and then bring the rooks into the attack. In the event of 15 . . . ♗e7 there is no point in being deflected from this plan for the sake of a pawn: 16 ♕xf7?! ♖af8 gives Black counterplay. Much stronger is 16 ♘c3.

15 . . . ♔e8
16 ♘c3 ♖d8

Slightly better was 16 . . . ♗e7, after which I would have chosen between 17 ♘xd5 ♕xd5 18 ♕g3, and 17 ♗d2 ♖d8 18 ♖ad1.

At this point Schmidt became aware of the perilous nature of his position, and he proposed a draw. I declined without any hesitation. Now that I had the opportunity, without having to wait until the last round, to win this tournament and secure myself a place in the main, grandmaster tournament of the following year, it would have been stupid not to take advantage of it.

17 ♗g5 f6

If 17 . . . ♗e7 then 18 ♗xe7 ♔xe7 19 ♖ad1 ♔f8 20 ♘xd5 exd5 21 ♕e3, with the threats 22 ♕xa7 and 22 ♖xd5! ♕xd5 23 ♕e7+ ♔g8 24 ♕e8+. Or 18 . . . ♕xe7 19 ♖ad1 ♘xc3 20 ♕xc3 ♖xd1 21 ♖xd1, winning. This last variation is quite instructive. White simply exchanges off all his opponent's developed pieces and essentially remains a rook up, since the black rook on h8 does not have the slightest significance.

18 ♖ad1 ♔f7
19 ♘xd5 exd5
20 ♗f4 ♕b6

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Q. 2.9 What should White play?

"In such positions, pawns should be taken only in passing, so to speak. All one's thoughts should be concentrated on the attack." (Spielmann).

The primitive 21 ♖xd5? ♗c5 would allow Black, finally, to complete his development. Why win back the pawn if, instead, it is possible, by increasing the threats, to invade behind enemy lines?

21 ♖c1! ♖d7
22 ♖c8 g6
23 ♕e2 ♔g7

23 . . . ♖e7 24 ♖xf8+.

24 ♕e8

Heavy loss of material is now unavoidable.

24	**. . .**	**♖f7**
25	**♗h6+**	**♔xh6**
26	**♕xf7**	**♗c5**
27	**♖xh8**	**♗xf2+**
28	**♔h1**	**♗xe1**
29	**h4**	**♔h5**
30	**♕xd5+**	

Black resigned.

Was the Attack Irresistible?

It is the annotator's misfortune that a game which finishes with one side being thoroughly and beautifully crushed is difficult to analyse objectively.
Bent Larsen

The following widely published game is usually quoted as an illustration of an initiative, seized by White in the opening by virtue of a positional pawn sacrifice, growing into a menacing attack on the king. In fact, the contest in this game was, as we shall see, far from one-sided, since in the skirmish that developed each player had his chances.

Alekhine–Junge
Prague 1942

1	**d4**	**d5**
2	**c4**	**e6**
3	**♘f3**	**♘f6**
4	**g3**	**dxc4**
5	**♕a4+**	**♘bd7**
6	**♗g2**	**a6**
7	**♕xc4**	**b5**
8	**♕c6**	**♖b8**
9	**0-0**	

According to modern theory, the opening variation chosen by White does not promise him any advantage either after the move in the game or in the event of 9 ♗f4 ♘d5 10 ♗g5 ♗e7 11 ♗xe7 ♕xe7 12 0-0 ♗b7 13 ♕c2 c5.

9	**. . .**	**♗b7**
10	**♕c2**	**c5**
11	**a4!?**	

Alekhine sacrifices the pawn on d4.

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

Black now has quite a wide choice of sound continuations: he may continue 11 . . . ♖c8, 11 . . . ♕b6, or 11 . . . b4. But the young and talented German player (incidentally, in this tournament he shared 1st–2nd place with his great opponent) decided to take the risk, and he accepted the sacrifice. Of course, White gets excellent positional compensation for the pawn. He has the bishop pair,

which may become exceptionally dangerous if the game is opened up. On the other hand, White has no lead in development and so Junge had every right to place his hopes in the defensive resources of his position.

Nimzowitsch gave the following advice: "Capture any central pawn, even though this might involve some danger (provided, of course, that it is not too excessive)".

11	**. . .**	**♗xf3!?**
12	**♗xf3**	**cxd4**
13	**axb5**	**axb5**
14	**♖d1**	**♕b6**

Black must exercise caution. Dubious is 14 . . . e5?! in view of 15 e3! ♖c8 16 ♗c6! ♕c7 17 ♖a6, when White secures the desired opening of lines. Also unsuccessful would be 14 . . . ♗c5? 15 ♗f4 ♖c8 (15 . . . e5 16 ♗xe5) 16 ♗b7 d3 17 ♕d3 ♗xf2+ 18 ♔f1.

15	**♘d2**	**e5**

Rather unattractive would be 15 . . . ♘e5, after which either 16 ♗g2 followed by ♘b3, or the immediate 16 ♘b3 ♘xf3+ 17 exf3, would be strong for White. But entirely possible was 15 . . . ♗c5!? 16 ♘b3 0-0 17 ♘xc5 ♘xc5! (worse is 17 . . . ♕xc5 18 ♕xc5 ♘xc5 19 ♗f4 ♖bc8 20 ♖a5), and 18 ♖xd4? is bad because of 18 . . . ♘b3!. The move in the game is more risky.

16	**♘b3**	**♘c5!**

This was the idea behind Black's previous move. In the event of the cautious 16 . . . ♗e7?!, White would have taken a firm hold on the initiative with 17 e3! dxe3 (17 . . . 0-0 18 exd4) 18 ♗xe3 ♕e6 19 ♘a5 or 19 ♗a7.

17	**♘xc5**	**♗xc5**

Illogical would be 17 . . . ♕c5 18 ♗c6+ (18 ♕f5!?) 18 . . . ♘d7 19 ♕e4 (also possible is 19 ♕xc5 ♗xc5 20 ♖a5), with advantage to White.

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Q. 2.10 How would you continue the offensive?

In this chapter, in contrast to the last (and also to my previous book), questions are sometimes asked to which no unambiguous answer can be given (or, at any rate, I do not know of one). So what can you do in these cases? First, identify the promising possibilities, then calculate variations as far as seems to you to be worthwhile (you will not manage anyway to take them right through 'to the end'), and, finally, make your choice. In deciphering

all the analysis that follows, you will have to judge for yourself whether you assessed the situation correctly, whether you saw enough, and whether the decision you made was a good one (from a practical point of view!).

So, what are the candidate moves? Black evidently wishes to castle. The modest 18 ♗d2?! does not prevent this intention: 18 . . . 0-0 19 ♗a5 ♕d6. White may prevent castling by sacrificing a second pawn: 18 b4?! ♗xb4 19 ♗c6+. But after 19 . . . ♔e7, followed by . . . ♖hc8, Black will successfully complete his development and White will have no real compensation for the material he has given up.

Tempting is 18 ♗g5!?, with the positional threat 19 ♗xf6. Black loses a piece after 18 . . . ♖c8? 19 b4. In the event of 18 . . . ♗e7 19 ♗c6+, or 18 . . . ♘d7 19 ♗g4, White's initiative becomes very dangerous. This means that Black has to reply 18 . . . 0-0 19 ♗xf6 gxf6. The compensation for the pawn is now indisputable, but it is not clear whether White has any real advantage.

Considerably sharper and more interesting is the positional exchange sacrifice undertaken by the World Champion.

18 ♖a6!? ♕xa6
19 ♕xc5

The black king can no longer castle and now comes under very strong attack. But the outcome of this attack remains problematic. In an example from the previous section White gave up just one pawn for the sake of keeping his opponent's king in the centre, but here the price paid is considerably higher.

Besides, White's dark-squared bishop has not yet come into play. Accurate calculation over the board of the consequences of the sacrifice was completely impossible, so Alekhine's decision involved quite a degree of risk. I think that both 18 ♗g5!? and 18 ♖a6!? are good replies to the question posed, and choosing between them is a matter of taste and style of play. But in any case it is necessary to see both these possibilities and to become clearly aware of the difference between them: by choosing the first, White risks not winning; in the second, he will have greater chances of success but he now runs a risk of losing, as the attack may run out of steam.

19 . . . ♕e6!

No good was 19 . . . ♘d7? 20 ♗c6 ♔d8 (20 . . . f6 21 ♕d6; 20 . . . ♖c8 21 ♕xe5+ ♔d8 22 ♗xd7) 21 ♕d5 ♕a7 22 ♕xf7.

20 ♗c6+ ♘d7!

Again Junge makes the correct choice. On 20 . . . Kd8 White would not have replied 21 f4? (which was Fine's recommendation) 21 f4? (in view of 21 . . . Rc8

22 Qb6+ Rc7), but simply 21 Bd2! b4 22 Qa5+.

21 ♗xd7+

A forced exchange, which signifies a definite achievement for Black—his opponent now has one attacking piece fewer.

21 ... ♔xd7

21 ... ♕xd7? 22 ♕xe5+.

22 ♕a7+



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Q. 2.11 How should Black defend?

This was the position Alekhine was aiming for when he sacrificed the exchange. Bad for Black now would be 22 ... ♔c8? 23 ♗d2 (or 23 ♗g5), followed by ♖c1+. But after 22 ... ♔d6! it is not easy to determine how White should develop his attack.

After the natural 23 ♗d2 Black will reply 23 ... ♕d7 24 ♗b4+ (24 ♕a6+ ♕c6) 24 ... ♔e6 25 ♕a6+ ♔f5. The positional threat 26 ... f6 compels White to continue his onslaught in highly aggressive style: 26 e4+ ♔xe4!. Now in the event of 27 f3+ ♔xf3! the king, which has penetrated deep behind enemy lines, has nothing to fear, as Black's central pawns limit the attacking possibilities of the white pieces. Stronger is 27 f4!?, but, all the same, the chances of such a 'speculative' attack succeeding would be highly dubious. In an interesting book by Fine, *Chess Marches On!*, published in 1945, 23 f4 is recommended, in connection with a variation which has since been reproduced in all the publications that have quoted this game: 23 ... f6 24 fxe5+ fxe5 25 ♗f4! exf4 26 ♕xd4+, and after 26 ... ♔e7 27 ♕xg7+, or 26 ... ♔c6(c7) 27 ♖c1+, Black has to give up his queen for the rook. But the move 23 ... f6? is not obligatory. It is better to hurry to evacuate the king from the danger zone: 23 ... ♕d7! 24 fxe5+ ♔e6 25 ♕a6+ ♔e7 26 ♗g5+ ♔f8 (having in mind ... ♖e8, ... h6, ... ♔g8 etc). Also possible is 26 ... ♔e8!? (in order on 27 ♗e3? to reply 27 ... ♕b7!) 27 ♖c1 ♔f8. Again the outcome of the contest remains completely unclear.

The only variation that can be calculated right through to a conclusion was pointed out by Junge himself: 23 ♗f4!? exf4 24 ♖xd4+ ♔c6 25 ♖d1! ♖hc8 26 ♖c1+ ♔d6 27 ♖d1+ with perpetual check. It is not impossible that this is what White would have had to play.

Regrettably, the most interest-

ing struggle which had been initiated in this game did not develop logically. Junge wavered, played inaccurately, and allowed his opponent to conclude his offensive successfully.

22 ... ♔c6?

An illogical move, which gives the white rook a tempo to link up with the attack down the c-file.

23 ♗d2 ♖hc8

23 ... ♖hd8 24 ♖c1+ ♔d5 25 ♖c5+.

24 e4!

It would be premature to play 24 ♖c1+ ♔d5. First it is necessary to deprive the enemy king of the d5-square.

24 ... ♕b3

The only defence against the threat 25 ♖c1+ ♔d6 26 ♗b4+. Of course, 24 ... dxe3 25 ♗xe3 would be hopeless.

25 ♖a1!

Commenting on this game in his book *300 Izbrannykh Partii Alekhina* ('300 Selected Games of Alekhine'), Panov provides the following footnote at this point: "All of these far from obvious moves by White show how accurately and subtly Alekhine had calculated the combination begun with his 18th move".

Such 'fine words', which unfortunately can be found in many chess books, distort the truth and prevent the reader from getting a sense of how great chessplayers actually think during play, how they solve the problems arising before them. It is clear that Alekhine had not even tried to see so far ahead—when sacrificing the exchange he was trusting in his intuition. It would have been impossible to calculate this combination right through to the end, and also unnecessary, as this would have led merely to a vain waste of time and effort. Human possibilities are limited, and one simply has to come to terms with this fact!

25 ... b4

25 ... ♖b6 26 ♖c1+.

26 ♖a6+ ♔b5

27 ♖a5+ ♔c6

27 ... ♔c4 28 ♕a6+.

28 ♕c5+ ♔d7

29 ♖a7+

Black resigned.

Is there such a thing as an 'Ideal Style'?

It is better to be healthy but rich, than poor but ill.
Russian Proverb

Which style of play promises the best chances of success? What is more important—understanding the subtleties of a position, or being skilled in playing combinations? Questions like these seem to me to be fruitless. It is sufficient to call to mind at least the creative achievements of various World Chess Champions

in order to convince ourselves that the road to chess mastery is not the prerogative of those who adhere to any particular style of play. Em. Lasker, Botvinnik, Tal, Petrosian . . . could one possibly imagine players who are more different?

Frequently a position which has arisen on the board permits only one correct solution, whether it be positional or tactical, and you are obliged to find it, irrespective of your style of play. But at times a more varied treatment of a position is permissible. It is extremely interesting to observe how a player's creative personality manifests itself in such cases. We have already come across such a situation when analysing the previous game, but it seems to me that the following very tense and difficult encounter is even more significant.

Karpov–Timman
Amsterdam 1981

1	**♘f3**	**♘f6**
2	**c4**	**b6**
3	**g3**	**♗b7**
4	**♗g2**	**g6**
5	**d4**	**c5**
6	**0-0**	**♗g7**
7	**♘c3**	

7 d5 b5!.

7	**...**	**♘e4**

More often Black plays 7 . . . cxd4 here.

8	**♘xe4**	

Another promising possibility was 8 ♘d5!?.

8	**...**	**♗e4**
9	**d5!**	**0-0**

Five years later, a game between the same players (Brussels 1986) went: 9 . . . e5 10 ♕b3 0-0 11 ♗h3! ♗xf3 12 ♕xf3 f5 13 e4 f4 (better is 13 . . . ♕f6) 14 ♕d1 and White obtained an advantage.

10	**♗h3!?**	

A typical method in such positions. By moving his bishop away from the g2-square, Karpov threatens to attack the bishop on e4, which has become marooned in the enemy's half of the board, with his knight, and so he forces a favourable exchange on f3.

10	**...**	**♗xf3**
11	**exf3**	**e5**

White also has the advantage after 11 . . . e6 12 f4, as in the eleventh game of the Women's Candidates match Levitina–Alexandria, Dubna 1983.

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

Q. 2.12 What should White play?

It would be a major positional concession to play either 12 dxe6? dxe6, or 12 d6? ♘c6, since in both cases the black knight heads for d4. It is clear that White must play f3–f4 in order to open up lines for his bishops. But the immediate 12 f4 leads to the loss of the pawn on b2. Therefore the move 12 ♕c2 suggests itself, followed by 13 f4. Probably many players would have played this.

A distinguishing feature of Karpov's creative style is his continual aspiration to limit his opponent's possibilities as much as possible, by guessing his intentions. (I have called this most important skill for any chessplayer, 'prophylactic thinking', and I shall have more to say on this subject in a subsequent book, devoted to positional play.) Here the World Champion realised that on 12 ♕c2?! his opponent will reply 12 . . . f5! 13 f4 e4, blocking the diagonals for the white bishops and maintaining an acceptable position. In order not to allow this, Karpov decides to sacrifice a pawn, despite the fact that giving up material is basically not his style.

12 f4! exf4

12 . . . e4 13 f5!.

13 ♗xf4 ♗xb2

14 ♖b1 ♗f6

On 15 ♗d6 Timman plans to reply 15 . . . ♗e7 16 ♗xe7 ♕xe7 17 d6 ♕f6 18 ♕d5 ♘c6 19 ♗xd7 ♘b4, followed by . . . ♖ad8. Of course, Karpov will not part so easily with the advantages of his position.

15 ♕a4!

The start of a plan to paralyse the opponent's queenside.

15 . . . d6

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

16 ♖b3!

Q. 2.13 What is the point of the move played by Karpov? How should Black respond?

Why did the World Champion not place his rook on the open file? Probably he asked himself how his opponent wished to develop his pieces. He saw the plan 16 . . . a6 (not fearing 17 ♕b3 b5) and then . . . ♖a8–a7–b7, and decided to prevent this. Bad now would be 16 . . . a6? 17 ♖fb1, and meanwhile White wishes to play 17 ♖fe1 followed by ♖be3, so that his prophylactic move will also come in useful for doubling rooks on the open file. Black can-

not succeed in preventing White's plan with 16 . . . ♖e8, because of 17 ♗xd6. On 16 . . . ♗g5 there follows 17 ♗xg5 ♕xg5 18 ♖e3! with an overwhelming advantage (less accurate is 18 ♖e1 ♕d2! 19 ♖be3 ♕b4). As you see, the modest rook move allowed Karpov to organise his pieces to dominate the whole board, which is a favourite strategy of his.

But, all the same, Black's defensive resources are not yet exhausted. Timman found the only way to maintain the tension:

16 . . . h5!

With the positional threat 17 . . . g5 18 ♗d2 g4 and 19 . . . ♘d7. Considering that Black subsequently succeeded in getting a draw, the Dutch Grandmaster, when annotating this game, expressed scepticism about his opponent's prophylactic move 16 ♖b3. "Tal or Spassky would have acted more energetically: 16 ♖fe1!", he writes.

Let us examine the variations quoted by Timman:

A. 16 ♖fe1 h5 17 ♗h6 ♗g7 18 ♗xg7 ♔xg7 19 ♖e3 f5 (otherwise Black cannot develop his knight; bad is 19 . . . a6 20 ♖eb3) 20 ♖e6 ♕c7 21 ♖be1 (weaker is 21 ♕a3 ♘d7 22 ♕c3+ ♘f6 23 ♖be1 ♖f7—van der Sterren) 21 . . . ♘d7 22 ♕d1! ♖f7 23 ♗xf5!! ♖xf5 24 ♕a1+ ♔h6 (24 . . . ♘e5 25 f4 ♖af8 26 fxe5 dxe5 27 d6 ♕d8 28 ♖1xe5) 25 ♖e7 ♖g8 26 ♖1c6! with the fatal threat of 27 ♕c1+.

B. 16 ♖fe1 a6 (this is the move that Karpov wanted to prevent) 17 ♖b3 ♖a7 18 ♖be3 (18 ♖eb1 ♖b7 is useless; 18 ♗h6 ♗g7 19 ♗xg7 ♔xg7 20 ♖be3 ♘d7 21 ♖e7 b5! also leads nowhere) 18 . . . ♖e7 (the threat was 19 ♖e8) 19 ♖xe7 ♗xe7 20 ♗h6 ♖e8 21 ♖e3!. The only move! Not 21 ♗g5?, in view of 21 . . . b5, and on 21 ♕b3 there follows 21 . . . ♘d7 22 ♗xd7 ♕xd7 23 ♕xb6 ♗f8 24 ♖xe8 (24 ♗e3 ♕a4) 24 . . . ♕xe8 25 ♗xf8 ♕e1+ 26 ♔g2 ♕e4+ 27 f3 ♕c2+ 28 ♔h3 ♕f5+ with perpetual check. 21 . . . f5 (there seems to be nothing else) 22 g4 ♕d7 23 ♕xd7 ♘xd7 24 gxf5 ♘f6 (24 . . . ♘e5 25 f6! ♗xf6 26 f4) 25 fxg6 hxg6 26 a4!, and White's two strong bishops guarantee him the advantage in the endgame.

Profound and, apparently, completely correct analysis! But now let us return to the game and try to think, along with Karpov, how White can best meet his opponent's clear positional threat. One simply does not wish to believe that White's subtle prophylactic strategy should have to collapse just because of a single idea, . . . g6–g5, which was only a 'sideline'. But finding the solution turns out to be far from simple.

On 17 ♗h6 Black has the reply 17 . . . ♖e8 (White cannot now play 18 ♗xd6). The move 17 f3

weakens the dark squares—after 17 . . . ♗g5 18 ♗xg5 ♕xg5 White cannot now play 19 ♖e3. In the event of 19 ♖xb6 ♕e3+ 20 ♔h1 axb6 21 ♕xa8 ♘d7, or 19 ♖e1 ♕d2! 20 ♖be3 ♕b4 21 ♕c2 b5, Black has genuine counterplay.

There is a tempting piece sacrifice: 17 ♖e1 g5 18 ♖be3!? gxf4 19 ♖e8. This is what Karpov played, but White's attack turned out to be insufficient to win.

Worthy of serious consideration is 17 ♖e3!?. On 17 . . . g5 there follows 18 ♕d1! ♗d4 (18 . . . gxf4 19 gxf4 with the threats 20 ♕xh5 and 20 ♖g3+) 19 ♕xh5 gxf4 20 gxf4 (20 ♗f5 ♖e8) 20 . . . ♗xe3 21 ♔h1! and Black is defenceless. But he can immediately reply 17 . . . ♗d4! 18 ♗h6 (18 ♖d3 g5) 18 . . . ♗xe3 19 fxe3 a6! 20 ♗e6 ♖a7.

Up until now I have been demonstrating variations found by other players, but now the moment has finally come to suggest something of my own.

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

Let us consider in reply to 17 . . . g5 a piece-sacrifice: 18 ♗f5! gxf4 19 gxf4. The opponent's queenside is, as before, frozen, and the threat is 20 ♖g3+ ♔h8 21 ♕d1. If 19 . . . ♗g7 then 20 ♖g3 ♕f6 21 ♖g5. Probably Black will play 19 . . . h4 or 19 . . . ♗h4, but then the attack may be continued with ♔h1 and ♖g1.

This idea looks promising, but what is the best move to prepare it? The natural 17 ♖e1 turns out to be a loss of a tempo, since the rook will need to operate from the square g1. It doesn't look bad to play 17 ♖e3, but, as we already know, Black has the reply 17 . . . ♗d4.

I suggest that White should play 17 ♔h1!!. After 17 . . . g5 18 ♗f5! gxf4 19 gxf4 White has won a very important tempo for including his rook in the attack down the g-file. This attack becomes irresistible. For example: 19 . . . ♗h4 20 ♖g1+ ♔h8 21 ♖h3 ♕f6 22 ♕d1 ♕xf5 23 ♖xh4, or 19 . . . h4 20 ♖g1+ ♔h8 (20 . . . ♗g7 21 ♖h3 with the threats 22 ♕d1 or 22 ♖g5) 21 ♖h3(e3) followed by ♕d1 (incidentally, in some cases White can also line up a dangerous battery: ♗b1 and ♕c2). Inserting the moves 17 . . . a6 18 ♖fb1 changes little—on 18 . . . g5 there follows 19 ♗f5! gxf4 20 gxf4 just the same.

It seems that the—at first sight—mysterious king move is the strongest way to continue the

attack. But I am by no means asserting that after this White will win. He is simply now ready to meet . . . g6–g5 with a worthy response. But it is best for Black to decline to advance the pawn and to play as Gulko recommends: 17 . . . ♗d4 or 17 . . . ♗g7.

So, the position after Black's 15th move allows two different approaches, which are diametrically opposed yet objectively of roughly equal merit. Very strong is the straightforward plan of attack suggested by Timman, but if his opponent defends with best play White cannot do without accurate prophylactic moves like 21 ♖e3! and 26 a4!. It is also entirely possible to play to prevent the opponent's possibilities in the spirit of Karpov: 16 ♖b3! (and 17 ♔h1!!), but White will not be successful if he limits himself to purely prophylactic operations—he will have to calculate sharp variations and sacrifice a piece.

The conclusion is clear: there is no good or bad style—only good or bad play. A chessplayer is entitled to play a game in any way he sees fit, but at the same time his combat arsenal must be sufficiently universal. All sorts of events may occur in the course of a game, and we may come up against the most varied tasks, so our preparation needs to be equally diverse, in order that such tasks may be solved successfully.

Let us look now at what happened in the game.

17 ♖e1 g5
18 ♖be3

Even now, with the loss of a tempo, the idea 18 ♗f5!? gxf4 19 gxf4 deserved the most careful consideration. After analysing the resulting position, I came to the conclusion that, here too, it is not easy for Black to parry his opponent's attack.

18 . . . gxf4
19 ♖e8

On 19 gxf4 Timman was going to reply 19 . . . ♗h4! 20 ♕d1 ♕f6.

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19 . . . b5!

This counter-thrust, which deflects the white queen away from the kingside and vacates the b6-square for the black queen, was undoubtedly seen by Timman in advance. He would have lost after 19 . . . ♕c7? 20 ♖xf8+ ♔xf8 21 ♖e8+ ♔g7 22 ♕d1 ♔h6 23 ♕f3.

20 ♕xb5 ♕b6
21 ♖xf8+ ♔xf8
22 ♖e8+

Karpov decides to transpose into an endgame. The pin of the enemy pieces along the eighth rank gives White compensation for the sacrificed piece, but no more than that. The game would be drawn after 22 ♕e8+ ♔g7 23 gxf4 ♕d8! 24 ♕b5 (24 ♕a4 ♔f8; 24 ♔h1 ♕xe8 25 ♖xe8 a5 26 a4 ♖a7! 27 ♖xb8 ♖e7) 24 . . . ♕b6 (the threat was 25 ♕b7) 25 ♕e8 ♕d8.

22 . . . ♔g7
23 gxf4 ♕xb5

Weaker, in Timman's opinion, was 23 . . . ♗d8, in view of 24 ♕xb6 ♗xb6 25 ♔g2 a6 26 ♖c8.

24 cxb5 ♗c3!

The bishop must come to support the queenside. Mistaken is 24 . . . c4 25 a4 (or 25 ♖c8 c3 26 ♗f5) 25 . . . c3? 26 ♗f5 followed by a4–a5–a6.

25 ♗f1

Playing 25 ♗c8 would not present any danger, because of 25 . . . ♘a6! (or 25 . . . ♘d7!?). On 25 ♗d7, there follows 25 . . . c4 26 ♗c6 ♘xc6 27 ♖xa8 ♘b4 28 ♖xa7 ♘xd5.

25 . . . ♗a5
26 ♖c8

Black wanted to play 26 . . . a6 27 bxa6 ♗c7 followed by 28 ♖a7. Karpov, who—as always—is paying careful attention to his opponent's intentions, prevents this plan, but he has to allow the enemy king to approach.

26 . . . ♔f6
27 ♔g2 ♔e7
28 ♔f3 ♗d8
29 a4

Not 29 ♔e4? f5+! 30 ♔xf5 ♔d7.

29 . . . a6
30 bxa6 ♔d7

After 30 . . . ♖xa6 31 ♖xb8 ♖xa4 32 ♖b7+ ♔f6 33 ♖d7 ♗e7 34 ♗g2 Black would have no real advantage, but he would still have had to reckon with 31 ♗xa6 ♘xa6 32 a5! ♔d7 33 ♖a8 ♘c7 34 ♖b8. Therefore Timman forces a draw.

31 ♗h3+ ♔e7
32 ♗f1

Otherwise 32 . . . ♖xa6.

32 . . . ♔d7

Drawn.

A truly fascinating skirmish!

One always likes to share discoveries like 17 ♔h1!!, and I included a fragment of this game in an article of mine devoted to Timman's analysis, published in the fourth edition of the magazine *New in Chess* in 1986. The same magazine also published the Grandmaster's objections to some of my variations. Some of these objections were fair, but not all of them.

After 17 ♔h1 g5 18 ♗f5 Timman suggested the interesting defence 18 . . . ♗g7 (with the threat 19 . . . ♕f6) 19 ♗c1 ♕e8!, but he added the following very strange comments.

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

"The exchange of queens favours Black, since after 20 ♕xe8 ♖xe8 it is not possible to play 21 ♗xg5? in view of 21 . . . ♖e5", writes Timman. In the very next edition of the magazine he was obliged to correct his mistake: White doesn't lose a piece at all. He may continue 22 ♖f3 ♘d7! 23 ♗c1 ♘f8 24 ♗d3 with a somewhat better endgame. Apparently still stronger is 22 ♗c8! (threatening 23 ♗b7) 22 . . . ♘a6! 23 ♗xa6 ♖xg5 24 f4 ♖g6 25 ♖e1 (worse is 25 h4 ♖e8) 25 . . . h4 26 ♔g2 and Black will have to defend a rather unfavourable ending.

If this is not enough for White, he may also retreat his queen. Timman's opinion: "20 ♕a3 ♕e5 is also good for Black, since White will not succeed in maintaining his bishop on f5". Why not? Doesn't the move 21 ♖f3! solve this task? After 21 . . . g4 22 ♖f4 it is hard for Black to parry the positional threats h2–h3 and f2–f3, or ♔g2(g1) followed by ♗d2 and ♖e1 (it is bad to play 22 . . . ♗h6? 23 ♗b2 ♕e2 24 ♗d3). If, however, 21 . . . ♕e2 then 22 ♔g1(g2) ♕xc4 23 ♕e3!? g4 24 ♖f4 and soon all the white pieces will hurl themselves at the enemy king.

An interesting question is why Timman, a superb analyst, sometimes makes such simple mistakes. In order to understand this better, let us turn to another example from the article mentioned above.

Portisch–Timman

6th game, Hilversum 1984

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

Q. 2.14 What should White play?

Timman's position is perilous, since his queenside, as in the previous game, is still undeveloped. But White must act forcefully, as the passive 21 f3?! ♘a6 would promise him nothing. Not too successful either was the move chosen by Portisch: 21 ♕h5?!. Black replied 21 . . . ♕e6 22 ♔b1

♘c6 23 a3 a5, preparing to sacrifice the knight on b4. There followed: 24 g3 ♘b4! 25 axb4 axb4 26 ♗h3 ♕a2+ 27 ♔c2 ♕c4+ 28 ♔d2 ♕d4+ 29 ♔c2 ♕c4+ 30 ♔d2 ♕d4+ Drawn.

How can White's play be improved? Clearly, developing the bishop to h3 has its advantages. When analysing this game Yusupov suggested the following variation:

21 g3! ♖xf2 22 ♗h3 c6 23 ♖f2 (in his annotations Timman considered 23 ♖hf1 ♖xf1 24 ♖xf1 ♔c7, with a good position for Black) 23 ... ♔c7 24 ♖hd1 ♖f7 25 e4. White intends first to attack a pawn with the move ♕h5, and then to put his bishop on f5 and play g3–g4–g5. There does not appear to be any real counterplay.

The Dutch Grandmaster raised the objection that instead of 24 ... ♖f7 Black can play 24 ... d5.



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He looked at the variation 25 ♖c2 ♕d7 26 ♕xd7+ (26 ♖xd5? ♖f1+!) 26 ... ♘xd7 27 ♖xd5 ♘c5! (27 ... ♖d8 28 b4!) 28 ♖xe5 ♖g8, followed by 29 ... a5, when the activity of the black pieces serves as quite good compensation for the loss of a pawn.

"It is clear that there is no reason to fear the check on c8", writes Timman. What's this? No reason? In fact, after 25 ♕c8+! ♔d6 there will now be a deadly pin along the eighth rank (recall that in the previous game a similar pin fully compensated for Black's extra piece). The threat 26 ... ♖f8 can be repelled by 26 e4 ♖xd2 (26 ... ♖f8? 27 ♖xd5+) 27 ♖xd2 with a clear advantge. For example: 27 ... d4 28 ♖f2 (28 ♕h8!?) 28 ... b5 29 ♕g8. Also strong is 26 ♗f5 (intending 27 g4) 26 ... h5 27 e4 ♖xd2 28 ♖xd2 d4 29 g4 hxg4 30 h5.

As you see, all the deficiencies in this analysis were of the same type—overestimation of one's own position and insufficient consideration of one's opponent's resources. It was on this very weakness, which in my opinion is characteristic of Timman's style of play, that Yusupov based his strategy in their Candidates Semi-final in 1986. He played as actively as possible, always looking for a chance to attack the king. Timman at some stage underestimated his opponent's threats and, as a result, the score ended up 6–3 in Artur's favour.

Science Fiction!

The profit or loss resulting from any activity is conditional upon a combination of circumstances.
Kozma Prutkov

In examining the game Karpov-Timman, we saw convincingly once again that even those who adhere strictly to a positional style of play are sometimes quite simply obliged to act uncharacteristically—to play combinations and to sacrifice. But there are players who willingly aspire to this sort of play, who constantly take risks and find it easy to decide to part with material. The most outstanding advocate of this attitude to chess is, indisputably, Mikhail Tal. The term 'Tal-like sacrifice' has become generally accepted, implying a totally unexpected sacrifice, desperately bold and ... objectively not entirely correct.

The small collection of 'Tal-like sacrifices' which I offer for your consideration in this section of the book includes games played by various players. Of course, it would be sadly deficient if it did not contain some examples played by Tal himself. I remember the powerful impression made on me by a rook sacrifice which he once played at the start of a Candidates Quarter-Final against Portisch in the mid 1960s.

Tal-Portisch

2nd game, Candidates match, Bled 1965

1	**e4**	**c6**
2	**♘c3**	**d5**
3	**♘f3**	**dxe4**
4	**♘xe4**	**♗g4**
5	**h3**	**♗xf3**

After 5 ... ♗h5 6 ♘g3 Black will have to exchange on f3 in any case, since 6 ... ♗g6? leads to a difficult position: 7 h4 h6 8 ♘e5 ♗h7 9 ♕h5 g6 10 ♗c4! (also good is 10 ♕f3 ♘f6 11 ♗c4 e6 12 d4) 10 ... e6 11 ♕e2 with the threat 12 ♘xf7!.

6 ♕xf3 ♘d7

It is not impossible that on 6 ... e6 the former World Champion would have replied with the gambit 7 d4!? ♕xd4 8 ♗d3 ♘d7 9 ♗e3.

7 d4

Tal doesn't wish to win a pawn with 7 ♘g5 ♘gf6 8 ♕b3 e6 9 ♕xb7. This is what Robert Fischer, who always willingly accepted material given up by his opponent, once played against Cardoso (Portoroz 1958), but after 9 ... ♘d5! he was faced with serious difficulties.

7	**...**	**♘gf6**
8	**♗d3**	**♘xe4**
9	**♕xe4**	**e6**

Portisch has emerged from the opening with a rather passive but very solid position.

10 0-0

Slightly more precise was 10 c3 ♘f6 11 ♕e2. Now Black could have replied 10 . . . ♘f6 11 ♕h4 ♘d5.

10 . . . ♗e7
11 c3 ♘f6
12 ♕h4

Simpler was 12 ♕e2, with a better position for White. But from this point onwards Tal deliberately sets a course for complications, looking to confuse his opponent. At the cost of one or two tempi he lures the black knight away from the square f6, where it was defending the kingside and could in some cases have been transferred to a more secure position on f8.

12 . . . ♘d5
13 ♕g4 ♗f6

13 . . . 0-0? 14 ♗h6 ♗f6 15 ♕e4.

14 ♖e1

Weaker was 14 ♕e4 (trying to make castling difficult), in view of 14 . . . ♘e7! followed by . . . ♕d5. Now in the event of 14 . . . 0-0 White can deploy his pieces comfortably by playing 15 ♗h6 (threatening 16 ♕e4) 15 . . . ♖e8 16 ♖ad1 ♕b6 17 ♗c1. Portisch does not wish to allow this and so attempts to make it difficult for his opponent to develop.

14 . . . ♕b6

White has a good position. He may choose between 15 ♖e2, 15 a3 (preparing c3–c4), and 15 ♕h5 g6 16 ♕e2 0-0 17 ♗h6. So, tell

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

me, what 'normal' chessplayer would take it into his head to consider seriously the rook sacrifice 15 c4 ♘b4 16 ♖xe6+? To do this you need Tal's brilliant imagination and his desperate courage.

"But look, the black king has remained in the centre of the board for fourteen moves without yet being punished! Is it not possible to exploit this and at the same time change the course of the game entirely? This was how the idea came to me of sacrificing the rook at e6. An amusing variation flashed through my mind—by no means forced but extremely well camouflaged—and it gave me a certain aesthetic pleasure. And I concluded that even if the sacrifice leads only to a draw, it is correct: a change in the nature of the game will certainly be unpleasant for Portisch." (Tal).

15 c4!? ♘b4

The most natural reply, but it is necessary to consider other possibilities as well.

Not, of course, 15 . . . ♗xd4? 16 cxd5 ♗xf2+, after which the simplest is 17 ♔h1! ♗xe1 18 dxe6, with a menacing attack for the sacrifice of the exchange.

In the event of 15 . . . ♘e7, 'only' a pawn would be sacrificed: 16 d5! cxd5 17 cxd5 ♘xd5, and after 18 ♕a4+ Black can no longer castle. You will see how Tal carries out an attack in such situations by examining a game given in the next section.

Worthy of consideration was 15 . . . h5. For example: 16 ♕e4 ♘b4 17 d5 0-0-0, or 16 ♕e2 ♘e7 17 d5 cxd5 18 cxd5 ♘xd5 19 ♗b5+ (19 ♗e4 0-0-0) 19 . . . ♔f8, followed by 20 . . . g6. White would probably have replied 16 ♕f3!? ♘b4 17 d5 0-0-0 18 ♗e3, maintaining a very promising position.

16 ♖xe6+!! fxe6

17 ♕xe6+

Black is now faced with a most difficult choice—all three moves are entirely playable.

Perhaps the most interesting variations arise after 17 . . . ♗e7.

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Q. 2.15 How should the attack be continued?

Mistaken is the straightforward 18 ♗g5? ♕c7 19 ♖e1, in view of 19 . . . ♘xd3! 20 ♗xe7 ♕d7!. It looks tempting to play 18 ♗xh7, but then Black does not take the bishop but plays 18 . . . c5!, repelling his opponent's threats.

Tal had foreseen the remarkable move 18 ♗g6+!!. The bishop cannot be taken: 18 . . . hxg6? 19 ♗g5 ♕c7 20 ♖e1 with the threats 21 ♗xe7 and 21 ♕xg6+. Black has to reply 18 . . . ♔d8! 19 ♗f5 ♕xd4 (but not 19 . . . ♕c7? 20 ♗f4 ♕c8 21 ♕e4).

After 20 ♗f4 (not allowing 20 . . . ♕d6) Tal liked his position, and not without reason. In his notes he reproduces the beautiful variation which had flashed through his mind during the game and had helped him to decide to sacrifice the rook: 20 . . . ♖e8 21 ♖e1 g6 (Tal gives this move a question mark, but this is quite unjust; 21 . . . ♘d3, in the hope of 22 ♖d1? ♗f6, is refuted by 22 ♖e4!) 22 ♗e3 ♕d6 23 ♗xa7 ♕xe6 24 ♗b6+ ♔c8 (not 24 . . . ♔d7? because of the mate in two) 25 ♗xe6+ ♔c8 26 ♗d7, and White has a clear advantage.

In the previous section, when analysing the game Polugayevsky–Tal, I remarked that long and spectacular variations like this, which inspire great feats from the Rigan Grandmaster,

were not calculated by him accurately, but only roughly and hastily estimated; they are nearly always unable to stand up to critical analysis. This is also the case here: after 23 . . . ♔c7! (instead of 23 . . . ♕xe6?), Black parries his opponent's threats and remains a rook up.

But it is possible to improve White's play as well. Let us reject the elegant manoeuvre 22 ♗e3 ♕d6 23 ♗xa7 in favour of the simple 22 ♗g4!. Bad for Black would be 22 . . . h5? 23 ♖d1 ♘d3 24 ♗e5!, so he has to play 22 . . . ♘d3 at once. Events then develop by force: 23 ♖e4 ♕xf2+ 24 ♔h2 ♕g1+!! (but not 24 . . . ♘c5? 25 ♕e5) 25 ♔xg1 ♗c5+ 26 ♗e3! ♖xe6 27 ♖xe6.

The endgame which has arisen seemed to me to be difficult for Black, in view of the variation 27 . . . ♗xe3+ 28 ♖xe3 ♘xb2 29 ♖b3 ♘xc4 30 ♖xb7 ♘e5 31 ♖xh7 ♖b8 32 ♗e6, when the bishop is considerably stronger than the knight. But Chernin found the correct defensive plan: 27 . . . a5!. The knight gets the excellent square c5 and this is sufficient to maintain the equilibrium.

So, although after 17 . . . ♗e7?! great perils lie in wait for Black, his position would still have been defensible.

Sounder is 17 . . . ♔d8!?. In this case White would have had to content himself with perpetual check: 18 ♕d6+ ♔e8 19 ♕e6+. "After the game Portisch admitted that he had seen the rook sacrifice but had not considered it to be dangerous; when I played it nonetheless, he began to feel rather uneasy. Only the fact that he was nervous can explain why he replied 17 . . . ♔f8 so quickly without any hesitation" (Tal). However, this move is also not at all bad.

17	**. . .**		**♔f8**
18	**♗f4**		**♖d8!**

Black has defended against the threat of 19 ♗d6+ and now wants to take the bishop or play 19 . . . ♕xd4. Black would have lost after either 18 . . . ♖e8? 19 ♗d6+ ♗e7 20 ♖e1 ♕d8 21 ♖e3!, or 18 . . . ♕d8? 19 ♖e1 ♗e7 (19 . . . g5 20 ♗d6+ ♔g7 21 ♗xb4) 20 ♗b1, followed by ♖e3 or ♖e5.

19	**c5**	**♘xd3!**

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Q. 2.16 How should White continue?

At first glance this question may appear to be absurd. It is clear that White cannot play 20 ♗d6+ ♖xd6 21 ♕xd6+ ♗e7; so this means that he has to take the queen, for which, however, Black will have more than equivalent material—a rook and two minor pieces.

In fact it is all much more complicated than that. Tal foresaw some time ago the surprising continuation 20 ♗h6!?, when 20 ... ♕c7? 21 ♕xf6+ ♔e8 22 ♗xg7 ♖g8 23 ♕e6+ is bad for Black. But after 20 ... ♕xb2! 21 ♕xf6+ ♔e8 White has to give perpetual check: 22 ♕e6+ ♔f8 23 ♕f6+.

I think that few players would have resisted the temptation to conclude this beautiful game with a spectacular drawing variation. Indeed, playing on entails a sizeable risk. But Tal, as we have already noted, usually does not bother to consider danger. He is reluctant to give up the fight until all his resources have been exhausted.

20	**cxb6!?**	**♘xf4**
21	**♕g4**	**♘d5**
22	**bxa7**	**♔e7?!**

Portisch chooses a dubious plan. He wishes to transfer his king to the queenside and, if possible, even gobble up the pawn on a7 with it. But the king's journey is too long—during this time White will manage to open up lines and create dangerous threats.

The simple solution—22 ... g6 followed by ... ♔g7—was at the same time the correct one. "How the game would have developed in this case, I frankly do not know. But over the board it seemed to me that the pawn on a7 insures White against defeat to a considerable extent. In a number of variations I could have succeeded, by giving the pawn up with a7–a8(♕), in capturing both of Black's queenside pawns by way of compensation." (Tal).

23	**b4!**	**♖a8?**

As Aronin has pointed out, stronger was 23 ... ♘c7!.

24	**♖e1+**	**♔d6**

24 ... ♔d8 25 ♖e6 ♖xa7 26 ♖d6+ ♔c7 27 ♖xf6!.

25	**b5**	**♖xa7**

This move loses immediately, but Black's position was already very difficult. White threatened both 26 bxc6 bxc6 27 ♕e6+ ♔c7 28 ♖c1, and 26 b6 ♘xb6 27 ♖b1. If 25 ... ♖he8 then 26 ♖xe8 ♖xe8 27 ♕g3+ ♔d7 28 ♕b8, and on 25 ... ♔c7 there follows 26 ♕g3+ ♔d7 27 b6 ♘xb6 28 ♖b1.

26	**♖e6+**	**♔c7**
27	**♖xf6!**	

Black resigned.

Games like this considerably extend our ideas of what is possible in chess. But the course of

action adopted by White can hardly be viewed from this perspective alone. I can imagine a dispute between an ardent admirer of Tal's play and a sceptic.

—Play of genius! What courage and imagination!

—But was it worth taking a risk when he had such an excellent position already?

—But, as it turned out, White could not have lost at any stage.

—No, but neither did he have a definite win at any stage. All three possible defences on move 17 were sufficient to draw.

—But was there really any guarantee of success if he had allowed events to develop quietly? After all, White was only slightly better.

—At any rate, he could have played on for a win for a long time. But in the game 17 . . . ♔d8 would have led to a draw immediately.

—In the final analysis, Tal won. And the winner is always right!

Although this final conclusion does not seem to me to be inescapable, it is nevertheless an argument to be reckoned with. But still more significant are the opinions expressed on this subject by the first serious investigator of real sacrifices, Rudolf Spielmann.

"The probability of success may be based on more than just an assessment of the position; all sorts of secondary circumstances may be significant. For example, one might take one's opponent's individual weaknesses into account—i.e. play on his psychology; one might make speculative moves when one's opponent is in time-trouble, and thereby seek to obtain an advantage. By taking such considerations into account, one should acknowledge many sacrifices to be correct, even though from an analytical point of view they do not stand up to serious criticism. From this we can see that it is necessary to distinguish between a theoretical and a practical assessment of the correctness of a sacrifice."

In reflecting upon the game we have just examined, we should by no means ignore the consideration that the profound strategist Lajos Portisch feels considerably less confident in double-edged positions overflowing with tactics. By sacrificing his rook, Tal consciously steered the game in a direction which favoured him psychologically and which was unpleasant for his opponent (remember, he stressed this point in his notes). Such 'play on the psychology' is an indispensable element of the game of chess.

Many years later, Yusupov, knowing the Hungarian Grandmaster's vulnerable spot, has constantly sought in all his games against him to make the situation sharper, to create complications. As a result, he has won game after

game against Portisch. Here is one of his 'psychological' victories.

Yusupov-Portisch
Tunis IZ 1985

1	**d4**	**d5**
2	**c4**	**dxc4**
3	**e4**	**♘f6**
4	**e5**	**♘d5**
5	**♗xc4**	**♘b6**
6	**♗b3**	

6 ♗d3 is also possible.

6	**...**	**♘c6**
7	**♘f3**	

Also played here are 7 ♘e2 and 7 ♗e3.

7	**...**	**♗g4**
8	**♗xf7+**	

If he wishes to, White may immediately force a spectacular draw: 8 ♘g5 ♗xd1 9 ♗xf7+ ♔d7 10 ♗e6+ with perpetual check.

8	**...**	**♔xf7**
9	**♘g5+**	**♔e8**
10	**♕xg4**	**♕xd4**

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

Six months prior to this Interzonal, in the game Ftacnik-Spraggett, Wijk aan Zee 1985, White transposed into an equal ending: 11 ♕xd4 ♘xd4 12 ♘a3 e6 13 ♗e3 ♗b4+ 14 ♔f1 ♗e7!. Yusupov preferred a different path—he sacrificed a pawn in an effort to make Portisch face a position of maximum tension.

11	**♕e2!**	

Other players have subsequently played this move on several occasions. But it is always hardest being the first.

11	**...**	**♕xe5**
12	**♗e3**	**♘d5**
13	**♘f3**	**♕f5**
14	**0-0**	**e6**
15	**♘c3!**	**♖d8**

Exchanging on c3 is risky: White wins first one tempo, by attacking the pawn on b7 with the move ♖ab1, and then, by attacking the queen with the rook from the square b5, a second . . . .

A later game, M. Gurevich-Drasko, Vrsac 1985, continued: 15 . . . ♗d6 16 ♘xd5 ♕xd5 17 ♖fd1 ♕f5 18 ♘d4 ♘xd4 19 ♗xd4 ♔e7 20 ♖d3 ♖ad8 21 ♖ad1! ♖hg8 22 g3 with excellent compensation for White's sacrificed pawn.

16	**♖fe1**	

More promising, in Yusupov's opinion, was 16 ♖ac1 or 16 ♘b5. These continuations, it seems, have not yet been encountered in practice.

16 ... ♗e7
17 ♘b5

White prepares not only to occupy the d4-square, but also in some lines to play ♖ac1 followed by ♖xc6. A different plan was adopted in the game Alburt-Gulko, Somerset 1986: 17 ♗d2!? ♘xc3 (17 ... ♔f7 18 ♘e4) 18 ♗xc3 ♔f7 19 ♕c4 ♗f6 20 ♖e3.

17 ... ♘xe3

A logical reply. White is forced to take on e3 with the pawn, after which the rook on e1 is not so strong. Nevertheless, exchanging the strong knight on d5 is arguable—worth considering was 17 ... ♗f6.

18 fxe3

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In looking at this diagram we are confronted with an optical illusion. Black's advantage seems indisputable, but don't forget: he has already been deprived of the right to castle, so Yusupov still has quite good compensation for the sacrificed pawn. Nevertheless, after 18 ... ♗d6 Black's position would have remained quite solid. But here Portisch deviates from the correct path and begins an unsound combination.

18 ... a6?
19 ♘xc7+ ♔d7

On 19 ... ♔f7 strong is 20 ♘d4! ♘xd4 21 exd4 ♗f6 22 ♖f1, and White will take on e6 with his next move.

20 ♘xa6!

Now in the event of 20 ... bxa6 21 ♕xa6 White's attack is unstoppable. For example: 21 ... ♖c8 22 ♕b7+ ♖c7 23 ♖d1+ ♗d6 24 ♖xd6+ ♔xd6 25 ♖d1+, or 21 ... ♖b8 22 ♖ac1, and if 22 ... ♕b5 then 23 ♖xc6!.

20 ... ♖a8
21 ♖ed1+ ♔c8

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

Portisch was reckoning on being able to trap the knight, which seems to have got buried, but the following unforeseen move refutes his plan.

22 b4! ♖xa6

22 ... bxa6 23 ♖ac1 ♔b7 24 ♖xc6, or 22 ... ♕e4 23 ♖c4.

23 b5 ♖a3
24 bxc6

White's attack is now irresistible.

24 ... b6
25 ♖ab1 ♗c5
26 ♖b3 ♖a5
27 ♕c4! ♖xa2
28 ♖xb6 ♗xe3+
29 ♔h1 ♗xb6

No use either was 29 ... ♕d5, in view of 30 ♖b8+! ♔xb8 31 ♕b4+ ♔c7 32 ♕b7+ ♔d6 33 ♕d7+ ♔c5 34 ♖xd5+ exd5 35 ♕e7+ ♔xc6 36 ♕xe3, and White, with an extra knight, must win.

30 ♕xa2 ♔c7
31 ♖d7+! ♔xc6
32 ♕a4+ ♔c5
33 ♘d2!

Black resigned.

Winning in Romantic Style

How does Tal win? It is very simple: he places his pieces in the centre and then sacrifices them somewhere.

David Bronstein

Tal-Larsen

6th game, Candidates match, Bled 1965

1 e4 ♘f6
2 e5 ♘d5
3 d4 d6
4 ♘f3 dxe5
5 ♘xe5 e6
6 ♕f3!

The most energetic response to the opening system chosen by Larsen. As yet, Black has not offered to exchange off the knight on e5 by playing ... ♘d7, so White hurries to make use of its merits. In the event of 6 ... ♘f6 he will rapidly complete development by playing ♗e3, ♘c3 and 0-0-0.

6 ... ♕f6

There is a Russian proverb: "When two people do the same thing, it is not in fact the same thing". The white queen has come out to an active position, whereas the black queen is now vulnerable, since it will immediately come under attack from White's minor pieces.

7 ♕g3 h6

The threat was 8 ♗g5.

8 ♘c3!

And now it is necessary to reckon with 9 ♘e4.

8 ... ♘b4?!

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

I think that better for Black, all the same, was 8 . . . ♘xc3.

9	**♗b5+**	**c6**
10	**♗a4**	**♘d7**

Q. 2.17 Identify all the candidate moves and assess how promising they are.

White has an enormous number of tempting continuations. Which of them did Tal first examine? Well, of course, the combinational one: 11 a3 ♘d5 12 ♘xc6. Black loses after 12 . . . bxc6? 13 ♗xc6 ♘b6 14 ♘b5!, but, unfortunately, White's plan is refuted by 12 . . . ♘xc3! 13 bxc3 (13 ♕xc3 ♘b6 14 ♘b8+ ♔d8) 13 . . . ♘b6 14 ♗b5 ♗d7 (also possible is 14 . . . a6) 15 ♘xa7 ♕d8.

It looks good to play 11 ♗f4!?. Tal did not like the reply 11 . . . ♘d5. But after 12 ♘xd5 exd5 13 0-0 Black experiences serious difficulties. If 13 . . . ♗d6 then 14 ♖ae1 ♗xc5 (14 . . . 0-0 15 ♘xd7) 15 ♗xe5 (also strong is 15 dxe5) 15 . . . ♘xe5 16 ♖xe5+ ♗e6 17 f4. Or 13 . . . ♘xe5 14 ♗xe5 ♕g6 15 ♕f3! (threatening 16 ♕xd5) 15 . . . ♗e6 16 c4 (also possible is 16 ♕b3 b5 17 ♗xb5).

I should also mention the modest move 11 ♗d2, when if 11 . . . ♘xe5 12 dxe5 ♕g6, White plays 13 ♕xg6 with an advantage in the ending.

Tal looked at the tempting plan 11 ♘e4!? ♕f5 12 f3, and then: 12 . . . ♘xe5 13 dxe5 ♗d7 14 a3 ♘d5 15 c4 ♘b6 16 ♗c2 ♕h5. White's position is noticeably better. (I should add that on 12 . . . ♘f6 a strong reply is 13 0-0. In the event of 12 . . . b5, White plays not 13 ♗b3 ♘xe5 14 dxe5 c5 15 a3 ♘c6!, but 13 a3! ♘d5 14 ♗b3 ♘xe5 15 dxe5, intending 16 c3 and 17 ♗c2, or 13 . . . bxa4 14 axb4, with the advantage.)

"I was intending to continue examining this variation when all of a sudden my attention was attracted by the possibility of a piece sacrifice which I played in the game a few moves later. This idea seemed to me very tempting." (Tal). Here it is again, the thinking of a Romantic: a beautiful idea instantly diverts him away from quiet and sound paths.

11	**0-0**	**♘xe5**
12	**dxe5**	**♕g6**
13	**♕f3**	

I suspect that the former World Champion retreated his queen without the slightest hesitation. But his opponent, Bent Larsen, later noted: "I think that Tal acted too much in the Tal style. 13 ♕xg6 would have given White a small but definite advantage—I certainly would have played this". This is another clear illustration of how differences in chessplayers' ways of thinking, their temperament and style of play, can influence the decisions they make over the board!

13 ... ♕f5

13 ... ♘xc2 14 ♗xc6+; 13 ... ♗d7!? 14 ♕e2, intending ♘e4 and c3.

14 ♕e2

This is where the idea which enticed Tal when he was considering his 11th move lies concealed. On 14 ... ♘d5 there follows the beautiful 15 ♘b5!.

14 ... ♗e7

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Q. 2.18 How would you have continued?

The knight sacrifice seemed so enticing to the Rigan Grandmaster that he played it here: 15 a3 ♘d5 16 ♘b5. But this decision was by no means unquestionable.

First, let us pose ourselves the question of whether it would have been possible to obtain an advantage by simpler and more reliable methods. If White could succeed in playing f4, ♘e4, c3 and ♗c2, the position of the enemy queen would be extremely awkward. I do not doubt that during the game Tal wished subconsciously to reply to our question in the negative (the majority of players would have wished quite the opposite), and he quickly convinced himself with the variation 15 f4 0-0 16 ♘e4 b5! 17 ♗b3 c5 18 c3 c4!, when Black's game is quite in order. But White's play may be improved.

There is the interesting idea 15 g4!? ♕g6 16 ♘e4. Most variations lead to positions which are difficult for Black. For example: 16 ... f5 17 exf5 gxf5 18 ♘g3 ♖g8 19 c3 ♘d5 20 f3 and 21 ♗c2, or 16 ... h5 17 g5 f6 (17 ... ♕f5 18 c3 ♘d5 19 f4) 18 exf6 gxf6 19 f4.

However, the move 15 g4 is almost as radical a measure as sacrificing a piece. White weakens the position of his king, and his opponent will surely be able to find some sort of counterplay. Probably he should look to sacrifice a pawn: 15 ... ♕g6 16 ♘e4 b5 (or the same after inserting the moves 16 ... h5 17 g5) 17 ♗b3 c5!? 18 ♕xb5+ ♗d7 19 ♕e2 ♘c6!, intending 20 ... ♘xe5 or 20 ... ♘d4.

There is a much more sound line for White, pointed out by Sergei Dolmatov: 15 f4 0-0 16 a3! ♘d5 17 ♘e4 (threatening 18 c4) 17 ... b5 18 ♗b3, and 18 ... c5 19 c3, followed by ♗c2, is useless for Black. If, however, 16 ... ♘a6 then 17 b4! and it is not clear what Black can do to oppose the plan

of ♘e4, c4 and ♗c2. For example: 17 . . . b5 18 ♗b3 c5 19 ♘xb5 cb 20 c3!, or 18 . . . ♗b7 19 ♘e4 c5 20 ♘g3 ♕g6 21 c3, when the threat of 22 ♗c2 is most unpleasant.

We have come to the conclusion that the sacrifice was not obligatory, as White could have retained an advantage by comparatively simple methods.

15 a3!? ♘d5

15 . . . ♘a6 16 ♘b5! cxb5 17 ♗xb5+ and 18 ♗d3.

16 ♘b5!! cxb5

Black has to take the knight—otherwise White would play ♘d4, c4 and ♗c2.

17 ♕xb5+

Of course, not 17 ♗xb5+? ♔f8 18 ♗d3 ♘f4.

17 . . . ♔d8

18 c4

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The knight can retreat to b6 or f4. In Tal's words: "The main variation of the combination conceived by White was 18 . . . ♘f4 19 ♖d1+ ♔c7 20 ♖d7+ ♗xd7 21 ♕xd7+ ♔b8 22 ♕xe7 ♕xe5 23 ♗e3 ♘g6 (the threat was 24 ♖d1) 24 ♕xf7 ♕f6 25 ♗e8! (this is the point!) 25 . . . ♕e7 (25 . . . ♘e5 26 ♗f4) 26 ♕xg6 ♖xe8 27 ♗c5! ♕d7 28 ♗d6+ ♔c8 29 c5 and the bishop on d6 is noticeably stronger than the rook".

Again we see a long main variation containing a spectacular 'point'. And again it is utterly unconvincing. It's not even a question of 25 . . . ♕xf7 26 ♗xf7 ♘f8 putting up more resistance than 25 . . . ♕e7—this is, as it were, a rather insignificant quibble. More important is that the whole variation turns out to be unnecessary: by playing simply 19 ♕a5+! b6 20 ♕d2+ White regains the piece and remains with a sound extra pawn.

After 18 . . . ♘b6! 19 ♕a5! White also wins back the piece, since it is bad for Black to continue 19 . . . ♗d7 20 ♗e3 ♔c7 21 c5. The variation pointed out by Tal—19 . . . ♔c7! 20 c5 ♔b8 21 cxb6 axb6 22 ♕b5 ♖a5 23 ♕b3—leads to a position, an assessment of which to a considerable extent determines the overall assessment of the piece sacrifice. In the Grandmaster's opinion White retains pretty good attacking chances. I would suggest that Black's chances of organising a successful defence are no worse. Indeed, after 23 . . . ♕xe5 (weaker is 23 . . . ♖xe5 24 ♕g3) the threat

is 24 . . . b5; in the event of 24 ♗d2!? ♖d5 Black for the time being has an extra pawn and control of the central squares. Instead of 23 ♕b3 probably stronger is 23 ♕c4, not giving up the pawn on e5 (23 . . . ♖c5 24 ♕b4). In turn, Black could a little earlier have considered playing 22 . . . ♖d8!?. This is all very unclear.

18 . . . ♕xe5?

"Larsen takes the path of least resistance. He gives back the piece, but the position of his king in the centre gives White an opportunity to launch a decisive attack quite easily, without any significant loss of material" (Tal). It is curious to note the psychological influence of the sacrifice: the Dane has lost faith in his position to such an extent that even afterwards he could not see how he could have defended successfully. He wrote: " . . . after 14 . . . ♗d7 my position would have been satisfactory. The continuation 14 . . . ♗e7? allowed the brilliant move 16 ♘b5!, and after this it was difficult for Black to save the game".

19	**cxd5**	**♗d6**
20	**g3**	**♕xd5**
21	**♕e2**	

To be completely happy White now has only to connect his rooks. The conclusive part of this game is a convincing example of an attack on a king which has got stuck in the centre of the board.

21	**. . .**	**♔e7**
22	**♖d1**	**♕a5**
23	**♕g4**	**♕f5**

In the event of 23 . . . e5 Tal wanted to sacrifice a piece by playing 24 ♕xg7! ♗e6 (or 24 . . . ♕xa4) 25 ♗xh6. And after 23 . . . ♖d8 White would have attacked in the same way: 24 ♕xg7! ♕xa4 25 ♗xh6.

24	**♕c4**	**♕c5**
25	**♕d3**	**♕d5**
26	**♕c3!**	**♗e5**

26 . . . ♕e5 27 ♗f4.

27	**♕e1**	**♕c5**
28	**♗d2**	**♔f6**
29	**♖ac1**	

White has finally got all his pieces into play, and Black's defence quickly falls apart.

29	**. . .**	**♕b6**
30	**♗e3**	**♕a6**
31	**♕b4**	

Threatening 32 ♗b5.

31	**. . .**	**b5**
32	**♗xb5**	**♕b7**
33	**f4**	**♗b8**
34	**♗c6**	

Black resigned.

Thus the sacrifice of a piece was objectively not the best continuation. But what do we mean by the best continuation? Tal played in full accordance with his style, a style which has brought him outstanding sporting and creative success. Incidentally, all his wins in this match against Larsen were achieved as a result of irrational decisions such as this. The out-

come of the match was decided by the final, 10th game, in which Tal also played a problematic knight sacrifice. In assessing his actions, he wrote: "In my opinion everything is quite clear in this situation. White does not need to justify himself, but nevertheless I shall observe for the thousand and first time: years of analysis and minutes of play are not quite the same thing".

Two Attacking Games by Rainer Knaak

When attacking one's opponent, one tries not to convince him but to surprise him.
Saviely Tartakower

The game which we are now going to examine developed for a long time along rather quiet lines. White had the initiative, and Black defended accurately.

Knaak-A. Petrosian
Leipzig 1977

1	**d4**	**d5**
2	**c4**	**e6**
3	**♘c3**	**♗e7**
4	**cxd5**	**exd5**
5	**♗f4**	**c6**
6	**e3**	**♗d6**
7	**♗xd6**	

7 ♗g3 is an interesting alternative.

7	**...**	**♕xd6**
8	**♗d3**	**♘e7**
9	**♕c2**	**♘d7**
10	**♘f3**	**♘f6**
11	**♘e5**	

Another possibility involves an attack by White's pawn minority on the queenside, which is a standard plan in such positions: 11 0-0 0-0 12 ♖ab1 g6 13 b4, as was played (with a slightly different move-order) in the game Gligoric-Portisch, Palma de Mallorca 1967.

11	**...**	**♘g4**
12	**♘xg4**	**♗xg4**
13	**0-0**	**♗h5**

Black wants to simplify the position still further with the move 14 . . . ♗g6.

14	**e4!**	**dxe4**
15	**♘xe4**	**♕xd4**
16	**♘g3**	**♗g4**

After 16 . . . ♗g6? 17 ♗xg6 hxg6 18 ♖fe1 Black's position is not one to be envied. He has to close the e-file by putting his bishop on e6.

17	**♖fe1**	**♗e6**
18	**♗f5**	**0-0-0**

In the event of 18 . . . 0-0 White would obtain an advantage with 19 ♖ad1 ♕f6 20 ♗xe6 fxe6 21 ♖d7.

19	**♗xe6+**	**fxe6**
20	**♖xe6**	**♘d5**
21	**♘f5**	**♕f4**
22	**g3**	**♕c7**
23	**♖ae1**	**g6**

23 . . . ♔b8.

24	**♘d4**	**♔b8**
25	**♖6e5**	**♕b6**
26	**♘e6**	**♘b4**
27	**♕e2**	**♘d3**



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Q. 2.19 Can White continue to play for a win?

Let us first examine the two 'normal' continuations: 28 ♘xd8 ♖xd8! 29 ♖d1 (29 ♖e8 ♘xe1) 29 . . . ♘xe5 30 ♕xe5+ ♔c8 31 ♕e6+ ♔b8; and 28 ♖d1 ♘xe5 29 ♕xe5+ ♔c8.

It is clear that in both cases the position is approximately level and that the game should end in a draw. If such an outcome does not suit White, he now has to immerse himself in this position in order to find a way to make the game sharper, to set his opponent new problems.

There is an extremely original idea here: to allow the capture on e5 and then play a2–a4!, with the threat a4–a5. If Black replies . . . a7–a5 then White will play b2–b4!

Where can White go with the other rook? Clearly not to d1. But neither to b1, as the move b2–b4 would not create the threat of b4xa5, since the white b-pawn would be pinned. So this means either to f1 (in some lines it might be important to have the f2-square defended) or to a1, from where the rook will support the attack.

Knaak played:

28 ♖a1!?

Q. 2.20 Do you think this idea is correct? How can Black best defend?

28 . . . ♘xe5

Bad is 28 . . . ♖d7? or 28 . . . ♖d6? because of 29 ♖d1!, but 28 . . . ♖he8!? deserved serious consideration. However, capturing on e5 is also entirely playable.

29 ♕xe5+ ♔c8

30 a4

After 30 ♘xd8 the position would have been level, but the rook did not retreat to a1 just for that.

In the game A. Petrosian lost his way and played 30 . . . c5?, and after 31 ♖c1 ♕d6 32 ♖xc5+ ♔b8 33 ♘xd8 he remained a pawn down and eventually lost.

To substantiate the soundness of his idea, Knaak quoted the variations 30 . . . ♖he8 31 a5 ♖d5 32 ♕xd5! ♕xb2 (32 . . . cxd5 33 axb6 ♖xe6 34 bxa7) 33 ♕d4!, and 30 . . . a5 31 b4! ♖he8 32 bxa5 ♖d5 33 ♕xd5! cxd5 34 axb6

♖xe6 35 a5 with an extra pawn for White.

Unfortunately, he did not consider the best defence: 30 ... ♖de8! 31 a5 ♕d8.

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White can win back the exchange by means of 32 ♘xd8 ♖xe5 33 ♘f7 or, still more accurately, 32 ♕xh8 ♖xh8 33 ♘xd8 ♖xd8 34 ♖e1. But here he would have had to fight to get a draw, since in the rook ending he stands worse.

Probably Knaak would have played 32 a6!? (this is where the rook on a1 comes in handy!). After 32 ... ♕e7 33 axb7+ ♔xb7 34 ♕d4!? ♔a8 35 ♖a6, or 33 ... ♕xb7 34 ♕d4!? ♕b6 (or 34 ... ♕d7) 35 ♖xa7 the position would remain rather complicated. In the event of 32 ... b6 White could think about 33 ♘xd8 ♖xe5 34 ♘xc6 ♖c5 35 ♘xa7+ ♔b8 36 b4. And on 32 ... b5 it looks not bad to continue 33 ♖c1 ♕d7 34 ♕f6! (with the threat 35 ♘d4) 34 ... ♕d6 35 ♕g7, forcing the black queen to return to d7.

To sum up, the risk which White took in trying to create winning chances was entirely well-founded. It was not excessive: even though we have found a sound defence for Black, we cannot assert that it refutes Knaak's ingenious idea. Over the board, it was not at all easy for his opponent to find his way in the complications that arose, especially if one makes the highly probable assumption (knowing A. Petrosian) that at this point he was already in time-trouble.

However, Knaak most probably did not even think about the risk involved. After all, according to his calculations White obtained an advantage in all variations. Mikhail Tal was totally right when he observed in one of his articles: "A chessplayer only really takes risks when he knows what it is he is risking".

In the following game we shall see again how Rainer Knaak attacks. Interesting here is whether you will agree with the choice he made at the decisive moment.

Knaak-Reeh

Balatonbereny 1987

1	**d4**		**♘f6**
2	**c4**		**e6**
3	**♘c3**		**♗b4**
4	**e3**		**b6**

5 ♘e2 ♗a6
6 ♘g3 0-0
7 e4 ♘c6
8 ♗d3! e5

8 . . . ♘xd4? 9 ♕a4! winning a piece.

9 d5 ♗xc3+

Entirely possible is 9 . . . ♘a5 10 ♕e2 ♗xc3+ 11 bxc3 d6.

10 bxc3 ♘e7
11 ♗g5!

White does not give his opponent time for 11 . . . d6 followed by 12 . . . ♘d7.

11 . . . ♘e8
12 h4! f6
13 ♗e3 c5

On 13 . . . c6 White would probably have played 14 d6!?.

14 h5 ♘d6
15 ♕e2 f5

Black wishes to create counterplay as quickly as he can. On 15 . . . ♕e8 Knaak points out the variation 16 0-0-0 f5 17 exf5 ♘exf5 18 ♘xf5 ♘xf5 19 ♕c2 e4 20 ♗xe4 ♘xe3 21 fxe3 h6 22 d6! with advantage to White.

16 ♗g5! h6

16 . . . ♕e8 17 h6 g6 18 0-0-0.

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

Now White can simply exchange on e7 and then take the pawn on f5. But there is also another, concealed possibility: the sacrifice of a piece with 17 exf5 hxg5 18 h6.

E. 2.1 Having carefully calculated the variations, determine which line offers the best prospects.

Dzhin Attacks!

A keen and dogmatic sense of prudence is the mortal enemy of great deeds.
Michel de Montaigne

Only a few minutes remained before the end of the penultimate, sixteenth round of the tournament. I had already finished my game and was following with enormous interest the battle being fought by one of the tournament leaders, Roman Dzhindzhikhashvili.

Dzhindzhikhashvili-Tseshkovsky
USSR Ch., 1st League, Tbilisi 1974

Q. 2.21 What would you do as White?

It seems that Black has the better chances. The g7-square is securely defended by the knight, while on the other hand the pin on the long diagonal of the rook on f3 is ex-

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

tremely unpleasant, and it is not clear how White can get out of it. On 31 ♖g5 a possible reply is 31 . . . ♖f6!. But Dzhin did not lose his head and found a stunning way to untangle himself—at the cost of giving up the other rook. (Roman's surname is too long, and it is understandable that to all his friends he was simply Dzhin.)

31 ♖xg7!! ♘xg7

32 ♔g1!!

Black cannot take the queen because it would be mate in two: 33 ♘f7+ and 34 ♘h6 mate, and meanwhile the threat is 33 ♘g6+!.

Vitaly Tseshkovsky captured on g7 almost automatically with the knight. If he had had a little more time, he probably would have settled for the sounder 31 . . . ♔xg7! (but, of course, not 31 . . . ♕xg7? 32 ♘g6+ hxg6 33 ♖h3+). Black threatens to block the terrible bishop with the move 32 . . . ♖d4, so Dzhin would have had to force a draw with 32 ♘d7+! ♘d4 33 ♗xd4+ cxd4 34 ♕e5+ ♔g8 35 ♕g5+ ♔f7 36 ♕f6+, as Black cannot play 36 . . . ♔e8?? 37 ♕e6 mate.

32 . . . ♖d4!

The only defence.

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Q. 2.22 And what would you play now as White?

While observing this game I at once noticed that White was able to get a rook ending with an extra pawn, although this is completely drawn: 33 ♘g6+ hxg6 34 ♖h3+ ♘h5 35 ♕xg6 ♕g7 36 ♖xh5+ ♔g8 37 ♕xg7+ ♔xg7 38 ♖xc5 ♖xf4 39 ♖c7+ (39 ♖d5? ♘c6) 39 . . . ♔g6 40 ♗xd4 ♖xd4 41 ♖xa7 ♖xd3. No doubt Dzhin also saw this variation—experienced players perform such calculations instantly—as the moves are actually forced for both sides.

Undoubtedly the temptation to conclude an outstanding contest with a beautiful drawing variation was very strong. But Dzhin is by nature a reckless gambler (and not only at chess!). With both

players in time-trouble he decided to risk playing for a win, despite his material deficit. Remember, Tal took an analogous decision in a similar situation on the 20th move of his game with Portisch that we analysed earlier. On both occasions fortune favoured the brave.

33 ♗xd4!!

The exclamation-marks, as will soon become clear, are not only for courage and the will to win, but also for an accurate assessment of the position.

33 ... cxd4

34 ♕h6

White threatens 35 ♖h3. Despite being a piece ahead, it is not easy for Black to defend—the knight on a7 is too far away from the scene of the action.

34 ... ♔g8?

35 ♖h3 ♘f5

36 ♕e6+ ♔g7

Not 36 ... ♔h8? 37 ♘g6+. On 36 ... ♖f7, strong is 37 ♘xf7 ♕xf7 38 ♕xf7+ ♔xf7 39 ♖xh7+ ♘g7 40 ♖h6 with a clear advantage to White in the endgame. But 37 ♖xh7!! decides the issue more quickly.

37 ♘d7! ♕c8

Bad was 37 ... ♖f7 38 ♖xh7+!, and in the event of 37 ... ♖c8 it is possible at least to take the knight and escape from the checks by running away to h4 with the king.

38 ♘xf8 ♕c1+

Black would have lost once with 38 ... ♕xf8? 39 ♕d7+ or 39 ♖h5, but 38 ... ♔xf8 deserved preference. However, Black would hardly have managed to hold the endgame after 39 ♕xc8+ ♘xc8 40 ♖xh7.

39 ♔g2 ♕d2+

Black could not have saved the game either with 39 ... ♘e3+ 40 ♖xe3! dxe3 41 ♕e7+ ♔g8 42 ♘e6 with inevitable mate, or 40 ... ♕xe3 41 ♕xe3 dxe3 42 ♘e6+ ♔f6 43 ♘d4 with a winning knight ending.

40 ♔g1 ♕d1+

41 ♔f2

The time-control has now been passed and the game was adjourned. Black resigned without resuming.

Having declined the draw on move 33, Dzhin did not have time to calculate variations sensibly; he was guided merely by instinct and a belief in his own good fortune. Afterwards I wanted to find out what this had actually been: an accurate assessment of the playing situation or simply a gamble which succeeded by chance. Careful analysis confirmed that the decision taken by White had been well founded: as it turned out, he was not losing at any time, and his opponent still had a hard job to find a sound defence. This conclusion is definitely not what one would have expected.

A few years later I suggested to

Sergei Dolmatov that we play out this fragment. He found the rook sacrifice on move 31 with some difficulty and then almost without thinking played 33 ♘g6+, forcing the transition to a drawn rook endgame.

I asked Dolmatov why he had not tried to play for a win. "But Black has an extra piece," Sergei replied.

"Then defend yourself, Sir!" I said, and turned the board around.

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

Q. 2.23 What should Black play?

Watch how our 'game' developed.

34 ... ♖c8?!

A natural move, which parries the threat of 35 ♘g6+ and prepares a counter-attack. In fact, White now wins back his piece in all variations and gets real winning chances.

35 f5!

This pawn threatens to advance further, and the queen takes control of the square c1.

35 ... ♕c7

Let us look at the other possibilities:

A. 35 ... ♘c6? 36 ♖h3 ♘xf5 37 ♕f6+ ♔g8 (37 ... ♘g7 38 ♕g6!; 37 ... ♕g7+ 38 ♘g6+! ♔g8 39 ♕e6+) 38 ♕e6+! (38 ♕xf5? ♘xe5) 38 ... ♔h8 (38 ... ♔g7 39 ♕xf5) 39 ♘f7+! and 40 ♕xf5, winning.

B. 35 ... ♘xf5 36 ♖xf5 ♖g8+ (36 ... ♕g7+? 37 ♕xg7+ ♔xg7 38 ♖f7+) 37 ♔f2! ♕g2+ 38 ♔e1 ♕g1+ 39 ♖f1 ♕e3+ 40 ♕xe3 dxe3, and an ending has arisen which is clearly better for White. Possible, for example, is 41 a3!?, preparing 42 ♔e2;

C. 35 ... ♖e8!? 36 ♖h3 ♘xf5 37 ♕f6+ ♕g7+ 38 ♘g6+ ♔g8 39 ♕xf5 ♕f7! (39 ... hxg6? 40 ♕d5+ ♔f8 41 ♖f3+) 40 ♕xf7+ ♔xf7 41 ♘f4 and again White's position is to be preferred.

36	**f6**	**♕c1+**
37	**♖f1!**	**♕xh6**
38	**♘f7+**	**♔g8**
39	**♘xh6+**	**♔f8**
40	**fxg7+**	**♔xg7**
41	**♘f5+**	**♔g6**
42	**♘xd4**	

White has won a pawn. There is no doubt about his advantage.

Thus 34 ... ♖c8?! leads to an inferior ending for Black; and the move chosen by Tseshkovsky, 34 ... ♔g8?, was also unsuccessful. So how can Black defend?

Black should have prevented the advance of the f-pawn. I can-

not see how to refute the odd-looking move 34 . . . ♖f5. After 35 ♖h3 ♘e8 it is useless to play 36 ♕e6 ♕c8, or 36 ♘g6+ ♔g8 37 ♖g3 ♘g7; that only leaves 36 ♖g3 ♘g7 37 ♖h3.

Still stronger is the modest move 34 . . . ♖e8!. In this case White would have had to obtain a draw with 35 ♖h3 ♘f5 (35 . . . ♘e6 36 ♖g3, forcing 36 . . . ♘g7) 36 ♕f6+ ♕g7+ 37 ♘g6+ ♔g8 38 ♕xf5 hg (we saw almost the same position after 34 . . . ♖c8 35 f5 ♖e8, but in that case there was no pawn on f4 and the knight could not be taken) 39 ♕d5+ ♔f8 (39 . . . ♕f7?? 40 ♖h8+!) 40 ♕d6+, after which it is not too difficult to ascertain that the game ends in perpetual check.

The Decisive Game

After all, chess is not just a matter of knowledge and logic!
Alexander Alekhine

Many experts considered the brilliantly talented young grandmaster from Lvov, Vasily Ivanchuk, to be the favourite for the 1991–92 Candidates series to find the next challenger for the world title. And they had very good reasons for thinking so. At the start of 1991 Vasily won the 'Super Tournament' in Linares, Spain, playing with great assurance and finishing ahead of World Champion Gary Kasparov and his historical rival, the former Champion Anatoly Karpov; Ivanchuk appeared in second place in the FIDE Rating List; and in his first Candidates match Ivanchuk had overwhelmed Leonid Yudasin with a score of $4\frac{1}{2}:\frac{1}{2}$.

But the next round, a quarter-final against Artur Yusupov, was a much more tense affair. Having won the second game, Yusupov took the lead, but then he lost the third and fifth games. Ivanchuk kept the lead until the final game, in which, consequently, Artur was obliged to play for a win.

What course of action should a chessplayer adopt if his position in the tournament requires that he definitely has to win (or, on the contrary, to get a draw)? We have already touched upon this problem in the section 'Giving up a pawn to prevent castling'. The events which unfurled at the end of this Candidates match in Brussels give us an excellent opportunity to return again to this theme (as we say in Russian: "Repetition is the mother of learning!"). Here is what Yusupov himself writes on this subject: "In such situations there are two possible strategies: create maximum tension immediately, or sustain the tension over the course of the whole game. I believe that, as a rule, the second strategy promises better chances of success. A

convincing example is the 24th game of the World Championship Match in Seville. I too originally intended to follow this sound principle: do not force events, maintain as many dangerous pieces on the board as possible, and wait for the right moment to proceed to take decisive action."

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Yusupov–Ivanchuk

8th match game, Brussels 1991

1	**d4**	**♘f6**
2	**c4**	**e6**
3	**♘c3**	**♗b4**
4	**e3**	**b6**
5	**♗d3**	**♗b7**
6	**♘f3**	**0-0**
7	**0-0**	**c5**
8	**♗d2**	

More often 8 ♘a4 is played here, but Yusupov does not like to put his knights on the edge of the board.

8	**. . .**	**cxd4**
9	**exd4**	**d5**
10	**cxd5**	**♘xd5**
11	**♖c1?!**	

A new and, apparently, not too successful move. More promising were other possibilities: 11 ♕e2, 11 ♕c2, or even 11 ♘e5!?, intending to meet the rather simple-minded 11 . . . ♘c6? with the typical trick 12 ♗a6!!

11	**. . .**	**♘c6**
12	**♖e1**	**♖c8**

Black can be satisfied with the outcome of the opening. His pieces are placed superbly and have secure control of the central squares. Realising this, and wishing to alter the course of a contest which is not entirely favourable, Yusupov rejects his original intention and launches a desperate attack on his opponent's king.

13 ♖e4!?

A very original manoeuvre—the rook is heading for h4. If 13 . . . ♗e7 then 14 ♖g4 (with the threat of 15 ♗h6) 14 . . . ♘f6 15 ♖h4.

What do you think? Does the attack conceived by White have a great chance of success? Objectively speaking, not really. There is a well-known and important strategic principle: *flank attacks are effective only if the centre is closed.* But here the centre is open, and Black's pieces have open lines for exchanges or for counter-attacking operations.

But things are in fact not quite so simple—the risky decision taken by Yusupov has an import-

ant psychological basis. His opponent is an exceptionally strong player, but at the same time highly emotional and very excitable. When preparing for this match Yusupov noticed that, when coming under attack, Ivanchuk sometimes begins to suffer from nerves, loses his composure and plays below his true strength.

Finally, the unusual and bold plan chosen by White was to a considerable extent a consequence of Yusupov's own emotional state. Having switched on the television on the 19th of August, we found out about the attempted *coup d'état* in our country which had been launched by communist leaders. President Mikhail Gorbachev had been removed from power, and tanks had appeared on the streets of Moscow. Naturally the changes of fortune in the match receded into the background, and Yusupov and I no longer discussed opening subtleties but the latest news from Moscow. On the 20th of August, in the seventh game, Yusupov missed quite a simple win, but he didn't even get particularly upset—he was preoccupied with other matters.

By the evening of the 21st of August we felt an enormous sense of relief, as it had become clear that the *putsch* had failed. And on the following day the decisive eighth game of the match took place. Yusupov was in an ideal frame of mind: he had total inner liberation, a desire to play an interesting, really substantial game, and absolutely no fear of possible failure. The powerful emotional impulse he had received as a result of the happy outcome of the events in Moscow helped Yusupov to come through the end of this match magnificently and to achieve a thoroughly deserved victory over a formidable opponent.

13 ... ♘ce7

14 ♘xd5!

The immediate 14 ♖h4 would be weaker because of 14 ... ♘g6, when White cannot play 15 ♖h3? in view of 15 ... ♘df4! 16 ♗xf4 ♘xf4 17 ♗xh7+ ♔h8 18 ♖h4 ♗xf3.

14 ... ♘xd5

15 ♖h4 g6

With the rook on h4 it looked good to reply 15 ... f5!?, but the move played by Ivanchuk is also entirely possible.

16 ♖xc8 ♕xc8

From a positional point of view there was some point in playing 16 ... ♗xc8 (the black queen keeps the rook on h4 'in its sights'). But in this case White could have immediately begun a combinational attack: 17 ♗xb4! ♘xb4 18 ♕d2 ♘xd3 19 ♕h6! ♖e8 20 ♕xh7+ ♔f8 21 ♕h6+! ♔e7 22 ♕g5+ ♔d6 23 ♕b5 ♕c7 (23 ... g5 24 ♘xg5) 24 h3!?.

17 ♘g5 ♗e7

During the game Yusupov had for some time feared a counter-attack down the c-file: 17 ... ♗xd2 18 ♕xd2 ♕c6 19 ♘xh7 ♖c8. For example, 20 h3 ♕c1+ 21 ♕xc1 ♖xc1+ 22 ♔h2 ♖d1 followed by 23 ... ♖d2. But then he saw that he could maintain the tension with 20 ♗f1! ♕c1 21 ♕e2, and calculated the following variations: 21 ... ♘f4 22 ♕e3 (but not 22 ♘f6+ ♔g7 23 ♕e5 ♕xf1+! 24 ♔xf1 ♖c1+) 22 ... ♗xg2 (nothing is changed by playing 22 ... ♗a6) 23 ♘f6+ ♔g7 (23 ... ♔f8 24 ♖h8+ ♔e7 25 ♖e8+!, or 24 ... ♔g7 25 ♘e8+!) 24 ♘e8+ ♔f8 (24 ... ♔g8 25 ♖h8+!) 25 ♖h8+ ♔e7 26 ♕a3+ ♖c5 27 ♕xa7+ and the black king is mated. If, however, 21 ... ♖c2 (instead of 21 ... ♘f4), then 22 ♕b5 ♗c6 23 ♕a6 ♔g7 24 ♕a3.

18 ♕g4



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In this position Ivanchuk sunk into deep thought for a long time (roughly an hour), and as a result left himself with considerably less time than his opponent. What was he thinking about?

White's attack does not look particularly dangerous. Black has several ways to parry the threats to his king. Not bad is 18 ... ♗xg5 19 ♕xg5 f5, or 18 ... f5 19 ♕e2 (not 19 ♕h3 ♗xg5 20 ♖xh7? ♗xd2) 19 ... ♗xg5. Another defensive plan would be 18 ... ♘f6 19 ♕h3 h5 (also possible is 18 ... h5 at once, not fearing 19 ♖xh5? ♘f6). In all cases Black would retain every chance of a good game.

But Vasily's attention was attracted by a possibility to force events, and he began to calculate.

18 ... ♗a6?!

19 ♕h3

Only perpetual check would have resulted from playing 19 ♖xh7 ♗xg5 20 ♕xg5 ♔xh7 21 ♗xg6+ fxg6 22 ♕h6+ ♔g8 23 ♕xg6+ ♔h8.

19 ... h5

The only move. Of course, Black could not play 19 ... ♗xd3?? 20 ♖xh7 ♗xg5 (20 ... ♗f6 21 ♖h8+; 20 ... ♕c2 21 ♖h8+ ♔g7 22 ♖g8+!) 21 ♗xg5 f6 22 ♕h6. Also dubious is 19 ... ♗xg5?! 20 ♗xg5 h5, in view of 21 ♗xa6 ♕xa6 22 g4! (also possible is 21 g4 at once).

20 ♖xh5!

It was not difficult for Artur to decide to sacrifice his rook, as all

other continuations were clearly inferior. No good was 20 ♗e4? ♕c4, or 20 ♗xa6? ♕xa6 21 g4 ♕e2!, and after the immediate 20 g4 there would have followed 20 ... ♗xd3 21 ♕xd3 ♘b4!? (but not 21 ... ♕d8? 22 ♘xe6!) and then, depending on circumstances, 22 ... ♕c2 or 22 ... ♕d8

20	**...**	**gxh5**
21	**♗h7+!**	**♔g7**
22	**♕xh5**	

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

Apparently this was the position that Ivanchuk had been studying for so long. But this was quite pointless! He should have sensed that the variations were too complicated to be grasped over the board without making a mistake, and this means that it was not even worth trying—the cost of miscalculation was just too high.

In difficult situations it is sometimes necessary to save oneself by plunging into positions like this, balanced on a knife-edge. But here the situation was rather different, as Black really stood quite well.

So why did Ivanchuk spend so long in talking himself into going for complications, and in the end actually convince himself that he should? Was this a consequence of his courage and self-confidence? I think, on the contrary, that it was a sign of psychological weakness. Normal continuations would have given him a normal game, but there would still have been a lot of play left in it—he would have had to struggle on and on. But he didn't want a struggle; he wanted to secure himself a draw as quickly as possible. With his calculations he was hoping to establish that after the sacrifice of the rook White could not give mate but only perpetual check—and this would have signified the immediate end both of the game and of the match. For this reason he immersed himself in a mass of complex variations, and for this reason he finally persuaded himself that everything was in order. Alas, as Tal once wrote: "A combination of sharp play and everyday caution is far from being the best combination in chess".

From a purely analytical point of view the decision taken by Black was entirely correct—his position was as yet by no means lost. But from a practical point of

view it was mistaken—he was simply setting himself too difficult a task. This is a convincing example of how excessive concentration on the necessary result can distort a chessplayer's thinking and prevent his intuition from functioning normally.

Q. 2.24 How should Black defend?

First let us see what happened in the game.

22	**...**	**♘f6?**
23	**♘xe6+!**	**fxe6**
24	**♕h6+**	**♔h8**

Ivanchuk had supposed that White, being a rook and a knight down, was obliged to give perpetual check. But in this match Yusupov had calculated variations better than his young opponent, and he had already found the winning line here long ago, when Black was still considering his move 18 . . . ♗a6.

25	**♗f5+!**	**♔g8**
26	**♕g5+**	**♔h8**
27	**♕h4+**	**♔g8**
28	**♕g5+**	

It makes sense to get nearer to the time-control by repeating moves once or twice and thereby avoid casual errors in time-trouble.

28	**...**	**♔h8**
29	**♕h4+**	**♔g8**
30	**♕g3+**	**♔h8**
31	**♕h3+**	**♔g7**
32	**♕g3+**	**♔h8**
33	**♕h3+**	**♔g7**
34	**♗xe6**	**♕xe6**

Forced.

35	**♕xe6**	**♗d8**

Black is totally bewildered! More stubborn was 35 . . . ♖e8 36 ♗g5 ♗b5.

36	**g4!**	**♖e8**
37	**♕f5**	**♗c4**
38	**g5**	

Black resigned.

Let us return to the position after White's 22nd move. During the game Yusupov feared 22 . . . ♗xg5. The draw arising after 23 ♕xg5+ ♔xh7 did not suit him of course, and after 23 ♗xg5 f6 he did not see how he could develop his attack (for example: 24 ♕g6+ ♔h8 25 ♗h6 ♕c7!, or 25 ♕h6 ♖f7! 26 ♗g6+ ♔e8 27 ♗xf7+ ♔xf7 28 ♕h7+ ♔e8 and the king escapes from the checks).

But the next day John Nunn demonstrated an astonishing possibility:

24	**♗e4!**	**♖h8**

24 . . . f5 25 ♗h6+ ♔f6 26 ♕g5+ ♔f7 27 ♕g7+.

25	**♕g6+**	**♔f8**
26	**♗xd5**	**exd5**

26 . . . fxg5? 27 ♕f6+.

27	**♕xf6+**	**♔g8**
28	**♕g6+**	**♔f8**
29	**♗d2!!**	(*see diagram*)

It would be useless to play 29 h4 because of 29 . . . ♕e8, and on 29 ♗f4 there would follow 29 . . . ♔e7.

29	**...**	**♕c4**

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

29 . . . ♔e7 30 ♗b4+ ♔d8 31 ♕d6+.

30 h3

White threatens 31 a3 or 31 ♗f4. Despite being a rook ahead, Black is defenceless. Amazing!

Let us go back again and examine the counter-punch 22 . . . ♗e2. The straightforward 23 ♕xe2? ♗xg5 24 ♗xg5 ♔xh7 25 ♕h5+ ♔g8 26 ♗h6 leads to defeat—Black repels the threat of mate with 26 . . . ♕c2!. Much stronger is 23 ♘f3! ♘f6 (the only move) 24 ♕h6+ ♔h8 25 ♗b1+ (worse is 25 ♗d3+ ♔g8 26 ♗xe2 ♕c2) 25 . . . ♔g8 26 ♗g5 ♘e4 (in the event of 26 . . . ♖d8, a standard mating routine is decisive: 27 ♗xf6 ♗xf6 28 ♗h7+ ♔h8 29 ♗g6+ ♔g8 30 ♕h7+ and 31 ♕xf7 mate) 27 ♗xe4 f5 28 ♗xe7 ♖f7 (28 . . . fxe4 29 ♗xf8) 29 ♗b7! ♕xb7 30 ♕g6+ ♖g7 31 ♕xe6+ and 32 ♕xe2. With three pawns for the exchange White retains a decisive advantage.

The only way to repel the attack is a move which is very hard to find, 22 . . . ♗b4!!, discovered by John Nunn; White has to reply 23 ♘xf7! ♖xf7 24 ♕h6+ (equality also results after 24 ♗g5 ♕e8!?) 24 . . . ♔h8 25 ♗f5+! ♔g8 26 ♗xe6 ♕c2! 27 ♗xf7+! (27 ♕g5+? ♔f8 28 ♕d8+ ♔g7 29 ♕g5+ ♕g6) 27 . . . ♔xf7 28 ♕h5+ with a probable draw.

Possibly White should continue according to Lautier's recommendation: 26 ♕g6+!? (instead of 26 ♗xe6) 26 . . . ♔h8! (but not 26 . . . ♖g7? 27 ♗xe6+ ♔h8 28 ♕h5+ ♖h7 29 ♕e5+; also unsuccessful is 26 . . . ♔f8? 27 ♗xe6) 27 ♗xe6 ♕g8 28 ♕xf7 ♕xf7 29 ♗xf7 ♗xd2 30 ♗xd5, but after 30 . . . ♗c1 31 b3 ♗b2 the endgame is most probably drawn.

Is it conceivable that anyone could calculate and evaluate such complications accurately when pondering over Black's 18th move? And what would be the point?

The Spectators went wild with Delight

We cannot resist the fascination of a sacrifice, since a passion for sacrifices is part of a chessplayer's nature.

Rudolf Spielmann

So the score in this Candidates Quarter-Final was levelled at the very last moment. According to the regulations, the players now

had to play two additional games with a reduced time-control: 45 minutes for 60 moves, and then 15 minutes each for every 20 moves.

'Quickplay chess' is very popular nowadays. Yusupov is not averse to playing such games from time to time—for amusement or for training purposes. But as a matter of principle he is against employing this form of chess to determine the winner in competitions as important as the World Championship.

Nevertheless, Artur has already on two occasions had to decide the fate of a Candidates match on 'tie-break', to use the language of tennis: against Spraggett (1989) and Dolmatov (1991). In both cases he was successful. This was a new test for him.

Yusupov considered that the match had already ended in a draw, as neither player had managed to demonstrate any superiority. Quickplay chess is merely a form of lottery to decide who is to play in the next round. It has no real meaning and does not determine who is stronger, since it has little in common with serious play, its result being too dependent on chance. Therefore Artur (unlike his opponent) did not experience excessive nervous strain, he was uninhibited and comparatively calm, in a mood to do battle in roughly the same style that he had adopted in the previous game—to attack sharply and decisively!

Ivanchuk–Yusupov

9th match game, Brussels 1991

1	**c4**	**e5**
2	**g3**	**d6**
3	**♗g2**	**g6**
4	**d4**	**♘d7**
5	**♘c3**	**♗g7**
6	**♘f3**	**♘gf6**
7	**0-0**	**0-0**
8	**♕c2**	**♖e8**
9	**♖d1**	**c6**
10	**b3**	**♕e7**

There is no point in discussing the opening moves of this game—they can be found in the *Encyclopaedia of Chess Openings*. What should be noted is the bold choice of opening—I cannot recall Artur ever having played the King's Indian Defence before as Black.

11 ♗a3

Too passive is the continuation analysed in reference books: 11 e3 ♘f8; but worth considering is Seirawan's recommendation: 11 e4!?.

11	**...**	**e4**
12	**♘g5**	**e3**
13	**f4?**	

More cautious is 13 f3.

13	**...**	**♘f8**
14	**b4**	**♗f5**
15	**♕b3**	**h6**
16	**♘f3**	**♘g4**

Black prepares to open lines on the kingside by playing 17 . . . g5.

17 b5 g5!

It would not be difficult to put a stop to White's counterplay on the queenside by retreating the queen to d7 or c7. But then Black's offensive would also be delayed. Yusupov correctly assessed the force of his own attack and decided not to hesitate.

18 bxc6 bxc6

19 ♘e5

Ivanchuk accepts the challenge. More cautious was 19 fxg5 hxg5 20 ♘e5!?.

19 ... gxf4

20 ♘xc6 ♕g5

21 ♗xd6 ♘g6

Weaker, in Yusupov's opinion, was 21 ... ♘xh2 (hoping for 22 ♔xh2 ♕xg3+ 23 ♔h1 ♘g6) because of 22 ♗xf4 ♕h5 23 ♘d5, with the threats 24 ♘ce7+ and 24 ♘xe3.

22 ♘d5

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

A colourful position! The white pieces totally dominate the centre, whereas Black's forces have been concentrated on the kingside. Who has the highest trumps? Well, as we say in Russian: "You can't improve on checkmate!". The white king clearly does not have enough defenders, and the 'nail' driven into White's position—the pawn on e3—prevents White from bringing up reserves for his defence.

Now the simple 22 ... fxg3! 23 ♗xg3 (23 hxg3 ♕h5) 23 ... h5 would have given Black an attack which was probably irresistible. But Yusupov saw a possibility to expose the enemy king totally and immediately with a sharp attack involving the sacrifice of two pieces. He almost did not hesitate—such highly risky play was quite in keeping with his attitude to this game.

22 ... ♕h5

23 h4 ♘xh4!?

Artur rejected 23 ... fxg3 24 ♗xg3 ♘xh4, not wishing to repeat moves after 25 ♘f4 ♕g5 26 ♘h3 ♕h5. The simple retreat 26 ... ♕f6!, which would have maintained an advantage for Black, fell outside his field of vision.

I should note that at this moment a mighty group of grandmasters (Karpov, Korchnoi, Short, M. Gurevich ...) had gathered in the press centre. They all considered the sacrifice that Artur had played to be totally incorrect.

24 gxh4 ♕xh4

25 ♘de7+?

A choice which is hard to

explain. It was clearly more logical to give a check with the knight on c6, keeping the other knight on d5, from where it attacks the pawns on f4 and e3.

25	**...**	**♔h8**
26	**♘xf5**	**♕h2+**
27	**♔f1**	

How can Black now strengthen his offensive? The only chance is to attack with the rook on the g-file, but the routine move 27 ... ♖g8? would be refuted by 28 ♘xe3! ♗xd4 (28 ... ♘xe3+ 29 ♕xe3) 29 ♖xd4 ♘xe3+ 30 ♔e1 ♖xg2 31 ♗e5+ ♔g8 32 ♕d3.

Yusupov found a remarkable combination, allowing him to get at the enemy king nonetheless.

27	**...**	**♖e6!**

While giving the other rook a path to g8, this rook is now heading for g6. But also worthy of serious consideration was 27 ... ♗f6!?, planning not only ... ♖g8 but also ... ♗f6–h4–f2. In the event of 28 ♖d3 Black cannot play 28 ... ♖g8? because of 29 ♖xe3 ♘xe3+ 30 ♘xe3 ♖ae8 31 ♘e5 ♗xe5 32 ♗xe5+ ♖xe5 33 dxe5 fxe5 34 ♕b7, but on the other hand very strong would have been 28 ... ♗h4! 29 ♖xe3 ♗f2 30 ♖xe8+ ♖xe8 31 e4 ♕g1+ 32 ♔e2 ♕xg2.

28	**♕b7**	

Q. 2.25 How should Black continue?

Artur thought for some time, examining variations, and only at this point did the grandmasters in the press centre finally see what was now bound to happen.

28	**...**	**♖g6!!**
29	**♕xa8+**	**♔h7**

Black is a rook and two minor pieces down, but he is even planning a spectacular sacrifice of his queen: 30 ... ♕h1+!! 31 ♗xh1 ♘h2+ 32 ♔e1 ♖g1 mate. On this subject Seirawan later remembered the wise advice of his first chess teacher, Jeffrey Parsons: "Think about what remains on the board, not about what has has been removed from it!".

30	**♕g8+!**	

The only possibility to prolong the resistance. In the event of 30 ♘xe3 ♘xe3+ 31 ♔e1 Black wins easily with either 31 ... ♖xg2 or 31 ... ♘xc4.

30	**...**	**♔xg8**
31	**♘ce7+**	**♔h7**
32	**♘xg6**	**fxg6**
33	**♘xg7**	

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

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Q. 2.26 What should Black play?

Even after the capture of the knight on g7 White still retains a lead in material, but this is not so important—it is clear that the decisive factor in assessing this position is the desperate position of the white king. Black has a wide choice: after 33 . . . ♔xg7 34 ♖db1, possible is 34 . . . h5 (preparing . . . h4–h3) or 34 . . . g5 (intending to shelter the king on h5 and, if necessary, to move it to g3). Also worth considering are both the immediate 33 . . . h5, and the intermediate 33 . . . ♕g3(h4) 34 ♔g1. All these possibilities were being actively discussed in the press centre, but Yusupov played quite differently.

33 . . . ♘f2!!

Now everything is clear: White has no satisfactory defence against 34 . . . ♘h3 (or 34 . . . ♘e4). An excellent example of how important it is to concentrate immediately on identifying all one's 'candidate moves'!

34 ♗xf4 ♕xf4
35 ♘e6

Also hopeless is 35 ♖db1 ♘h3+ 36 ♔e1 ♕h4+ 37 ♔d1 ♕xd4+ 38 ♔c2 ♕xc4+ 39 ♔b2 ♕xe2+.

35 . . . ♕h2
36 ♖db1 ♘h3
37 ♖b7+

More stubborn was 37 ♔e1 ♕xg2 38 ♔d1.

37 . . . ♔h8
38 ♖b8+ ♕xb8
39 ♗xh3 ♕g3

White resigned.

"It amused the audience"—Artur observed calmly in response to my congratulations after the game had finished. Yes, the spectators were indeed wild with delight, and not only ordinary chess-lovers but also grandmasters who had seen a thing or two. How often do we see at the decisive moments of matches at the highest level such liberated, courageous and, finally, simply beautiful play? 'A Close Look at a Great Game', was how Yasser Seirawan entitled his annotations in the magazine *Inside Chess*. And John Nunn in the *British Chess Magazine* even compared it with the masterpiece of the 19th century—the 'Immortal' game Anderssen-Kieseritzky.

So what was the cause of Yusupov's rather ironic reference to what had happened? The point is that he does not value external effects in chess nearly so much as the depth and objective correct-

ness of the decisions he takes. But depth and correctness are fundamentally incompatible with a reduced time-limit, as there is no opportunity to calculate variations accurately.

Black's attack set his opponent rather difficult problems, given his shortage of time. So, what does it matter whether or not it was correct or whether it was really necessary to get involved in such a risky undertaking? For a serious game such an approach would indeed be totally unsound, since the probability that one's opponent will find a refutation is considerably greater.

Analysing quickplay games profoundly is a rather senseless occupation, but on this occasion it is perhaps worth making an exception. Let us return once more to some of the crucial moments in this battle.

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

The unfortunate move 13 f4? opened the sluice-gates for Black's attack, based on the terrible strength of the pawn on e3. ("The next time you invite your opponent to move his pawn to e3, you must be sure that you will be able to destroy it!"—Seirawan.)

Many experts considered that by playing 13 f3!, followed by ♘ge4, White would have obtained an advantage. Yusupov does not agree with this assessment. Here is his variation:13 ... ♘f8 14 ♘ge4 (14 ♘ce4 ♗f5 15 ♕c3 ♘xe4 16 ♘xe4 c5) 14 ... ♗f5 15 ♕c1 ♗xe4 16 ♘xe4 ♘xe4 17 fxe4 c5 18 e5 ♘e6! 19 exd6 ♕xd6 20 ♗xb7 (20 dxc5!? ♕c7) 20 ... ♘xd4! with excellent counterplay.

Instead of 16 ♘xe4, White can try 16 fxe4!? ♘g4 17 e5. The game Schulz-Jackelen, Porz 1990, continued: 17 ... ♕g5 18 ♗xd6 ♕h6 19 h3 ♘f2 20 ♘e4! ♘xd1 21 ♕xd1 ♘d7 22 ♕f1 ♗f8 23 c5, and White obtained a clear advantage. But not everything here was forced by any means. Black can try, for example, 17 ... f5!? 18 ♗xd6 ♕g5. While the pawn on e3 is still alive Black can hope to organise a counter-attack.

We already know that the sacrifice of two pieces was not objectively the strongest continuation. But the question is: could White have refuted it and won? Let us examine the position which would have arisen after 25 ♘ce7+! (instead of 25 ♘de7+?) 25 ... ♔h8 26 ♘xf5 ♕h2+ 27 ♔f1.

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

The pawn on f4 is *en prise*, so Black has no time for moves like 27 . . . ♖e6 or 27 . . . ♖g8. But his resources are by no means exhausted. He has the brilliant move 27 . . . ♗e5!!, which covers the pawn on f4 and vacates the g-file. (With a knight on c6 this move would not have been possible—does this perhaps explain Ivanchuk's choice?)

Q. 2.27 How should White continue?

Seirawan gives convincing analysis of this position in his annotations. He considers three main moves: 28 ♗xe5+, 28 dxe5 and 28 ♕b7.

A. 28 ♗xe5+ ♖xe5 29 dxe5 ♖g8. An already familiar threat has been created: 30 . . . ♕h1+!!. After 30 ♘dxe3 fxe3 31 ♘xe3 ♕f4+ 32 ♔e1 ♘xe3 it is not too difficult to establish that Black maintains a decisive attack. The only chance of salvation is offered by the ingenious defence suggested by Christiansen: 30 ♘g7!!, when if 30 . . . ♖xg7 then 31 ♕b8+ ♖g8 32 ♕xg8+ ♔xg8 33 ♘f6+ ♘xf6 34 exf6.

B. 28 ♕b7 ♗xd6 (but not 28 . . . ♖g8? in view of 29 ♗xe5+ ♘xe5 30 ♘dxe3) 30 ♘xd6 (risky is 30 ♘f6 ♘xf6 31 ♘xd6 ♕h4 32 ♕f3 ♘g4, or 32 ♘xf7+ ♔g8 33 ♘xh6+ ♕xh6) 30 . . . ♕h4 31 ♘xf7+ ♔g8, and a draw after 32 ♔g1 ♕f2+ seems to be perhaps the right result.

C. 28 dxe5!. It turns out that after 28 . . . ♖g8 White parries the threat of the queen sacrifice with 29 ♘dxe3! fxe3 (29 . . . ♘xe3+ 30 ♘xe3 fxe3 31 ♕b7) 30 e6!. No better is 28 . . . f3 29 exf3 e2+ 30 ♔xe2 ♕xg2+ 31 ♔d3.

So, Black's attack could actually have been refuted, but it was not easy to find the correct defence even after analysis.

But now let us see what would have happened in the game after 25 ♘de7+? ♔h8 26 ♘xf5 ♕h2+ 27 ♔f1 ♖e6! Instead of 28 ♕b7 White could try 28 ♘ce7!?, attempting to prevent the rook from reaching the g-file.

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

Q. 2.28 How should the attack be continued?

Not 28 . . . ♖xd6? 29 ♘xd6, in view of the threat to the black king: 30 ♘xf7+ ♔h7 31 ♕d3 mate. Also bad is 28 . . . ♗f6? 29 ♕b7.

A drawing variation is 28 . . . ♖xe7 29 ♘xe7 (dangerous is 29 ♗xe7 f3 30 exf3 e2+ 31 ♔xe2 ♕xg2+ 32 ♔d3 ♕xf3+) 29 . . . ♕g3 30 ♔g1.

But, as Seirawan pointed out, Black can play much more forcefully: 28 . . . ♖g8!!. What can White do now? If 29 ♘xg8 then 29 . . . ♖g6 (threatening 30 . . . ♕h1+!!) 30 ♘xe3 ♘xe3+ 31 ♔e1 (31 ♕xe3 ♕xg2+ 32 ♔e1 fxe3) 31 . . . ♖xg2 32 ♕d3 ♘f1! with the fatal threats 33 . . . ♕h4+ and 33 . . . ♘g3. On 29 ♕d3 strong is 29 . . . ♗f8 (of course, not 29 . . . ♗f6? 30 ♘xg8) 30 ♘xg8 ♖g6 31 ♘xe3 ♘xe3+ 32 ♔e1 ♗xd6. After 29 ♕b7, besides 29 . . . ♗f8 Black may also play 29 . . . ♗xd4. Little is changed by playing 29 ♕b2 ♗f8 30 d5+ ♔h7 31 ♘xg8 ♖g6, since after 32 ♘f6+ ♘xf6 33 ♘xe3 ♗xd6 the attack is irresistible.

In the tenth game the roles were reversed. Now it was Ivanchuk who had to win at any cost, while Artur would have been entirely happy with a draw. Let us see how he got this draw since this game too had many adventures!

Yusupov–Ivanchuk

10th match game, Brussels 1991

1	**d4**	**♘f6**
2	**c4**	**e6**
3	**♘c3!**	

Usually Yusupov plays 3 ♘f3, steering towards the Queen's Indian Defence. But for this Candidates match he had prepared the Nimzo-Indian Defence, and he adopted it successfully—he won two games and drew two.

The Nimzo-Indian Defence usually leads to a complicated, double-edged struggle. The move 3 ♘f3 is a little quieter, and so the temptation to play it was strong. Of course, this would not have been a 'mistake'. But if White were subsequently to choose only accurate moves instead of the most challenging, the initiative might imperceptibly pass to his opponent. A cautious frame of mind as a rule leads to passive play and consequently does not reduce the danger of defeat but, on the contrary, only increases it. Realising this, Yusupov decided to go flat out for a win, without a thought for the significance of the result of this game.

3	**. . .**	**♗b4**
4	**e3**	**c5**
5	**♗d3**	**♘c6**
6	**♘f3**	**♗xc3+**
7	**bxc3**	**d6**

This opening formation (in the spirit of Nimzowitsch) was intro-

duced into modern tournament practice by Grandmaster Robert Hübner at the Interzonal tournament in Palma de Mallorca in 1970. Ivanchuk's choice of this variation was entirely well-founded from a psychological point of view, as it leads to non-standard positions, and the slightest inaccuracy from White usually allows Black to blockade the white bishops safely and proceed to exploit the pawn weaknesses.

8	**0-0**	**e5**
9	**♕c2?!**	

Here it is, an inaccuracy! If White wished to accomplish the manoeuvre ♘f3-g5-e4 he should have done this at once.

9	**...**	**0-0**
10	**♘g5**	**h6**
11	**♘e4**	**b6**
12	**♘xf6+**	**♕xf6**
13	**♗e4**	**♗b7**
14	**dxc5**	**dxc5**
15	**♗d5**	**♘a5**
16	**e4**	

The plan of occupying the d5-square with the bishop was found in the 1930s by Botvinnik, but in this situation it does not give White anything.

16	**...**	**♕g6**
17	**f4**	**♗xd5?**

An unfortunate exchange. Much stronger was 17 ... exf4 18 ♗xf4 ♖ad8, intending 19 ... ♗xd5 20 cxd5 ♖xd5, or 19 ... ♗a6. This position (after a different move-order) arose in the game Sande-Csom, played at the Malta Olympiad in 1980.

18	**cxd5**	**exf4**
19	**♗xf4**	**♖ae8**
20	**♖ae1**	**♘c4**
21	**♕e2**	**♘e5**
22	**♗g3**	

It would appear that it was possible to simplify the position by means of 22 ♕a6 ♖e7 23 ♗xe5 ♖xe5 24 ♕xa7 ♖xe4 25 ♖xe4 ♕xe4 26 ♕xb6. But such straightforward playing for a draw is not in Artur's nature. Besides, he had noted in reply to 22 ♕a6?! the unpleasant counter 22 ... f5!. On 23 exf5 there follows 23 ... ♘f3+! 24 ♔f2 ♕g4! (weaker is 24 ... ♕xf5 25 ♖xe8 ♖xe8 26 ♔xf3 ♖e4 27 g3) 25 ♖xe8 ♖xe8, when it is bad to continue 26 ♕a4? ♖e2+! 27 ♔xe2 ♘d4+ 28 ♔d2 ♕xg2+, winning.

Now White plans 23 ♖f5, and if 23 ... f6 then after an exchange on e5 a pawn structure arises which is good for White and which, more importantly, is absolutely safe—the defended passed pawn on d5 insures him against any surprises.

22	**...**	**♕d6!**

Ivanchuk skilfully hinders his opponent's plans. On 23 ♖f5, there follows not 23 ... f6? 24 ♕h5! (24 ... g6? 25 ♗xe5), but 23 ... g6, and only then 24 ... f6.

23	**♕h5**	**♕e7!**

Black prepares 24 ... ♘d3 fol-



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lowed by 25 . . . c4, when the powerful knight on d3 will make it difficult for White to manoeuvre and will lay the ground for a counter-attack or the transition to a favourable ending. White may prevent this plan by simply retreating his queen to e2. But, again, this is not Artur's style. He chooses the most testing continuation, after which the position suddenly becomes more complicated.

24	**♖f5!?**	**♘d3**
25	**♖e3**	**c4**
26	**d6**	**♕e6**
27	**♖d5**	

Q. 2.29 What do you think of the move 27 . . . f5?

By playing this, Black would have fallen into the trap set by his opponent: 28 ♖xf5! ♖xf5 29 ♕xf5 ♕xf5 30 exf5 ♖xe3 31 d7, and the pawn promotes.

27	**. . .**	**♖d8!**
28	**h3!**	

We are familiar with this idea from the section 'Don't let your king get in the way of a combination!'.

Since White cannot for the time being undertake anything specific, he should improve the position of his king while he can.

28	**. . .**	**♖d7**
29	**♔h2**	**a6**
30	**a4**	**♖e8**

Ivanchuk in turn sets a cunning trap. It seems that White can win with 31 ♖exd3 cxd3 32 ♖e5 ♕xe5 33 ♗xe5 g6 (33 . . . d2 34 ♗f4) 34 ♕g4. But the intermediate 31 . . . g6! 32 ♕xh6 cxd3 changes the picture—after 33 ♖e5 ♕xe5 34 ♗xe5 ♖xe5 Black has the advantage. Probably stronger is 33 ♖d4 (instead of 33 ♖e5), intending to take the pawn on d3 with the queen, but then there follows 33 . . . ♕b3 (or 33 . . . ♕a2 34 ♕e3 ♕e2! 35 ♖xd3 ♕xe3) 34 ♕e3 (34 ♕d2 ♕c2) 34 . . . ♕xc3 35 ♖xd3 ♕c5(c6), and White's compensation for the sacrificed exchange appears to be inadequate.

All the same, it seems to me that on positional grounds it would have been better for Black to put his rook not on e8 but on c8.

31 ♖d4

Intending 32 ♖f3.

31 . . . f5?!

Psychologically, Ivanchuk's wish to make the game sharper is entirely understandable, but the

complications do not turn out in his favour.



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Q. 2.30 What should White do?

As John Nunn pointed out, White could have decided the outcome of this struggle with 32 ♖xc4 g6 (32 . . . ♕xc4 33 ♕xe8+) 33 ♕xh6 ♕xc4 34 ♕xg6+ ♔f8. Now from the point of view of bringing the match to a close the simplest is 35 ♖xd3 ♕xd3 36 ♕f6+ (but not 36 ♗f4 ♖g7 37 ♗h6 ♕xc3, with the threat 38 . . . ♕e5+) 36 . . . ♔g8 37 ♕g6+, forcing perpetual check. But objectively stronger is 35 ♖f3! ♖f7 (35 . . . f4 36 ♗xf4 ♘xf4 37 ♖xf4+ ♖f7 38 ♖g4) 36 exf5 (threatening 37 ♕h6+ ♔g8 38 ♗e5) 36 . . . ♖g7 37 ♕h6 ♔g8 38 f6, and Black is defenceless.

32 ♖exd3?!

The conditions of 'quickplay chess' have begun to tell! Yusupov confessed after the game that he had kept a careful eye on the undermining move . . . f7–f5, having quite a good reply in mind. When his opponent actually played this move, Yusupov quickly made the move he had already planned, without any further examination (of course he had very little time).

32 . . . cxd3
33 exf5 ♕e2

33 . . . ♕f7? 34 ♕f3 with a clear advantage to White.

34 ♕g6 ♖e4!

Now White would lose with 35 ♖xe4? ♕xe4 36 ♕e6+ ♕xe6 37 fxe6 ♖xd6 38 ♗xd6 d2. The Grandmasters who had gathered in the press centre thought that it was necessary to play 35 ♖d5 d2 36 f6, after which there would follow 36 . . . ♖e6!, when the position rather favours Black. Yusupov found a different possibility.

35 ♗f4!

The bishop comes to join the battle against the passed pawn. But in playing this White has to reckon with 35 . . . ♖xf4!? 36 ♖xf4 d2.

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Q. 2.31 What should White do?

He cannot, of course, play 37 f6?, in view of 37 . . . ♕e5! (but not 37 . . . d1(♕)? 38 f7+ ♔f8 39 ♕h7 or 39 ♕xg7+ with a draw). Tempting is 37 ♖d4 ♕e5+ 38 ♔h1 (bad is 38 ♕g3 ♕xd4 39 cd d1(♕) 40 ♕e5 ♕h5) 38 . . . ♖f7 (38 . . . ♕xd4 39 ♕e8+) 39 ♕g4, obtaining a draw, since 39 . . . ♖xf5? is refuted by 40 ♕xf5! ♕xf5 41 d7 ♕f1+ 42 ♔h2 ♕f4+ 43 ♕xf4 d1(♕) 44 ♖d4. But by choosing 38 . . . ♔f8! (instead of 38 . . . ♖f7) 39 ♕e6 (39 ♕g4 ♖xd6) 39 . . . ♕xd4 40 cxd4 d1(♕)+ 41 ♔h2 ♕xa4, Black wins.

White can only get a draw by playing 37 ♕e6+! ♕xe6 38 fxe6 d1(♕) (38 . . . ♖xd6 39 e7 ♖e6 40 ♖d4) 39 e7!!.

Having used up virtually all his time on the calculation of combinations, Ivanchuk chooses a different path, but here too his opponent had a surprise in store for him.

35 . . . ♖f7!?

Now the threat is 36 . . . ♖xf4, and on 36 d7? there follows simply 36 . . . ♖xd4 37 cxd4 ♖xd7.

36 ♗e5!

By covering the e-file, White prepares to advance his passed pawn. On 36 . . . ♖xe5 there also follows 37 d7. As we shall see, the powerful move found by Yusupov was associated with a temporary rook sacrifice, but in the last few games this had already become a habit of his.

It was also possible to prepare the advance of the d-pawn with 36 ♖d5!?. Then, probably, the result would also have been a draw: 36 . . . ♕f1 (worse is 36 . . . ♖e8 37 d7 ♖d8 38 ♕e6) 37 ♗e5 ♖xe5 38 ♖xe5 d2 39 ♖e8+ ♖f8 40 ♕e6+ ♔h7 41 ♕g6+.

36 . . . ♖xd4
37 cxd4 d2
38 d7 ♕xe5+!
39 dxe5 d1(♕)
40 e6 ♕d6+

Bad is 40 . . . ♖f8? 41 f6! (also possible is 41 e7) 41 . . . ♕d6+ 42 ♕g3, and White wins.

41 ♕g3!

It would be a mistake to play 41 ♔h1? ♖f8 42 f6 ♖xf6 43 ♕e8+ ♔h7, when the threat is 44 . . . ♖f1 mate.

41 . . . ♖xd7!
42 exd7 ♕xd7
43 f6 b5
44 axb5 axb5
45 fxg7 ♕xg7
46 ♕b3+

The queen ending is, of course, drawn, but Ivanchuk had only a couple of seconds remaining on his clock (and he still had 15 moves to make before the time-control). Artur offered a draw, but in reply his opponent . . . resigned and immediately left the playing hall. The judges were confused.

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

"How did the game end?"—the arbiter asked Yusupov.

"It was drawn."

"But I heard him resign!"

"It isn't important. I offered a draw, and the position is in fact drawn"—the Grandmaster replied.

As a result, a peaceful outcome of this extremely tense fight was agreed, and Yusupov reached the Semi-Finals of the World Championship Candidates tournament for the third time in succession.

"Of course, I could have played on until my opponent's flag fell, but why spoil an interesting game with senseless moves in time-trouble?"—Artur explained to me later.

A Chink in the Armour

The main resource for a defending side—presence of mind—was fully exploited by my opponent. At one point I was forced to interrupt my calculation of variations and ask myself, who is attacking whom?

David Bronstein

Almost all the attacks which we have analysed in this chapter, although extremely dangerous, nonetheless did not lead to a forced win and could have been repelled. The fact that they were eventually successful does not testify to the superiority of the sword over armour in general, but merely that this was the case in the particular games examined. It would not be difficult to select examples where the outcome was quite the opposite.

What advice can be given to the defending side? First, do not lose your composure in a dangerous situation—maintain your presence of mind, believe in the hidden resources of your position. Pay close attention to your opponent's attacking possibilities and calculate variations accurately. Make use of typical defensive methods, such as returning extra material at an appropriate moment, simplifying the position, or deflecting enemy pieces from the attack by means of counter-threats.

Dorfman–Dolmatov
Rostov-on-Don 1980

1	**c4**	**c6**
2	**d4**	**d5**
3	**♘f3**	**♘f6**

4	**♘c3**	**e6**
5	**e3**	**♘bd7**
6	**♕c2**	**♗d6**
7	**e4**	**dxe4**
8	**♘xe4**	**♘xe4**
9	**♕xe4**	**c5**
10	**♗g5**	

10 ♗d2!?.

10 ... ♘f6?!

Subsequent practice has demonstrated safer ways of playing this position:

A. Seirawan-Yusupov, Toluca IZ 1982: 10 ... ♕a5+ 11 ♗d2 ♕c7 12 ♗c3 (in the event of 12 ♕g4 Artur planned a positional exchange sacrifice: 12 ... 0-0!? 13 ♗h6 g6 14 ♗xf8 ♕a5+ 15 ♘d2 ♗xf8) 12 ... ♘f6 13 ♕h4 cxd4 14 ♕xd4 (or 14 ♘xd4 a6 with chances for both sides) 14 ... 0-0 15 ♖d1 ♖d8 16 ♗d3 e5! 17 ♕h4 (17 ♘xe5? ♖e8) 17 ... h6 18 0-0 ♗g4 and Black equalised.

B. Gorelov-Kishnev, Moscow 1984: 10 ... ♗e7 11 ♗xe7 ♕a5+! (after 11 ... ♕xe7 12 0-0-0 White has the freer game) 12 ♘d2 ♔xe7 13 0-0-0 ♖d8! 14 ♕xh7 ♘f6 15 ♕xg7 ♖xd4 16 ♕g5 ♗d7! with an excellent game for Black.

11 ♕h4 cxd4

12 0-0-0!

In the event of 12 ♕xd4 ♗b4+ the game would be level. Not wishing to allow this, Dorfman sacrifices a pawn. His opponent accepts the challenge.

12 ... e5!

13 ♗d3

Harmless would be 13 ♘xe5 ♗xe5 14 ♖e1 ♕a5 (the rook is attacked) 15 f4 ♘g4.

13 ... h6?!

Black prepares to castle, but now his position becomes really perilous. In Dolmatov's opinion he should have urgently initiated counterplay with 13 ... ♗e6 14 ♖he1 b5!?, or even 13 ... b5!? at once. The king may hide on f8 if need be.

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How can White now exploit his indisputable lead in development? Master P. Kondratiev recommends 14 ♘xe5! and gives two variations: 14 ... ♗xe5 15 ♖he1 0-0 16 ♖xe5 hxg5 17 ♖xg5 with irresistible threats; 14 ... 0-0 15 ♗xh6! (I should note here that also the simple 15 ♗xf6 or 15 ♗f4 maintains an advantage for White) 15 ... gxh6 (15 ... ♗xe5 16 ♗xg7 ♔xg7 17 ♕g5+ ♔h8 18 ♕xe5 ♖e8 19 ♕f4) 16 ♕xh6 ♖e8 (16 ... ♗e6 17 ♗c2!) 17 ♕g5+ ♔f8 18 ♘xf7 ♔xf7 19 ♗g6+ ♔f8 20 ♗xe8 ♔xe8 21 ♖xd4 and White has the advantage.

The relatively best defence is provided by 14 . . . ♗xe5 15 ♖he1 ♕e7 (too dangerous is 14 . . . ♔d7?! 15 ♖xe5 hxg5) 16 f4 (worthy of consideration is 16 ♔b1!?) 16 . . . ♗xf4+ 17 ♗xf4 (17 ♕xf4 ♗e6 18 ♗xf6 ♕xf6 19 ♕xf6 gxf6 with an acceptable position for Black) 17 . . . ♗e6. For example: 18 ♗e5 ♘g4 19 ♕xe7+ ♔xe7 20 ♗xd4 ♘xh2!?. White, of course, has the initiative, but the outcome is still unclear.

However, the piece sacrifice undertaken by Dorfman also looks very tempting. The next stage of the game may be considered as an excellent exercise for playing out—Black will need to find a series of moves, each of which is the only one really playable.

14 ♖he1 0-0
15 ♗xh6 gxh6
16 ♕xh6 ♖e8!

Black defends the pawn on e5 and vacates the f8-square for the king or the bishop. The incorrect 16 . . . ♗g4? would be refuted most quickly by 17 ♖e4!, as mate is inevitable after 17 . . . ♘xe4 18 ♗xe4.

17 ♘g5 ♗e6!

Anything else would lose. For example: 17 . . . ♗f8? 18 ♗h7+, or 17 . . . e4? 18 ♘xe4 ♖xe4 (18 . . . ♘xe4 19 ♖xe4 with irresistible threats) 19 ♕g5+! ♔f8 20 ♖xe4. This means that Black has simply to defend the f7-square and wait patiently to see what his opponent will do.

18 ♗h7+ ♘xh7

A lost position would arise after 18 . . . ♔h8? 19 ♗f5+ ♔g8 20 ♗xe6 ♖xe6 21 ♘xe6 fxe6 22 ♖d3, and if 22 . . . e4 then 23 ♖xe4!.

19 ♕xh7+

Also worth considering was 19 ♘xh7 ♗e7 (19 . . . f5?? 20 ♕g6+ ♔h8 21 ♘f6) 20 ♖d3 (weaker is 20 ♖xe5 ♕c7!, when Black gets counter-threats). But after 20 . . . ♗f5 21 ♖g3+ ♗g6 22 ♖xg6+ fxg6 23 ♕xg6+ ♔h8 24 ♕h6 ♔g8 White has only a draw, since the attempt to continue the attack with 25 ♖e4?! would come up against the strong reply 25 . . . ♕c8! 26 b3 ♕f5.

19 . . . ♔f8
20 ♕h6+

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Q. 2.32 Where should the king retreat?

In the event of 20 . . . ♔g8 White cannot of course play 21 ♖xd4?

exd4 22 ♖xe6 because of 22 . . . ♗f4+; also unsuccessful would be 21 ♖d3? ♕c8 22 ♖g3 ♕xc4+ 23 ♔d1 ♗g4+!!. But very strong is 21 ♖e4!, with the threat 22 ♖h4, and White maintains a dangerous attack. An interesting variation is given by Kondratiev: 21 . . . ♕c8 22 ♔b1 ♕xc4 23 b3 ♕c3 24 ♘xe6 ♖xe6 25 ♖g4+ ♖g6 26 ♖xg6+ fxg6 27 ♕xg6+ ♔h8 28 ♕xd6 with advantage to White.

By giving back his extra piece, Dolmatov makes use of a convenient opportunity to force the transition to an ending.

20	**. . .**	**♔e7!**
21	**♘xe6**	**♗h8!**

Of course, not 21 . . . fxe6?? 22 ♕g7 mate.

22	**♘xd8**	

Forced.

22	**. . .**	**♖xh6**
23	**♘xb7**	**♔d7!**

The only defence against the threat of 24 ♖xd4. Now, though, Black wishes to take the pawn on h2, and on 24 h3 there follows 24 . . . ♖g8 25 ♖g1 ♗b4 26 a3 ♖b6 27 axb4 ♖xb7 28 b5 ♖c8.

24	**♘xd6**	**♔xd6**

A highly instructive situation has arisen. White has two extra pawns, but all Black's pieces are very active, and his central pawns may become dangerous. If now 25 h3 then 25 . . . ♖g8 26 f4 (26 ♖g1 ♔c5 27 b3 e4) 26 . . . f6 27 ♖d2 ♖g3! and White's lead in material cannot make itself felt at all. So Dorman sensibly decides to force a draw.

25	**f4**	**f6**
26	**g4**	**♖xh2**
27	**♖d2**	

27 g5 ♖b8!.

27	**. . .**	**♖h4!**

In the event of an exchange of rooks White would achieve the breakthrough g4–g5.

28	**♖e4**	**♖g8**
29	**♖de2**	

29 g5 ♖xf4.

29	**. . .**	**♖gxg4**
30	**fxe5+**	**fxe5**
31	**♖xe5**	**d3!**
32	**♖d5+**	**♔c6**

$\frac{1}{2}-\frac{1}{2}$

A game well played by both sides and an excellent example of cool-headed and accurate defence.

In the rest of this book we shall not dwell particularly on defending against mating attacks but shall proceed to examine defensive problems in general and, more precisely, the psychological aspects of defending.

The Psychology of Defence

I have included in this book many of my own games. Some authors explain away such a procedure by claiming they understand their own games best and therefore they can best serve as didactic

examples. My reason is more simple—vanity.
Raymond Keene, Flank Openings

Defence is just as integral and important a part of chess as attack. If one player has an advantage, this means that the other player has to defend an inferior position. You will by no means be on the stronger side every time, so you simply cannot do without defensive skills.

The basic principle of defence consists in making the opponent's task as complicated as possible, creating ever new obstacles in his path. But this is too general a formulation. Let us consider by what means we can make our opponent's life more complicated.

First, of course, there are the pure chess methods. By evaluating the position soberly and carefully calculating the variations, we shall find the moves that are objectively best, most stubborn. With their aid we shall probably rescue an inferior position if it is in fact possible to rescue it, or in the extreme case we shall prolong the struggle, forcing our opponent to overcome bitter resistance.

But sometimes much greater effect can be obtained by playing on your opponent's psychology. *If you can succeed in abruptly changing the situation on the board (even by choosing a continuation which is objectively not the strongest, associated with a degree of risk), your opponent, having already envisaged a particular pattern of play, will frequently not manage to reorganise his thoughts and will begin to make mistakes.*

The nature of the game may be changed in various ways. For example, when defending against an attack on your king it sometimes makes sense to force the transition into an endgame, even if this is not particularly favourable for you. Or, by sacrificing material, to put an end to the attack by compelling your opponent to switch from attack to defence for some time. It can be useful to make an unfavourable position suddenly sharper, to compel your opponent, who had planned on quietly exploiting his advantage, to occupy himself with the calculation of concrete variations and the search for the correct moves. To do this, you sometimes have to be prepared either to sacrifice material or, on the contrary, to capture something, even at the risk of exposing yourself to a fearful attack in return. Finally, the overall pattern of play can also be changed by moves which are crucial in a strategic sense, associated with definite positional concessions.

Sometimes it is practically impossible to draw a dividing-line between pure chess decisions and those related to the psychology of

chess. In striving for an abrupt change in the nature of the contest, we sometimes find a continuation which turns out to be correct not only from a psychological point of view but also objectively. But this distinction is not particularly important. In all the examples which we are going to examine, the main feature is a psychological determination to bring about a sudden change in the course of a game which is not going well; whether or not the solutions found are actually entirely correct is only a secondary consideration. As you accumulate more experience of practical play you will learn to determine the degree of permissible risk, which very much depends on how bad your initial position is.

Most of the episodes quoted below have been taken from my own games. In the opening I very often did not choose the best plan and quickly came up against difficulties. Rather against my will I was forced to learn how to extricate myself from dubious situations, to work out, so to speak, an 'escape technique'.

Let us begin with an ending which vividly illustrates not only the motifs which can force a player to alter the course of a game abruptly, but also the difference between an 'objective' and a 'psychological' solution to a position.

Dvoretsky–Khachaturov
Moscow 1972

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

Q. 2.33 How would you assess this position (Black to move)?

I presumed that the game would end at once with repetition: 23 . . . ♖c2 24 ♖f2 ♖c1+ 25 ♖f1 ♖c2. However, Khachaturov played 23 . . . d5!.

In order to be able to organise a successful defence, it is very important to become aware in good time of impending danger, to realise that your position is inferior and requires well thought-out defensive operations. Lots of games which should really not have been lost at all have been totally ruined by frivolous and unjustified optimism.

After the move played by my opponent I fortunately sensed immediately that I stood worse. Black intends to play 24 . . . ♗d6 (tying the rook down to the defence of the pawn on f4) and only then 25 . . . ♖c2. The activity

of the rook will allow him either to win a pawn or, by attacking the bishop on d4, to begin to advance his passed d-pawn. The white knight cannot really leave the g3-square for the time being, since it would be bad to allow the enemy knight to come to f5. That knight may, on the other hand, jump to g4 in some lines, as for example in the variations 24 ♖b1 ♖c2 25 ♖b2 ♖c1+ 26 ♔f2 ♘g4+, or 24 ♖d1 ♖c2 25 ♗e3? ♘g4.

Over the board I could not find a sound defensive plan and, having realised that 'vague' play may lead move by move to disaster, made up my mind after twenty minutes' thought to play a rather risky pawn sacrifice.

Meanwhile, however, there was also a more 'normal' plan (and also quite concrete). It was possible to play 24 ♖d1!?, not fearing the line 24 . . . ♗d6 25 ♗e3, as I would have the threats 26 ♖xd5 and 26 ♖c1. I was worried about the reply 24 . . . ♖c2, but then there could have followed 25 ♘f1!! ♘f5 (25 . . . ♖xa2 26 ♘e3) 26 ♘e3 ♘xd4 27 ♘xc2 (but not 27 ♖xd4? ♖c1+ 28 ♖d1 ♗c5!, or 28 ♔f2 ♗c5 29 ♖xd5? ♖c3) 27 . . . ♘xc2 28 ♖xd5, when my rook is certainly no weaker than my opponent's two minor pieces. Probably more unpleasant for White after 24 ♖d1 is the quiet move 24 . . . ♔f7!?

24 h3!? ♗d6

25 ♗e3!

In the event of the passive 25 ♖f2 ♖c1+ 26 ♔h2 ♖d1, or 25 ♖f3 ♖c2 26 a4 ♖d2, Black can either advance his d-pawn immediately, or first bring his king closer to the centre. This was the sort of unfavourable turn of events that I had firmly resolved to avoid.

25 . . . ♖c3

The threat was 26 ♖c1 with full equality; on 25 . . . ♖c2 there would have followed 26 ♖c1 ♖xa2 27 ♖c6.

26 ♔f2! ♖c2+

Quite safe for White would be 26 . . . d4 27 ♗xd4 ♖xg3 28 ♔xg3 ♘f5+ 29 ♔f3 ♘xd4+ 30 ♔e4.

27 ♔f3 ♖xa2

28 ♖c1

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This was the position that White had been aiming for. His king has come out towards the centre and strengthened the weak pawn on f4; his rook has occupied the open file and now intends to infiltrate Black's position.

Was the plan of defence (or, more accurately, of counter-attack) that I had conceived correct? I am not sure. A pawn is a pawn, and besides, Black may in some lines get a dangerous passed a-pawn after winning the pawn on b3. But in any case White is not yet doomed to passivity, since he has obtained real counterplay. One should also take into account the psychological effect of the operation carried out by White. His opponent does not know that the pawn was in fact sacrificed—he probably thinks that he won it quite normally and that the rest is now just a simple matter of technique. As a result, instead of the full mobilisation of forces which is required at a moment like this, the reverse picture can be seen. His concentration is weakened, his sense of awareness is dulled, and mistakes—as practice has shown—become almost inevitable.

28 ... ♖b2?

It was only possible to fight for the initiative by playing 28 ... ♖a3! 29 ♖c6 ♗b4 30 ♔f2 a5!. White has quite a few active resources: ♘h5, ♖c7, ♖c8+ followed by ♖c7+, f4–f5, but it remains unclear whether these would have been sufficient to save the game.

29	**♖c6**	**♗b4**
30	**♖xa6**	**♖xb3**
31	**♔f2**	**♗e1+?!**

After this move a draw is inevitable. But also after 31 ... d4!? 32 ♗xd4 ♖xg3 33 ... ♔xg3 ♘f5+ 34 ♔f3 ♘xd4+ 35 ♔e4, White, so it seems to me, should not lose. I once rescued a similar position in an ending against Romanishin (it is examined in *Secrets of Chess Training* Chapter 2).

32	**♔xe1**	**♖xe3+**
33	**♔f2**	**♖b3**
34	**♖d6**	**♖b5**

34 ... ♖xg3? 35 ♖d8+.

35	**♖d7**	**♘f7**

35 ... ♔f8 36 ♔f3, and Black is unable to strengthen his position.

36	**♘f5**	

White threatens at least 37 ♖xd5; and not 36 ... ♔f8? 37 ♖xf7+. So Black reconciles himself to a draw.

36	**...**	**♖b2+**
37	**♔f3**	**♖b3+**
38	**♔f2**	**½–½**

A desire to force events, to change and, if at all possible, to clarify a situation to your advantage, very often helps you to find the correct solution in a dubious position, but by no means always.

Marshall–Rubinstein
Lodz 1908

1	**d4**	**d5**
2	**c4**	**e6**
3	**♘c3**	**c5**
4	**cxd5**	**exd5**
5	**♘f3**	**♘f6**

More accurate is 5 . . . ♘c6, in order not to allow White's next move.

6 ♗g5!? ♗e7

According to modern theory, preferable is 6 . . . ♗e6 7 e4 dxe4 8 ♘xe4 cxd4 9 ♗b5+ ♗d7 10 0-0 ♗e7 11 ♗xf6 ♗xb5 12 ♗xe7 ♕xe7 13 ♖e1 0-0, as in the game D. Gurevich–I. Ivanov, New York 1983, but here too Black stands worse.

7 dxc5 ♗e6
8 ♖c1 0-0
9 ♗xf6 ♗xf6
10 e3 ♕a5
11 a3?!

White could have maintained an advantage by playing 11 ♕d2 ♘c6 12 ♘d4, when on 12 . . . ♕xc5 there would follow 13 ♘e4.

11 . . . ♘c6

11 . . . ♕xc5? 12 ♘b5 and 13 ♘c7.

12 ♗d3 ♕xc5
13 h4!?

True to his aggressive style, Marshall begins an attack on the king. This plan for White is highly questionable—indeed, *with an open centre, flank attacks do not usually have any chance of success.* However, after the quiet 13 0-0 ♕e7 Black would have retained a fine position, and the pawn sacrifice 13 ♘e4 ♕a5+ 14 b4 ♕xa3 15 ♘xf6+ gxf6 is hardly correct.

13 . . . ♕e7
14 ♘g5

White cannot play 14 ♗xh7+? ♔xh7 15 ♘g5+ in view of 15 . . . ♔g8 16 ♕h5 ♗f5.

14 . . . h6
15 ♘xe6 fxe6
16 ♗b1

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

Q. 2.34 How should Black continue?

The threat of 16 ♕d3(c2) is very unpleasant. *In a middlegame with opposite-coloured bishops it is very important to seize the initiative at any cost, to force your opponent onto the defensive*, so Rubinstein is completely right in initiating a counter-attack involving the sacrifice of a piece.

16 . . . ♗xh4!
17 g3

Marshall has to accept the challenge. He would achieve nothing with 17 0-0 ♗f6 18 ♕d3 g5.

17 . . . ♗xg3!
18 fxg3 ♕g5
19 ♕d3

White also has his threats. The great strategist Akiba Rubinstein did not feel too sure of himself in

double-edged situations like this. It is not surprising that he deviates from the correct path and quickly loses a game in which he had stood well: 19 . . . ♕xg3+? 20 ♔d2 ♖f2+? 21 ♘e2 ♘e5 22 ♕h7+ ♔f7 23 ♖c7+ ♔f6 24 ♖xh6+! Black resigned.

Instead of the mistaken 19 . . . ♕xg3+?, Marshall recommended 19 . . . ♘e5 20 ♕h7+ ♔f7 21 ♖f1+ ♔e7. Yusupov, however, rightly noted that there is no point in giving a check with the rook—stronger is 21 ♘e2! (with the threat of 22 ♖c7+) 21 . . . ♖ac8 22 ♖xc8 ♖xc8 23 0-0+ ♔e7 24 ♖f4, when the compensation for the piece may turn out to be inadequate.

In one of our lessons Artur and I played out the position arising after White's 16th move. He, as did Rubinstein, sacrificed the bishop, but on his 19th move Artur chose a much stronger continuation:

19	**. . .**	**♖f5!**
20	**♘e2**	**♘e5**
21	**♕b3**	**♖f3**

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

Q. 2.35 Calculate 22 ♕xb7.

I saw the objectively correct move 22 ♖c3!, but did not want to play it, as after 22 . . . ♖af8 the game is still very tense and White will again have to calculate variations and choose the best defence. As in the previous example, I attempted to find a more definite and forced line, which would change the situation on the board, and very soon I persuaded myself that I had found it.

22	**♕xb7?**	**♖af8**
23	**♖c8**	**♕xe3**
24	**♖xf8+**	**♖xf8**
25	**♖f1**	

I was hoping to get a completely equal game after 25 . . . ♘f3+ 26 ♖xf3 ♕xf3 27 ♔d2!. This idea is not a bad 'escape-plan': by giving back the extra material White abruptly changes the character of the game—he has simplified the position, liquidated his opponent's attack (in such situations the knight can protect the king securely), and is himself counting on exploiting the vulnerability of the pawns on a7 and e6. Alas, Yusupov's reply came as a very unpleasant surprise for me.

25	**. . .**	**♖xf1+!**
26	**♔xf1**	**♕f3+**
27	**♔g1**	

Also hopeless was 27 ♔e1 ♕h1+ 28 ♔d2 ♘c4+ 29 ♔c2 ♕e4+.

27	**. . .**	**♕xe2**
28	**♕b8+**	**♔f7**

29 ♕xa7+

29 ♕c7+ ♔e8 30 ♕b8+ ♔e7 31 ♕c7+ ♘d7.

29 ... ♔f6
30 ♕f2+ ♕xf2+
31 ♔xf2 ♘c4

The final touch—Black captures one of the queenside pawns and with two extra pawns will win without particular difficulty.

The conclusion is clear: *when initiating a forced operation to rescue an inferior position, you should examine the variations most carefully. The strategic risk in such cases is entirely permissible, but it is important to avoid tactical 'holes'. Your opponent should not be able to find an easy way to refute your plan.*

Dvoretsky–Balashov
USSR Ch., Premier League, Leningrad 1974

1 e4 c5
2 ♘f3 e6
3 c3 ♘f6
4 e5 ♘d5
5 d4 cxd4
6 cxd4 ♘c6
7 a3

The same opening system as in the game Dvoretsky-Schmidt, which we examined in the section 'Giving up a pawn to prevent castling'.

7 ... d6
8 ♗d3 ♗d7
9 0-0 dxe5
10 dxe5 ♗e7

White has a good position. He should choose one of two roughly equally attractive plans: 11 ♗d2 and 12 ♘c3; or 11 ♖e1 0-0 12 ♕e2, intending 13 ♕e4 g6 14 ♗h6 ♖e8 15 ♕g4. Instead he plays a careless move, overlooking his opponent's simple reply.

11 ♕e2? ♘a5!



E. 2.2 What would you do to counter the obvious threat of 12 ... ♘b3?

Into the Eye of the Storm!

It is not happiness which he seeks
Nor happiness which he flees!
Mikhail Lermontov

One of the manifestations of the intuition in chess, in addition to, say, combinational vision or positional flair, is a sense of danger. Authors of chess books and articles devote regrettably little space to such problems of a general

nature and prefer to deal with more accessible and tangible matters—opening or endgame theory, concrete variations, annotations to games etc. In this book I am trying to fill this gap to some extent.

Let us imagine a number of standard situations in which a player may be saved by a sense of danger.

Your opponent makes an outwardly harmless move, but you, suspecting something is wrong, puzzle out the trick which was being prepared and successfully render it harmless.

You discover an idea which is very tempting, but there is also something about it that you do not like, and, having looked more closely, you find the hidden refutation. But, not wishing to lose too much time, you might perhaps not even find the refutation, but will reject it immediately merely on the basis of a feeling that it will not turn out well.

You have calculated complicated variations, but a sense of danger compels you to re-examine your calculations and prompts you to find exactly where the error lies.

It would be useful on the basis of concrete examples to analyse each of the cases mentioned above, and also a few others on the same theme, but within the confines of a single book it is not possible to 'embrace the unembraceable'. Therefore we shall restrict ourselves merely to the careful examination of a situation, discussion of which was begun above—namely where an understanding of the unfavourable nature of his or her position compels a chessplayer to take firm measures without fearing the risk. The earlier you sense such danger the more varied will be the possibilities available to you to change the course of the game.

Dvoretsky–Taimanov
USSR Ch., Premier League, Leningrad 1974

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

This position seems approximately equal. But let us give some thought to what each player is able to undertake.

Black's plan is clear: he is going to play ... ♕c7, put his rook on d8, and then drive the knight away from the c4-square by playing ... a7–a6 and ... b6–b5,

obtaining an advantage in space. And here there is no obvious counterplay for White; if he does not think of anything, his position will get steadily worse.

Having become conscious of the danger just in time, I gladly made use of my first opportunity to complicate the game.

13 a5! b5

There would be no point at all in Black's destroying his own pawn chain: 13 ... bxa5?! 14 ♘fe5, or 13 ... ♘xa5?! 14 ♘xa5 bxa5 15 ♕a4 (also possible is 15 ♘e5).

14 a6 ♗c8

If 14 ... bxc4 then 15 dxc4!. After 14 ... ♗a8 15 ♘ce5 play would have developed more quietly than in the game, but Taimanov prefers to go immediately for the pawn which has buried itself at a6. I assumed, however, that even if I lost this pawn I would get sufficient tactical counter-chances in return.

15 ♘fe5!

Weaker was 15 ♘ce5?! because of 15 ... ♖b6!.

15 ... ♘xe5
16 ♘xe5 ♖b6
17 ♗d2!

It is clear that White cannot do without the move c3-c4, but right now this would be premature: 17 c4 bxc4 18 dxc4 ♘b4! with advantage to Black. It is first necessary to take control of the important square b4.

17 ... ♗f6!

Black would lose after 17 ... ♖xa6? 18 ♖xa6 ♗xa6 19 ♘c6 and 20 ♗xd5. An unclear position arises after either 17 ... ♗xa6 18 c4 ♘b4 (18 ... bxc4? 19 ♗a5) 19 ♗xb4 cxb4 20 cxb5 (20 ♘c6 ♕e8) 20 ... ♗xb5 21 ♖xa7, or 17 ... ♕c7 18 c4 ♘b4 19 ♗xb4 cxb4 20 cxb5. And on 17 ... ♗d6, I had intended 18 c4 ♗xe5 19 ♖xe5 ♕d6 20 ♖g5!, having an exchange sacrifice in mind: 20 ... f6 21 ♖xg7+! ♔xg7 22 cxd5 exd5 23 ♕h5, or 20 ... h6 21 ♖xg7+! ♔xg7 22 ♕h5!.

18 ♘g4!

Weaker was 18 c4 ♘b4 19 ♗xb4 cxb4, when the pressure exerted along the diagonal a1–h8 by the menacing bishop on f6 secures Black the advantage.

18 ... ♖xa6
19 ♖xa6 ♗xa6
20 ♕a1 ♕b6
21 ♘xf6+ ♘xf6
22 b4!?

It would not be good to play 22 ♗e3?, in view of 22 ... ♘g4, but entirely possible was 22 ♕a3!?. I rejected this move because of 22 ... b4 23 cxb4 cxb4 24 ♗xb4 ♖c8 with the positional threats 25 ... ♘g4 and 25 ... ♗b7, but then 25 d4! would be very strong. It is better for Black to give back the pawn at once: 22 ... ♗b7.

22 ... cxb4
23 ♗e3 ♕d6
24 ♗f4

Not 24 cxb4 ♕xb4! 25 ♖c1 ♕a4!.

24 ... ♕b6
25 ♗e3

Neither player can avoid repeating moves. In the event of 25 cxb5?!, unpleasant for White would be 25 ... ♘g4!, followed by ... ♗b7.

25 ... ♕d6
26 ♗f4 ♕b6
27 ♗e3 ♕d6
28 ♗f4 ♕b6
$\frac{1}{2}-\frac{1}{2}$

Shamkovich–Dvoretsky
Viljandi 1972

202
B



Here the strategic danger threatening me is both more obvious and much more serious than in the previous example. By moving his f-pawn to f5, and, if he can manage it, then to f6, White will develop a fearful attack on my king. By any means possible I must make it difficult for my opponent to carry out this plan.

15 ... ♕d7
16 ♘f5!

Shamkovich has easily puzzled out his first little task: the hasty 16 f4? would have allowed Black to halt the white pawns by playing 16 ... f5!. So White makes the move ... f7–f5 physically impossible and intends to play 17 f4 followed by 18 ♘xe7+ ♕xe7 19 f5. In search of a way out of this awkward position, Black decided to weaken his kingside.

16 ... g6!?
17 ♘h6+

The Grandmaster is playing for an attack and so does not wish to exchange pieces. But also worth considering was 17 ♘xe7+ ♕xe7 18 ♗h6 ♖fe8 19 g4!, preparing to move the f-pawn and not allowing ... f7–f5.

17 ... ♔h8

17 ... ♔g7? 18 ♘g4!.

18 ♖e1

Q. 2.36 What should Black do now?

White's last move—not entirely logical at first sight (the rook on f1 would have supported the advance of the f-pawn)—was played for a very specific reason. Now the threat is 19 ♘xf7+ ♖xf7 20 e6; and 18 ... f5? 19 e6 is bad for Black.

18 ... ♖ae8!

A drowning man clutches at straws! In a difficult situation it is essential to look for and utilise all

the hidden possibilities which might at least somehow alleviate one's position. Black wishes to retreat his bishop and play f7–f5 nonetheless. On 19 ♘xf7+ ♖xf7 20 e6 he had prepared the reply 20 ... ♗h4!, since after 21 ♗g5! ♖xe6 22 ♗xh4 Black's position is entirely acceptable.

19	**♗f4**	**♗h4!?**
20	**g3**	**♗d8**
21	**♘g4**	

21 g4!?

21	**...**	**h5**

Black cannot permit 22 ♗h6.

22	**♘f6?**	

Having become carried away by his attack, White makes serious positional concessions. The modest 22 ♘f2 would have maintained better chances for him.

22	**...**	**♗xf6**
23	**exf6**	**♘c4**
24	**♗e5**	**c6**
25	**♔g2**	**♕f5!**
26	**♕e2**	**♖e6**
27	**g4**	**♕g5**
28	**h4?!**	**♕xh4**
29	**f4**	**♖fe8**
30	**♖h1?**	

This move, which had been prepared in advance, is associated with a rather simple miscalculation. But also after 30 ♕f3 hxg4 31 ♕g3 ♕h3+! 32 ♔f2 (32 ♕xh3+ gxh3+ 33 ♔xh3 ♔h7 followed by ... ♖h8) 32 ... ♘d2 33 ♕xh3+ gxh3 34 ♖h1 ♘e4+ and 35 ... ♘xf6 Black has repelled the attack.

30	**...**	**♕xg4+**
31	**♕xg4**	**♘e3+**

Intermediate checks like this one quite often fall outside one's field of vision when calculating variations.

32	**♔f3**	

32 ♔g3 ♘xg4 33 f5 ♖xe5 34 dxe5 ♖xe5 35 fxg6 fxg6.

32	**...**	**♘xg4**

Black subsequently converted his extra material into victory.

Let us return to the position which arose after Black's 17th move. The continuation 18 ♖e1, chosen by Shamkovich, did not achieve its aim because of the strong reply 18 ... ♖ae8!, and so it can hardly be considered the strongest. Worthy of preference was at least the simple 18 f4 f5 19 exf6 ♗xf6 20 f5. Also tempting is the developing move **18 ♗f4!?**, associated with a beautiful combinational idea.

203
B



Q. 2.37 How should Black defend?

White plans ♖ae1 (creating the

already familiar threat of ♘xf7+), and then g2–g4, ♗g3 (or ♗c1) and, finally, f3–f4–f5. Black would very much like to take advantage of a convenient opportunity to play 18 . . . f5 (this move, as you see, was the leitmotif of the whole game), but this would be followed by an explosive breakthrough: 19 e6! ♕xe6 20 ♖ae1 ♕d7 21 ♖xe7! ♕xe7 22 ♗e5+.

Is this so dreadful? Of course it is. But grave consequences would also await Black if events were to unfold quietly. *In such cases it is already too late to be afraid. You should examine the combination conceived by your opponent most carefully, in search of the slightest thing to latch onto. And if you can succeed in finding something, you should go boldly forward into the eye of the storm:*

18	**. . .**	**f5!**
19	**e6!**	**♕xe6**
20	**♖ae1**	**♕d7**
21	**♖xe7!**	**♕xe7**
22	**♗e5+**	**♖f6**
23	**♘g4!**	

23 g4?! ♘c4 24 g5 ♘xe5 would not pose any danger for Black.

23	**. . .**	**fxg4**
24	**fxg4**	**♔g8!?**

Also possible is 24 . . . ♖f8 25 ♖xf6 (25 g5?? ♕xe5!) 25 . . . ♖xf6 26 g5 ♔g8 27 gxf6 ♕e6 with a slightly inferior but, clearly, entirely defensible position.

25 ♖xf6

Now the tempting 25 . . . ♘c4 would unfortunately be refuted by 26 ♖xg6+! hxg6 27 ♕xg6+ ♔f8 28 ♕h6+, and White will soon win back the rook, retaining his extra pawns. Black has to limit himself to the modest 25 . . . ♖d8. There is no obvious way for White to turn the activity of his pieces into anything more substantial, and this means that the consequences of his combination were not too clear and it was indeed necessary for Black to continue fearlessly with 18 . . . f5!.

Rashkovsky–Dvoretsky
USSR Ch., 1st League, Odessa 1974

1	**d4**	**♘f6**
2	**c4**	**g6**
3	**♘c3**	**♗g7**
4	**e4**	**d6**
5	**♘f3**	**0-0**
6	**♗e2**	**e5**
7	**0-0**	**♘bd7**
8	**♖e1**	**c6**
9	**♗f1**	**a5**
10	**h3?!**	**♖e8?!**

Stronger is 10 . . . exd4 11 ♘xd4 ♖e8, followed by . . . ♘c5. Usually in such cases White defends the pawn on e4 with the move f2–f3, but then his pawn on h3 would look rather silly.

Instead of thinking for myself, I began, unfortunately, to repeat the moves of a game played a year earlier (Rashkovsky–

Tukmakov, Moscow 1973) in which Black obtained equality without much trouble.

11	**dxe5**	**dxe5**
12	**♘a4**	**♗f8**

12 . . . ♕e7.

13	**♗g5**	**h6**
14	**♗e3!?**	

But here is the improvement that Rashkovsky had prepared. In the game mentioned above there had followed: 14 ♗h4 ♕c7 15 ♗xf6 (15 c5 ♘h5) 15 . . . ♘xf6 16 c5 ♗e6 with equality.



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B

Q. 2.38 Is it possible to take the pawn on e4?

To be honest, I hardly even considered capturing the pawn, first fearing the moves ♘b6 or ♗b6, but mainly not wishing to get involved in forced variations undoubtedly studied by my opponent during analysis at home.

Later I recollected a similar episode, from the fourth game of the Candidates match Tal–Larsen (Bled 1965). After 1 e4 ♘f6 2 e5 ♘d5 3 d4 d6 4 ♘f3 de 5 ♘xe5 the Dane quickly played 5 . . . ♘d7?! and Tal (imagine—Tal of all people!) did not risk sacrificing the knight for precisely the same reason—fearing what his opponent had worked out at home. Meanwhile, 6 ♘xf7! ♔xf7 7 ♕h5+ ♔e6 8 c4 or 8 g3 would have guaranteed White an advantage.

14	**. . .**	**♕c7?**

I still had not sensed the strategic perils of my position and was hoping to neutralise White's obvious threat, 15 ♕c2 followed by 16 c5, by simple means.

15	**♕c2**	**b6**
16	**c5!**	**b5**
17	**♘b6**	**♖b8**
18	**♘xc8!**	

Black was only expecting 18 a4, after which he would have had a choice between 18 . . . ♗a6 and 18 . . . ♘xc5 19 ♘xc8 ♘fxe4.

18	**. . .**	**♖exc8**
19	**a4**	**♘h5**
20	**♖ec1!**	

The knight cannot now manage to reach e6, since it has to defend against 21 axb5 cxb5 22 c6. Much weaker was 20 g3, in view of 20 . . . ♘g7!.

20	**. . .**	**bxa4?!**

Better was 20 . . . b4 but, here too, White's advantage is obvious.

21	**♖xa4**	**♘f4**
22	**♖ca1**	

And Black remained a pawn

down, since it is bad to play 22 . . . ♕b7 (or 22 . . . ♖a8) 23 b4.

If I had foreseen on my 14th move what awaited me after the quiet 14 . . . ♕c7?, then it is possible that I would nevertheless have considered capturing the pawn on e4. In dubious positions there is some point in going for complications:

14 . . . ♘xe4!?
15 ♗b6

15 ♘b6 ♖b8 or 15 . . . ♖a6 16 c5 ♖a7.

15 . . . ♘xb6
16 ♕xd8 ♖xd8
17 ♘xb6 ♖a6
18 c5!

18 ♘xc8 ♘c5! would only lead to equality.

18 . . . ♗xc5!

In the event of 18 . . . ♘xc5 19 ♗xa6 ♘xa6 Black's compensation for the loss of the exchange is clearly inadequate. Another losing line is 18 . . . ♗f5 19 ♗xa6 ♗xc5 20 ♖xe4 ♗xe4 21 ♘a4.

205
W



It would have been entirely possible to calculate up to this point, since play was forced. The wild position which has now arisen, in which several pieces are under attack at the same time, cannot be subjected to either assessment or calculation—only to scrupulous analysis. White has to choose between 19 ♗xa6 and 19 ♘xc8.

A.

19 ♗xa6 ♗xf2+
20 ♔f1

After 20 ♔h2 ♗xb6 Black may in some lines take advantage of the position of the white king on the diagonal h2–b8. And on 20 ♔h1 not bad is 20 . . . ♘g3+ 21 ♔h2 ♗xb6.

20 . . . ♗xb6!
21 ♖xe4 bxa6
22 ♘xe5

Black's strong bishops guarantee him good compensation for the loss of the exchange. It is true that the pawn on c6 is attacked and that Black has some difficulties in completing his development (22 . . . ♖d2? 23 ♘c4; 22 . . . ♗e6? 23 ♘xg6). But he does have the entirely sound continuations 22 . . . ♗f5 or 22 . . . ♔g7.

B.

19 ♘xc8 ♗xf2+
20 ♔h2

If 20 ♔h1 then 20 . . . ♘g3+ 21 ♔h2 ♘xf1+ 22 ♖xf1 ♗c5, and Black wins the piece back.

20 ... ♗g3+

Probably also possible is 20 . . . ♗xe1 21 ♖xe1 b5. For example: 22 ♘e7+ ♔f8 23 ♘xg6+ fxg6 24 ♖xe4 ♖d1 25 ♗e2 ♖b1.

21 ♔h1

21 ♔g1 ♗f2+ with repetition.

21 ... ♗xe1

It looks tempting to continue with 21 . . . ♘f2+ 22 ♔g1 b5, but White plays 23 ♘e7+ ♔f8 24 ♘xe5 and Black will not be able to win the piece back. 22 ♗xa6 (22 ♖xe1 ♘g3+ and 23 . . . ♘xf1) 22 . . . bxa6!?. Also worth considering was 22 . . . ♗g3!? 23 ♗xb7 ♘c5 (weaker is 23 . . . ♖d7 24 ♗a6) 24 ♘e7+ ♔f8 25 ♘xc6 ♖d7 26 ♗a8 ed with good compensation for the piece, since White's pieces are disconnected and the e-pawn is dangerous.

23	**♖xe1**	**♘f2+**
24	**♔g1**	**♘d3**
25	**♘e7+**	**♔f8**
26	**♘xc6**	**♖d6**
27	**♘cxe5**	

27 ♖e3? ♖xc6 28 ♖xd3 e4.

27 ... ♘xe1

28 ♘xe1 ♖d2(d1)

The endgame is most probably drawn.

So, it was entirely possible to take the pawn. For a long time I considered that Black was able to maintain the equilibrium only by such desperate means. But some years later one of my pupils pointed out a much simpler solution: 14 . . . ♖b8!?. Not 15 c5? ♘xe4, as after 15 ♕c2, Black plays 15 . . . b5. I suspect that in this case Rashkovsky would simply have forced a draw with 15 ♗a7 ♖a8 16 ♗e3.

E. 2.3

206
B



How should Black defend (it is his move)?

E. 2.4

207
B



Calculate and evaluate 23 . . . ♘d7.

Bluff!

He who dares, must lose. He who doesn't dare, loses.
Saviely Tartakower

In desperate situations any remedies are good. You are right even in deliberately going for a continuation known to be incorrect, just so long as it promises at least some practical chances.

Dvoretsky–S. Sokolov
Moscow Ch. 1973

208
W



Black's advantage is clear. His bishop wishes to come out to g4, and White has to reckon with the continual threat of an invasion on d4. The knight on a5 has nowhere to retreat to, and behind it the white rooks are pining away through inactivity.

Perhaps the only possibility for White to complicate the game is the tactical operation 26 ♗xe5 ♖xe5 27 ♘xe5 ♕xe5 28 ♘xc4 ♘xc4 29 ♖xa8.

Q. 2.39 What do you think of this?

Of course, an abrupt change in the position would suit White, but I immediately noticed a tactical refutation: 28 . . . ♗xf2+!! (instead of 28 . . . ♘xc4). If 29 ♕xf2, then 29 . . . ♕xa1+! 30 ♖xa1 ♖xa1+ 31 ♗f1 ♘xc4 32 ♔g2 ♗e6—the rook and two minor pieces are clearly stronger than the queen. And after 29 ♔xf2 Black has a pleasant choice between 29 . . . ♕f6+ followed by . . . ♖xa2, and 29 . . . ♘xc4 30 ♖xa8 ♕d4+.

But nevertheless I had to risk it. What did I have to lose? After all, the tactical operation involving the capture on f2 was far from obvious, and it was possible that my opponent would not notice it, particularly since he was already in rather severe time-trouble.

26	**♗xe5!?**	**♖xe5**
27	**♘xe5**	**♕xe5**
28	**♘xc4**	**♘xc4?**

My calculation has paid off. Now the battle flares up again with renewed vigour.

29	**♖xa8**	**♘b6**

In tense situations a chessplayer sometimes begins to get a 'feeling' for his opponent, to sense what mood he is in, what he will see and what his reaction will be. I rapidly calculated a favourable tactical variation and for some reason did not doubt that in fearful time-trouble my opponent would not notice the strong reply he had available and would definitely fall into my net.

30	**♗h3!?**	**f5?**

An impulsive reply. It was essential to play 30 . . . ♘d4!.

31 exf5!

Now Black's position falls to pieces almost instantaneously.

31	. . .	♕**xe1**+
32	♖**xe1**	♘**xa8**
33	♖**e8**+	♔**f7**
34	♖**xc8**	♘**bc7**

34 . . . ♘ac7 35 fxg6+ hxg6 36 c4.

35	**fxg6**+	**hxg6**
36	♗**g2**	

Black resigned.

Dvoretsky–Averkin

USSR Ch., 1st League, Odessa 1974

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W



White's position is strategically hopeless. His pieces occupy extremely unfortunate positions and are unable to develop any sort of activity. Meanwhile Black has the possibility of breaking through on either wing: on the queenside by playing . . . b6–b5, and on the kingside by exchanging off the knight on h4 and preparing the breakthrough . . . h5–h4. In some lines it also makes sense to exchange dark-squared bishops, since then the pawn on a3 will become very weak.

All I can do is try, at any cost, to divert my opponent from preparing his planned pawn breaks. To begin with, I tried to tempt him into winning a pawn.

28	♖**eb2!?**	♘**ec8**
29	♘**g6**	

White has taken control of the b5-square, not fearing 29 . . . ♖xa3 30 ♖xb6 ♖xd3 31 ♕xd3 ♘xb6, since after 32 ♗a3 or 32 ♘d2 his pieces begin to come to life. My opponent preferred not to deviate from his planned course.

29 . . . ♘f7!

It is all very clear: now Black will play 30 . . . ♘h8, forcing a favourable exchange of knights. I had to decide on a desperate measure—a piece sacrifice which I knew to be entirely unsound. But chances of saving the game would only appear if I could succeed in luring Averkin—a player with a strict positional style—into an abyss of tactical complications in which he would not feel too confident. Besides, he only had twenty minutes remaining until the time-control, and if the game were to become suddenly sharper he would probably have to make his last few moves in time-trouble.

30	♕**e2**	♘**h8**
31	♘**f4!?**	**exf4**
32	**gxf4**	♗**h4!**

Weaker was 32 . . . ♗e7 33 f6!

(33 e5? ♗xf5) 33 . . . ♗xf6 34 e5 and 35 e6. In sacrificing the knight, I was reckoning that if the e-pawn could manage to advance to e6 then Black's pieces would be disconnected and his extra piece would not be able to make its presence felt.

33 f6 ♗xf6?

Black's time-trouble has begun to tell! Correct, of course, was 33 . . . ♕xf6! 34 e5 ♕e7, when the pawns are stopped.

34 e5 ♗h4
35 e6 ♗a4
36 f5



210
B

This is the position that White had been aiming for. Now it is not easy for my opponent to choose the correct plan of defence, especially with his flag about to fall. If, for example, 36 . . . ♗g5, then 37 ♗xg5 ♕xg5 38 ♕e5. Best, apparently, was 36 . . . ♘d6 37 ♕e5 ♗f6.

36 . . . ♕f6?
37 ♕e4 ♗g5

37 . . . ♘d6 38 ♕d5 ♘xf5 39 ♖xb6

38 ♗xg5 ♕xg5
39 ♕e5

I played this move without thinking, having already intended to play it in the event of an exchange of bishops. But in this situation also quite good was 39 f6.

39 . . . ♖h6?

The final mistake in time-trouble.

40 ♗b7 ♖a7
41 ♗xc8

Black resigned.

On the Edge of a Precipice

Victory awaits the man whose life is in order, and this is called success.
Roald Amundsen

Every chessplayer dreams of coming to an important competition in good form. It is for each player to decide in his own way how to achieve this, as it is a very individual matter. But, all the same, I shall share with you one prescription of a general nature, one which has proved useful on numerous occasions both for my pupils and myself. Success in a tournament or match requires on the one hand a good state of health, with reserves of strength and endurance, and on the other, a considerable supply of nervous

energy, a freshness of perception and similar faculties. Therefore, *when preparing for a competition, it is important to ensure that you are fit enought to cope with a high degree of physical and emotional stress*. Or, putting it more simply, you should take part in an interesting and very thorough training session, in which pure chess lessons are constantly alternated with exciting competitive games.

This was how I prepared for a rather strong tournament in the Estonian town of Viljandi, a tournament in which I—then still an ordinary master—succeeded in taking first prize, winning nine games and drawing four. Three grandmasters, including Mikhail Tal himself, finished behind me.

Being in good form is by no means a guarantee against making mistakes, but it does help to reduce their number. The main thing is that it helps at all times in maintaining one's alertness and clarity of thought, in order to be able to continue playing calmly after any turn of events. The following game may serve as a good example. I got into a desperate position right from the opening and was unable to get out of it until almost the very end, which nevertheless turned out to be rather fortunate.

Let us examine this game in some detail as it was quite a fluctuating battle.

Heuer–Dvoretsky
Viljandi 1972

1	**e4**	**e6**
2	**d4**	**d5**
3	**♘c3**	**♗b4**
4	**e5**	**c5**
5	**a3**	**♗xc3+**
6	**bxc3**	**♘e7**

I nearly always tried to avoid long forced variations in the opening, and so in reply to 7 ♕g4 I did not go in for the most testing line 7 . . . cxd4 8 ♕xg7 ♖g8, but limited myself to the modest 7 . . . 0-0 8 ♘f3 ♘bc6 9 ♗d3 f5.

In a game against Karlsson (Moscow 1969), after 10 exf6 ♖xf6 11 ♗g5 ♖f7 12 ♕h4 (more accurate is 12 ♗xe7, forcing Black to capture with the rook) 12 . . . h6 13 0-0, I succeeded in setting a trap, conceived over the board: 13 . . . c4 14 ♗g6? ♖xf3! 15 gxf3 (15 ♗xe7 ♕xe7 16 ♕xe7 ♘xe7 and the white bishop is under attack) 15 . . . hxg5 16 ♕h7+ ♔f8 17 ♕h8+ ♘g8. Black warded off the attack and profited from his material advantage. When I consulted the opening manuals after the game, I was amazed to find that their authors had fallen into the same trap: not considering the capture 14 . . . ♖xf3!, they examined in reply to 14 ♗g6? only 14 . . . ♘xg6 15 ♗xd8 ♘xh4 16 ♗xh4.

In order better to understand subsequent events it is useful to

note that in the event of 10 ♕g3 (instead of 10 exf6) Black can initiate counterplay with 10 . . . ♕b6 or 10 . . . ♕a5 11 ♗d2 b6, intending 12 . . . ♗a6 or 12 . . . ♔a4.

In the second half of the 1980s opening theory took a considerable step forward in this system. First it was established that after 10 exf6 ♖xf6 11 ♗g5 Black is not obliged to retreat the rook—the complications which begin with the move 11 . . . e5!? are altogether good for Black. White soon found a move order that is much more dangerous for his opponent: 8 ♗d3! (instead of 8 ♘f3), and if 8 . . . ♘bc6 then 9 ♕h5!. Black has also tried 8 . . . c4, 8 . . . f5 and 8 . . . ♘d7, but, as far as I know, no reliable antidote has yet been found.

7 ♗d3!?

A very original move, which to my mind deserves attention. White retains the possibility of the thrust ♕g4, and in some cases may even play f2-f4 and only then develop his knight. I decided to take the game along familiar lines.

7 . . . ♘bc6
8 ♕g4 c4

On 8 . . . 0-0 I was worried about the reply 9 ♕h5. And not without reason—as is clear from the variation quoted above.

9 ♗e2 0-0
10 h4

We now arrive at the first critical situation in the game.

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B



Q. 2.40 What should Black do now?

"We shall now meet White's flank attack with a counter in the centre," I thought to myself, and a moment later I replied . . .

10 . . . f5??

Having played this move, I at once noticed to my horror that after 11 ♕g3! Black's position becomes critical. With a pawn on c5 Black would have had counterplay on the queenside or in the centre, but now, when the centre has been closed by the moves . . . c5–c4 and . . . f7–f5, Black has nothing with which to oppose White's offensive on the kingside. White's delay in developing his knight has also worked to his advantage—now it can take the optimal route g1–h3–f4, and then, in some lines, ♘h5.

Essential, of course, was 10 . . . f6! with a good position for Black (this really would have been a counter in the centre!). Why did Black not play this?

In principle, the same mistakes

may be committed for very different reasons, so that it is difficult to make a reliable diagnosis on the basis of a single episode—a series of observations is necessary. The reason for the move 10 . . . f5?? could have been a poor understanding of the position; but this was not the case here—in fact I realised immediately what a grievous error I had committed. Incidentally, this shows clearly how important it is for a trainer, when diagnosing the shortcomings of his pupils, not to confine himself solely to the texts of their games and an analysis of them. He should discuss with the player concerned what actually happened, how he evaluated the position, and hear his opinion of the reasons for his mistakes. It can be very useful to keep a record of the time spent—it would have shown here that Black played his last move without giving it sufficient thought. And then other explanations arise—the routine move (in this opening variation Black does indeed nearly always have to play . . . f7–f5) and, what is most probable, impulsiveness, a tendency to take hasty decisions not sufficiently thought through, for which one later has to pay very dearly.

11 ♕**g3!** ♕**a5**
12 ♗**d2** ♕**a4**

I was trying as hard as I could to divert my opponent from developing an initiative on the kingside, but my counter-attacking resources are very insignificant, and after the calm and composed 13 ♗d1! Black's position would not have been one to envy.

13 ♘**h3?**

An unprofessional decision. Although, having taken the pawn on c2, Black comes under a dangerous attack, he does get counter-chances, and now his situation is no longer strategically hopeless.

13 . . . ♕**xc2**

It would not do to hesitate—Black has to take this pawn, come what may!

14 ♗**h6**



Q. 2.41 How should Black defend?

In the event of 14 . . . ♘g6 White will obviously play 15 h5. The only possibility then is 15 . . . f4! 16 ♘xf4 ♖xf4 17 hxg6 (17 ♗xf4 ♘xf4, and not 18 ♕xf4? ♕xc3+) 17 . . . gxh6. The position of Black's king is quite horrific, but he is a piece up and there does not appear to be a forced mate.

After 14 . . . ♖f7 15 ♗h5 it is necessary to consider 15 . . . g6 and 15 . . . ♘g6. On 15 . . . g6, strong is 16 ♘f4! (worse is 16 0-0 f4!) followed by retreating the bishop, or even in some lines by sacrificing a piece on g6. If, however, 15 . . . ♘g6, then possible is 16 ♗xg6 hxg6 17 ♖c1 ♕e4+ 18 ♗e3 (threatening 19 ♘f4 or 19 ♘g5) 18 . . . ♕g4 19 ♕xg4 fxg4 20 ♘g5, and then ♔e2 and h4–h5. The position that arises is not so sharp as that after 14 . . . ♘g6, but on the other hand Black has no material advantage (the extra pawn is not at all significant).

So, in the event of 14 . . . ♖f7 White maintains an advantage 'free of charge'. But in the variation with 14 . . . ♘g6 he will have to play extremely accurately and forcefully, as any error in carrying out an attack when one is already a piece down may prove fatal. And that means that this is what Black has to play:

14	**. . .**	**♘g6**
15	**h5**	**f4!**
16	**♘xf4**	**♖xf4**
17	**hxg6**	**gxh6**

If now 18 gxh7+ ♔xh7 19 ♕xf4 ♕xc3+ 20 ♕d2, then not 20 . . . ♕xa1+? 21 ♗d1, when White's attack is irresistible, but simply 20 . . . ♕xd2+ 21 ♔xd2 ♘xd4 with two pawns for the exchange.

18	**♖xh6**	

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

Q. 2.42 What should Black play?

In such sharp situations a decision is frequently taken by the method of exclusion—it is simpler not to calculate the best move in any detail but to convince oneself that all other moves are bad. The threat is 19 gxh7+ ♔h8 20 ♕g8 mate. Clearly unsuccessful are both 18 . . . ♖f8? 19 ♖xh7, and 18 . . . hxg6? 19 ♖xg6+ ♔f7 20 ♖g7+ ♔f8 21 ♖g8+ ♔e7 22 ♕g5+ ♔d7 23 ♖g7+. In the event of 18 . . . ♘e7? a spectacular and decisive conclusion is 19 gxh7+ ♔h8 20 ♕g7+!! ♔xg7 21 h8(♕)+. That really leaves only one possibility.

18	**. . .**	**♗d7!**
19	**♔f1**	

While Heuer was thinking about his move I calculated the variation 19 ♖xh7 ♖e4 20 ♕f3 (20 ♖h8+ ♔g7! 21 ♖h7+ ♔g8 leads to a draw) 20 . . . ♖xe2+ 21 ♔f1 (21 ♕xe2? ♕xc3+) 21 . . . ♖xf2+ 22 ♕xf2 ♕xf2+?! (mistaken is 22 . . . ♖f8? 23 ♖h8+,

but the winning continuation 22 . . . ♕xg6! fell totally outside my field of vision; chessplayers often overlook long retreats with pieces) 23 ♔xf2 ♖f8+.

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W

Q. 2.43 Where should the king retreat?

A typical exercise, which trains the ability to see the opponent's resources. It is evident that Black wishes to play 24 . . . ♗e8 25 ♖xb7 ♗xg6. We find the idea 24 . . . ♗e8 25 g7!, which may lead to winning a piece. But after 24 ♔g3(e3) ♗e8 25 g7 Black has the counter 25 . . . ♖f3+!, and after 24 ♔e2—25 . . . ♖f2+!. That means that the only correct move is 24 ♔g1!!, when it is bad for Black to continue 24 . . . ♗e8(c8) 25 g7! ♖f1+ 26 ♖xf1 ♔xh7 27 ♖f8.

19	**. . .**	**♖af8**
20	**gxh7+?!**	

White is diverted by the attack. He should have forced a draw: 20 ♖xh7 ♘xf2+ 21 ♔g1 ♕xe2 22 ♖h8+! ♔g7! 23 ♖h7+ ♔g8 24 ♖h8+, but not 24 ♕g5? ♖xg2+ 25 ♕xg2 ♕e3+ (or even 25 . . . ♕xg2+ 26 ♔xg2 ♗e8 27 g7?! ♖f2+!).

20	**. . .**	**♔h8**
21	**♖g6**	**♖xf2+**
22	**♔g1**	

Q. 2.44 What should Black play?

Now it was finally time to liquidate my opponent's offensive and obtain an advantage by playing 22 . . . ♖2f7! 23 ♖g8+ ♔xh7 24 ♖g4 ♔h8!. For example, 25 ♖f1 ♖xf1+ 26 ♗xf1 ♖xf1+ 27 ♔xf1 ♕d3+. For the second time in this game I was unable to notice a long move backwards with a piece (the first time was when calculating the variation 19 ♖xh7). This would seem to be a trifling point, but a trainer can correct such minor deficiencies in his pupils by drawing attention to them at an opportune moment and suggesting specially selected exercises.

Black's omission costs him very dearly. Again he is rolling towards the very edge of the precipice.

22	**. . .**	**♘e7?**
23	**♖g8+**	**♘xg8**
24	**hxg8(♕)+**	**♖xg8**
25	**♕xf2**	

Q. 2.45 Should Black grab the pawn on c3?

Material equilibrium has been re-established, but all the pawns

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shielding my king have disappeared, and so White has a clear advantage. Again Black has a choice: to make a normal, 'consolidating' move (for example, 25 ... ♕g6), or to take the 'poisoned' pawn on c3, exposing his king to a terrible attack after 26 ♕h4+.

I again (as on my 14th move) preferred to take the risk. The logic behind my decision was precisely the same: at first you assess the positions arising after quiet continuations (unfavourable!), and then you try to find a forced refutation of the move 25 ... ♕xc3, and if you cannot find one, then you just have to pluck up courage and make up your mind to take the pawn!

25 ... ♕xc3!?

26 ♕h4+

Inaccurate is 26 ♖f1? ♕g3.

26 ... ♔g7

27 ♖f1 ♕e3+

This check is, of course, essential. Which of White's three replies (28 ♖f2, 28 ♔h1 and 28 ♔h2) is best? We shall soon return to this question. For a long time I considered that I knew the answer, but now I can no longer say this.

28 ♔h1 ♗e8!

Another example of a move which is easily found by the method of exclusion. All other tries are quickly refuted: 28 ... ♕xe2? 29 ♕g5+; 28 ... ♕h6? 29 ♖f7+; 28 ... ♖h8? 29 ♗h5 ♗e8 30 ♕e7+ ♔h6 31 ♗xe8.

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W



29 ♖f3?

A grave mistake, which loses the game. But could White have actually won? During the game I saw the variation 29 ♕f6+ ♔h7 30 ♖f3 ♕xc2 31 ♖h3+ ♗h5 32 ♕f7+ ♔h6 33 ♕xg8 ♕f1+ 34 ♔h2 ♕f4+ 35 ♕g3 ♕xg3+ (but not 35 ... ♕xd4? 36 ♖h4) with an endgame which is difficult to assess. By the way, this is the reason for taking pawns like the one on c3—so that variations like this, which lead to one's opponent gaining material, nevertheless end up in positions that are unclear.

Let us go back a little and examine other possibilities for White besides 28 ♔h1. It is unlikely that 28 ♖f2 would be fatal—with a pinned rook it is not so easy to attack. On the other hand, 28 ♔h2 may seem to be a significant improvement. After 28 . . . ♗e8 29 ♕f6+ ♔h7 30 ♖f3 ♕xe2 31 ♖h3+ ♗h5 32 ♕f7+ ♔h6 33 ♕xg8 Black now has no check on f1 and he loses. But Dlugy and Gulko found a counter-punch which saves the game: 30 . . . ♖xg2+!! (instead of 30 . . . ♕xe2?) 31 ♔xg2 ♕xe2+.

We arrive at the conclusion that Black's bold capture of material, on his 14th move and his 25th, was justified not only by psychological considerations but also objectively.

29 . . . ♕h6!?

Tempting was 29 . . . ♕xf3 followed by 30 . . . ♖h8. But it seemed to me that White would first give a check and only then take the queen; and so the move 29 . . . ♕xf3 was immediately rejected. But in fact White cannot usefully give a check anywhere: 30 ♕e7+ ♕f7; 30 ♕f6+ ♕xf6; 30 ♕g5+ ♔f7.

Remember that episode in the opening: 10 . . . f5??. It would appear that my hypothesis about the tendencies of the player of Black to make impulsive and hasty decisions was correct. This is confirmed by the fact that for such a sharp and highly complicated game Black had used little more than an hour. Regrettably, only since becoming a trainer have I learned to pay particular attention to such faults. In those days, although I could see my own weaknesses, I made no serious attempts to combat them. It was for this reason that I was unable to realise my full potential as a tournament player.

Incidentally, *when making a diagnosis, a player or trainer should be guided not so much by the objective mistakes as by the mistakes made when deliberating over moves, in the approach to the taking of decisions.* In this instance I made a move which was not at all bad. It had been calculated accurately and it led to a forced win.

30	**♖g3+**	**♗g6**
31	**♗h5**	**♔h7**
32	**♖g5**	**c3!**

The passed pawn decides the outcome. White resigned, in view of 33 ♗xg6+ (33 ♔g1 c2) 33 . . . ♖xg6 34 ♖h5 ♕xh5 35 ♕xh5+ ♖h6.

This game is far from exemplary, but it was a real battle and, I think, highly instructive. Careful analysis has allowed us to single out many incidents—relating both to the game itself and to its psychological aspects—which are methodologically important. I have always advised my pupils to

study their own most substantial games in such a way, and this work has invariably yielded excellent results.

Positional Exchange Sacrifices

If you sit, think, and play positions of this type, you will sense that the theoretical advantage of the exchange cannot make itself felt at all.
Tigran Petrosian

Martin Gonzalez–Dolmatov

Barcelona 1983

1	**e4**	**e6**
2	**d4**	**d5**
3	**♘c3**	**♗b4**
4	**♘e2**	**♘f6!?**

Sensible opening tactics. When playing an opponent who is weaker then yourself it makes sense to avoid theoretical debates in variations that have already been worked out in some detail (4 . . . dxe4), in order to begin a dispute of your own over the board as soon as possible.

5	**e5**	

Preferable is 5 ♗g5 dxe4 6 a3 ♗e7 7 ♗xf6 gxf6 8 ♘xe4.

5	**. . .**	**♘e4**
6	**a3**	**♘xc3**
7	**♘xc3**	**♗xc3+**
8	**bxc3**	**0-0**
9	**♕h5**	

An approximately equal game would result after 9 ♗d3 f5 10 exf6 ♕xf6 11 0-0 c5 12 dxc5 ♘c6.

9	**. . .**	**f5**
10	**g4**	

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

Q. 2.46 How should Black continue?

White's aggressive thrust looks at first sight just as convincing as did 10 h4 in the previous game. But that game also showed how dangerous an irresponsible attitude to one's opponent's attacking possibilities can be.

Dolmatov did not repeat my mistake but grasped the subtleties of the position and found an excellent solution to the task before him, involving a profound and purely positional sacrifice. White intends to play 11 ♗d3 followed by 12 gxf5. Clearly bad for Black is 10 . . . fxg4 11 ♗d3. If Black neutralises the bishop on d3 by playing . . . g7–g6, his dark squares will be abruptly weakened and White's dark-squared bishop will become very strong.

It may seem tempting to play 10 ... b6 (with the idea 11 ♗d3 ♗a6!). But then there follows 11 ♗g5! ♕e8 (11 ... ♕d7 12 gxf5 ♖xf5 13 ♗d3) 12 ♕xe8 ♖xe8 13 gxf5 exf5 14 ♗g2, and White has the advantage in the endgame.

Countering in the centre with 10 ... c5 also does not solve all of Black's problems. White continues either 11 ♗d3 c4 12 ♗e2 (again we have cause to remember the previous game), or more sharply with 11 gxf5 ♖xf5 12 ♕h3 cxd4 13 cxd4 ♘c6 14 c3 (but not 14 ♗d3 ♘xd4! with excellent compensation for the exchange).

10 ... ♗d7!

11 gxf5

11 ♗d3 ♗e8 and 12 ... ♗g6.

11 ... ♖xf5

12 ♕h3 ♗e8

13 ♗d3 ♗g6!

Weaker is 13 ... ♖h5 14 ♕g2 or 14 ♕g3 followed by 15 ♖g1. Black sacrifices the exchange, getting excellent positional compensation in return. His bishop will now have absolute control of the light squares. The psychological factor here is also not insignificant: Martin Gonzalez had been in a mood to attack, but now his attack is over and Black seizes the initiative, and so White has to go onto the defensive. For most players, making such a transition is psychologically unpleasant and difficult.

14 ♖g1 ♕f8

Q. 2.47 How should Black reply to 15 c4?

In the event of 15 c4, bad for Black is 15 ... dxc4? 16 ♗xc4 ♕f7 (16 ... ♗f7 17 ♗h6) 17 ♕b3. But Black has the excellent counter 15 ... ♘c6!.

15 ♗xf5 ♗xf5

16 ♕f3

Worthy of consideration was 16 ♕h4, setting a treacherous trap: 16 ... ♔h8? 17 ♖xg7!! ♕xg7 18 ♗h6, and White wins. Black would simply have played 16 ... ♘c6!, not fearing 17 ♗h6 because of 17 ... ♗g6.

16 ... ♘c6

17 ♕e2

It was possible to exchange queens: 17 ♗h6 ♗g6 18 ♕xf8+ ♖xf8. But after 19 ♗e3 ♗xc2 Black has a pawn for the exchange, and the white rooks have no scope to develop activity.

17 ... ♔h8

18 a4



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Q. 2.48 What should Black play?

It is clear that the knight should be transferred to c4. Tempting is

18 ... ♘a5, but then the white queen unexpectedly breaks into the heart of Black's position: 19 ♕b5! b6 20 ♕d7. If, however, 18 ... b6 then after 19 ♗a3 ♕f7 20 ♗b4! the knight can no longer reach a5.

18 ... ♕f7!

A subtle positional move; now the threat really is ... ♘a5. For example: 19 ♗a3 ♘a5 20 ♕b5 b6 and the square d7 is covered. On 19 ♕b5 Black will reply 19 ... ♖b8, planning 20 ... ♗xc2 or 20 ... ♕h5. Possible is the following interesting variation: 20 a5 ♗xc2! 21 a6 ♕f3 22 ♗e3 bxa6! 23 ♕xc6? ♗d3 with inevitable mate.

19 a5?!

Relatively best was 19 f3 ♘a5 20 ♔f2.

19 ... b6

The knight will come to a5 all the same, and besides, after an exchange on b6 Black gets a passed a-pawn and the c-file for a rook.

20	**axb6**	**cxb6**
21	**♖g3**	**♘a5**
22	**f3**	

In Dolmatov's opinion White should have given back the exchange by playing 22 ♖xa5 bxa5 23 c4 dxc4 24 ♕xc4. However, after 24 ... ♕b7 (preparing ... ♖c8, ... ♕h1+ and ... ♕b1) his position would still have been alarming. An attack when the opposing bishops are of opposite colours is no laughing matter!

22	**...**	**♘c4**
23	**♔f2**	**a5**

A pleasant situation for Black—he can gradually strengthen his position, and his opponent has no counterplay of any sort.

24	**♔g1**	**a4**
25	**♗a3**	**♗g6**
26	**♔f2**	**♕f5**
27	**♖a2**	**♖a7**
28	**♗c1**	**h6**
29	**♔g1**	**a3**
30	**♖g2**	

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

"Here I realised", writes Dolmatov in his notes to this game, "that finally achieving victory was not quite so simple. It is necessary to play on both flanks, to strain the enemy's defences." As you see, the principle of two weaknesses, which we met in the second chapter of *Secrets of Chess Training*, does not only apply to the endgame.

30	**...**	**♗h5**
31	**♖g3**	**♕f8!**

Preparing ... ♖a7–f7–f5.

32 ♖h3

White has succeeded in preventing his opponent's plan. So Black begins to prepare a breakthrough on the queenside.

32	**...**	**♗g6**
33	**♖g3**	**♗f5**
34	**♕g2**	**b5**
35	**♕f2**	**b4!**
36	**♕e1**	**♗xc2!**
37	**cxb4**	

Quite bad would be 37 ♖xc2 b3.

37	**...**	**♗b1**
38	**♖a1?**	

Now White has no chances left at all. Much more stubborn was 38 ♖xa3 ♘xa3 39 ♗xa3. But after 39 ... ♗d3! (worse is 39 ... ♖xa3?! 40 ♕xb1. For example: 40 ... ♕f4 41 ♕g6! ♕xd4+ 42 ♔g2 ♕xe5 43 ♕e8+ ♔h7 44 ♕g6+ with perpetual check) 40 ♕c3 ♗c4 White's position is difficult despite his extra pawn. And again thanks to the formidable influence of opposite-coloured bishops, which make any attack considerably stronger.

38	**...**	**a2**
39	**f4**	**♕e8!**
40	**♕e2**	**♕a4**
41	**♕e1**	**♖b7**
42	**♗d2**	**♘xd2**
43	**♕xd2**	**♖xb4**
44	**♖d3**	**♗xd3**
45	**♕xd3**	**♖b3**

If now 46 ♕d1 then 46 ... ♕b4.

White resigned.

E. 2.5

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

Black to move

E. 2.6

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Black to move

E. 2.7

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

Black to move

Two 'French' Endgames

Bakulin–Dvoretsky
Moscow 1974

1	**e4**	**e6**
2	**d4**	**d5**
3	**♘d2**	**c5**
4	**exd5**	**exd5**
5	**♗b5+**	**♗d7**
6	**♕e2+**	**♕e7**
7	**♗xd7+**	**♘xd7**
8	**dxc5**	**♕xe2+**
9	**♘xe2**	**♗xc5**

Usually Black captures on c5 with the knight, but I was aiming to turn off the well-beaten theoretical tracks as quickly as possible.

10	**♘b3**	**♗b6**
11	**0-0**	**♘e7**

It seems that this was a new move—previously Black's knight had been developed to f6.

12	**♗f4**	**0-0**
13	**♖ad1**	**♖ad8**
14	**♘c3**	

14 ♗d6 ♖fe8 15 ♗xe7 ♖xe7 16 ♘f4 ♘f6 is not dangerous for Black.

14	**...**	**♘c5**

14 ... ♘f6? 15 ♗g5.

15	**♘xc5**	

15 ♖fe1 ♘e6.

15	**...**	**♗xc5**
16	**♘a4**	

16 ♖fe1 ♗b4!.

16	**...**	**♗d6**
17	**♗xd6**	**♖xd6**
18	**♖fe1**	



Q. 2.49 Assess the consequences of 18 ... ♖e6.

Considering that 18 ... ♖e6 19 ♘c5 is unpleasant for Black, I had wanted to play 18 ... ♘c6. But my sense of danger was alert, and I began to doubt the position arising after 19 c4 d4 20 ♘c5 b6 21 ♘d3. White gets a pawn majority on the queenside, he securely blockades the pawn on d4, and he has possession of the e-file. He would have the advantage—perhaps not a very substantial one, but on the other hand it would be persistent.

It was this realisation that my position offered very few strategic prospects that helped me quickly to find an exchange combination.

18	**...**	**♖e6!**
19	**♘c5**	**♖xe1+**
20	**♖xe1**	**♖c8!**
21	**♖xe7**	**♔f8!**
22	**♖xb7**	**♖xc5**
23	**c3**	**d4**
24	**♔f1**	

24 ♖b3?? d3 25 ♔f1 ♖e5!.

24	**...**	**dxc3**

25	**bxc3**	**♖xc3**
26	**♖xa7**	**♖c2**



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When I showed this game to my friend Boris Gulko, he smiled ironically. "This is the first time I have seen anyone play a combination for the sake of transposing from a position with equal material into one where he is a pawn down."

But if Black had declined to play this combination he would have had to defend patiently, seeking the correct continuation move after move, and before long he would have made a mistake at some point. But in the rook ending which has now arisen there was virtually no possibility of making a mistake, since I was familiar with the theory of this type of ending and knew for sure that with correct defence Black can get a draw without particular difficulty. By avoiding 'play' and making a transition to 'theory', Black has greatly alleviated his defensive task (this, incidentally, is quite a good illustration of how important it is for a chessplayer to have a good knowledge of theory). From a practical point of view, Black's decision was completely justified.

27	**g3**	**g6**
28	**♔g2**	**♔g7**
29	**♔f3**	**h5**
30	**h4**	**♔f6**
31	**♔e3**	**♖c3+**
32	**♔e4**	**♖c2**
33	**f3**	**♖e2+**
34	**♔f4**	**♖b2**
35	**♖a6+**	**♔g7**
36	**♖a3**	**♔f6**
37	**♖a6+**	**♔g7**
38	**♖a4**	**♔f6**

38 . . . ♖f2!?.

39	**g4**	**hxg4**
40	**fxg4**	**♖f2+**
41	**♔g3**	**♖c2**
42	**♖f4+**	

42 g5+ ♔e5 is also not dangerous.

42	**. . .**	**♔e6**
43	**a4**	

43 ♖f2 ♖c3+ 44 ♔f4 f6.

43	**. . .**	**f5**
44	**gxf5+**	**gxf5**
45	**♖f2**	**♖c4**
46	**♖a2**	**♖c3+**
47	**♔f4**	**♖c4+**
48	**♔g3**	

48 ♔g5 ♖g4+ 49 ♔h5 ♖f6 50 a5?? ♖g8.

48	**. . .**	**♖c3+**
49	**♔g2**	**♖c4**
50	**h5**	**♖h4**

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Heuer–Dvoretsky
Tallinn 1976

1	**e4**	**e6**
2	**d4**	**d5**
3	**♘c3**	**♘f6**
4	**♗g5**	**♗b4**
5	**e5**	**h6**
7	**exf6**	

6 ♗d2 or 6 ♗e3 leads to a more complicated game.

6	**...**	**hxg5**
7	**fxg7**	**♖g8**
8	**h4**	**gxh4**

The threat was 9 h5.

9	**♕g4**	**♕f6**
10	**♖xh4**	**♕xg7**
11	**♕xg7**	**♖xg7**
12	**♖h8+**	**♗f8**

Keres recommended 12 ... ♔d7 13 ♘f3 ♘c6, when on 14 ♗b5 Black has the solid reply 14 ... ♗d6. Stronger is 14 0-0-0. For example: 14 ... b6 (also after 14 ... a6 15 g3 White's position is to be preferred) 15 ♗b5 f6? (essential was 15 ... ♗d6) 16 ♖h6 ♗e7 17 ♘xd5!! with advantage to White (Atyashev–Abroshin, USSR 1954).

13	**0-0-0**	**♗d7**
14	**♖e1!**	(*see diagram*)

I was intending to play 14 ... ♘c6 and 15 ... 0-0-0. By attacking the pawn on d5, my opponent wishes to prevent this.

Q. 2.50 How should Black complete his development?

On 14 ... ♗c6 (with the idea of



playing ... ♘d7 and ... 0-0-0), there would obviously follow f2–f4–f5. Black can, of course, choose 14 ... c6, but then Black will have difficulties in developing his knight, and his light-squared bishop remains passive. I did not wish to make concessions dooming myself to passive defence in a slightly inferior position. So what was I to do?

My calculation began with the variation 14 ... ♘c6 15 ♘xd5 0-0-0 16 ♘f6. It is not hard to see that Black cannot take the pawn: 16 ... ♘xd4? 17 ♘xd7 ♔xd7 18 ♖d1. But also 16 ... ♖g6 (recommended by Suetin) would not suit Black, in view of 17 ♘xd7 ♔xd7 18 ♖h7, attacking the pawn on f7 and intending to defend his own by playing c2–c3.

Then I turned to the move 14 ... ♗c6 and saw that I could then, by sacrificing the pawn on e6, counter-attack the enemy pawn on d4. This plan seemed to me more attractive than the passive 14 ... c6.

14	**...**	**♗c6!**
15	**f4**	**♘d7**
16	**f5**	**0-0-0!**

Worse was 16 ... ♔e7 17 ♘h3! with the threat 18 fxe6 fxe6 19 ♘f4. On 17 ... ♖g4 unpleasant would be 18 fxe6 fxe6 19 g3!.

17	**fxe6**	**fxe6**
18	**♖xe6**	**♖g4!**

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This position has come about by force. If now 19 ♘f3 then 19 ... ♗g7 and the pawn will be regained. The thrusts ♘b5 or ♗b5 also promise White nothing.

During the game I only feared the move 19 ♖h5!?. On 19 ... ♗g7 there would follow 20 ♘xd5, and if 19 ... ♖xd4 then 20 ♘f3 ♖g4 21 ♘xd5 ♘c5 22 ♘e7+ ♗xe7 (otherwise 23 ♘xc6) 23 ♖xe7 and White retains his extra pawn (23 ... ♗xf3 24 gxf3 ♖g1 25 ♖e1). As you see, the decision taken by Black on move 14 was not a forced combination, but a real sacrifice, the consequences of which I was unable to calculate accurately.

Later Yusupov pointed out that on 19 ♖h5 Black has to reply 19 ... ♘b6! 20 ♘f3 (20 ♘ge2 ♗d7 followed by 21 ... ♗g7 or 21 ... ♖g6) 20 ... ♗g7 21 ♘e2?! (21 ♘e5 ♗xe5 22 dxe5 d4, or 22 ♖xe5 ♖xd4 with equality) 21 ... ♖f8! and Black has more than adequate compensation for the sacrificed pawn in view of the fact that his opponent's pieces are tied down.

19	**♘f3**	**♗g7**
20	**♖xd8+**	

20 ♖h5 ♘f8 and 21 ... ♗xd4.

20	**...**	**♔xd8**
21	**♘d1**	

Not 21 ♘e2? ♘f8 22 ♖e3 ♗h6. After 21 ♘b5 ♗xb5 Black's position is preferable, and on 21 ♗b5 ♗xb5 22 ♘xb5 possible are both 22 ... a6 23 ♘c3 c6, and 22 ... ♖xg2.

21	**...**	**♗xd4**
22	**♘xd4**	**♖xd4**

A completely equal ending has arisen, which, however, White lost unexpectedly quickly. Walter Heuer, a player with a very active style, loves to attack, but he feels much less confident in 'boring' endgame positions, and this soon showed, with decisive effect. He was simply unable to attune himself to a dry technical struggle.

23	**♗e2**	**♘c5**

Black wishes to consolidate by means of ... ♗d7 and ... c7–c6.

24	**♖h6**	**♗d7**
25	**c3?!**	

Much more accurate was 25 ♗f3 c6 26 ♘e3, not permitting 26 . . . ♖f4? in view of 27 ♖h8+ ♔c7(e7) 28 ♗xd5.

25	**. . .**	**♖f4**

But not 25 . . . ♖a4? 26 ♖h8+ ♔e7 27 ♖h7+ ♔d6 28 b4! ♘e4 29 ♖xd7+.

26	**g3?**	

A mistaken plan. White hurries to advance his passed pawn, but in so doing weakens the foundations of his position and deprives his bishop of a secure base on f3.

26	**. . .**	**♖f8**
27	**g4**	**c6**
28	**♔d2**	**♘e4+**
29	**♔d3?**	

The decisive mistake! Essential was 29 ♔e3. Black probably would have replied simply 29 . . . ♔c7, retaining the better chances, since he would gain nothing by playing 29 . . . ♘g3 30 ♗f3 ♘f1+ 31 ♔e2.

29	**. . .**	**♘g3**
30	**♘e3?!**	

It would have been better for White to reconcile himself to the loss of the pawn on g4.

30	**. . .**	**♖f2**
31	**♖h8+?!**	

Why urge the black king forward?

31	**. . .**	**♔c7**
32	**♗d1**	**♘e4!?**

A probing move.

33	**♔d4**	

After 33 ♗e2 I would clearly have gone back to g3 with the knight and then captured the pawn on b2.

33	**. . .**	**♖xb2**
34	**♗c2**	**♘g5!**
35	**♖g8**	**♘f3+**
36	**♔d3**	**♖xa2**
37	**♔e2**	**♘e5**
38	**g5**	**♘g4!**
39	**g6**	**♘xe3**

White resigned.

It's Better to Give Up a Pawn . . .

Pawn sacrifices are in most cases more profound than piece sacrifices.
Siegbert Tarrasch

I now offer for your consideration two more examples of successful 'escape operations' from bad positions, these being perhaps the most difficult I have ever undertaken.

Romanishin–Dvoretsky
USSR Ch., Premier League, Leningrad 1974

1	**c4**	**g6**
2	**d4**	**♗g7**
3	**♘c3**	**d6**
4	**e4**	**e5**
5	**dxe5**	**dxe5**
6	**♕xd8+**	**♔xd8**
7	**f4**	**♘d7**
8	**♘f3**	**f6?!**

Black has chosen a rather dubious opening set-up anyway,

but now he allows a move order which immediately lands him in a difficult position. More accurate was 8 . . . c6 9 ♗e2 ♔e8 10 0-0 and only now 10 . . . f6, intending . . . ♘g8–h6–f7.

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

9	**fxe5!**	**♘xe5**
10	**♘xe5**	**fxe5**
11	**♗g5+**	**♗f6**
12	**0-0-0+**	**♗d7**

12 . . . ♔e8? 13 ♗xf6 ♘xf6 14 ♘b5.

13	**♗e3**	**c6**
14	**g4!**	

Romanishin seizes space on the kingside and limits the mobility of the black pieces.

14	**. . .**	**h6**

A different defensive plan deserved consideration: 14 . . . ♗h4!? 15 g5 ♔e8, planning . . . ♗e6 and then either . . . h7–h6 or . . . ♘e7 and . . . ♖f8.

15	**h4**	**♔e8**

The king does not go to c7, since it must prevent the incursion of a white rook along the f-file or h-file.

16	**♗e2**	**♗e7**

Retreating the bishop to g7 would have given White the excellent square d6.

17	**g5**	

Black's position is horrible, since his rooks are disconnected and his knight and dark-squared bishop have no prospects at all. Now it was necessary to resolve to do something, to choose a definite defensive plan. I should have liked to play 17 . . . h5, planning . . . ♗e6 and . . . ♖h8–h7–f7, but how could I then have defended the pawn on e5 after 18 ♗f2! (with the idea 19 ♗g3)? Therefore 17 . . . hxg5 seems forced, but I did not rush to play this and instead pondered for a long time.

A few moves earlier I had begun to study the position arising after 18 hxg5 ♖xh1 19 ♖xh1 ♔f8 20 ♖h7 (otherwise 20 . . . ♔g7) 20 . . . ♗e6 21 ♘d1! and could not find any convincing way of defending against my opponent's obvious plan: ♘f2 and then, depending on circumstances, ♗g4, ♘g4 or ♘d3. For example: 21 . . . ♖d8 22 ♘f2 ♖d7 23 ♔c2! (but not 23 ♗g4? ♗xg5!) 23 . . . ♗d8 (Black loses the exchange after 23 . . . ♗xg5 24 ♖xd7 ♗xe3 25 ♖d3 or 25 ♖d1, but it is possible that this was relatively his best chance) 24 ♖xd7 ♗xd7 25 ♘d3! ♗c7 26 ♗xa7. Black loses a pawn, and all the negative aspects of his position remain.

In search of a way out I turned my attention to the move 17 . . . ♗e6. Generally speaking, this is a useful move for Black whichever defensive plan he adopts. But I was frightened to play it—indeed, my opponent could then smash his way through on the kingside by playing 18 gxh6 ♘xh6 19 ♖dg1. How could I then avoid losing the ill-fated knight on h6 after 19 . . . ♗f7 20 h5?

We have noted more than once that in desperate situations it is already too late to fear anything, since, however strange it may seem, the most risky continuations sometimes promise the best practical chances of saving the game. And this is the case here—I continued calculating the variation and discovered a tactical subtlety which would permit me to avoid an immediate rout . . .

17 . . . ♗e6!!
18 gxh6 ♘xh6
19 ♖dg1 ♗f7

I could not play 19 . . . ♘g8 20 ♖xg6 ♗f7 21 ♖g4 ♗e6 because of 22 ♖g7! ♔f8 23 ♖g6 ♗f7 24 ♖g4 ♗e6 25 ♖f1+! ♔e8 26 ♖g6 ♗f7 27 ♖g7, when White retains his extra h-pawn.

20 h5

20 ♔c2!?.

Q. 2.51 How should Black defend?

Of course, it would be hopeless to play 20 . . . g5? 21 ♗xg5, as Black cannot succeed in erecting any sort of blockade.

20 . . . gxh5
21 ♗xh5

The threat is 22 ♗xh6 or 22 ♗xf7+, winning a piece. On 21 . . . ♗f8 there follows 22 ♗xf7+ ♔xf7 (22 . . . ♘xf7 23 ♖xh8 ♘xh8 24 ♖g8 ♘f7 25 ♗e5) 23 ♖g5 ♗g7 24 ♖f1+ ♔g8 25 ♖fg1 ♖h7 26 ♖xe5, intending 27 ♖e7. Black has lost a pawn, and he has still not disentangled his pieces on the kingside.

21 . . . ♗xh5
22 ♖xh5 ♖g8!

This is the tactical subtlety prepared as long ago as move 17. The knight cannot be taken: 23 ♖xh6? ♖xg1+ 24 ♗xg1 ♗g5+. Not dangerous either would be 23 ♖hh1 ♘g4!.

23 ♖xg8+ ♘xg8
24 ♖xe5 ♔d7

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

This is the position that Black had been aiming for. Despite having lost a pawn, he retains good chances of saving the game—or at

any rate, no less than he had in the initial position, before 17 . . . ♗e6. He has succeeded in exchanging several pawns, which usually favours the weaker side, his pieces can quickly come into play, and White's foundations have been somewhat weakened.

Here I was expecting 25 ♖f5 ♘f6 26 ♗d4, with White counting on 26 . . . ♔e6? 27 ♘e2, and I was going to reply 26 . . . ♘e8! with the threat of 27 . . . ♘d6.

25	**♔c2**	**♘f6**
26	**♖g5?!**	

It is not easy for White to strengthen his position. In the event of 26 ♗g5, Black easily parries the threat of 27 ♖xe7+ ♔xe7 28 e5 with 26 . . . ♖g8, and if 26 ♖f5 then 26 . . . ♔e6. But the move played by Romanishin makes Black's task easier, giving him the possibility of carrying out a favourable exchange operation.

26	. . .	**♘xe4**
27	**♘xe4**	**♗xg5**
28	**♗xg5**	**b6**
29	**♔d3**	**♖h8**
30	**♗f4**	**c5**

The endgame is apparently drawn.

31	**a3**	**♖h3+**
32	**♗e3**	**♖h1**

More accurate was 32 . . . a5.

33	**♘c3**	**a5**
34	**♘d5**	

The game would be drawn after 34 b4 axb4 35 axb4 cxb4 36 ♘d5 ♖d1+ 37 ♔e4 (37 ♔c2 ♖xd5) 37 . . . b5 (worse is 37 . . . b3 38 ♘xb6+ ♔c6 39 ♘a4) 38 cxb5 b3 39 ♗d4 (39 ♘c3 b2) 39 . . . b2! 40 ♗xb2 ♖b1 41 ♘b6+ ♔c7 42 ♘c4 ♖xb2 43 ♘xb2 ♔b6.

34	. . .	**♔c6**
35	**♘e7+**	

And here 35 b4 deserved serious consideration. White has decided not to take any decisive action before the adjournment.

35	. . .	**♔b7**
36	**♘g6**	**♖b1**
37	**♔c2**	**♖f1**
38	**♘e5**	**♖f5**
39	**♘g4**	**♖f3**
40	**♔d3**	**♖h3**
41	**♔e4**	**♖g3**
42	**♔f4**	

This was the sealed move. What happened when this game was resumed is described in Chapter 2 of *Secrets of Chess Training*, in the section entitled 'The strongest piece is the rook!'.

Dvoretsky–Kupreichik
USSR Ch., 1st League, Minsk 1976
(*see following diagram*)

White has a difficult defensive task ahead of him, since his pawn structure is ragged and his opponent has a rather noticeable advantage in space.

22	**♔g2**	

With the intention of playing 23 f4 exf4 24 ♕xe7 ♖xe7 25 ♖xf4, and parrying the thrusts 25 . . .

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

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

♖e3 or 25 . . . ♖e2+ by means of 26 ♖f3 or 26 ♖f2.

22 . . . ♕c7

Black has prevented the move f2–f4. He wishes to increase the pressure with . . . ♕c6 and, at a convenient moment, . . . f7–f5.

23 ♕f3!

Not wishing to defend passively, White begins a complicated operation, with the aid of which he suddenly makes the position more dynamic and compels his opponent to calculate variations and find accurate moves.

23 . . . ♕c6

Premature would be 23 . . . e4 24 dxe4 dxe4 25 ♕e2 ♕c6 26 ♔g1, followed by 27 ♖xd8 ♖xd8 28 ♖d1.

24 cxd5! (*see diagram*)

Positionally, an exchange like this is most undesirable, but here it is based on concrete calculation. Black now has a quite difficult choice to make.

It is easiest to discard 24 . . . ♕xd5?!, since after 25 ♕xd5 ♖xd5 26 f4! (it is important to get rid of the opponent's strong central pawn) 26 . . . exf4 27 ♖xf4 a roughly level endgame arises.

On 24 . . . ♖xd5 White replies 25 ♖c1 ♕d7 26 ♖c7! (this was the point of exchanging on d5) 26 . . . ♕xc7 27 ♕xd5 followed by 28 ♖c1. The same position is reached after 26 . . . ♕d6 27 ♖c7!. Even after the best 26 . . . ♕e6! 27 ♖c7, the active position of the rook guarantees White real counterplay.

24 . . . ♕c2!?
25 ♖b1 ♕xb3
26 ♗xe5 ♕xd5

No advantage is offered by 26 . . . ♕xa4 27 ♗c7 ♖d7 28 d6. For example: 28 . . . ♗xd6 29 ♗xd6 ♖xd6 30 ♖xb7, or 28 . . . ♕c6 29 ♕xc6 bxc6 30 ♖fc1 ♗xd6 31 ♗xa5.

27 d4! f6
28 ♗c7 ♕xf3+
29 ♔xf3 ♖xd4
30 ♖fd1

Having sacrificed a pawn, White has simplified the position, activated his pieces and main-

tained definite drawing chances. If now 30 . . . ♖c4 then 31 ♖d7, threatening to play 32 ♗xa5! ♗xa5 33 ♖bxb7. In the event of 30 . . . ♖de4!?, White may choose between 31 ♗d6 and 31 ♖d7 ♖4e7 32 ♖bd1.



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30	**. . .**	**♖xd1?!**
31	**♖xd1**	**♔f7**
32	**♖d5**	

Now it was really time to agree to a draw. But, as so often happens, Kupreichik, discouraged after the loss of his advantage, began to play carelessly and before long got himself into serious trouble.

32	**. . .**	**♔e6**
33	**♖b5**	**♖h8?!**
34	**♔g2**	**♔d7**
35	**♖xb7!**	**♔c6**
36	**♖a7**	**♗c5**
37	**♖xa5**	**♖c8?!**

Black could have got a draw by playing 37 . . . ♗xf2! 38 ♔xf2 ♔xc7 39 ♖a7+ ♔d6! 40 ♖xg7 g5 41 ♔g3 ♖a8.

38	**♗g3**	**♗b6**
39	**♖b5**	**♖a8**
40	**♖b4**	**♗c5**
41	**♖e4**	**♖a7?**

Correct was 41 . . . ♔d5 42 f3 ♗d4.

42	**f3**	**♔d5**
43	**♗f2**	**♗xf2**
44	**♔xf2**	**g5**
45	**♔g3**	

Now it is far far from easy for Black to get a draw. Regrettably, on resumption I fell into a cunning trap (see an exercise in the section 'A Great Master of the Endgame' in Chapter 2 of *Secrets of Chess Training*) and allowed my opponent to save the game.

Form your Own Opinion

A simpleton believes every word he hears; a clever person watches each step.
Proverbs 14:15

Study of the classical legacy is an obligatory and very important stage in every chessplayer's development. When familiarising yourself with the games of the greatest masters of the past, you should pay particular attention to the strongest aspects of their play, to those qualities which made them stand out among their contemporaries.

The second World Champion. Emanuel Lasker, was renowned above all for his psychological approach to chess and his skill in defending difficult positions. One

of his victories over Siegbert Tarrasch from their World Championship match is considered to be perhaps the most characteristic example of his creative style. I suggest that you first simply play it through on the board without any commentary. Then we shall do some analysis. What is interesting here is the impression you gain of how the game went.

Tarrasch–Lasker

4th match game, Düsseldorf 1908

1	**e4**	**e5**
2	**♘f3**	**♘c6**
3	**♗b5**	**♘f6**
4	**0-0**	**d6**
5	**d4**	**♗d7**
6	**♘c3**	**♗e7**
7	**♖e1**	**exd4**
8	**♘xd4**	**♘xd4**
9	**♕xd4**	**♗xb5**
10	**♘xb5**	**0-0**
11	**♗g5**	**h6**
12	**♗h4**	**♖e8**
13	**♖ad1**	**♘d7**
14	**♗xe7**	**♖xe7**
15	**♕c3**	**♖e5**
16	**♘d4**	**♖c5**
17	**♕b3**	**♘b6**
18	**f4**	**♕f6**
19	**♕f3**	**♖e8**
20	**c3**	**a5**
21	**b3**	**a4**
22	**b4**	**♖c4**
23	**g3**	**♖d8**
24	**♖e3**	**c5**
25	**♘b5**	**cxb4**
26	**♖xd6**	**♖xd6**
27	**e5**	**♖xf4**
28	**gxf4**	**♕g6+**
29	**♔h1**	**♕b1+**
30	**♔g2**	**♖d2+**
31	**♖e2**	**♕xa2**
32	**♖xd2**	**♕xd2+**
33	**♔g3**	**a3**
34	**e6**	**♕e1+**
35	**♔g4**	**♕xe6+**
36	**f5**	**♕c4+**
37	**♘d4**	**a2**
38	**♕d1**	**♘d5**
39	**♕a4**	**♘xc3**
40	**♕e8+**	**♔h7**
41	**♔h5**	**a1(♕)**

White resigned.

Of course, this text, taken as it were from the pages of an express bulletin, is suitable only as a starting-point for subsequently trying to make sense of the events which occurred in this game and the problems which arose. Before drawing definite conclusions, it is necessary to subject the game to careful and unbiased analysis, otherwise our perception of it will be strongly influenced by the apparent pattern of play and the final outcome. As a result, the general picture will turn out to be superficial, if not simply false.

If such a picture, sketched by a great player, gets published, the mistaken conclusions are bound to be reproduced uncritically in subsequent publications and to find their way into anthologies. Regrettably, this has indeed hap-

pened more than once with regard to the writings of some of the leading players of the past, and many of their games have been seen in a false light as chess masterpieces.

In familiarising yourself with a classical game, you should make use of any existing annotations. But do not confine yourself to them—you should analyse for yourself the incidents in the game which interest you. The results of such analysis will at times diverge from the book evaluations; do not be afraid in such cases to rethink the verdicts which have existed for so long—form your own opinion. But, of course, in so doing do not rush to draw conclusions; re-examine your analyses, don't throw the baby out with the bathwater by denying, on the basis of any inaccuracies or errors detected, the positive elements which the study of classical material may be able to give us.

Now let us turn to a concrete study of this duel between two of the leading grandmasters from the start of the century, and also of the notes to it.

"Réti's notes on the 4th game of the match Lasker-Tarrasch (1908), published in his book *Modern Ideas in Chess*, even today serve as an unsurpassed example of this genre of chess literature, as an object of sublime envy on the part of other annotators."

Such is the opinion of Vainstein, the author of a substantial book about Em. Lasker entitled in Russian *Myslitel* ('The Thinker'). I wish to quarrel with this opinion, or rather with the particular picture of this contest which Réti offers us.

This is how Réti sums up his impressions of the duel between Lasker and Tarrasch:

"What do we like about this game? The most to be expected from the amateur is an interest in the unexpected move 27 . . . ♖xf4. But the connoisseur will pay greatest attention to Lasker's idea—as original as it was profound—of transferring his rook to an apparently risky square, in order to free himself from a cramped position. And we should very much like this bold idea to emerge triumphant over more prosaic methods."

"Later we see how Tarrasch begins to close in on the trespassing rook systematically, and we come close to thinking that Black is losing a game which had won our sympathy. But at this point the rook appears on d8, intending not only to rescue the other rook but also to wreck White's position. Then comes a combination by White. The drama approaches a climax. And when everything has been solved happily (. . . ♖c4xf4), we rejoice that a miracle has happened, that this brilliant

idea, for which every pedant would have predicted a sad end, has nonetheless triumphed over all dogma, over all the rules . . . "

"Plato is dear to me but dearer still is truth" (Aristotle). What a pity it is to have to dispel such an impressive picture, but I must.

In order to experience the rejoicing which Réti speaks about, one has to convince oneself that the outcome of this game was actually determined by the triumph of Black's original and bold conception over White's 'ordinary' play—that it was not a crude error which led to Tarrasch's defeat, but that Lasker did indeed outplay his opponent. Alas, it turns out that this was not quite so.

We shall begin from the very beginning, but we can skip through the opening almost without delay.

1	**e4**	**e5**
2	**♘f3**	**♘c6**
3	**♗b5**	**♘f6**
4	**0-0**	**d6**
5	**d4**	**♗d7**
6	**♘c3**	**♗e7**
7	**♖e1**	

E. 2.8 Can Black play 7 . . . 0-0?

7	**. . .**	**exd4**
8	**♘xd4**	**♘xd4**
9	**♕xd4**	**♗xb5**
10	**♘xb5**	**0-0**

In the game Capablanca-



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Thomas, Hastings 1919, there followed: 10 . . . a6 11 ♘c3 0-0 12 ♗g5 ♘d7 13 ♗xe7 ♕xe7 14 ♘d5 and White obtained a freer position.

11	**♗g5**	

Capablanca recommended 11 ♕c3 c6 (11 . . . a6 !?) 12 ♘d4.

11	**. . .**	**h6**
12	**♗h4**	**♖e8**
13	**♖ad1**	

Threatening e4–e5.

13	**. . .**	**♘d7**
14	**♗xe7**	**♖xe7**
15	**♕c3**	



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How can the pawn on c7 be defended? Of course, it is no good playing 15 . . . ♘f6? or 15 . . .

♘c5? because of 16 e5. But entirely possible was 15 . . . ♘f8, not fearing 16 e5?! a6!. White would have replied 16 ♘d4!, provoking a weakening of Black's kingside—16 . . . g6. Thanks to his advantage in space, White would have maintained a lasting initiative, although, of course, Black could quite well have defended successfully.

Lasker, a brilliant tactician, finds an ingenious way to defend the pawn on c7 indirectly.

15 . . . ♖e5!

Now White cannot play 16 ♘xc7?? ♖c5, and 16 ♕xc7? ♖xb5 17 ♕xd6 ♖xb2 18 ♕xd7 ♕xd7 19 ♖xd7 ♖c8! leads to an endgame that is better for Black.

16 ♘d4!

White threatens to play 17 ♘f5 followed by 18 f4. It was possible, of course, for Black to reconcile himself to a slightly inferior position after 16 . . . ♘c5 17 f3 (17 ♘f5? ♘xe4) 17 . . . g6 (weaker is 17 . . . ♕d7 18 ♘f5). But Lasker finds an original way to divert his opponent from applying pressure on the kingside, while avoiding any weakening of his pawn structure.

16 . . . ♖c5!

17 ♕b3

On 17 ♕g3, possible was at least 17 . . . ♕g5.

17 . . . ♘b6

Also worthy of consideration was 17 . . . a5.

Now Black need no longer have any apprehensions about the g7-square, but in order to achieve this he has had to place his rook in a rather awkward position. According to Lasker's philosophy this is how a genuine struggle should be contested: by achieving success in one area at the cost of making concessions in another. Supreme skill is demonstrated by the player who is able to assess which side gains by such an 'exchange'—to sense who has the 'highest trumps'. When you are defending an inferior position, it is particularly important, as we have already noted several times, to be able to change the situation on the board abruptly. In most of the examples already considered the weaker side was prepared to sacrifice material in order to achieve this, but in the present game the great master of defence Em. Lasker 'sacrificed' a positional factor—the placement of his rook.

18 f4

"In the way he handles this game positionally, Tarrasch is inferior to Lasker. He undertakes no counter-manoeuvres but makes merely the most obvious moves, which go without saying. Now he has cut off e5 as a retreat-square for the rook, considering Lasker's rook manoeuvre to be a mistake. But when Lasker transferred his rook to c5 he of course

had no intention of returning it immediately to the e-file" (Réti).

I do not like this note at all. While criticising the move played by Tarrasch (condemning it not even on positional grounds but only because it "goes without saying"), Réti does not suggest any alternative. Having advanced the pawn to f4, White has taken control of the squares e5 and g5 and prepared to close in on his opponent by playing ♕f3, b2–b3 and c3–c4. Just because Tarrasch lost this game it certainly does not follow that all his decisions were mistaken.

18 ... ♕f6
19 ♕f3

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

Q. 2.52 What should Black play?

19 ... ♖e8?

Here we have an excellent opportunity to discuss the pernicious nature of 'natural' moves. This is the moment when Lasker destroys the fruits of the defensive operation begun so splendidly and gets a very difficult position.

Laster also regarded the move he played to have been inaccurate, and suggested 19 . . . a5!?. After 20 b3 a4 21 b4 ♖c4 22 c3 Black, compared with what occurred in the game, simply has an extra tempo. And if 21 c4 (instead of 21 b4) then 21 ... axb3 22 axb3 ♖ca5, when the rook is better placed on a8 than on e8 (this tells, for example, in the variation 23 ♘b5 ♕e7 24 ♕f2 ♖a2).

Nevertheless, also after 19 . . . a5 White's position would have remained somewhat better. A sounder line, which apparently leads to full equality, was found by a young pupil of the Dvoretsky–Yusupov chess school, Candidate Master Ilya Makariev. He suggested 19 ... ♘a4!. Now 20 b3 is not good, since the black pieces get access to the square c3. In the event of 20 ♕b3 ♘b6 21 ♕f3 ♘a4 the game ends in a draw by repetition, and on 20 ♕a3 Black has the worthy reply 20 . . . ♖c4!?. White also achieves nothing after 20 e5 dxe5 21 ♕xb7 ♖d8 22 ♘b3 (22 ♕xa7 ♖xd4 23 ♖xd4 exd4 24 ♕xa4 ♕xf4) 22 . . . ♖xd1 23 ♖xd1 ♖xc2 24 ♕e4 ♕g6! 25 f5 ♕c6.

How can the error committed by Black be explained? I believe that to a certain extent it was due to the peculiarities of Lasker's style. He was a player with an


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exceptional fondness for the concrete, a brilliant tactician, but when it came to strategy he was noticeably weaker (this was particularly apparent during the opening phase of the game). Lasker believed that he could always find a way to correct the strategic shortcomings of his position by tactical means, and more often than not he actually succeeded in doing so. In this instance, realising that his opponent intended to play b2–b3 and c2–c4, the World Champion was probably tempted by the possibility of setting a trap: 20 b3? ♘d5!. For the sake of this he played a move which was not entirely in keeping with his plan.

20 c3! a5

21 b3

Tempting was 21 ♘b3 ♖b5 22 ♕e2, having in mind 22 . . . c6 23 ♘d4 ♖c5 24 ♕f2 with a clear advantage. But Black would reply 22 . . . ♖f5! 23 g3 a4. Also worth considering was 21 . . . ♖c4 (instead of 21 . . . ♖b5) 2 ♘xa5 ♖a4.

21 . . . a4

22 b4?!

Réti doesn't even consider the natural move 22 c4, which would have maintained a noticeable spatial advantage for White. Vainstein recommends in reply 22 . . . axb3 23 axb3 c6 24 ♘f5 d5, but after 25 ♕f2! ♘d7 26 ♘g3 Black's forces are completely tied down and White's advantage becomes overwhelming. Also strong is 25 ♕e3! ♘d7 26 ♕h3 ♖xe4 27 ♖xe4 dxe4 28 ♘d6 (Makariev).

Probably Lasker would have replied 22 . . . axb3 23 axb3 ♖a5, but then 24 ♘b5!, and if 24 . . . ♕e7 then not 25 e5?! d5, but 25 ♕f2. The threat is 26 ♘xd6, and also possible in some lines would be e4–e5 or ♘b5–c3–d5.

It is clear that Black would have had quite a difficult defensive task ahead of him, and that White would have been risking absolutely nothing. These considerations completely nullify any criticism of Tarrasch's previous play.

So, does it turn out that this is where Tarrasch made his mistake? Instead of naturally gaining space he 'dogmatically' continued playing to trap the rook, and for this he was punished. A very tempting conclusion, but unfortunately it is too hasty, since it is refuted by analysis. It turns out that, having

played 22 b4?!, Tarrasch still retained no less an advantage than he would have had after 22 c4. So why do I consider the move played to be dubious (this is what is meant by the '?!')?

Nowadays we understand very well (to a great extent thanks to Lasker) that, *when assessing a particular decision, it is necessary to take not only its objective strength into account, but also its psychological aspects—the various accompanying circumstances.*

After 22 c4 the position is clear-cut, making White's subsequent play simpler. After 22 b4 the position is more complicated and less standard. Lasker was superior to his opponent in tactical play, better able to find his bearings in dynamic situations. Besides, he was considerably younger than Tarrasch, and so he was stronger and had more stamina. It is quite clear who would benefit if the game were to become more confused.

22 ... ♖c4

23 g3

After the thrust White had planned, ♘b5, he would have had to reckon with the counter . . . d6–d5. In this case it is important that the pawn on f4 be defended.

23 ... ♖d8

Lasker prepares to counter with . . . c7–c5, which is the only real resource he has (if we ignore . . . a4–a3 followed by . . . ♘a4).



The immediate 23 . . . c5? would be refuted by 24 ♘b5.

24 ♖e3?

Commenting upon this move, Réti writes: "Lasker has outplayed his opponent, who has no positional defence at all against the threat . . . c7–c5. Therefore Tarrasch seeks a solution in a combination, which, however, like most combinations born of desperation, does not succeed".

Again, a typical case of 'being wise after the event'. What grounds does White have for desperation? By playing, for example, 24 a3 c5 25 ♘b5, would he really have been taking any risk? More likely the other way round: here it would be Black who would still have to demonstrate that he has a way to achieve equality. Also entirely possible was 24 e5 dxe5 25 ♖xe5.

As a matter of fact the question here is a different one: how can White obtain an advantage? To do this he needs to find a "positional defence against the threat

. . . c7–c5". Contrary to Réti's opinion, such a defence does exist, and there is actually more than one.

An interesting and subtle prophylactic move was suggested by Rellstab: 24 ♕e3! Now it is not good to play 24 . . . c5 in view of 25 ♘b5, when the pawn on c5 is pinned. And White plans to continue his operation to trap the rook, by playing (in one order or another) the moves ♘b5, ♖d3, ♘a3. On 24 . . . ♖e8 there follows 25 ♕d3 ♘d8 26 ♘b5, threatening 27 c5 or 27 ♖e3. In the event of 24 . . . a3 25 ♘b5 ♘a4 (25 . . . c6 26 ♕xb6 cxb6 27 e5) there is no point in playing 26 ♖d4? because of the exchange sacrifice 26 . . . ♘xc3! 27 ♖xc4 ♘xb5 with a solid position for Black. Stronger is 26 e5! dxe5 27 fxe5 ♕e7 28 ♖xd8+ ♕xd8 29 e6 ♕e7 30 ♕d3 with a decisive advantage (Black's rook and knight are now out of play).

Another possibility to prevent the breakthrough . . . c7–c5 is the modest move 24 ♖b1! (pointed out by Chernin), after which 24 . . . c5 25 bxc5 dxc5 26 e5 would certainly not suit Black. White however plans ♖e3 (maybe first ♕d3 and only then ♖e3) followed by ♘d4–b5–a3. It is not easy to oppose this plan with anything convincing. On 24 . . . a3 there follows, of course, 25 ♖b3.

Finally, I should also mention a suggestion made by Makariev: 24 ♖d3!. If 24 . . . c5 then 25 bxc5 ♖xc5 (25 . . . dxc5 26 ♘b5) 26 ♖b1, winning the pawn on b7.

So, we have convinced ourselves that at the decisive point in this game Lasker not only did not outplay his opponent but, on the contrary, found himself in a very difficult position. Tarrasch on the other hand had played excellently up until now, but here, regrettably, two mistakes from him changed the logical course of the game completely.

24	**. . .**	**c5**
25	**♘b5?**	

Tarrasch continues the mistaken combination begun with his previous move. Meanwhile, as Teichmann rightly noted, by playing 25 bxc5! ♖xc5 (bad is 25 . . . dxc5? 26 e5 or 26 ♘b5) 26 ♖b1 ♘c4 27 ♖d3 followed by ♘d4–c2–e3, White would have stood at any rate no worse.

25	**. . .**	**cxb4**
26	**♖xd6**	**♖xd6**
27	**e5**	**♖xf4!**

Tarrasch had of course overlooked this counter-punch. But his combination would have been incorrect even if Black had not had this reply. Indeed, also very strong was 27 . . . ♖d1+!? 28 ♕xd1 ♕c6.

Here we shall conclude our examination of this game and consider why the picture painted by such a subtle connoisseur as Richard Réti was so misleading.

It is a characteristic of every chessplayer that he will see in any material being studied precisely that which he is looking for. In his own tournament play Réti always strove to produce games forming a consistent whole, with a single plan running through them. He usually annotated the games of other grandmasters in precisely the same vein. While not denying the educational importance of such a method of annotation, it is impossible not to see at the same time its obvious defects, to which, incidentally, Em. Lasker himself referred in his famous *Chess Manual*: "The plan of an entire game should not be conditional upon a single motif as advanced by Réti; such a motif is too meagre for this purpose. Réti's considerations are correct and valuable as long as they are substantiated by analysis. But when he abandons the foundations of analysis in order to draw too bold, too general a conclusion, then his arguments are mistaken".

What interests me most in chess is the problem of the search for the best move and the taking of decisions. The game Tarrasch–Lasker contains quite a few instructive episodes of this nature, for example:

1. The bold and non-standard transfer of the black rook onto the fifth rank, with the aim of changing the situation on the board and diverting White from an attack on the king.

2. The connection between the mistake committed by Lasker on his 19th move and his style of play. The logical comparison of the various possibilities when calculating variations, which could have helped Black to prefer 19 . . . a5!? to the move he played in the game.

3. The problem of White's choice on his 22nd move. Taking psychological factors into account when choosing a plan. Note particularly: here it is not possible to say unambiguously what is better and what is worse. In chess we constantly come up against problems such as these, which do not have an exact solution. These problems frequently turn out to be the most interesting and instructive.

4. The skill of 'prophylactic thinking', which could have prompted the correct decision on White's 24th move.

5. The final blow inflicted by the 'desperado rook'. The term 'desperado' (which comes from a Spanish word meaning 'the desperate one', 'frantic') was suggested by Lasker. In the course of a game particular pieces or pawns may become the weak points of one's position—they may prove to be vulnerable or may hinder the interaction of one's own forces. These pieces then have an urge to sacrifice themselves, they

become 'desperados'. A chess-player needs to keep a most careful eye on possible manifestations of activity on the part of such pieces or pawns before they die. Tarrasch did not . . .

Having studied a game and identified the ideas which interest us, it is useful to find or remember other examples on the same theme. It will be interesting, for example, to compare the Tarrasch–Lasker encounter with the following ending.

Levitina–Alexandria

11th game, Women's Candidates Semi-Final, Dubna 1983



The pawn on c4 is under attack. White (who, incidentally, was already short of time) also had to reckon with the manoeuvre . . . ♘c7–a6–b4(b8)–c6, which would give Black the advantage if she could carry it out.

Levitina played **22 ♖e4?!**, after which her opponent immediately forgot about any sort of manoeuvring with the knight, as she found it impossible to resist a plan directed against the white rook incarcerated on the edge of the board.

22 . . . f5!?

22 . . . ♘a6!?.

23 ♖h4 ♗f6?

Black should have moved the knight. The exchange of bishops is based on standard logic in such situations: it is necessary to exchange off as many as possible of one's opponent's good pieces, in order to leave him/her only with bad ones. But after the disappearance of the bishops the black king becomes vulnerable, and this turns out to be a more important factor.

But Alexandria was not the only one who had assessed this position incorrectly. At this moment her trainers—the present author and Grandmasters Eingorn and Palatnik—were sitting in the viewing hall, discussing the course of the game and thinking precisely the same thoughts. It was as if the rook on h4 had us all mesmerised. After the game I began to understand better how Tarrasch must have felt.

24 ♗g5 ♗xg5

Both players overlooked a tactical possibility: 24 . . . ♖xa2!? 25 ♕xa2 ♗xg5. To be fair, I should note that by continuing 25 ♕d7! (instead of 25 ♕xa2?) 25 . . . ♕xd7 26 ♖xd7 ♗xg5 27 ♖hxh7

♗f6 28 ♖xc7 ♗d4 29 ♖h6 White could have obtained a draw.

25 ♕xg5 ♖a7

If Black can now manage to play . . . ♘a6 and . . . ♖d7, her position will immediately be completely winning. But . . .

26 ♖d6! ♘a8?

A move which is wrong on principle: who needs the pawn on b6? More logical was 26 . . . ♘a6. But it turns out that this does not have any particular significance—Black has played rather too 'quietly' and now retribution must follow.



Q. 2.53 How should White continue?

White has two 'desperado' pieces at the same time: the rook on h4 and the bishop on h3. Their tendency to sacrifice themselves must be taken into careful consideration by both sides. Alas, both Levitina and Alexandria were not sufficiently familiar with Lasker's ideas and so did not notice a beautiful combination flowing from them. But the spectators in the hall didn't see it either—I only discovered the solution after the game.

White could have obtained a winning position with 27 ♗xf5!! exf5 28 ♖xh7!! ♖xh7 (28 . . . ♔xh7 29 ♖xg6 ♔h8 30 ♖h6+ ♖h7 31 ♕f6+ ♔g8 32 ♖g6+) 29 ♖xg6+ ♔f8 30 ♖g8+ ♔f7 31 ♕g6+ ♔e7 32 ♕xh7+. It is clear that the same combination would also be possible with the black knight on a6.

27 ♕d2?

From a positional point of view this is a reasonable move, preventing the exchange of rooks. But, of course, it wasn't the best move!

27 . . . ♕c7

With the threat of 28 . . . ♖xa2.

28 a4 ♕g7

Intending 29 ♕a1+ and 30 . . . ♕xa4. Despite the exposed position of the rook on h4, after 29 ♗f1! Black apparently has no advantage. She cannot simplify the game or quickly transfer the knight to a better position (here, having played the knight to a6 and then 28 . . . ♘b4 or 28 . . . ♘b8 instead of her last move, Black would have had a winning position). White meanwhile would have a useful (although very lengthy) plan of action: g3–g4–g5, and then either ♖h6 and h2–h4–h5, or f3–f4 and ♖h3.

In a time scramble there followed:

29	**♔g2?**	**♖xa4!**
30	**♖d7**	**♖e7**
31	**♖d8+**	**♔f7**
32	**♖e4**	

White has not exploited the psychological advantages of her 'Laskerian rook', although she could have done so, and now, taking advantage of the opportunity, she brings it back home.

32	**...**	**♘c7!**
33	**♖e1?!**	**♖xc4**

Black has a decisive advantage. However, this adventure was not the end of it, and later in the game a terrible blunder in time-trouble cost Alexandria the full point.

The ending which we have just examined demonstrates convincingly the need to be familiar with our classical heritage. Situations which occurred in the games of the leading players of the past repeat themselves, as you see, even today.

Exercises for Analysis

E. 2.9



The black knight is attacked. It is possible, of course, simply to retreat it to g5, but other possibilities also deserve consideration.

What would you recommend for Black?

E. 2.10



White clearly intends to sacrifice his bishop on f7. Should Black hurry with his counter-attack on the queenside—18 ... b4—or is it better to confine himself to the defensive move 18 ... ♘e8?

E. 2.11



Black is faced with a difficult choice. He may play quietly, but highly tempting is a spectacular breakthrough on the kingside with 20 . . . g5

What decision would you take? And how in the event of 20 . . . g5 would you begin to defend as White?

Solutions to Analytical Exercises

(An asterisk signifies that the position occurred only in analysis.)

E. 1.1 Petrosian–Dvoretsky
blitz game, Liepaja 1975

At first it seemed to me that White can defend by means of 27 ♖a8+ ♔xg7 28 ♕a1+ ♔h6 (28 . . . ♔f7 29 ♖f8+!) 29 ♕c1! e3 30 ♘xe3 g5 31 ♗f3, but I soon noticed after 27 ♖a8+ ♔xg7 28 ♕a1+ the winning move 28 . . . ♖f6!.

Much stronger was **27 ♗e5!!** ♕xe5 28 ♖a8+. What can Black do now? After 28 . . . ♔g7 29 ♕a1 or 28 . . . ♔f7 29 ♘xf4 ♕xf4 30 ♖f1 the queens are exchanged. That only leaves 28 . . . ♖f8, but then 29 ♖xf8+ ♔xf8 30 ♖f1+ ♔g8 (30 . . . ♔g7 31 ♕a1) 31 ♖f4 and Black's attack is beaten off, since in the event of 31 . . . c6 32 bxc6 bxc6, White proceeds to a decisive counter-attack with 33 ♕a4! ♔g7 34 ♕a8!.

It is a shame, but I have to admit that Black's combination could have been refuted.

E. 1.2 Dvoretsky–Volovich
*USSR Ch., Kharkov 1967**

1 ♖h7+! ♔xh7 2 ♗f5+ ♔g7 3 ♗xe4 and Black loses a piece.

E. 1.3 Dvoretsky–Rafalsky
blitz game, Moscow 1967

1 ♕xf6! ♖xd1+ 2 ♖xd1 gxf6 3 ♖d8+ ♔g7 4 ♘f5+ ♔g6 5 ♖g8+ ♔h5 6 g4 mate.

E. 1.4 Dolmatov–Plachetka
Hradec Kralove 1981

21 ♘xb5! axb5 22 ♕xb5, when White wins his piece back and remains after 22 . . . ♘xd5 23 exd5 ♖xe3 24 ♗xe3 with a sound extra pawn.

E. 1.5 Kupreichik–Yusupov
Yerevan Zonal 1982

12 . . . ♘d5!!

The knight is heading for e3, and it cannot be captured because of mate: 13 exd5 ♕xd5 14 ♘f2 ♖ae8+ 15 ♘e4 ♖xe4+ 16 dxe4 ♕xe4+. In the game there followed:

13 ♕h5 ♘e3
14 ♔e2

Also hopeless was 14 ♘g5 h6 15 ♘e6 ♕f6 16 ♘xf8 ♖xf8 17 ♕e2 ♘e5 18 c3 dxc3 19 ♕xe3 cxb2 20 ♖b1 ♘f3+.

14	**. . .**	**g6!**
15	**♕h6**	**♕d7**
16	**♕h4**	**♗xd2**
17	**♔xd2**	**♘e5**
18	**♘xg5**	**♖f2+**
19	**♔c1**	**♘xd3+**
20	**♔b1**	**♘xb2**

White resigned.

E. 1.6 Voloshin–Dvoretsky

Moscow 1970

If Black does not capture on c3 then his pawn structure in the centre will fall apart. But if he does take, how can he answer 27 ♖xd5? A combination comes to the rescue.

26	**. . .**	**dxc3!**
27	**♖xd5**	

27 bxc3 ♔e6 with an excellent position for Black.

27	**. . .**	**♔e6**

Otherwise 28 bxc3.

28	**♖ed1**	**c2!**
29	**♖d6+**	**♔e7!**

The idea of the combination! Bad is 29 . . . ♔f5 30 ♖c1.

30	**♖xd7+**	**♔e8**

Black regains the rook and gets a roughly equal rook ending. The game finished in a draw.

E. 1.7 Dvoretsky–Katalymov

friendly game, Riga 1977

22	**♕xd7+!!**	**♔xd7**

Or 22 . . . ♖xd7 23 ♖c8+ ♗xc8 24 ♖xc8+ ♖d8 25 ♗c6+ ♔f8 26 ♖xd8 mate.

23	**♖c7+**	**♔e8**
24	**d7+!**	**♖xd7**
25	**♖c8+**	**♗xc8**
26	**♖xc8+**	**♖d8**
27	**♗c6**	mate.

E. 1.8 Botvinnik–Smyslov

18th match game, Moscow 1958

In the game there followed: 23 ♗h3? ♘e5 24 ♘xe5 fxe5 25 f4? (25 f3! ♗d7! 26 ♖1e2 with equality) 25 . . . ♗c6 26 ♕g5?!, and here Smyslov, by playing 26 . . . ♖de8?, missed his opportunity to win by force with 26 . . . ♖d2! 27 ♗e6+ ♖f7! 28 ♗xf7+ ♔xf7. But earlier White had missed a win:

23	**♘d4!!**	**♘xd4**

If 23 . . . cxd4 then 24 ♗d5+! ♖xd5 (or 24 . . . ♔h8 25 ♖e7) 25 ♖e8!.

24	**♖e7!**	

Botvinnik did not just make a mistake in the game, but also in his analysis, where he gave 24 ♗d5+! (the exclamation mark is Botvinnik's) 24 . . . ♖xd5 25 ♖e7, but in this case Black can save the game with 25 . . . ♘e2+! 26 ♔f1 (not 26 ♖7xe2? ♖d1!, or 26 ♖1xe2? ♖d1+ 27 ♔g2 ♗c6+ 28 f3 ♗xf3+) 26 . . . ♖f7 27 ♖xf7 ♔xf7 28 ♕xh7+ ♔f8 (this was found by pupils of the Dvoretsky-Yusupov school when doing their homework).

24	**. . .**	**♖f7**
25	**♗d5!**	

Also winning was 25 ♖xf7 ♘e2+ 26 ♖xe2 ♖d1+ 27 ♗f1 ♖xf1+ 28 ♔xf1 ♕d1+ 29 ♖e1 ♗b5+ 30 ♔g2 ♕d5+ 31 f3 (or 31 ♔h3) 31 . . . ♕xf7 32 ♕f4, but 25 ♗d5! is simpler and more convincing.

25	**. . .**	**♘f3+**
26	**♔h1**	**♕xf2**
27	**♗xf7+**	**♔h8**
28	**♖e8+!**	

"My old 'illness'—weak combinational vision—was to blame" was how Botvinnik summed this up.

E. 1.9 Ivanchuk–Dolmatov

Manila IZ 1990

Black's position is alarming. Bad would be 10 . . . f6? 11 ♕h5+ g6 12 ♘xg6. If Black prepares the move . . . f7–f6 with 10 . . . g6, then 11 ♖e1 f6 (on 11 . . . ♗g7 the same reply follows) 12 ♘xc6! ♗xc6 13 ♕f1. Finally, in the event of 10 . . . ♕e6 11 ♖e1 ♗e7 White continues 12 ♘b3 (also possible is 12 ♕f1 at once) 12 . . . c5 13 ♕f1 with dangerous threats.

Have we taken all of Black's candidate moves into consideration? No, there is one other, not noticed by Ivanchuk during analysis, which Dolmatov found over the board.

10	**. . .**	**♔d8!!**

Black has created the threat of 11 . . . f6. Since the endgame arising after 11 ♖e1 f6 offers White few prospects (the extra pawn will be defended with . . . c6–c5), Ivanchuk had to decide on a debatable piece sacrifice.

11	**♘b3**	**f6**
12	**♗g5**	

Worthy of consideration was Anand's recommendation: 12 f4!?.

12	**. . .**	**fxg5**
13	**♘a5**	

13 ♘xd4 ♔c7.

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

13	**. . .**	**♕e8!**

Another subtle defensive move. It would be premature to play 13 . . . ♔c7? in view of 14 ♕a6, but now Black is indeed ready to play 14 . . . ♔c7 15 ♕a6 ♕c8!. Unfortunately, here the game came to an end—the players agreed to a draw. I doubt whether White has sufficient compensation for the sacrificed piece.

E. 1.10 Mochalov–Dvoretsky

Minsk 1972

I carelessly played 22 . . . ♔g8?, having underestimated 23 ♖xf6! gxf6 24 ♕d7. If now 24 . . . ♘e8

then 25 ♕b7 ♖d8 26 ♕xb6, gathering a rich harvest of black pawns. But also after 24 . . . ♕d2 25 ♕xd6 (no less strong is 25 ♖f3) 25 . . . ♕xc3 26 ♕xf6 White would obtain a winning position.

Of course, I should have prevented the exchange sacrifice by playing **22 . . . ♖h6!**, when Black's position is to be preferred.

E. 1.11 Gorelov–Dvoretsky

Moscow 1976

Black has planned the moves . . . ♔d7, . . . ♕h5 and . . . ♖g4. But which one should he play first?

Mistaken is 21 . . . ♔d7? because of 22 ♘e4!. But also in the event of 21 . . . ♖g4? White complicates the game with 22 ♕f3 ♔d7 23 ♘e4!, or 22 . . . ♘e7 23 b4!. In view of these variations, I chose the most accurate move order: **21 . . . ♕h5!**, planning . . . ♔d7, . . . ♖g4 and . . . ♖bg8 with the advantage.

E. 1.12 G. Kuzmin–Dolmatov

Minsk 1982

An insignificant distance separates victory from defeat—just one move. Playing directly for mate with 25 ♖xd8? ♖xd8 26 ♕h6 leads to quite the opposite result: 26 . . . ♕xb1+! 27 ♔xb1 ♖d1+ 28 ♕c1 ♗a2+!. But Kuzmin's choice 25 ♖hd3? was no better, in view of 25 . . . ♗a2!. Having calculated the variation 26 ♕h6 ♕xb1+ 27 ♔d2 ♖xd3+ 28 cxd3 ♕xb2+ followed by 29 . . . ♕xf6, White resigned.

But with **25 ♖dd3!!** (with the irresistible threat 26 ♕h6) White could have forced his opponent to capitulate.

E. 1.13 Klovsky–Dvoretsky

USSR Peoples' Spartakiad, Moscow 1979

Black stands better. If on 26 . . . ♕d6 my opponent were forced to reply 27 ♕e2, then by playing 27 . . . ♕c6 I would increase my positional advantage. But it was necessary to examine the most testing reply 27 e4!.

Tempting looks 27 . . . fxe4 28 fxe4 ♘f6 29 e5 ♕d5 30 ♕d3+ ♕e4 with a clear advantage to Black. But instead of 29 e5? White can play 29 ♕d3!, and if 29 . . . ♕c6 then 30 d5. On the immediate 27 . . . ♘f6, there also follows 28 ♕d3!. For example: 28 . . . ♕xh2 29 exf6 with an unclear position.

So, after 26 . . . ♕d6? 27 e4! Black cannot succeed in securely blockading the enemy pawns and the game becomes sharper, and that means that Black should not play this move, so we need to find a suitable alternative which meets the requirements of the position.

In the game there followed: **26 . . . ♘f6!** 27 b3?! ♕d6! 28 ♕e2 ♕c6, and Black obtained an appreciable positional advantage.

E. 1.14 Dvoretsky–Alburt
USSR Ch. Semi-Final, Voronezh 1973

It is tempting to maintain the connected pawns in the centre, but straightforward examination forces White to reject this idea. 24 d6? ♖f5 25 b4 a5 and White's pawn chain is destroyed; 24 e4? exd5 25 exd5 (25 ♘xd5 ♖f7 and 26 . . . ♖e8) 25 . . . ♖f4! followed by . . . ♖c4 or . . . ♖d4.

Since there is no particular point in playing 24 ♘e4 ♖f5, only one plan remains for White—to eliminate the pawn on d3 as quickly as possible with the rook.

24	**♖d1!**	**exd5**
25	**♘xd5**	**♖f7**
26	**♖xd3**	

A complicated ending has arisen, giving chances to both sides. Alburt chose an incorrect plan and I managed to win.

26	**. . .**	**♖e8?**

Correct was 26 . . . ♖af8

27	**♖d4!**	

Not allowing 27 . . . ♖e4.

27	**. . .**	**♔g7**
28	**b4**	**♖f5**
29	**b5**	**♖fe5?**

29 . . . ♖e6.

30	**c6**	**bxc6**
31	**bxc6**	**♖c8**

31 . . . ♖e4 32 ♘c7!.

32	**c7**	**♔f7**
33	**e4**	**♖ee8**
34	**♖a4**	**♖a8**
35	**♖a6!**	**♖e6**
36	**♖xa7**	**♖c8**
37	**♔f2**	**♔e8**
38	**a4**	**♔d7**
39	**a5**	**♔d6**
40	**♖a6+**	**♔e5**
41	**♖xe6+**	**♔xe6**
42	**a6**	**♔d6**
43	**a7**	**♖f8+**
44	**♔e3**	**♔c6**
45	**c8(♕)+**	

Black resigned.

E. 1.15 Yusupov–Lputyan
USSR Ch., 1st League, Frunze 1979

The simple move **23 ♘xc3!** was also the best. White has obtained a serious advantage. On 23 . . . ♖e5, strong are both 24 e4, intending ♘d5, and 24 ♕e2!? (threatening 25 ♕g4+) followed by 25 ♕c4.

Yusupov wanted more and played 23 ♕e4?, attacking the bishop and both rooks simultaneously. He had reckoned only with 23 . . . ♕d8 and, unfortunately, had underestimated his opponent's counter-attack: 23 . . . ♖cd8! 24 ♕xe7 (24 ♘xc3 ♕xc3 25 ♕xe7 is only sufficient for equality) 24 . . . c2 25 ♘b2 ♕c3. There followed: 26 ♕b7 ♖5d7 27 ♕b5 a6 28 ♕b6 (if 28 ♕c4? then not 28 . . . ♕xb2? 29 ♖a2 with advantage to White, but 28 . . . ♕xc4! 29 ♘xc4 ♖d1 30 ♘b2 ♖xa1 31 ♖xa1 ♖b8) 28 . . . ♖d6. Drawn, in view of perpetual attack on the queen: 29 ♕b7 ♖6d7 30 ♕b6 ♖d6.

E. 1.16 Gutman–Dvoretsky
Tbilisi 1979

If Black retreats the queen from the diagonal h3–c8 (for example, 22 . . . ♕e7), White has the tactical trick 23 ♘f6! gxf6 (23 . . . ♗xc1 24 ♘xh7; 23 . . . ♘e6 24 ♗xe6) 24 ♗xf4 with the threat 25 ♖d7. This means that it is necessary to choose between the squares e6 and f5.

In the game there followed: 22 . . . ♕f5? 23 gxh6 ♕g6 (23 . . . gxh6 24 ♗xf4 ♕xf4 25 ♕e3) 24 ♖d7! ♘e6 25 hxg7+ ♘xg7 26 ♗d2! ♕xd2 27 ♕xd2 ♖f3 28 ♔h2 with an unclear position.

It was necessary to play **22 . . . ♕e6!**, leaving the f-file free for the rook. In this case Black could have obtained an advantage after, for example, 23 gxh6 gxh6 24 ♗d2 ♗xd2 25 ♕xd2 ♖f3!.

E. 1.17 Yusupov–Gulko
Reykjavik 1990

The game would have been drawn after **31 . . . ♔h8!** 32 ♘xg6+! fxg6 (also possible is 32 . . . ♔g8 33 ♘e7+ ♔h8) 33 ♗f6! ♖b7 34 ♗xe2 ♖xe2 35 ♗xg7+ ♖xg7 36 ♕f4!.

Gulko overestimated his chances and played for a win (but as it turned out—for a loss) with **31 . . . ♔f8?**. There followed:

32 ♕xh7 ♘f4+
33 ♔h2 ♔e8
34 ♕g8+!

34 ♕xg7+? ♖xf1 and Black does actually win.

34 . . . ♗f8

34 . . . ♔d7 35 ♕xf7 ♖xf1 36 ♘c6+! ♔xc6 37 ♕xc4+ ♔d7 38 ♕xb3.

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

35 ♘xg6!!

This was the move that evidently fell outside Black's field of vision. Bad is 35 . . . ♘xg6 36 ♗xc4.

35 . . . fxg6
36 ♕xc4 ♖xf1
37 ♕xf4!

Not so convincing is 37 ♕xb3 ♔xd8 38 ♕c4 ♖xf2+ 39 ♔g3 ♘xh3!.

37 . . . ♖xa3
38 ♗h4?!

An inaccuracy in time-trouble. Much stronger was 38 ♗f6!. But the bishop ending which arose in the game after 38 . . . ♖aa1 39 ♕e4+ ♔f7 40 ♕f3+ ♔g8 41 ♕d5+ ♔g7 42 ♕b7+ ♔g8 43 ♗g3 ♖h1+ 44 ♕xh1 ♖xh1+ 45 ♔xh1 turned out to be winning.

E. 1.18 Gutman–Razuvaev
USSR Cup, Tbilisi 1976
Black should not take on b4, since after **10 ... ♗xb4?** 11 ♗xf6 gxf6 (11 ... ♕xf6 12 ♘xd5 is clearly better for White) White wins back the pawn with a little combination, based on a double attack: 12 ♘xd5!! ♕xd5 13 ♕a4, and Black cannot play either 13 ... ♗h3 14 ♘f4, or 13 ... ♗e7 14 ♕xe8 ♗h3 15 ♘f4!.

In the game Gutman did not notice the combination and played the weaker 12 ♕b3?, and after 12 ... ♗xc3 13 ♘xc3 c6 14 ♕d1 f5 15 ♕h5 ♕f6 did not obtain real compensation for the sacrificed pawn.

E. 1.19 Khodos–Mikenas
USSR Ch., Yerevan 1962
In the game there followed: 25 ... ♗a8? 26 f3 ♖xe5 27 ♖c7, and White subsequently converted his positional advantage into victory.

Black could have obtained a draw by temporarily sacrificing the bishop: **25 ... ♖xe5!**. For example: 26 ♘xb7 ♖d5 27 g3 ♖d7, or 26 f3 ♖d5! 27 ♘xf7 ♔xf7 28 ♖c7+ ♔f6 29 ♖xb7 ♖d1+ 30 ♔f2 ♖d2+ 31 ♔g3 ♖xb2.

E. 1.20 Dolmatov–Yurtaev
World Junior Ch., qualifying tournament, Sochi 1978
31 e6! ♗xe6 32 ♖ae1 ♗d7 33 ♖xe8+ ♗xe8 34 ♖e1 ♗c6 35 ♗d4. Since Black cannot play 35 ... ♖d7?? 36 ♖e8 mate, White wins the exchange, for which Black has no real compensation.

Unfortunately, Dolmatov played less forcibly and only achieved success thanks to an error from his opponent in return: 31 c4? dxc4 32 bxc4 ♗f5 33 ♗e2 ♘f7? (33 ... ♗g4+! would have been unclear) 34 g4! ♘xg5 35 gxf5 ♘e4 36 f6! ♖d7 37 ♗f2 ♖d2 38 ♖ae1 ♘xf6 (38 ... g5 39 ♔g1 gxf4 40 ♗f3) 39 ♗f3 ♘h5 (more stubborn was 39 ... ♘fd7) 40 ♗xh5 gxh5 41 f5 ♘xc4 and Black resigned.

E. 1.21 Bareev–Dolmatov
USSR Ch., Premier League, Kiev 1986
The black pieces are getting ready to pounce on the enemy king, which has strayed into their territory. But catching it is not that simple. In the game there followed: 26 ... ♖a8? 27 ♕b7 ♗c6 (27 ... ♖cb8? 28 ♘f5!; 27 ... ♗g6? 28 ♕xb5) 28 ♕b6 ♖xa2 29 ♖a1 with an unclear position.

In order to attack the bishop with the rooks it is first necessary to deprive the white knight of the square f5. Dolmatov considered 26 ... ♗d7? but rejected this move in view of 27 e4! ♖a8 28 ♕b7 ♖cb8 29 e5! ♕e6 30 ♕c7.

Black could have won with **26 ... ♗g6!!**. Now after 27 e4 ♖a8 28 e5 or 28 ♕b7 ♖cb8 29 e5 the

black queen can retreat to d8, but the white queen has no retreat squares. Just as hopeless is 27 ♕a5 ♘c6 28 ♕a6 ♖c7! 29 e4 ♖a7 30 e5 ♕e6(d7).

E. 1.22 Yusupov–Timman

Reykjavik 1988

White could have won by force with **38 e6!** ♖xd6 39 e7 ♗c6 40 ♖f8+ ♔h7 41 ♗f5+! g6 42 ♖d8 ♖f6 43 ♗d7 ♗xd7 44 ♖xd7. Yusupov did not notice the intermediate check 41 ♗f5+!, and chose 38 g3? ♔h7 39 ♗g2 ♗xg2 40 ♔xg2 ♔g6 41 ♖f8, but Timman had the defence 41 ... ♘b2!, after which it turned out to be impossible to convert his extra pawn into victory.

E. 1.23 Dvoretsky–Alburt

USSR Ch., Premier League, Yerevan 1975

White needs to do something, as his opponent wishes to play 36 ... d3. It seems tempting to play 36 ♕f5 ♖xc7 37 ♖b1, but Black has the beautiful defence 37 ... ♖d7!! 38 ♕xd7 (38 ♖b8+ ♖d8) 38 ... ♕xa2+ 39 ♔h3 ♕xb1 with a winning queen ending.

Once this variation has been found, the solution becomes clear: it is necessary to move the king so as to prevent the check.

36 ♔h3!

If now 36 ... d3 then 37 ♕f5!, after which Black would lose in the variation 37 ... ♖xc7? 38 ♖b1 g6 39 ♖b8+ ♔g7 40 ♕e5+ f6 41 ♕e8. Black has to force a draw with 37 ... ♕a6! 38 ♖b1 (38 ♕xd5 ♕e6+; 38 ♖c6 ♕b7 39 ♕xd5 d2!, but not 39 ... ♖f8? 40 ♖c5!) 38 ... g6! 39 ♕xd5 (39 ♕d7 d2 40 ♖b8 d1(♕)) 39 ... ♔g7 40 ♖b8 d2!.

On 36 ... g6 White plays 37 ♖c6 with the threat of 38 ♖xg6+.

The game finished as follows:

36	**...**	**♕b6**
37	**♕xd5**	**♕e6+**
38	**♕xe6**	**fxe6**
39	**f4**	**♔f7**

$\frac{1}{2}$–$\frac{1}{2}$

I did not risk playing 40 ♔h4 because of 40 ... e5! 41 fxe5 ♔e6 42 ♖c5 ♔f5.

E. 1.24 Dolmatov–Lputyan

Manila IZ 1990

White has an extra pawn, but the black pieces are active and the threat of ... ♕b2 is unpleasant. Dolmatov found a way to release the tension to his advantage:

25	**♘d4!**	**♕b2**
26	**♖e1**	**♘xd4**
27	**♖xd4**	**♖xd4**

Bad is 27 ... ♕xc2 28 ♖xc4+ dxc4 29 ♖c1.

28	**♕xd4**	**♕xc2**(*244*)
29	**♔h2!!**	

The 'point' of the operation conceived by Dolmatov. The hasty 29 ♖e3? would have led to an unclear position after 29 ... ♕b1+ 30 ♔h2 c2 31 ♖c3+

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♔b7, and if 32 ♕d2 then 32 ... ♗a4. But now White does threaten 30 ♖e3, winning the important pawn on c3. For example: 29 ... ♔b7 30 ♖e3 ♖xf2 (30 ... ♕d2 31 ♖d3) 31 ♗xf2 ♕xf2 32 ♕xc3 ♕xh4+ (not 32 ... d4 33 ♕xd4 ♗c6 because of 34 ♖e4!) 33 ♖h3, when White has excellent winning chances.

29	**...**	**♕d2**
30	**♕xd2**	**cxd2**
31	**♖d1**	**♔b7**
32	**♖xd2**	

And Dolmatov successfully turned his extra pawn into a win. As you see, sometimes one's king can be safely hidden away from unpleasant checks at the very climax of a combination, not just before it begins.

E. 1.25 Simic–Dvoretsky

match USSR-Yugoslavia, Tallinn 1977

Black would like to exchange rooks, in order then to direct his king towards the centre of the board. But an immediate exchange of rooks would not promise much—first it is necessary to lure the white b-pawn forward.

24	**...**	**♖a4!**
25	**b5**	

If 25 fxe4 then not 25 ... ♖xb4? in view of 26 ♘f5+, but firstly the intermediate check 25 ... ♗g4+!, and only after 26 ♘f3 then 26 ... ♖xb4 with an advantage.

25	**...**	**♖a2+**
26	**♖d2**	

Also bad is 26 ♔f1 exf3.

26	**...**	**exf3+**
27	**gxf3**	**♖xd2+**
28	**♔xd2**	**♔d6**

With a white pawn on b5 it is quite elementary to win the minor-piece ending.

29	**b6**	**♔c5**
30	**♔c3**	**♔xb6**
31	**e4**	

31 ♔c4 ♗e6+; 31 ♔b4 g5; 31 ♘b3 ♗e6.

31	**...**	**g5**

More accurate than 31 ... ♔c5 32 ♘b3+ and ♔d4.

32	**♔b4**	**♗e6**
33	**♘e2**	**♔c6**
34	**f4**	**♔d6!**
35	**fxg5**	**hxg5**
36	**♔c3**	**♔e5**
37	**♔d3**	**♗d7!**
38	**♘d4**	**♔f4**
39	**♘b3**	**♔f3**
40	**♘c5**	**♗c8**
41	**e5**	**g4**

White resigned.

E. 1.26 Dvoretsky–Kremenetsky
Moscow 1976

White must exchange dark-squared bishops. On 22 ♗d6 the best defence is 22 . . . ♗c8. It is possible to deprive the bishop of the c7-square with the *Zwischenzug* **22 ♗c7!**, which is more accurate than the immediate 22 ♗d6.

22	**. . .**	**♖c8**
23	**♗d6**	

The only playable reply now is 23 . . . b6, but even then after 24 ♗xe7 Black's position is difficult. The attempt to take advantage of the now vacant square d8 for the bishop only made my task easier: 23 . . . ♗d8? 24 ♘c5 ♗c7 25 ♘g5+! (stronger than 25 ♘xb7 ♖b8 26 ♘c5 ♗xd6 27 ♘xd7— White wishes to leave his opponent with a light-squared bishop, not a dark-squared one) 25 . . . ♔g8 26 ♘ge4 f5 27 ♗xc7 ♖xc7 (27 . . . fxe4 28 ♗g3) 28 ♘d6 ♖e7 29 ♘cxb7 and White won.

E. 1.27 Wahls–Dreev
European Junior Ch., 1988/89

It would be good for Black to play . . . g5–g4, in order then to capture the pawn on h5. But if at once 31 . . . g4? then 32 ♘xg4! fxg4 33 ♗xg4 and the white pawns are dangerous, since Black cannot play 33 . . . ♘g7? 34 ♗c5.

31	**. . .**	**♖a2!**
32	**♗f3**	

Other moves are no better.

32	**. . .**	**g4**

Now after 33 ♘xg4 fxg4 34 ♗xg4 ♘g7! the thrust 35 ♗c5 is no longer dangerous and White's pawns will be stopped successfully.

33	**♗g2**	**♗xh5**
34	**♘f1**	**♗e8**
35	**♗f2**	**♗c6**
36	**♘e3**	**♖a3!**
37	**♗e1**	**♘c5**
38	**♗f1**	**♔f7**
39	**♘c2**	**♖a8**
40	**♘d4**	**♘b3**
41	**♘xb3?**	

More stubborn was 41 ♖b1 ♘xd4 42 cxd4.

41	**. . .**	**cxb3**
42	**♖b1**	**♗a4!**
43	**c4**	**♖c8**
44	**♖a1**	**b2**
45	**♖b1**	**dxc4**
46	**♖xb2**	**c3**
47	**♖b4**	**c2**
48	**♗d2**	**♖d8!**
49	**♗e3**	**♖d1!**
50	**♖xa4**	**♘d5!**
51	**♖a7+**	**♔g6**
52	**♖a6+**	**♔h5**
53	**♔f2**	

The last hope: 53 . . . ♘xe3? 54 ♗b5 ♖d8 55 ♖c6.

53	**. . .**	**♖xf1+**

White resigned.

E. 1.28 Dolmatov–G. Kuzmin
Kislovodsk 1982

Tempting is 27 ♘e4, but Black will defend the weak d6-square with 27 . . . ♘f5, not fearing 28 ♘exg5 ♘xd4 29 ♘xd4 hxg5 with

an acceptable position. Dolmatov found a treacherous intermediate check.

27 ♗h7+!! ♔h8
28 ♘e4

Now if 28 . . . ♘f5 then 29 d5 is decisive. Bad are both 28 . . . ♔xh7 29 ♘f6+, and 28 . . . f5 29 ♘xd6.

28 . . . dxc5
29 dxc5

If now 29 . . . ♘f5 then 30 ♘exg5 (the white pawn on d4, which the black knight would not have been averse to capturing, has now disappeared from the board).

29 . . . ♘d5
30 ♘d6 ♕xd6
31 cxd6 ♖xc2
32 ♗xc2 ♗b2
33 ♖cd1

And White, the exchange ahead, won easily.

E. 1.29 Paunovic–Chernin
Pula 1988

Black played **14 . . . ♘b6!**, which is extremely useful from a positional point of view. He wishes to drive the white bishop away from the diagonal a2–g8: 15 ♗b3 a4. Otherwise his opponent would either be able to prepare a retreat-path for it with 15 a4, or play 15 ♗d4. Exchanging the bishop for the knight—15 ♗xb6 ♕xb6 16 ♘g5 ♖f8—is good for Black.

At the same time Chernin provokes his opponent to sacrifice the bishop, which does look very tempting.

15 ♗xf7+? ♔xf7
16 ♘g5+ ♔g8

16 . . . ♔f6?? 17 ♗xb6 ♕xb6 18 ♕f4 mate.

17 ♘e6 ♘c4!

An accurate move order! Mistaken is 17 . . . ♕c8? (or 17 . . . ♕d7) 18 ♘xg7 ♘c4 (18 . . . ♔xg7 19 ♗d4+, but not 19 ♗xb6? c5) in view of 19 ♕d4! ♘xe3 20 ♘xe8 (threatening to mate on g7 with the queen) 20 . . . ♕xe8 21 ♕xe3, when White remains the exchange and a pawn up.

18 ♕e2

After 18 ♘xd8 ♘xd2 19 ♘xb7 ♘c4 (or 19 . . . ♘xe4) the white knight cannot free itself from the trap. On 18 ♕d3 strong are both 18 . . . ♘e5 and 18 . . . ♕c8 19 ♘xg7 ♘e5 20 ♕d4 c5 (or 20 . . . ♔xg7 21 f4 c5).

18 . . . ♕c8
19 ♘xg7

19 ♕xc4 ♗a6 20 ♕b3 a4 or 20 . . . ♖b8.

19 . . . ♘xe3
20 ♘xe8 ♘xd1
21 ♕xd1

In the game there followed 21 ♘xd6 exd6 22 ♖xd1 ♕e6 and White resigned.

21 . . . ♕d7!

Of course, not 21 . . . ♕xe8? 22 ♕b3+ and 23 ♕xb7. Unconvincing is 21 . . . ♔f7?! 22 ♘xd6+ exd6 23 ♕xd6.

22 ♕b3+ ♔f8(h8)

And White is left a piece down, with only two pawns to show for it.

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E. 1.30 Smyslov–Spassky
Moscow 1959
In the game there followed: 37 e5?! ♕c7? (after 37 . . . ♕c5! Black could have defended successfully) 38 ♕xd4 ♕a5 39 ♖e1! g6 40 ♖e2 ♖c5 41 ♕f4! ♖d5 (41 . . . ♖cxe5 42 ♕f6! ♖d5 43 ♖dxe6) 42 c4! and White won.

A combination with which White could have won by force was found by Dolmatov: **37 ♖xe6!** fxe6 38 h4! ♖a5 39 ♕f7+ ♔h8 40 e5 (threatening 41 ♕f8+) 40 . . . ♕c5 41 ♕g6 ♕xe5+ 42 ♔h1.

E. 1.31 Chernyshov–Ostrivnoi
*Stavropol 1967**
Black does not have sufficient compensation for the pawn. He may dispute this assessment only with the ingenious tactical trick **23 . . . ♗d2+!?**. His opponent lost his way completely and even lost the game after: 24 ♔b1? ♕xd6 25 ♕xd2 ♕xd2.

Of course, also bad were both 24 ♗xd2? (or 24 ♔xd2?) 24 . . . ♕xd6, and 24 ♖xd2? ♖xa2 with the threats 25 . . . ♕xb2 mate and 25 . . . ♖a1 mate.

24 ♕xd2 ♖xa2

In books and articles which have quoted this ending, only the natural move 25 ♕b4?! has been considered, after which there is a forced draw: 25 . . . ♖d8! (25 . . . ♕f3? 26 ♖e1) 26 ♔b1 (mistaken is 26 ♖xd8+? ♕xd8 27 ♔b1 ♕a8) 26 . . . ♖da8! 27 ♔c1! ♖d8!. Black cannot play for a win: 27 . . . ♕f3? 28 ♖e1; 27 . . . c5? 28 ♕xc5! (but not 28 ♗xc5? ♕f3 29 ♖e1 ♖a1+ 30 ♔d2 ♖xe1 31 ♔xe1 ♖a1+ 32 ♔d2 ♖d1 mate).

Alas! With the calm and composed 25 ♕d3! White repels all the threats, retaining his extra piece. And if Black's combination was incorrect then this means the initial position was also bad for him.

E. 1.32 Marshall–Pillsbury
*Vienna 1903**
After either continuation White can get a draw with accurate play.
A.

32 ♕xc6+ ♔b8

32 . . . ♔a6 33 ♕b5+ ♔b7 34 ♕c6+.

33 ♘b5 ♖c8

If 33 . . . ♖d7 then 34 ♘d6

♖d8 35 ♘b5, or 34 . . . ♖xd6 35 ♕xd6+ ♔b7 (35 . . . ♔c8 36 ♕c6+) 36 ♕c6+, and on 36 . . . ♔a6 possible are both 37 c4 and 37 ♕c8+.

34 ♕d6+ ♔b7

If 34 . . . ♔a8 then White has at least 35 ♕e7 ♘b7 36 d6.

35 ♕e7+ ♔a6

36 c4! ♘b7

37 ♕b4!

But not 37 ♕a3+? ♘a5. Now the threat is 38 ♘c7+! ♖xc7 39 ♕b5 mate.

37 . . . ♘a5

38 ♘d6 ♖xc4+!

38 . . . ♖c5 39 ♕b5+!!.

39 ♘xc4

White intends 40 ♘xa5 or 40 ♘d2. The position is roughly equal.

B.

32 ♕xd8 ♕f1!

By threatening mate after 33 . . . ♕e2+, Black at the same time deprives the enemy knight of the squares b5 and c4.

33 dxc6+ ♔xc6

34 ♕c8+!

After 34 ♕d5+? ♔c7 35 ♕e5+ ♔b7 the black king can easily hide from the checks. Another losing line is the passive 34 ♘b1? g3 35 ♕d5+ (35 ♘d2 g2) 35 . . . ♔c7 36 ♕e5+ ♔b7 37 ♕xg3 ♕e2+ 38 ♘d2 ♕xd2+! 39 ♔xd2 ♘xe4+.

34 . . . ♔d6

35 ♕d8+

Now it is no use playing 35 . . . ♘d7?, in view of 36 e5+. It is also bad to go forward with the king: 35 . . . ♔e5? 36 ♕e8+! (36 ♕e7+? ♘e6; 36 ♕d4+? ♔e6 37 ♕d5+ ♔f6) 36 . . . ♘e6 37 ♕xh5+ ♔xe4 38 ♕xg4+ and Black remains a pawn down. This means that he must go back with the king to c6, consenting to a draw.

E. 1.33 F. Olafsson–Keene

Reykjavik 1976

White achieves nothing with either 31 ♘c7? ♗xe4+, or 31 ♗e7? ♘h7. **31 ♗d8!**. Black is unable to parry two threats at once: 32 ♕h6+ and 32 ♘c7. In the game there followed: 31 . . . ♔g7 (31 . . . ♗xd5 32 cxd5 ♖xc1+ 33 ♖xc1 ♕d7 34 ♕h6+ with mate) 32 ♘c7 ♕h3 33 ♘xa6 bxa6 34 ♕xd6 and Black resigned.

Just as strong was **31 ♗e3!** ♗xd5 32 ♗xc5. For example: 32 . . . ♗xc4 33 ♗xd6, or 32 . . . ♗xe4+ 33 fxe4 dxc5 34 ♕h6+ ♔g8 35 ♖d8 ♕e7 36 ♖cd1 and 37 ♖1d7.

E. 1.34 Ivanovic–Bednarski

Balashikha 1977

The main defects of Black's position are the vulnerable position of his queen and the weakness of the e6-square. White may win the queen at once, but the variation 18 ♘f3? ♘xf3 19 ♗c5+ ♔g8 20 ♖xe5 ♘xe5 is clearly not to

White's advantage.

18 ♗b5! ♗c6

18 . . . ♗xb5 19 ♘xb5.

19 ♕h4! ♘g4

20 ♗xd4

And not 20 . . . ♕xd4 21 ♘xe6+. After 20 . . . ♕f4+ 21 ♗e3 ♕xh2 22 ♘xe6+ Ivanovic gradually turned his advantage into victory.

Now the immediate **18 ♕h4!** would also have guaranteed White a decisive advantage: 18 . . . ♘g4 19 ♗g1! ♕f4+ 20 ♔b1 ♘c6 (the threat was 21 h3 or 21 ♘h3) 21 h3 h6 22 ♘xe6+ ♗xe6 23 ♖xe6.

25 . . . ♕xf3
26 ♗xf3 ♖xf3
27 ♕h2 ♖af8
28 ♕h7+ ♔f7
29 ♖h6 ♘f4
30 ♖f6+ ♔e8
31 ♕xg7

Black resigned.

White could have chosen a quite different plan of attack, also involving the sacrifice of material:

24 ♖g4! g5
25 ♖hg1 ♗h6
26 ♖xf4! exf4
27 ♗d4 ♕e7
28 ♕h2 ♖f6
29 ♖h1 ♖af8

29 . . . ♗g7 30 ♕h7+ ♔f7 31 ♖h5.

E. 1.35 Kavalek–Martinovic

Sarajevo 1968

Unconvincing is 24 ♕h2?! ♔f7 25 ♗xf4 ♕xf4+ 26 ♕xf4 exf4 (intending 27 . . . ♖h8). Kavalek broke through his opponent's defences with a spectacular rook sacrifice:

24 ♖xg6!! ♘xg6
25 ♗g5

The main variation of White's combination is: 25 . . . ♕f7 26 ♕h2 ♗h8 (after 26 . . . ♖fe8 27 ♕h7+ ♔f8 28 ♗xg6 ♕xf3 the simplest is 29 ♗d3, preparing 30 ♖f1) 27 ♗xg6 ♕xg6 (27 . . . ♕g7 28 ♗h7+ ♔f7 29 ♕h5+) 28 ♕xh8+ ♔f7 29 ♖h7+ ♔e8 30 ♖e7+.

Martinovic gave up his queen immediately, but not even this helped:



30 ♕xh6! ♖xh6
31 ♖xh6

With decisive threats. The magnificent interaction of White's two bishops and rook is very impressive.

E. 1.36 Cvitan–Short

Mexico 1981

Black has an enormous lead in

material, but the position of his king is extremely awkward. The threat is 22 ♖xf7 ♘xf7 23 ♘f6+ and 24 ♕xf7 mate. In the game there followed: 21 ... ♔f8? 22 ♖xf7! (worse is 22 ♕xh6+ ♔g8 with unclear complications) 22 ... ♘xf7 23 ♘f6! and Black resigned.

Cvitan considers the best defence to be 21 ... ♕b8!, vacating the square d8 for the king, and he quotes the following beautiful variation: 22 ♖xf7 ♘xf7 23 ♘xe7! (but not 23 ♘f6+? ♔d8) 23 ... ♔d8!? (or 23 ... ♔xe7 24 ♕xf7+ with a draw) 24 ♗xf7! (with the threat 25 ♕h4; no use is 24 ♕xf7? ♕xe5) 24 ... ♔xe7 25 ♕h4+! ♔xf7 26 ♕f6+ with perpetual check.

Let us examine **21 ... ♗xd5!** 22 ♗xd5. In Cvitan's opinion White gets an advantage: 22 ... ♕b8 23 ♖xf7! ♘xf7 24 ♕xf7+ ♔d8, and now not 25 ♗xa8? ♕xe5, but 25 ♕g7!! and only then 26 ♗xa8, winning back the rook. But Yusupov rightly noted that after 22 ... ♕c7! 23 ♖xf7 0-0-0 24 ♖xe7 c4! 25 ♖e8 ♕c5+ Black's position is not worse.

E. 1.37 Marants–Dvoretsky

Beltsy 1972

In trying to shield myself from checks as quickly as possible, I carelessly played 60 ... ♔c2?. After the unforeseen reply 61 ♔f3! it transpired that the pawn on e3 was lost. There followed: 61 ... ♕f2+ 62 ♔e4 ♕e2 63 ♕xe3 ♕xc4+ 64 ♔f5 ½–½.

There is an old saying in Russian: "Hurry slowly!". I could have won with 60 ... ♔e2! 61 ♕g4+ ♔d3 62 ♕f5+ (62 ♕g6+ ♔c3) 62 ... ♔d2 63 ♕a5+ (63 ♕d5+ ♔c1) 63 ... ♔d1 64 ♕a4(a1)+ ♔e2 65 ♕c2+ ♕d2.

E. 1.38 Gaprindashvili–Alexandria

Kislovodsk 1982

There is no doubt about Black's advantage, but it may evaporate after the hasty move **29 ... h4?** that was played in the game. Luckily for Alexandria, White replied in a time scramble with the unfortunate 30 f3?, which led to her defeat: 30 ... ♖d1+ 31 ♖xd1 ♕xd1+ 32 ♔f2 (32 ♔g2 ♕e2+ 33 ♗f2 h3+ 34 ♔xh3 ♕xf3 with the threat of 35 ... ♘f4+) 32 ... ♕c2+ 33 ♔f1 ♕xc3 34 gxh4 ♘xh4 35 ♔f2 g5! 36 ♕c8+ ♔g7 37 ♕g4 ♕c2+ 38 ♔f1 ♕d1+ 39 ♔f2 f6 and White lost on time.

Essential was 30 ♕xb5! ♖d1+ 31 ♔g2 ♘f4+ (31 ... ♕g4? 32 f3; 31 ... h3+ 32 ♔f3 ♕d3 33 ♕e8+ ♔h7 34 ♖b8) 32 ♗xf4! (32 gxf4?? ♕g4 mate; 32 ♔f3? ♕d3 33 gxf4 ♖xb1 34 ♕e8+ ♔h7 and White is threatened with mate in two) 32 ... h3+ 33 ♔f3 ♕d3+ 34 ♔g4! ♖xb1 35 ♕e8+ ♔h7 36 ♕xf7 and the position becomes drawn.

Considering that in the initial position White cannot play 30

♕xb5? in view of 30 . . . ♖d1 + 31 ♔g2 ♘h4 + !, she should have chosen the preparatory move 29 . . . ♔h7, or, still better, **29 . . . ♖d3!**, freeing the queen from defence of the rook and intending the thrust . . . ♕g4. For example: 30 ♔g2 ♕g4 (with the threats 31 . . . ♘h4 + and 31 . . . ♕xe4 +), or 30 h4 ♕g4 31 ♕xb5 ♕xe4 32 ♕e8 + ♔h7 33 ♕xf7? ♖xe3. And if 30 f3 then 30 . . . h4 gains in force considerably, and 31 ♖xb5? ♖d1 + is bad.

E. 1.39 Dvoretsky–Tsikhelashvili
Beltsy 1972

20	**♘xd7**	**♘xd4**
21	**♖xc8**	**♘xb3**
22	**♖xf8 + !**	**♖xf8!**

22 . . . ♗xf8? 23 ♖a3.

23	**♖xa6!**	

Now 23 ♖a3 is useless because of 23 . . . ♖d8.

23	**. . .**	**♖d8**
24	**♖b6!**	

Clearly weaker is 24 ♖a7 ♗xb2 25 ♗xh6 ♗d4 26 ♖b7 (26 ♖c7 ♖a8) 26 . . . ♘c5 27 ♘xc5 ♗xc5 28 ♖b1 f6!? and Black has excellent drawing chances.

24	**. . .**	**♖xd7**

In the event of 24 . . . ♘d4 25 ♖b8, or 24 . . . ♘a5 25 b4 ♘c4 26 ♖b8 White must surely win the minor-piece ending.

25	**♖xb3**	**♖d1 +**
26	**♔h2**	**♖b1**
27	**♖b8 +**	**♔h7**
28	**♖b7**	

28 b4?? ♗e5 + .

28	**. . .**	**♖xb2**
29	**♖xe7**	**♔g8**


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This position has arisen more or less by force. Can White turn his extra pawn into a win? I am not sure. I think Black's chances of a draw are no worse than White's chances of winning. But in the position from which we started I nevertheless had nothing better than the exchange operation I played in the game.

There are no precise recommendations for playing such positions—only rough guides, based on experience of similar situations. *Usually it is expedient for Black to 'unstraighten' his pawns by playing . . . h6–h5, and for White—to prevent this with g2–g4.*

30	**g3**	

I declined to play 30 g4 because of 30 . . . ♖b5! followed by 31 . . . h5, after which I would have had either to exchange a couple of pawns or to advance my pawn to g5, and both these options were

undesirable. Now (or on one of his next few moves) Black should have played . . . h6–h5, but he was evidently not familiar with the rule mentioned above.

30	**. . .**	**♖a2**
31	**♔g2**	**♖a6**
32	**♖d7**	**♖a4**
33	**♔f3**	**♖b4?**

33 . . . h5!

34	**g4!**	**g5**

34 . . . ♖b5 35 ♖d5.

35	**♖d5**	

Threatening 36 h4 gxh4 37 ♖h5.

35	**. . .**	**♖b3**
36	**e5!**	

36 h4? gxh4 37 ♖h5 ♗d4 38 ♖xh6 ♗xe3 with a probable draw.

36	**. . .**	**♖b4**
37	**♗d4**	**♔h7**

37 . . . ♖b3+ 38 ♔e4 ♖xh3 39 e6!.

38	**♔e4**	**♗f8**
39	**♖d7**	

Mistaken is 39 ♔f5?? because of the reply 39 . . . ♗c5!!, but worthy of serious consideration was 39 ♖d6!?.

39	**. . .**	**♔g6**
40	**♖c7**	**♖a4**
41	**♖c8**	**♗a3?**

Yusupov noted that after 41 . . . ♗g7! it would not have been at all easy for White to break through his opponent's defences.

42	**♖c6+**	**♔h7**
43	**♖c7**	**♔g8**

43 . . . ♔g6 44 e6! ♗b2 45 e7.

44	**♖a7!**	**♖xa7**
45	**♗xa7**	**♗b4**

More stubborn was 45 . . . ♔h7 46 ♔f5 ♗e7, but here too, as analysis showed, White has a winning position.

46	**♔f5**	**♗e7**
47	**e6!**	

On 47 . . . fxe6+, decisive is 48 ♔g6!

Black resigned.

E. 1.40 Popov–Makarychev

Rostov-on-Don 1976

22	**. . .**	**♖ab8!**
23	**♔a1**	

23 ♔c1 ♘f4 24 exf4 ♗xe4 wins for Black.

23	**. . .**	**♘b4**
24	**♘g5**	**♗e4!**
25	**♗xe4**	**♕xe4!**

And White is defenceless. In the game there was played: 24 ♘c3 ♗e4 (24 . . . ♗f3 also won easily) 25 ♖d2 (25 ♗xe4 ♕xe4! 26 a3 ♕c2 27 ♖c1 ♕b3) 25 . . . ♗xg6 26 ♖xg6 ♖xf2! 27 ♖xf2 ♕xe3 28 ♖g8+ ♖xg8 29 ♕f3 ♖g1+ 30 ♔b2 ♕xf2+ White resigned.

If you began your calculation straightaway with the move 22 . . . ♖ab8!, then you probably found the whole winning variation without any difficulty. Much more time would have had to be spent in attempting to grasp Black's other attacking possibilities if they were first to attract your attention:

22 . . . ♘f4? 23 exf4 ♗xe4 24 ♗xe4 ♕xe4 25 ♕g5 ♖f7 26 ♖d2 ♖ab8+ 27 ♔a1, when Black has to transpose into only a slightly better endgame by playing 27 . . . ♕xf4 28 ♕xf4 ♖xf4; or 22 . . . ♘xe3? 23 fxe3 ♗xe4 24 ♗xe4 ♕xe4.

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

Here is an additional task (for those who did not calculate this position when solving the main exercise): establish the difference between the moves 25 ♕h6 and 25 ♕g5.

It turns out that 25 ♕h6? loses by force: 25 . . . ♖f2+ 26 ♔a1 ♖xa2+ 27 ♔xa2 ♕c2+ 28 ♔a3 ♕c3+. Now on 29 ♔a2 there will follow not 29 . . . ♕a5+? 30 ♔b2 ♖b8+ 31 ♔c2, when Black cannot succeed in giving checkmate, but 29 . . . ♕c4+! 30 ♔a3 ♕a6+ 31 ♔b2 ♖b8+ 32 ♔c3 (32 ♔c2 ♕c4+!) 32 . . . ♕a3+ 33 ♔d2 ♖b2+ 34 ♔e1 ♕b4(a5)+ with unavoidable mate. If, however, 29 ♔a4, then 29 . . . ♕c4+ 30 ♔a5 ♕a2+ 31 ♔b5 ♖b8+ 32 ♔c6 ♕c4+ 33 ♔d7 ♕f7+ 34 ♔c6 ♖b6 mate.

Only by calculating this last variation to the very end is it possible to note the benefits of having the queen on g5. After 25 ♕g5! ♖f2+ (25 . . . ♖f7 26 ♖d2 is only slightly better for Black) 26 ♔a1 ♖xa2+ 27 ♔xa2 ♕xc2+ 28 ♔a3! ♕c3+ 29 ♔a4! ♕c4+ 30 ♔a5! ♕a2+ 31 ♔b5 ♖b8+ 32 ♔c6 ♕c4+ 33 ♔d7 and Black's attack comes to a dead end, since on 33 . . . ♕f7+, White can reply 34 ♕e7.

Try not only to find all the candidate moves but also to determine which of them should be calculated first!

E. 1.41 Chandler–Christiansen
*Hastings 1981/82**

The threat is f4–f5. Black cannot of course play either 16 . . . ♘e4? 17 ♘xg6, or 16 . . . ♗e4? 17 g5. Black must carefully examine a combination beginning with the move 16 . . . ♘xg4. And if it is not playable, then he must simply retreat the knight to e8.

16 . . . ♘xg4?!
17 hxg4

17 ♘xg6? ♖xe3.

17 . . . ♗xh4
18 f5 exf5
19 gxf5

Now on 19 . . . ♗g5? White wins with 20 ♕d2!, and on 19 . . . ♗g3?—20 ♔g2!. Much more dangerous is 19 . . . ♖e8!. In the

event of 20 ♘d5?, a strong reply is 20 . . . ♗g5!. Also unsuccessful is 20 ♕d2? ♖xe3! 21 ♕xe3 ♗g5 22 ♕g3 (22 ♕h3 ♗xc1 23 fxg6 hxg6! 24 ♖xc1 ♕g5+) 22 . . . ♗xf5! (also possible is 22 . . . ♗xc1) with an excellent game for Black.

But the simple 20 ♗d2! repels the attack and guarantees White the advantage. For example: 20 . . . ♕b6(f6) 21 fxg6 ♕xd4+ 22 ♔g2 hxg6 23 ♖f4; or 20 . . . ♗g3 21 ♔g2! (21 fxg6? ♕h4! 22 gxf7+ ♔h8 23 fxe8(♕)+ ♖xe8 24 ♔g2 ♕h2+ 25 ♔f3 ♕h3!) 21 . . . ♕h4 22 ♖h1 ♕xd4 23 ♔xg3!? (also possible is 23 fxg6 ♕f2+ 24 ♔h3) 23 . . . ♗xf5 24 ♗f4 and White's extra piece is considerably stronger than Black's three pawns.

Having calculated these variations, Black should have declined to play the combination and by the method of exclusion chosen 16 . . . ♘e8! 17 ♘g2 f5, retaining an acceptable position.

E. 1.42 Kuzmin–Yusupov

Rostov-on-Don 1980

The threats to the black king are more dangerous than they may appear at first sight.

In the game there followed: 26 . . . ♕a3? 27 ♗c4+ ♔h7 (27 . . . ♔h8 28 ♖h4! with the threat 29 ♖xh6+) 28 ♕xd7 ♘xb1 29 ♗d3 f5 30 ♕xf5+ ♔g8 31 ♕e6+ ♔h8 32 ♕g6 ♕xd3 33 cxd3 ♘c3 34 ♖e7 ♖g8 35 ♖xb7 b1(♕) 36 ♖xb1 ♘xb1 37 ♕xc6 ♘d2 38 ♔g2 Black resigned.

Black would also have lost after 26 . . . ♕c5? 27 ♗c4+ ♔h7 (27 . . . ♗e6 28 ♗xe6+ ♔h8 29 ♖h4) 28 ♕xc3! ♕xf2+ 29 ♔h1 ♗xh3 30 ♖e2.

Only the modest move **26 . . . b6!** could have saved Black. It is important not just to untangle the knight but also to maintain the queen on the fifth rank.

27 ♗c4+

If 27 ♖e7 then 27 . . . ♕c5! (not 27 . . . ♘xb1 28 ♗c4+ ♔h8 29 ♕xd7 with the threats 30 ♖xg7 and 30 ♖e8+) 28 ♗c4+ ♔h7(h8) 29 ♕xd7 ♕xf2+ and the game ends with perpetual check.

27 . . . ♔h7!

27 . . . ♔h8? 28 ♖h4.

28 ♕xd7

28 ♖h4 ♘xb1 29 ♖xh6+ gxh6 30 ♕xd7+ ♔h8 31 ♗d3 f5 32 ♗xf5 ♕xf5 33 ♕xf5 ♘c3 is equal.

28 . . . ♘xe4!

But certainly not 28 . . . ♘xb1? 29 ♖e7 ♕g5 30 f4.

29 ♗d3 f5

30 ♕xc6 ♖f8

And chances are roughly equal.

E. 1.43 Sturua–Dvoretsky

Kutaisi 1978

Black wishes to double rooks on the second rank or, after winning the pawn on b2, to advance his c-pawn. In the game there followed:

29 ♘g5?! ♖xb2 30 ♘xe6 ♖dd2 31 ♘xc5 ♖xh2+ 32 ♔g1 and the players agreed to a draw.

The threat of 29 ... ♖xb2 could have been repelled with 29 ♖ab1. For example: 29 ... ♖c2 30 ♘g5 ♖dd2 31 ♘f3 ♖f2 32 ♖e5! ♖xf3 33 f7 ♖ff2 34 ♖xc5+ ♔b6 35 ♖h5, or 29 ... ♖f2 30 ♘e5 ♖dd2 31 ♘g4. But 29 ... ♗d4! 30 ♘e5 ♗xb2 31 f7 ♖d8 leads to an unclear position.

During the game I did not see any satisfactory defence after the unexpected check:

29 a4+!! bxa3

The king has no suitable retreat square.

30 bxa3

The main variation:

30 ... c3

31 ♘g5!

31 a4+!?.

31 ... c2

32 ♘e4 ♖d1

33 ♘c3+

the *Zwischenzug* 22 ♘c5!. In the game there followed: 22 ... ♕c8 23 ♕g2 ♖h4 24 ♕d5+ ♔h8 25 f3 ♗h2+ 26 ♔g2 dxc5 27 ♕g5 ♕c6 28 ♕xh4 ♖xf3 29 ♔xh2 ♕c7+ 30 ♔g2 ♕c6 31 ♔g1 Black resigned.

Does this mean that it is necessary, without pondering for too long, to retreat the rook to f7? No, here we cannot afford to adopt the method of exclusion automatically—indeed, after 21 ♘g5 Black loses the exchange. First it is necessary to realise that Black gets adequate compensation for it, in view of the awkward position of the enemy queen.

20 ... ♖5f7!

21 ♘g5 ♖g7!

Worse is 21 ... ♕c6? 22 ♗xf4 ♗xf4 23 ♘xf7 ♖xf7 24 ♖xe7! g5 25 ♖xf7 gxh4 26 ♖xf4 with a winning position for White.

22 ♗xf4 ♗xf4

22 ... ♖xf4? 23 ♖xe5.

23 ♘e6 ♖f6!

24 ♘xg7 g5!

But not 24 ... ♔xg7? 25 f3 and 26 ♕f2.

25 ♕h5 ♔xg7

26 ♖d5

Otherwise 26 ... ♖h6.

26 ... ♖g6

Bad is 26 ... ♖h6? 27 ♖xg5+; after 26 ... e5? White has a pleasant choice between 27 ♖exe5 and 27 ♖ed1 ♕e7 28 c4 (28 ... ♖h6 29 ♕xh6+ ♔xh6 30 ♖xd6+).

E. 1.44 Ravinsky–Anoshin

Moscow 1958

Quite bad is 20 ... ♗f6? 21 ♘xf6+ (simpler than 21 ♕g3 ♗e5 22 gxf5 ♘e2+, which, however, also favours White) 21 ... ♖5xf6 22 ♗xf4 ♖xf4 23 ♖xe7. The tempting 20 ... ♘xh3+? 21 ♕xh3 ♖h5 (counting on 22 ♕f1?? ♗h2+, or 22 ♕g2? ♖h2 23 ♕xh2 ♖xh2+ 24 ♔xh2 ♕xg4 with unclear play) is refuted by

But now the threat is 27 . . . e6. It is best for White to give back the exchange: 27 ♖f5 e6 (weaker is 27 . . . e5 28 c4 b6 29 b3, intending f3 and h4, and on 29 . . . ♕e7—30 ♖xf4) 28 ♖xf4 gxf4 29 ♕a5 with chances for both sides.

E. 1.45 Georgadze–Yusupov
USSR Ch., Premier League, Vilnius 1980/81

Black has to choose one of two possible combinations. Both are rather complicated and beautiful—it is a matter of which is stronger.

A.

25	**. . .**	**♘xd5!?**
26	**♖xd4**	**♘f4**

It may appear that after 27 ♗xf4 ♖xd4 28 ♗xe5 ♖d2 29 ♕g4 ♖f7 30 ♖e2 White parries his opponent's threats and remains with a lead in material. But here he falls under a decisive double attack: 30 . . . h5! 31 ♕xh5 ♖xc2! 32 ♖xc2 ♕xe4.

The tempting move 30 ♖c2? is a mistake—necessary is 30 ♖c1! (in order on 30 . . . h5 to reply 31 ♕g6). How is one to assess the position arising after 30 . . . ♖dxf2?

Georgadze declined to win two pieces for a rook and played 27 ♕d1!? ♖xd4 28 ♕xd4 ♘d7!, and now with 29 ♗xf4 could evidently have maintained the equilibrium. But he allowed the black knight to be transferred to d4: 29 ♔h2?! e5 30 ♕a7 ♖a8 31 ♕e3 ♘e6, and Black obtained an advantage. After a long struggle that was far from error-free an interesting ending arose, which was examined in the first chapter of *Secrets of Chess Training*, in the section entitled 'An analysis that was not taken to its end'.

B.

25	**. . .**	**♖xd5!!**
26	**exd5**	**♕xd5**
27	**♕f1**	

27 ♗e4? ♘xe4 28 ♕xe4 ♕xe4 29 ♖xe4 ♗xe4 30 ♖xd4 c2 and the pawn slips in to queen.

27	**. . .**	**♘f3+!**

But not 27 . . . ♘h5? in view of 28 ♖xe5!

28	**gxf3**	**♕xf3**
29	**♔h2**	**♘h5!**
30	**♖xd4**	

30 ♕h1 ♕xg3+! 31 fxg3 ♖f2+ 32 ♔g1 ♖d2+; 30 ♖d3 ♘xg3 31 ♖xf3 ♘xf1+; Black wins in both cases.

30	**. . .**	**♘xg3**
31	**fxg3**	

31 ♕g1 ♘e2 wins for Black.

31	**. . .**	**♕xf1**
32	**♖xf1**	**♖xf1**
33	**♖d8+**	**♔f7**
34	**♖d7+**	**♔f6**
35	**♖xb7**	**♖f2+**
36	**♔g1**	**♖xc2**(*249*)

A twelve-move forced variation has led to a very interesting ending, in which Black has for the time being just two pawns for a knight, but on his next move he

249
W



will capture a third pawn and then—if necessary—a fourth (on b3). The menacing passed pawn on c3 and the unfortunate position of the white king, cut off on the back rank, ensure a serious, probably decisive, advantage for Black.

Now it is understandable why after the game Yusupov was annoyed that he had not chosen 'the other' combination.

E. 2.1 Knaak–Reeh
Balatonbereny 1987

First let's see where the straightforward winning of a pawn leads.

17 ♗xe7 ♕xe7
18 exf5

Weaker is 18 ♘xf5—in reply White would even have to reckon with a positional exchange sacrifice: 18 . . . ♖xf5!? 19 exf5 e4 20 f3 ♕f6.

18 . . . e4!
19 f3!

On 19 ♘xe4 entirely possible is 19 . . . ♘xe4 20 ♗xe4 ♕e5, or 20 ♕xe4 ♕f6!? with counterplay. But stronger is 19 . . . ♗xc4! 20 ♗xc4 (20 ♘xd6 ♕xd6) 20 . . . ♕xe4 21 ♕xe4 ♘xe4—Black regains the pawn and gets an excellent position.

19 . . . ♖ae8

If 19 . . . e3 then 20 f4!, with a2–a4, 0-0 and ♖f3 to follow. In the variation 19 . . . ♕e5 20 ♘xe4 ♘xf5 21 0-0, or 20 . . . ♘xe4 21 fxe4 ♕xc3+ 22 ♔f2 Black does not have sufficient compensation for the sacrificed pawn.

20 ♘xe4

20 fxe4 ♕g5.

20 . . . ♕e5

Now 20 . . . ♘xe4 21 fxe4 ♗xc4? 22 ♗xc4 ♕xe4, in view of 23 ♔d1! ♕f4 24 ♖f1. Perhaps Black has slightly better counterchances after 20 . . . ♘xf5.

21 g4!? ♘xe4
22 fxe4 ♕xc3+
23 ♔f2

White has an extra pawn and prospects of an attack on the kingside (g4–g5). He has the advantage.

Rainer Knaak is a very aggressive player. He prefers not to capture material but to sacrifice it, just so long as he doesn't concede the initiative to his opponent even for a short time.

17 exf5 hxg5

In the event of 17 . . . e4, White would have had to transpose to the variations considered above by playing 18 ♗xe7. He cannot

play 18 ♘xe4 ♘xe4 19 ♕xe4? hxg5 20 f6 ♖xf6.

18 h6


250 B

White opens up the h-file and wishes to bring his queen into the attack via the h5-square. In Knaak's opinion the sacrifice he played was completely correct. Black is mated after 18 . . . gxh6? 19 ♖xh6 ♘f7 20 ♖h2 (threatening not only 21 ♕h5 but also 21 f6 or 21 0-0-0 followed by 22 ♖hd1) 20 . . . ♔g7 21 f6+! ♔xf6 22 ♘h5 mate. Also bad is 18 . . . ♘exf5? 19 hxg7 ♘xg7 (19 . . . ♔xg7? 20 ♕xe5+ or 20 ♗xf5 ♘xf5 21 ♕h5) 20 ♗h7+ ♔f7 (20 . . . ♔h8 21 0-0-0 ♕f6 22 ♖h2, or 21 . . . ♖f4 22 ♘e4) 21 ♖h6 ♕e7 22 ♘e4! and White's attack is irresistible.

In the game there followed: 18 . . . ♖f6? 19 hxg7 ♘f7 20 0-0-0 ♘c8 21 ♖h8+! ♘xh8 22 gxh8(♕)+ ♔xh8 23 ♖h1+ ♔g7 24 ♕h5 ♕g8 25 ♘e4! and Black resigned, in view of 25 . . . ♖xf5 26 ♘xg5 ♖f6 27 ♘h7.

When Sergei Dolmatov and I analysed this game, he easily found the strongest continuation for Black, being guided by the old maxim: "*The best response to a flank attack is a counter in the centre*".

18 . . . e4!

How can the offensive now be continued? Bad is 19 ♘xe4 ♘xe4 20 ♕xe4 ♘xf5 (or 20 . . . ♖e8 21 0-0-0 ♘g6!). If 19 ♗xe4 (in the hope of 19 . . . ♗xc4 20 ♕h5 with an attack), Black defends in a similar fashion: either 19 . . . ♘exf5 20 hxg7 ♔xg7, or 19 . . . ♘xe4 20 ♕xe4 ♖e8 (worse is 20 . . . ♘xf5 21 hxg7) 21 0-0-0 (on 21 hxg7 the same reply follows) 21 . . . ♘g6!.

In the event of 19 ♕h5 Black has a choice between 19 . . . ♕e8 20 hxg7 ♕xh5 21 gxf8(♕)+ ♖xf8 22 ♖xh5 exd4, and 19 . . . g6 20 fxg6 exd3.

Finally, after 19 hxg7 ♔xg7 it is useless to play 20 f6+ ♖xf6 21 ♘h5+ ♔f7 22 ♘xf6 ♔xf6 (also possible is 22 . . . exd3), and White also achieves nothing with 20 ♕h5 ♖h8 21 ♕xg5+ ♔f7 22 ♗e2 ♖xh1+ 23 ♘xh1 ♘exf5 24 ♗h5+ ♔f8. And on 20 ♗xe4 ♘xe4 21 ♕xe4 Black has the excellent reply 21 . . . ♘g8! 22 f6+ (22 0-0-0 ♘f6) 22 . . . ♖xf6, vacating the f8-square for the king.

The conclusion is clear: the sacrifice of the bishop was highly dubious. An experienced oppon-

ent would most probably have found the counter-punch 18 . . . e4!, which fends off the attack. But there was simply no need to play a combination—with a series of accurate moves White could have consolidated his material advantage. Saviely Tartakower once made the following apt observation: "It is always better to sacrifice a piece . . . belonging to your opponent".

E. 2.2 Dvoretsky–Balashov
USSR Ch., Premier League, Leningrad 1974

On 12 ♘bd2 there follows 12 . . . ♘f4, exchanging the important light-squared bishop and obtaining the advantage of the two bishops. In this case, White would be doomed to defending an inferior position throughout the game.

Similar are the consequences of the exchanges arising after 12 b4 ♘b3 13 ♖a2 ♘xc1 14 ♖xc1 ♘f4. On 12 ♘d4, strong is 12 . . . ♗c5 or 12 . . . ♕b6. If 12 ♗c2 then 12 . . . ♖c8 13 b4 ♕c7 (or 13 . . . ♘c4 at once). Again Black will have the initiative.

In order not to sink into defending a lifeless position, I decided to give myself pawn weaknesses and, if necessary, to sacrifice a pawn.

12 ♘c3!? ♘xc3

12 . . . ♘b3 13 ♘xd5.

13 bxc3 ♘b3

A tempting raid by the knight. Black is aiming at the pawn on a3, but White has sufficient tactical resources.

14 ♖b1 ♘xc1
15 ♖fxc1 ♗c6?!

The abrupt change in the nature of the game has had the immediate consequence of bringing about an error by Black, after which the game becomes completely equal. Black would also have achieved nothing with 15 . . . ♗xa3 16 ♖d1 ♕c7 (16 . . . ♕c8 17 ♗b5 ♗c6 18 ♘d4 0-0 19 ♗xc6 bxc6 20 ♕c4) 17 ♗b5 ♗c6 18 ♘d4 (also strong is the immediate 18 ♗xc6+) 18 . . . 0-0 19 ♗xc6 bxc6 20 ♕a6. White has sufficient compensation in the event of 15 . . . b6 16 ♖d1 0-0 (16 . . . ♕c7? 17 ♗b5) 17 ♗xh7+ (or first 17 ♗e4). But even after the best continuation, 15 . . . ♕c7 16 ♗b5 (16 ♖d1 a6 17 ♗e4 ♖b8) 16 . . . 0-0 17 a4 Black's advantage is insignificant.

16 ♘d4 0-0

On 16 . . . ♗xa3 there would follow 17 ♘xc6 bxc6 18 ♗e4 ♖c8 (18 . . . ♕c7 19 ♕a6!) 19 ♖d1 ♕c7 20 ♕a6.

17 ♘xc6 bxc6

½–½

E. 2.3 Smyslov–Mestel
Hastings 1972/73

The white pieces are bearing down menacingly on the black king. The only thing that somewhat hampers White is the pin of

his bishop. If he can manage, by playing 22 a4, to drive the rook away from the fifth rank, his attack will surely become decisive. This means that Black has to seek his salvation in a forced variation beginning with the move 21 . . . c6!, to which White replies 22 ♕h6! (but not 22 ♗xf7+? ♔g7).

Smyslov gives the following variations: 22 . . . ♘xh4 23 ♗xf7+ ♔xf7 24 ♕xh7+ ♔f8 25 ♕h8+ ♔f7 26 ♕xd8 ♘f3+ 27 ♔h1 ♘xe1 28 ♕d7+ with a decisive advantage to White; 22 . . . ♖xd5 23 ♗xf6 ♕f8 24 ♖e8! ♖d1+ 25 ♔g2 ♗f1+ 26 ♔f3 ♖d3+ 27 ♔g4 ♗e2+ 28 f3 ♗xf3+ 29 ♔h3 and the king is safely hidden from any more checks.

In the second variation one may suggest 26 . . . ♗e2+!? (instead of 26 . . . ♖d3+) 27 ♔xe2 ♕xe8+ 28 ♔xd1 ♕f8, but after 29 ♕e3 Black's position still remains difficult.

But there is an entirely sound defence, which is also rather simple.

22 . . . ♕f8!

23 ♕xf8+

Forced.

23 . . . ♔xf8

24 ♗xc6 ♖c5

With his next move Black will exchange on h4 and his position in the endgame will not be at all inferior.

All that remains to be added is what occurred in the game: 21 . . . ♔g7? 22 a4 ♖b4 (22 . . . ♖a5 23 ♕d1 ♘xh4 24 gxh4 with the terrible threat of 25 b4) 23 ♗xf7! ♕d7 (23 . . . ♘xh4 24 ♖e8 ♘f3+ 25 ♕xf3 ♕d7 26 ♖g8+ ♔xf7 27 ♕d5+ ♕e6 28 ♖g7+) 24 ♗xg6 hxg6 25 ♗xf6+! ♔xf6 26 ♕h8+ ♔g5 27 f4+ ♔g4 28 ♖e3 g5 29 ♕h6 ♖xf4 30 gf ♔xf4 31 ♔f2 ♕c6 32 ♕f6+ ♔g4 33 ♖g3+ ♔h4 34 ♕xg5 mate.

E. 2.4 Belyavsky–Dorfman

Vilnius 1978

Black stands worse. In the game there followed: 23 . . . ♔g7?! 24 ♗c3 ♕c7 25 ♕d2 ♖b8 26 ♘f5+! gxf5 27 ♕g5+ with a clear advantage to White.

The transfer of the knight to c5 looks logical and promises Black definite counter-chances. So why did Dorfman not play 23 . . . ♘d7? He had puzzled out his opponent's conception and seen the beautiful combination which had been prepared.

24 ♗f5!? gxf5

Forced, since White threatens both 25 ♘e7+ and 25 ♘xd6.

25 exf5 ♗xf5

26 ♗xc6 ♖xc6

In the event of 26 . . . ♗xd3 27 ♗xd7 ♖d8 28 ♕xd3 ♖xd7 29 ♖e2 White has a big advantage.

27 ♖g3+ ♗g6

Otherwise the double attack 28 ♕f3 is decisive.

28 h4!

251
B



Black cannot successfully halt the advance of the h-pawn: 28 . . . h5 29 ♕d5 or 29 ♖xg6+ fxg6 30 ♕d5+. Bad is 28 . . . ♘f6 29 h5 (weaker is 29 ♕f3 d5) 29 . . . ♘e4 30 hxg6 ♘xg3 31 gxf7+. Also no use is 28 . . . ♔h8 29 h5 ♗f5 (29 . . . ♗e4 30 ♕g4) 30 ♕f3. Finally, in the event of 28 . . . ♕d8, White wins with 29 h5! (29 ♕f3 e4! 30 ♕xe4 ♖c5) 29 . . . ♕h4 30 hxg5 (mistaken is 30 ♕g4? ♕xg4 31 ♖xg4 ♘f6, but entirely possible is 30 ♖h3) 30 . . . ♕xg3 31 ♕d5!.

Nevertheless Black would still very much like to play 23 . . . ♘d7, as otherwise his position will remain difficult. Having become aware of this, you try again and again to find a weak link in your opponent's—at first sight—irreproachable conception, and it sometimes happens that you do find one.

28	**. . .**	**♔f8!**
29	**h5**	**♗e4!**
30	**♕g4**	**♘f6**

And Black repels the attack (pointed out by Chernin). This means that 23 . . . ♘d7! was the move to play.

E. 2.5 Kupreichik–Yusupov
USSR Ch., Premier League, Vilnius 1980/81

Tempting is 14 . . . h6, but how, after 15 ♗d4, can Black defend against the bishop sacrifice on g7? If, for example, 15 . . . ♘e6 then 16 ♗xg7! ♘xg7 17 ♕xh6 f5! (the only move) 18 ♖d3!? with the threat 19 ♖g3. This is the sort of sharp situation which Kupreichik—a brilliant attacking player—could only have dreamt about.

14	**. . .**	**♖xe3!**
15	**fxe3**	**♕e7**

Black has full compensation for the loss of the exchange—a pawn, a better pawn structure, and strong squares for his knight on the e-file. Objectively the game is roughly equal, but psychologically Black is in a better position—the attack has been stopped and Kupreichik now has to switch to the sort of 'boring' positional struggle he dislikes.

16	**♗c4!**	**h6!**

Capturing the pawn on e3 would give the white rooks active possibilities on the open e-file.

17	**♖he1**	**♗e6**
18	**♔b1**	**♖e8**
19	**♕d4**	**a6**
20	**♗d5**	**c5!?**
21	**♕d3**	**♗xd5**
22	**♕xd5**	**♘e4**

23	**♖f1**	**♕c7!**
24	**♖f5**	**g6**
25	**♖f4**	**♖e5**
26	**♕d3**	**♕e7**
27	**a4?**	

White should have forced a draw with 27 ♖df1 ♘g5 28 ♖d1.

27	**...**	**♕e6**
28	**♔b1**	

28 c4!?.

28	**...**	**h5**
29	**c4**	**g5!**
30	**♖f3**	**h4**
31	**♕b3**	**♕d7**
32	**♕b6**	**♔g7**
33	**♖d3**	**♖e7**
34	**♖f1!**	**f6**
35	**♖fd1**	**♕g4!?**
36	**♖xd6!**	**♘xd6**
37	**♕xd6**	**♖f7**
38	**♖d2?**	

In a time scramble White makes a decisive mistake. Necessary was 38 ♕d5!.

38	**...**	**♕xc4**
39	**b3**	**♕c3**
40	**♖d3**	**♕e5**
41	**♕d8**	**♕c7**
42	**♕d5**	**♕c6**
43	**♔c1**	**♕xd5**
44	**♖xd5**	**g4**
45	**♔d1**	

45 ♖xc5 h3 46 gxh3 g3, and the pawn cannot be stopped.

45	**...**	**♔g6**
46	**♔e2**	**♖h7**
47	**♔f2**	**♖h5!**
48	**e4**	**♖e5**
49	**♔e3**	**h3**
50	**gxh3**	**gxh3**
51	**♔f2**	**♖g5!**
52	**♖d3**	**h2**
53	**♖d1**	**♖g1**

White resigned.

E. 2.6 Dolmatov–Yusupov

1st match game, Candidates, Wijk aan Zee 1991

"It's like a slow death!" White threatens to transfer his rook from e2 to a5, obtaining a big advantage. Black's best chance is to sacrifice the exchange.

30	**...**	**♖xe4!**
31	**fxe4**	**♗xc3**
32	**♖xb5**	**♗xb4**
33	**♔f1**	

Intending 34 ♖c2 and 35 ♔e2.

33	**...**	**♗d6!**

A timely transfer of the bishop to a more active position.

34	**g4**	**♗e5**
35	**♖c2**	**c3**

The strong pawn on c3, the good positions of the black pieces and, finally, the limited amount of material remaining on the board give Yusupov every reason to reckon on a draw.

36	**♔e2**	**♗f6**
37	**h4**	**♔g6**
38	**g5**	**hxg5**
39	**hxg5**	**♗e5**
40	**♖b6**	

40 ♖a2 ♗f4 is slightly better for White.

40	**...**	**♔f7**
41	**♖a2**	**♘f4+**
42	**♔f3**	**♖d3**
43	**♖c6**	**♗d4**

44	**♔xf4**	**♗xe3+**
45	**♔g4**	**♖d1**
46	**♖c7+**	

46 g6+!? ♔xg6 47 ♖xe6+ ♔f7 48 ♖c6.

46	**. . .**	**♔g6**
47	**♖a6**	**♖g1+**
48	**♔f3**	**♗d4!**
49	**♖d6**	**♖f1+**
50	**♔e2**	**♖f2+**
51	**♔d3**	**♖d2+**
52	**♔c4**	**c2**

52 . . . ♔h5!?.

53	**♔b3**	**♔xg5**
54	**♖xc2**	

54 ♖xe6 ♔f4 55 ♖xc2 ♖xc2 56 ♔xc2 ♔e3 with a draw.

54	**. . .**	**♖xc2**
55	**♔xc2**	**e5**
56	**♔d3**	**♔h5**
57	**♔e2**	**g5**
58	**♖f6**	**g4**
59	**♔f1**	**♔h4**
60	**♔g2**	**♗e3**
61	**♖f5**	**♗f4**

$\frac{1}{2}-\frac{1}{2}$

E. 2.7 Yusupov–Dolmatov

6th match game, Candidates, Wijk aan Zee 1991

White wishes to play 31 e7, 32 ♖e6 and then either ♕g3 or h3 and g4, developing a terrible attack on the king.

30	**. . .**	**♖ee7!!**

The only defence. Many years ago Petrosian sacrificed the exchange in similar fashion—in order to blockade the e-pawn—in a famous game against Reshevsky (Candidates Tournament, Zürich 1953). Incidentally, the positional exchange sacrifice was a 'trademark' of the ninth World Champion.

31	**♗xe7**	**♖xe7**

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W



Rooks love open files, but here there aren't any. Therefore Black's bishop is only slightly less strong than White's rook. Black has considerable chances of a draw.

32	**♕b3**	**♕e8**
33	**a4!**	

Otherwise Black would play . . . a5–a4.

33	**. . .**	**♕f8**
34	**g3**	**♕f6**
35	**♖f3**	**♔f8**
36	**♔g2**	**♖h7**
37	**h3**	**♔e7**

The only winning plan involves playing g3–g4, but it is very difficult to achieve this.

38	**♖d1**	**♖g7**
39	**♕c2**	**♖g8**
40	**♖fd3**	**♗b2**
41	**♕e2**	**g5!**

It turns out that Black is quite entitled to develop activity on the kingside himself.

42	**♔h2**	**gxf4**
43	**gxf4**	**♕h4**
44	**♖f1?!**	

More accurate is 44 ♖f3, not allowing 44 . . . ♗d4? in view of 45 ♖xd4! cxd4 46 c5.

44	**. . .**	**♗d4**
45	**♕e1**	**♕xe1**
46	**♖xe1**	**h4**
47	**♖e2**	**♗c3**
48	**♖g2**	**♖b8!**

Now, going forward with the rook would be too risky—Black has prepared very strong counterplay on the queenside.

49	**♖g1**	**♗d4**
50	**♖b1**	**♖g8**
51	**♖db3**	**♗f2**

The transfer of the bishop to g3 allows Black to build an impenetrable fortress.

52	**♖f1**	**♗g3+**
53	**♔h1**	**♖g7**
54	**♖b2**	**♖g8**
55	**♖b3**	**♖g7**
56	**♖b2**	**♖g8**
57	**♖bb1**	**♖g7**
58	**♖f3**	**♖g8**
59	**♖bf1**	**♖g7**
60	**♖e3**	**♖g8**

$\frac{1}{2}-\frac{1}{2}$

E. 2.8 Tarrasch–Marco

Dresden 1892

This was the first game in which the move 7 . . . 0-0? was refuted.

8	**♗xc6**	**♗xc6**
9	**dxe5**	**dxe5**
10	**♕xd8**	**♖axd8**

If 10 . . . ♖fxd8 then 11 ♘xe5 ♗xe4 12 ♘xe4 ♘xe4 13 ♘d3 f5 14 f3 ♗c5+ 15 ♔f1!.

11	**♘xe5**	**♗xe4**
12	**♘xe4**	**♘xe4**
13	**♘d3**	**f5**
14	**f3**	**♗c5+**
15	**♘xc5!**	

Now though, 15 ♔f1 achieves nothing, in view of 15 . . . ♗b6 16 fxe4 fxe4+ 17 ♘f4 g5 18 ♖xe4 gxf4 19 ♔e2 (19 ♗xf4 ♖d2; 19 ♖xf4 ♖d1+ 20 ♔e2 ♖xf4) 19 . . . ♖fe8 20 ♖xe8+ ♖xe8+.

15	**. . .**	**♘xc5**
16	**♗g5**	**♖d5**
17	**♗e7!**	

Not at once 17 c4 ♖d7 18 ♗e7 ♘d3. Here, Black resigned, in view of 17 . . . ♖e8(f7) 18 c4.

E. 2.9 Estrin–Gusev

Moscow 1959

If Black retreats the knight to g5, then after ♘xc6 or ♕d2 (followed by ♖ae1) White will apparently have the better chances. Usually a move such as 1 . . . ♘g5 is played only having first convinced oneself that all other, more active, tries can be refuted by force. Let's see!

Mistaken is 1 . . . ♘c5?, in view of 2 ♘g4! ♗xg4 3 dxc5 ♗xc5+ 4 ♔h1, and Black loses a piece.

Clearly incorrect is 1 . . . c5?, at least because of 2 fxe4 cxd4 3 ♘f3 dxe4 4 ♗xd4 (or first 4 ♗c4+).

Much more interesting is 1 . . . ♖xe5?!. In the event of 2 fxe5? ♖xe4 3 ♗xe4 dxe4 Black gets excellent compensation for the sacrifice of the exchange. The most testing variation occurred in the game: 2 dxe5! ♗c5+ 3 ♔h1 ♘g3+ 4 hxg3 ♕h6 5 ♕xf4 g5.

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W

As White can play neither 6 ♕f6?? ♗g6 mate, nor 6 ♕f5?? ♗g4 mate, it may seem that he is forced to continue 6 ♕d4, with an extremely unclear position. Such a turn of events would have suited Black entirely, but his combination was refuted by the unexpected counter-punch 6 ♗xh7+!!. There followed: 6 . . . ♔xh7 (6 . . . ♕xh7 7 ♕xg5+ ♗g6+ 8 ♕h4) 7 ♕f5+ ♗g6+ 8 ♕h3 ♖h8 9 e6 d4 10 ♖fd1 ♔g8 11 ♖xd4! ♕f8 12 ♕xh8+ ♔xh8 13 ♖h4+ Black resigned.

We still have one other possibility to consider, the one which in my opinion is in fact the strongest:

1 . . . ♘g3!!

Of course, this piece sacrifice involves some risk, since it is very difficult to calculate its consequences accurately. But the opponent who accepts it is taking no less a risk, since Black's attack is extremely dangerous.

2 hxg3?! fxg3

3 ♕e3 ♕h4

Weaker is 3 . . . c5? 4 ♖fe1!.

4 ♖fe1

In the event of 4 ♖fd1 the reply 4 . . . c5! gains in force.

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4 . . . ♖f8!

The vulnerable spot in White's defence is the f3-square. If he consolidates it with 5 ♗e2, Black may quietly strengthen his position with 5 . . . ♖f4. And on 5 ♔f1 decisive is 5 . . . ♗xe5 6 dxe5 ♗xf3! 7 gxf3 ♕h2!

Evidently White should not take the piece. Also dubious is 2 ♖e1?!, in view of 2 . . . ♖xe5! 3 ♖xe5 ♕xe5! 4 hxg3 (4 dxe5? ♗c5+) 4 . . . ♕g5 with a promising position for Black. And after 2 ♖f2!? Black may choose between

2 . . . ♕h4 and 2 . . . ♘f5 3 ♕xf4 ♘xd4 4 ♕xf6 gxf6 5 ♘d7 ♗e5, with an unclear position. At any rate, Black's chances here are no worse than after 1 . . . ♘g5.

E. 2.10 Kholmov–Petrienko

Penza 1980

If in reply to **18 . . . b4** White were forced to play 19 ♘b1, Black would seize the initiative with 19 . . . ♗b5 20 ♘d4 e5. This means that the assessment of this move depends mainly on the correctness of a piece sacrifice which White may now undertake.

19 ♗xf7!

Weaker was 19 ♘d5 exd5 20 ♗xf7. Two pieces are too high a price, as Black will surely find a defence. Besides the obvious 20 . . . ♔xf7 21 ♕h5+ ♔xf6 22 ♕xh6+ ♔f7, when White has at best perpetual check, also worthy of consideration is 20 . . . ♗g4!? 21 ♕xg4 ♘e3 (dangerous is 21 . . . ♕xf7 22 ♕h4) 22 ♕e2 ♘xf1 23 ♗xd5 ♗xf4+ 24 ♔b1 ♘e3 25 ♗xa8 ♘xd1 26 ♕xd1 ♕d8!? 27 ♗d5 (or 27 ♕g4) 27 . . . ♕xf6.

19 . . . ♘e5!

Capturing the bishop or the knight allows White to develop a terrible attack. For example: 19 . . . bxc3 20 ♕h5 cxb2+ 21 ♔b1 ♘a3+ 22 ♔xb2 ♕xc2+ 23 ♔xa3, and the white king hides from the checks, whereas the black king has no escape.

But what should White do now? Bad are both 20 ♕h5 ♘xf7, and 20 ♗h5 bxc3. All he can do is plough ahead.

20 ♘d5!

After 20 . . . exd5 21 ♗xd5 ♖c8 22 ♘d4 or 22 ♖d2 the position of the black king is not to be envied. But this fascinating duel continues.

20 . . . ♕d8!

If now 21 ♗h5 then 21 . . . exd5, with the threat 22 . . . ♗b5. This is where Kholmov's analysis ends. In his opinion the attack has been successfully repelled and Black has the advantage. But let us continue this variation:

21 ♘e7! ♔xf7

22 ♕h5

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

I should prefer to play this position as White. White has two pawns for his sacrificed piece, and his opponent's forces are disconnected. Having first retreated his king to b1, White may then increase the pressure by playing ♖g1 or e4–e5.

If you agree with this assessment, we may draw the conclusion that the move 18 . . . b4?! is too risky.

More solid and stronger is **18 . . . ♗e8!** which was the move played in the game. There followed: 19 ♘d2 ♘a3! 20 bxa3 (20 ♕d3? b4 21 bxa3 bxc3 22 ♘c4 ♗b5!) 20 . . . ♕xc3 21 ♕d3 ♕a1+ 22 ♘b1 ♕xf6! (weaker 22 . . . ♖d8 because of 23 ♕c3) 23 ♕xd6+ ♕e7 24 e5 ♖g8 with chances for both sides.

E. 2.11 Brinckmann–Kmoch

Kecskemét 1927

The breakthrough **20 . . . g5!?** brought Black not only victory but also the brilliancy prize. Let us first analyse what happened in the game.

21 d5 cxd5!

But not 21 . . . exd5? 22 fxg5, with the threat 23 ♖xf4+.

22 ♗xh8 ♖xh8

23 hxg5

23 fxg5 ♗xg3.

23 . . . h4

24 ♖fc1

In the event of 24 ♔g2, there would have followed 24 . . . ♕xc5 25 ♖fe1 (25 ♖fc1 ♘xe3+; 25 ♖ae1 ♗b6) 25 . . . hxg3 26 ♘f1 (26 ♔xg3 ♖h2) 26 . . . ♗b6 27 ♖ac1 ♕d6! (not 27 . . . ♕e7 28 ♔xg3 ♔g6 29 ♖c6 ♖h1 30 ♔g2 ♕h7? 31 ♖xe6+) 28 ♔xg3 (the threat was 28 . . . ♘xe3+) 28 . . . e5! 29 ♕b5 ♗xe3 30 ♕b7+ ♔g6 31 ♖c6? exf4+ 32 ♔g2 f3 mate (analysis by Kmoch).

24 . . . hxg3

25 ♘f1 d4!

26 ♕b2

On 26 ♖ab1, Kmoch points out the following variation: 26 . . . ♘xe3 27 ♘xe3 ♗xf4! 28 ♘c4 (28 ♘xf5 exf5 29 ♕c4+ ♔g6 30 ♕xd4 ♖h1+!) 28 . . . ♗xc1 29 ♖xc1 (29 ♖b7 ♕xb7 30 ♘xd6 ♔g6 31 ♘xb7 ♗e3+; 29 ♘d6+ ♕xd6!) 29 . . . ♕xg5 and Black wins.

26 . . . ♔g6

27 ♖ab1

27 ♕xd4 ♕h7; 27 ♘xg3 ♖h3.

27 . . . g2!

28 ♕xg2

28 ♔xg2 ♕h7.

28 . . . ♘xe3!

29 ♘xe3 dxe3

30 ♖b7

30 ♕g3 e5!.

30 . . . ♖h4!

31 ♔f1 ♖xf4+

32 ♔e1 ♗a5+

White resigned.

I think White's first move was not the best. He won the exchange but in return strengthened his opponent's position in the centre, which is known to be an important condition for the success of a flank attack.

Unsuccessful also is 21 fxg5?! ♗xg3 22 ♘xe4 ♗xh4 23 ♘d6+ ♔g8 24 e4 ♕xg5 with a very strong attack (Kmoch). On 25 ♗d2, there follows simply 25 . . .

♘e3+ 26 ♔h1 ♘xf1 27 ♖xf1 ♕g4. Instead of 24 e4? more stubborn is 24 ♖f3! ♕xg5 25 ♔h1, and if 25 ... ♖h6 then 26 ♗d2! ♖f8 27 ♖af1 with the threat 28 e4. Black nevertheless maintains an advantage by playing 25 ... ♖h7!? 26 ♖af1 ♖g7 27 d5 ♗g3! 28 ♖xg3 ♕h4+ 29 ♔g2 f4!!

In Yusupov's opinion White was obliged to play **21 hxg5!** h4, and now not 22 ♔g2? hxg3 23 ♔xg3 ♕xg5, but 22 ♘xe4! hxg3 23 ♘xg3.

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B

How are we to assess this position? Of course, Black still has a dangerous attack along the h-file, but White, who now has two extra pawns, also has counter-threats in the centre: d4–d5 and, particularly, e3–e4. Yusupov and I studied Black's various possibilities for rather a long time, but in each case the game did not turn out in his favour. For example: 23 ... ♖h3 (23 ... ♖h2 24 ♕f3) 24 ♕g2 ♖ah8, and now not 25 d5? exd5! 26 ♘xf5 (26 ♗xh8 ♕xe3+) 26 ... ♖h1+ 27 ♕xh1 ♖xh1+ 28 ♔xh1 ♕e4+, but simply 25 ♖ae1! with the strong threat 26 e4.

Even if the conclusion we have drawn is correct and White could actually have beaten off the attack, it would all the same be unjust to consider Kmoch's idea to have been incorrect. In nearly all variations his attack was successful; under the conditions of practical play, finding the correct line for White and assessing its consequences was almost impossible. As Tarrasch rightly noted: "It is a characteristic of such 'wild' attacks, involving sacrifices, that they can nearly always be refuted only after the game is over".

Of course, it was also possible to play more quietly with, for example, 20 ... ♖hb8. In this case Black would not have risked losing, but most probably would not have been able to win either. The choice here is a matter of taste. The bold decision taken by Black in the game was closer to my own heart.

Index to Questions and Exercises

Do you wish to be able to find your bearings confidently in any situation which may arise on the board, to develop the skills necessary for making the correct decisions? Training the particular aspects of practical play that most interest you is a reliable way to make progress. The thematic index below will help you to choose the appropriate exercises and is arranged according to thinking-skills and the types of problem to be solved.

Many exercises may be utilised for various purposes and so have been listed more than once in different sections of the index.

Imagination, combinational vision: **Q:** 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.8, 1.9, 1.10, 1.11, 1.28, 1.32, 1.33, 1.35, 1.38, 1.39, 1.54, 1.58, 1.62, 1.63, 2.3, 2.19, 2.21, 2.25, 2.28, 2.31, 2.51, 2.53. **E:** 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.18, 1.19, 1.20, 1.21, 1.22, 1.30.

Taking the opponent's resources into account: **Q:** 1.5, 1.17, 1.20, 1.21, 1.22, 1.24, 1.27, 1.33, 1.34, 1.53, 1.55, 1.56, 1.58, 1.67, 2.1, 2.23, 2.24, 2.29, 2.37, 2.42, 2.43. **E:** 1.10, 1.11, 1.12, 1.13, 1.15, 1.17, 1.18, 1.23, 1.27, 1.31, 1.37, 1.41, 1.42, 1.44, 2.1, 2.9.

Traps: **Q:** 1.45, 1.46, 1.47, 2.36. **E:** 1.29, 2.4.

Candidate moves: **Q:** 1.14, 1.15, 1.16, 1.21, 1.23, 1.40, 1.48, 1.50, 1.52, 1.56, 1.57, 1.58, 1.59, 1.61, 1.62, 1.64, 1.66, 1.68, 1.69, 1.70, 2.8, 2.10, 2.15, 2.16, 2.17, 2.18, 2.19, 2.24, 2.26, 2.28, 2.30, 2.44, 2.46, 2.52, **E:** 1.1, 1.9, 1.31, 1.36, 1.42, 1.43, 2.3.

The method of exclusion: **Q:** 1.23, 1.24, 1.26, 1.65, 2.31, 2.42, **E:** 1.9, 1.11, 1.12, 1.14, 1.15, 1.16, 1.17, 1.37, 1.41, 1.44.

Comparison: **Q:** 1.18, 1.44, 1.69. **E:** 1.16.

Intermediate moves: **Q:** 1.5, 1.7, 1.12, 1.44, 1.45, 1.51, 2.15, 2.49. **E:** 1.22, 1.24, 1.25, 1.26, 1.27, 1.28, 2.10.

Deep or multi-variation calculation: **Q:** 1.18, 1.19, 1.24, 1.29, 1.37, 1.42, 1.46, 1.49, 1.50, 1.51, 1.53, 1.54, 1.56, 1.65, 2.18, 2.20, 2.24, 2.27, 2.35, 2.38. **E:** 1.29, 1.32, 1.39, 1.40, 1.45, 2.1, 2.4, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, 2.11.

Positional sacrifices: **Q:** 1.6, 1.43, 1.51, 2.1, 2.6, 2.10, 2.12, 2.19, 2.34, 2.46, 2.50. **E:** 1.10, 1.44, 2.1, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.9.
Attacking the king: **Q:** 1.17, 1.56, 1.58, 1.59, 1.60, 1.62, 1.63, 1.71, 2.4, 2.6, 2.9, 2.20, 2.22, 2.25, 2.28, 2.34. **E:** 1.5, 1.35, 1.38, 1.40, 2.9, 2.10, 2.11.
Defence: **Q:** 1.6, 1.18, 1.19, 1.35, 1.61, 2.11, 2.13, 2.23, 2.24, 2.32. 2.36, 2.37, 2.41, 2.45, 2.46, 2.49, 2.50, 2.51. **E:** 1.1, 1.9, 1.36, 1.42, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.10, 2.11.
Exchanges: **Q:** 1.25, 1.28, 1.29, 2.32. **E:** 1.19, 1.24, 1.25, 1.26, 2.2.
Placement of pieces, manoeuvres, regrouping: **Q:** 1.17, 2.5, 2.14.
Play with pawns, pawn structure: **Q:** 1.30, 1.36, 1.37, 1.39, 1.54, 2.2, 2.12, 2.29, 2.40. **E:** 1.14, 1.22.
Prophylaxis: **Q:** 1.35, 1.56, 2.5, 2.12, 2.13, 2.23, 2.48.
Strategic thinking, planning: **Q:** 1.30, 2.5, 2.7, 2.17, 2.18, 2.33, 2.48.
Intuition, positional feeling: **Q:** 1.18, 1.65, 2.10, 2.22, 2.33, 2.40, 2.41. **E:** 2.11.
Various: **Q:** 1.13, 1.31, 1.41, 2.39, 2.47. **E:** 1.23, 1.33, 1.34.

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